Chapter 19. "Inequality, Identity, and the Long-Run Evolution of Political Cleavages in Israel 1949-2019" Yonatan Berman Appendix: Figures, tables and raw results

Main figures and tables Figure 1 Legislative election results in Israel, 1949-2019 Figure 2 Class cleavages in Israel, 1969-2019 Figure 3 Vote for right and left in Tel Aviv, Israel, 1949-2019 Figure 4 Residual identity component in Tel Aviv, Israel, 1981-2015 Figure 5 Vote for right-wing and left-wing parties among unemployed and inactive voters in Israel, 2003-2015 Figure 6 The educational cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019 Figure 7 Vote for right-wing parties among Sepharadic voters in Israel, 1969-2019 Figure 8 The religious cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019 Figure 9 The gender cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019 Appendix figures and tables Figure A1 General election results in Israel by bloc, 1949-2019 Figure A2 Income inequality in Israel, 1979-2015 Figure A3 Vote for left by social class (excluding center and Arab parties), 1969-2019 Figure A4 Vote for the Republican and Democratic candidates in New York City, 1948-2016 Figure A5 The effect of the 2003 reforms on left and right vote Figure A6 Share of voters by ethnicity and religiosity, 1969-2019 Table A1 Division of parties to blocks Table A2 The effect of the 2003 reforms on right vote Figure 18.1 - Legislative election results in Israel, 1949-2019 100% Right (Likud, Israel Beitenu, etc.) Left (Labor, Meretz, etc.) 90% Center (Kahol Lavan, etc.) Arab parties (Joint Arab List, etc.) 80% Ultra-orthodox (Shas, Yahadut HaTora, etc.) 70%

60%

50%

40%

Share of votes (%) votes of Share 30%

20%

10%

0% 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019

Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world). Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by different political blocs in Israel. The definition of each party by bloc and a historical breakdown of blocs by party are given in appendix Table A1 (see wpid.world). Figure 18.2 - Class cleavages in Israel, 1969-2019 45% 40% Diff. between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 50%) voters in terms of social class voting left 35% Diff. between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) voters in terms of social class voting left 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% -5% -10% -15% -20% -25% 1969-1977 1981-1988 1992-1999 2003-2009 2013-2019

Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world). Note: the figure shows how the vote for left-wing parties depends on self-reported social class, after controlling for age, gender, education, and household size. Until the late 1980s, lower classes were as likely to vote left (including center and Arab parties) as the general public. They became much less likely to do so during the last three decades. The opposite occured, to a lower extent, among the top 10% upper classes. Figure 18.3 - Vote for right and left in Tel Aviv, Israel, 1949-2019 25% Vote for right-wing and ultra-orthodox parties 20% Vote for left-wing, centrist, and Arab parties 15%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10%

-15%

-20%

-25% 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019

Source: author's computations using historical election results (multiple sources) (see wpid.world). Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of votes received by right-wing parties (including ultra-orthodox parties) in Tel Aviv and the share of votes received by right-wing parties in Israel as a whole, as well as the same difference for left-wing parties (including center and Arab parties). Tel Aviv used to be more right-leaning and less left-leaning than the general public in the first election. It gradually became more left-leaning. Figure 18.4 - Residual identity component in Tel Aviv, Israel, 1981-2015 30%

Difference between (% of left-wing voters in Tel Aviv) and (% of left-wing voters in Israel) 25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

-5% 1981-1988 1992-1999 2003-2009 2013-2019 Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world). Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of votes received by left-wing parties in Tel Aviv and the share of votes received by left-wing parties in the rest of Israel, after controling for self-reported social class, ethnicity, religiosity, gender, education, household size, and age. It illustrates a stable residual left-leaning identity component in Tel Aviv. Figure 18.5 - Vote for right-wing and left-wing parties among unemployed and inactive voters in Israel, 2003-2015 25% Difference between (% of unemployed/inactive) and (% of employed) voters voting left 20% Difference between (% of unemployed/inactive) and (% of employed) voters voting right 15%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10%

-15% 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015

Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world). Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of unemployed/inactive voters voting for left/right-wing parties and the share of employed voters voting for left/right-wing parties. There is a mild trend of increasing support for right-wing parties among unemployed and inactive voters in recent years. Figure 18.6 - The educational cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019 30%

Difference between (% of top 10% educated) and (% of bottom 90% educated) voting left 25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

