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Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 253 | 3.11.2017 www.osw.waw.pl Soft Belarusianisation. The ideology of Belarus in the era of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict Piotr Rudkouski Over the past three years, a distinct change has become visible in the ideological discourse of the government of Belarus. To an increasing degree, the state ideology is focusing on strengthening national identity, emphasising the divergence of Belarus’s interests from those of Russia, and re-examining the historical narration in a direction which emphasises the dis- tinctiveness of the history of Belarus from that of Russia. Above all, the government has changed its attitude towards the Belarusian language and culture. A campaign promoting the Belarusian language is being carried out on a large scale – under the auspices of state ideologues. The government has also become involved in the promotion of vyshyvanka, tradi- tional, embroidered Belarusian clothes and their ornamentation. This allows us to talk about a process of ‘soft Belarusianisation’. Articles criticising Kremlin policy have begun to appear fairly regularly in the government media. Official representatives of the authorities, while not going so far as to promote the idea of friendship with the West, no longer refer to it using the rhetoric of the ‘enemy’, as was previously the case. This modification of ideological discourse probably means that the regime is looking for new ways to arrange its relationships, both with its own society and with the countries of the West. This does not mean, however, that the authorities are ready for systemic changes. The role of the President and the concept of the state remain unaltered in ideological discourse; there is still no tripartite division of power, and civil society’s room for manoeuvre remains narrow. Piotr Rudkouski – is a philosopher, theologian and director of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies in Minsk. From September to October 2017 he was a visiting fellow at the OSW. This analysis was produced within the Think Visegrad Non-V4 Fellowship programme. Think Visegrad – V4 Think Tank Platform is a network for structured dialog on issues of strategic regional importance. The network analyses key issues for the Visegrad Group, and provides recom- mendations to the gov-ernments of V4 countries, the annual presidencies of the group, and the International Visegrad Fund. For more information about Think Visegrad and its members visit www.thinkvisegrad.org OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 253 1 Belarusian ideology before Russia’s This image was needed above all in the fight annexation of Crimea against the democratic opposition, which was ideologically and financially linked to the West. The ideology of the Belarusian state has never Thirdly, the Soviet period was idealised, and ear- been a coherent system with a clearly defined lier periods in the history of Belarus were dep- message, although it is possible to highlight recated, in particular the eras of the Principality some elements that have predominated for of Polotsk and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. more than ten years in this discourse, since it Back in 2014, the leading Belarusian ideologue was institutionalised in 2003. Vladimir Melnik stressed that “the Belarusians First, the regime’s ideology spent a long time took possession of their own statehood at fighting against the version of the national idea the beginning of the 20th century, namely on which emphasised the Belarusian language 1 January 1919”, i.e. upon the creation of the and took a critical approach to the Soviet and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. This, he Russian imperial eras in the history of Belarus. wrote further, was the result of “the truly inval- The state ideologues promoted a version of uable help of the fraternal Russian people in the the national idea in which the central element creation, preservation and strengthening of the was the modern Belarusian state, which owed Belarusian state”.1 its existence to Bolshevik power. As during the existence of the BSSR, the Belarusian language The first change: was not seen as an important element in the in the direction of ‘soft Belaruthenisation’ foundation of the state. During this period, the regime’s natural ideological allies were the Slav- A light alteration of the national idea in the ophiles and that part of the Communists who government’s discourse had already begun drew upon the heritage of the Communist Par- a few years before the annexation of Crimea. ty of the BSSR. In 2010-2012, new textbooks on the history of Belarus were published which no longer pre- sented the idea of ‘all-Russian‘ unity, as had A light alteration of the attitude to the na- previously been the case. However in the public tional idea in the government’s discourse space, formed by official ideologues, the mes- had already begun a few years before the sage was still strong that Belarusian identity is annexation of Crimea. closely tied to Orthodox Russian civilisation. Un- til 2014, Lev Krishtopovich, Vladimir Melnik and Cheslav Kirviel were the leading ideologues; Secondly, a