Asia Report, Nr. 103: Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks
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WEAKENING INDONESIA'S MUJAHIDIN NETWORKS: LESSONS FROM MALUKU AND POSO Asia Report N°103 – 13 October 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. MALUKU, POSO, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LOCAL JIHADS ................... 2 III. THE CERAM ATTACK................................................................................................ 4 A. BACKGROUND TO THE ATTACK IN LOKI................................................................................4 B. NETWORKS PERSONIFIED -- ASEP'S STORY ...............................................................................6 IV. THE TENTENA BOMBING....................................................................................... 10 A. THE BOMBS ........................................................................................................................10 B. THEORIES ABOUT THE BOMBERS.........................................................................................10 1. Radical Islam ...........................................................................................................10 2. Corruption................................................................................................................12 C. THE SUSPECTS ....................................................................................................................13 V. JUSTICE, REINTEGRATION AND NETWORKS................................................. 15 A. JUSTICE AND SECURITY.......................................................................................................15 1. Improving police-community relations ...................................................................16 2. Dealing with the past ...............................................................................................16 3. Giving a sense of security........................................................................................17 B. DISMANTLING NETWORKS ..................................................................................................18 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 19 APPENDICES A. MAP OF INDONESIA.............................................................................................................21 B. MAP OF EASTERN INDONESIA ..................................................................................................22 C. MAP OF MALUKU ....................................................................................................................23 D. MAP OF POSO DISTRICT ...........................................................................................................24 E. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INDONESIAN TERMS ................................25 F. VIOLENCE IN POSO AND MALUKU, 2004-2005........................................................................27 G. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...........................................................................30 H. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA ..................................................................31 I. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES .......................................................................................34 Asia Report N°103 13 October 2005 WEAKENING INDONESIA'S MUJAHIDIN NETWORKS: LESSONS FROM MALUKU AND POSO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS In the wake of a second terrorist attack on Bali, the need Poso thus remain a focus for religious outreach and to understand Indonesia's violent jihadist networks is recruitment efforts; greater than ever. Two incidents in May 2005 -- the execution of paramilitary police in Ceram, Maluku, and for some fighters, both local and non-local, the the bombing of a market in Tentena, Poso -- offer case combination of military training and active combat studies of how those networks are formed and operate. may have been the most meaningful experience of Weakening the networks is key to preventing further their lives: it may be difficult for them to return to violence, including terrorism. In Maluku and Poso, sites more mundane "civilian" life unless better options of the worst communal conflicts of the immediate post- emerge; and Soeharto period, one place to start is with programs the concentration of ex-mujahidin has made both aimed at ex-combatants and imprisoned mujahidin due areas attractive to fugitives who in the past have for release. These men are often part of networks that found a ready support network there. extend beyond the two conflict areas, but if they can be "reintegrated" into civilian life, their willingness to The Ceram attack on a paramilitary police post on 16 support mujahidin elsewhere in Indonesia and engage May 2005, in particular, shows how a disparate group of in violence themselves might be lessened. Addressing men linked through various networks can come together broader justice and security issues would also help. and form a team of operatives. The attack involved members of KOMPAK, Darul Islam, a Poso-based A study of the Ceram and Tentena incidents suggests that organisation, and perhaps JI, but the hit squad does not the conflict areas continue to be home to "leftover appear to have been organised through any institutional mujahidin" who went there to fight from other parts of hierarchy. The common experience of training and the country and never left; who returned home but fighting during the early stages of the Poso and Maluku maintained regular contact with people they had trained conflicts appears to be more important as the organising or fought with there; or who were locally recruited and principle. Those ties were also sufficiently strong to draw continued to be active in jihadist circles long after the the attackers together from Java, Sulawesi, Sumatra and conflicts waned. Maluku. Violent jihadist networks remain strong in these areas The bomb in the marketplace of the Christian town of for several reasons: Tentena, Poso, is more mysterious. The investigation has produced over a dozen arrests but no clear suspect. It has members of the major jihadist organisations in highlighted the complexity of the networks involved in Indonesia -- Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), some splinters other recent violence in the area, going beyond mujahidin and offshoots of Darul Islam (DI), KOMPAK and circles to include local officials and gang leaders. others -- see Maluku and Poso as areas where "enemies of Islam", including local Christians, One need in these conflict areas is for better law continue to pose a threat to the Muslim community; enforcement. Problems are of long standing and not they believe that parts of Maluku and Poso, but entirely of current incumbents' making, but police particularly Poso, have the potential to develop into practices, particularly wrongful arrests and ill-treatment a qoidah aminah, a secure area where residents can of detainees, have alienated local communities, making live by Islamic principles and apply Islamic law: people unwilling to help investigations. The failure of in their view, such a base could then serve as the government security forces in the past to provide protection building block of an Islamic state, and Maluku and to threatened communities means people who take the law into their own hands are treated as heroes. Prosecutors, Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso Crisis Group Asia Report N°103, 13 October 2005 Page ii lawyers and judges have been subjected to intimidation to prosecutors, judges and defence lawyers to and worse, and perpetrators of violence have often received facilitate fair and transparent trials and that crimes questionable acquittals or rejoined their networks after committed in conflict areas are treated at least serving short sentences. as seriously as crimes committed elsewhere in Indonesia. Several measures would help: better treatment of detainees, control over access to firearms, better coordination To Donors: among intelligence agencies, and serious punishment for serious crimes. 5. Explore, in cooperation with the Department of Law and Human Rights and local stakeholders, A second need is for direct engagement with local veterans options for a reintegration program aimed at of the Poso and Maluku violence to reintegrate them back detained members of mujahidin networks that into "civilian" life. One possibility is to link a reintegration would be tied into the assimilation programs of program to the "assimilation" program of the Indonesian the Indonesian prison system. prison system, whereby those about to be released are allowed to work outside prison during the day under 6. Explore the possibility of vocational training for closely supervised conditions. This could be a vehicle for former gang members that would mesh with the trying to introduce members of these networks to new local economy and job market while keeping them social contacts while at the same time giving them viable out of security-related jobs. alternatives to violence. 7. Explore the possibility for community development programs that would specifically include members of mujahidin networks but that would be available RECOMMENDATIONS to ex-combatants from both Muslim and Christian communities. To the Government of Indonesia: Jakarta/Brussels, 13 October 2005 1. Conduct a systematic