-5% 1969-1977 1981-1988 1992-1999 2003-2009 2013-2019

Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world). Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for left-wing parties, after controlling for age, social class, religiosity, ethnic origin, household size, and gender. In 2013-2019, higher-educated voters were more likely to vote for left-wing parties by 14 percentage points. Figure 18.7 - Vote for right-wing parties among Sepharadic voters in Israel, 1969-2019 40% Difference between (% of Sepharadic voters) and (% of non-Sepharadic voters) voting right 35%

30% After controlling for age, gender, social class, education, religiosity

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

-5%

-10% 1969-1977 1981-1988 1992-1999 2003-2009 2013-2019

Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world). Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Sepharadic (or Mizrachi) voters and the share of non-Sepharadic voters voting for right-wing parties, before and after controls. In 2013-2019, Sepharadic voters were more likely to vote for right-wing parties by 22 percentage points. Figure 18.8 - The religious cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019 80% Difference between (% of religious voters) and (% of non-religious voters) voting right 70% After controlling for age, gender, education, social class, ethnicity 60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

-10% 1969-1977 1981-1988 1992-1999 2003-2009 2013-2019

Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world). Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of religious voters and the share of non-religious voters voting for right-wing parties. In 2013-2019, religious voters were more likely to vote for right-wing parties by 36 percentage points. Figure 18.9 - The gender cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019 10% Difference between (% of women) and (% of men) voting left 8% After controlling for age, education, social class, religiosity, ethnicity

6%

4%

2%

0%

-2%

-4% 1969-1977 1981-1988 1992-1999 2003-2009 2013-2019

Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world). Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing parties. Women have consistently been more left-leaning than men, but only to a rather small degree, and only when controlling for other effects. Figure A1 - General election results in Israel by bloc, 1949-2019 100% Right + Ultra-orthodox 90% Left + Center + Arab 80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

Part des voix (%) voix des Part 30%

20%

10%

0% 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019

Source : author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world). Note : the figure shows the share of votes received by different political blocs. The definition of each party by block, and a historical breakdown of left and right blocks by party are given in Table A1. Figure A2 - Income inequality in Israel, 1979-2015 60% Market income 55% Net income

50%

45%

40% Coefficient de de Gini Coefficient 35%

30%

25% 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Source : Dahan (2017) (see wpid.world). Note : the figure shows the evolution of income inequality in Israel quantified using the Gini coefficient. It is estimated for market income, i.e. without including taxes and transfers, and for net income Figure A3 - Vote for left by social class (excluding center and Arab parties), 1969-2019 40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

-10%

Difference between (% left vote among bottom 50% -20% social class voters) and (% left vote in general public)

-30% Difference between (% left vote among top 10% social -40% class voters) and (% left vote among bottom 50% social class voters) -50% 1969-1977 1981-1988 1992-1999 2003-2009 2013-2019 Source : author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world). Note : the figure shows how left vote depends on self-reported social class, controlling for age, gender, education and household size. Here center parties and Arab parties were excluded from the definition of left. Compare with Figure 2 Figure A4 - Vote for the Republican and Democratic candidates in New York City, 1948-2016 40%

Vote for democratic candidate Vote for Republican candidate 30%

20%

10%

0%

-10%

-20%

-30%

-40% 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 Source : author's computations using the Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (see wpid.world). Note : the figure shows the difference (in percentage points) between the share of votes to the Republican and Democratic candidates in New York City and the general public in the United States (compare with Figure 4). Figure A5 - The effect of the 2003 reforms on left and right vote

100% 50% Right block for Left block 90% 40% 80% Left block for Right block 30% 20% 70% 10% 60% 0% Basse Moyenne Haute 50% Classe sociale

40%

30%

20%

Probabilité de changer de vote (%) vote de changer de Probabilité 10%

0% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nombre d'individus dans le ménage Source : author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world). Note the figure shows the probability for right bloc voters in the 2003 election to change their vote to the left block (blue) or to left (red) in the 2006 election by household size. The inlet shows the probability to change from right to left (black) and from left to right (grey) between 2003 and 2006 by self-reported social class. Figure A6 - Share of voters by ethnicity and religiosity, 1969-2019