belief predominated that the spec- it was they who promoted the Russocentric ver- ificity of ‘Belarussianness’ lay not so much in sion of Belarusian identity, and warred against cultural or historical differences, as the other Western European trends in Belarusian society. way round – in total fidelity to Russian (and ul- Since the first half of 2014, more significant timately Slavonic) civilisation. The idea of state changes have become apparent in the official sovereignty also emerged in ideological dis- ideology of Belarusian identity. During this pe- course, but was usually accompanied by the riod, President Lukashenko’s statements started strongly reiterated thesis that such sovereignty to discuss the question of the Belarusian lan- was only possible within the Union State of Rus- guage more frequently than before, and always sia and Belarus. The West was generally por- trayed as the ‘traditional’ enemy of East Slavon- 1 Национальная идея или белорусская идея?, ic civilisation, and thus of the Belarusian nation. Беларуская думка 3/2014, p. 54, http://beldumka.belta. by/isfiles/000167_941630.pdf OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 253 2 in a positive manner. In April that year, shortly On 13 June, the Liberal-Democratic Party of after Russia’s occupation of Crimea, he said in Belarus (LDPB) released a statement in which a speech: “If we forget Russian, we will lose our it called for the legalisation of the white-red- mind. If we forget how to speak in Belarusian, we white flag and the Pahonia coat of arms, and will cease to be a nation.” In the same speech, he for them to be given the status of historical and implicitly criticised himself, saying, “They could cultural values4. Considering the origin of this be right, those who criticise me for neglecting party and its specific function in the Belaru- the [Belarusian] language”.2 This was a signal to sian political system, it is difficult to treat the the state ideologues that his previous language statement above as just an element of the usual policy (of Russification) should no longer be changes in image. The LDPB was created in the treated as binding by government officials. first half of the 1990s as a branch of Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, and a significant part of its history is marked by In 2014 an ideological conflict arose a struggle for Belarusian-Russian unity. Besides, between Lukashenko and Putin for the this party is an instrument of the Belarusian gov- first time. ernment, thanks to which the latter maintains a semblance of pluralism and can, in the event of a joint boycott from the real opposition, Other visible manifestations of interest in build- smother any attempts to create alternatives ing a national community have appeared at dif- during elections. The statement above, coming ferent levels of government. In summer 2014, from the ‘systemic opposition’, could be part of the Belarusian parliament adopted a resolution a process to prepare the public for the possible ‘On Belarusians abroad’,3 which not only regu- rehabilitation of these symbols. lates the Belarusian state’s cooperation with the diaspora, but also includes an ideological mes- The second change: sage. Article 2 speaks about the need to build Russia is more ‘them’ than ‘us’ a supra-territorial community, moreover, one which is based on the national culture. In the last In 2014, perhaps for the first time, an ideological two to three years, the Belarusian government conflict arose between Presidents Lukashenko has actively engaged in promoting vyshyvanka and Putin. Earlier controversies between them embroidery, which is one of the most important were based on economic matters, or were sim- attributes of the non-Soviet national culture. ply personal animosities; however, since Russia As for the authorities’ attitude towards the took over Crimea, Lukashenko has publicly ac- most important national symbols, i.e. the cused Russia of violating international law on at white-red-white flag and the Pahonia coat of least three occasions. During an interview for arms, their display in public spaces is still offi- Euronews TV on 1 October 2014, the Belaru- cially prohibited. However, in summer 2017 an sian president struck at the very core of Rus- event took place which could be understood sian propaganda’s argument that Crimea was as a harbinger of gradual changes in this area. once ‘ours’ and ergo today must also be ‘ours’ again. Lukashenko pointed out that in accord- 2 Послание Президента Республики Беларусь А.Г. Лу- ance with the Kremlin’s logic, one could make кашенко белорусскому народу и Национальному со- бранию Республики Беларусь, «Сильная и экономика a demand to return to the days of the Batu-Khan честная власть - фундамент независимости страны (that is, to return a huge part of Russian terri- и процветания нации», 22 April 2014, http://pravo.by/ document/?guid=3871&p0=P014p0001 3 Аб беларусах замежжа, a bill passed by the House of Representatives on 14 May 2014, and adopted two 4 ЛДП заклікае легалізаваць бел-чырвона-белы сцяг weeks later by the Council of the Republic; came into і «Пагоню», http://belsat.eu/news/ldp-zaklikae-legaliza- force on 16 July 2014.
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