100% Share of religious subject in survey 90% Share of Sepharadic subjects in 80% survey Share of Ashkenazi subjects in survey 70% Share of Arab subjects in survey 60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 2017 Source : author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world). Note : this figure shows the share of religious voters in the INES election surveys, as well as voters of different ethnic origin. See endnotes for the definitions of religious subjects and subjects of different ethnic origin. All shares are computed from the number of subjects intending to vote in the upcoming election. Table A1 - Division of parties to blocks Ultra-orthodox Ultra-orthodox Election year Right (actual) Right (survey) Left (actual) Left (survey) Center (actual) Center (survey) Arab (actual) Arab (survey) (actual) (survey) Wizo; Progressive Party; Herut; General Zionists; Yemenite Association; 1949 Fighters' list; United Religious Mapai; Mapam; Maki Democratic List of Nazareth Sepharadim and Oriental Front Communities Progressive Party; Progress and Work; Herut; General Zionists; Yemenite Association; Poalei Agudat Israel; Agudat 1951 Mapai; Mapam; Maki Agriculture and Development; Hapoel HaMizrachi; Mizrachi Sepharadim and Oriental Israel Democratic List for Israeli Arabs Communities Progress and Work; Herut; General Zionists; Mapai; Mapam; Maki; 1955 Progressive Party Agriculture and Development; Religious Torah Front National Religious Front Ahdut HaAvoda Democratic List for Israeli Arabs Progress and Work; Mapai; Mapam; Maki; Agriculture and Development; 1959 Herut; General Zionists; Mafdal Progressive Party Religious Torah Front Ahdut HaAvoda Democratic List for Israeli Arabs; Cooperation and Brotherhood Mapai; Mapam; Maki; Cooperation and Brotherhood; Poalei Agudat Israel; Agudat 1961 Herut; Liberal Party; Mafdal - Ahdut HaAvoda Progress and Development Israel Alignment (Labor); Rakah; Gahal; Mafdal; Independent Cooperation and Brotherhood; Poalei Agudat Israel; Agudat 1965 Maki; HaOlam Haze; Mapam; - Liberals Progress and Development Israel Rafi Alignment (Labor); National List; Alignment (Labor); National List; Cooperation and Brotherhood; Cooperation and Brotherhood; Poalei Agudat Israel; Agudat Poalei Agudat Israel; Agudat 1969 Gahal; Mafdal; Free Center Gahal; Mafdal; Free Center Independent Liberals Independent Liberals Rakah; Maki; HaOlam Haze Rakah; Maki; Haolam Haze Progress and Development Progress and Development Israel Israel Progress and Development; Progress and Development; Likud; Mafdal; Free Center; Alignment (Labor); Moked; Alignment (Labor); Rakah; Poalei Agudat Israel; Agudat 1973 Likud; Mafdal Independent Liberals Independent Liberals Arab List for Bedouin and Arab List for Bedouin and Religious Torah Front Reshima Ezrachit Rakah; Ratz Maki; Haolam Haze Israel Villagers Villagers Alignment (Labor); Hadash; Sheli; Alignment (Labor); Rakah; Ratz; Independent Liberals; Dash; Poalei Agudat Israel; Agudat 1977 Likud; Mafdal; Shlomzion Likud; Mafdal; Shlomzion Independent Liberals; Dash United Arab List - Religious Torah Front Ratz Meri; Women’s party; Moked Peace and Development Israel Alignment (Labor); Rakah; Poalei Agudat Israel; Agudat 1981 Likud; Mafdal; Tami; Hatehia Likud; Mafdal; Hatehia Alignment (Labor); Hadash; Ratz Telem; Shinui Telem; Shinui - - Agudat Israel Sheli; Ratz Israel Likud; Mafdal; Morasha; Tami; Likud; Mafdal; Morasha; Alignment (Labor); Hadash; Ratz; Alignment (Labor); Hadash; Ratz; 1984 Shinui; Yahad; Ometz Shinui; Yahad; Ometz - - Agudat Israel; Shas Agudat Israel; Shas Kach; Hatehia Tami; Hatehia; Flatto-Sharon Progressive list for peace Sheli; Yahad; Lova Eliav

Labor; Mapam; Ratz; Likud; Mafdal; Tzomet; Likud; Mafdal; Tzomet; Labor; Mapam; Ratz; 1988 Progressive list for peace; Shinui Shinui; Meimad Mada - Agudat Israel; Shas; Degel Hatora Agudat Israel; Shas; Pagi Moledet; Hatehia Moledet; Hatehia; Kach Progressive list for peace Hadash Likud; Mafdal; Tzomet; Shinui; Meimad; 1992 Likud; Mafdal; Tzomet; Moledet Moledet; Hatehia; Labor; Meretz Labor; Meretz - Hadash Progressive list for peace Yehadut Hatora; Shas Yehadut Hatora; Shas Russian immigrant party Modai (new liberal party) Likud-Gesher-Tzomet; Mafdal; Likud-Gesher-Tzomet; Hadash-Balad; Mada- Hadash-Balad; Mada- 1996 Labor; Meretz Labor; Meretz Third way party Third way party Yehadut Hatora; Shas Yehadut Hatora; Shas Moledet; Israel Bealia Mafdal; Moledet; Israel Bealia Raam Raam Likud; Israel Beitenu; Center party; Shinui; Third way Likud; Israel Beitenu; Mafdal; Mafdal; Moledet; Israeli Ahat (Labor); Meretz; One Israeli Ahat (Labor); Meretz; party; 1999 Moledet; National Union; Israel Center party; Shinui Hadash; Balad; Raam Hadash; Balad; Raam; Mada Yehadut Hatora; Shas Yehadut Hatora; Shas National Union; Israel Bealia; nation One nation; Women’s party Green party; Green leaf; Bealia Tzomet Pnina Rosenblum Shinui; Israel Acheret; Green Likud; Mafdal; National Union; Labor; Bronfman; One nation; Hadash; Balad; Raam; Mada; Yehadut Hatora; Shas; Ahavat 2003 Likud; Mafdal; National Union Labor; One nation; Meretz Shinui; Israel Bealia party; Hadash; Balad; Raam Yehadut Hatora; Shas Tzomet; Israel Beitenu; Herut Meretz; Women’s party Ahmad Tibi Israel Green leaf; Israel Bealia Kadima; Hetz; Shinui; Green Likud; National Union - Mafdal; Likud; Israel Beitenu; party; Hadash; Balad; Raam- Hadash; Balad; Raam- 2006 Tzomet; Israel Beitenu; Herut; Labor; Meretz Labor; Meretz; Lehem Kadima; Pensioners Yehadut Hatora; Shas Yehadut Hatora; Shas National Union - Mafdal Green leaf; Tafnit; War on banks; Taal Taal Hazit Leumit Yehudit Pensioners Likud; Jewish home; Israel Kadima; Green movement - Likud; Jewish home; Hadash; Balad; Raam- Hadash; Balad; Raam- 2009 Beitenu; Labor; Meretz Labor; Meretz Kadima Meimad; Yehadut Hatora; Shas Yehadut Hatora; Shas Israel Beitenu; National Union Taal Taal National Union Green party; Pensioners Likud; Jewish home; Israel Likud-Israel Beitenu; Jewish Labor; Meretz; Daam; Hadash; Balad; Raam- Hadash; Balad; Raam- 2013 Beitenu; Labor; Meretz Yesh Atid; Kadima; Hatnua Yesh Atid; Kadima; Hatnua Yehadut Hatora; Shas Yehadut Hatora; Shas home Eretz Hadasha; Koah Lehashpia Taal Taal National Union; Otzma L’Israel Likud; Jewish home; Israel Yahad; Likud; Jewish home; Kulanu; Yesh Atid; Green party; 2015 Zionist bloc (labor); Meretz Zionist bloc (labor); Meretz Kulanu; Yesh Atid Joint list Joint list Yehadut Hatora; Shas Yehadut Hatora; Shas; Bizchutan Beitenu Israel Beitenu Green leaf Likud; Israel Beitenu; Likud; Israel Beitenu; Right Right Parties Union; 2019 Labor; Meretz Labor; Meretz Kahol Lavan; Kulanu Kahol Lavan; Kulanu; Gesher Hadash-Taal; Balad-Raam Hadash-Taal; Balad-Raam Yehadut Hatora; Shas Yehadut Hatora; Shas Parties Union The New Right; Otzma Yehudit; Zehut Note: this tables details how political blocks are defined in each election. The definitions in the surveys slightly differ from the actual one block definitions - some surveys were conducted before the elections, so that "last-minute" changes in the structure of different blocs occured between the survey and election. Also, as the surveys were conducted from 1969 onward, the definitions before 1969 only refer to the actual election results. Table A2 - The effect of the 2003 reforms on right vote Household size effect Lower class effect Right to non-right Right to left Right to non-right Right to left Household size -0,044 -0,020 SE 0,067 0,032

Lower class dummy -0,178 -0,044 SE 0,097 0,046

Observations 294 294 294 294 Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world). Note: the table shows the results of a linear probability regression used to test whether changing vote from right to non-right or from right to left between 2003 and 2006 depended on the number of people in the household or on belonging to the lower social class. We control for religiosity, gender, ethnic origin, income and education. The table shows that the dependence of the probability of a right voter in 2003 to switch to non-right or left in 2006 cannot be explained by either household size or belonging to the lower class, after controlling for other socio-demographic variables. The only statistically significant result is that being of lower class reduced the probability of changing vote from right to non-right.