Part I. a Short History of Indonesian Cultural Policy
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47 Part I. A Short History of Indonesian Cultural Policy 48 Chapter 1 The Genesis of Modern Cultural Policy in Indonesia: Culture and Government in the Late Colonial and Japanese Occupation Periods, 1900-1945 Benedict Anderson, in his introduction to Southeast Asian Tribal Groups and Ethnic Minorities, writes: It is easy to forget that minorities came into existence in tandem with majorities ... They were born of the political and cultural revolution brought about by the maturing of the colonial state and by the rise against it of popular nationalism. The former fundamentally changed the structures and aims of governance, the latter its legitimacy. (1987a, p. 1) This chapter explores how Indonesian cultural policy was born within the complex relationship between Indonesian populations and the policies of foreign administrations. Anderson’s observation highlights that when the Indonesian nationalists declared independence, they declared popular dominion over a territory that was already profoundly shaped by modern methods of government. Indeed, the resistance of anticolonial nationalists, as noted by David Scott, was articulated into a ‘political game’ that was itself linked to the ‘political rationality’ of the colonial state (1995, p. 198) and also, in the case of much of Southeast Asia, then impacted by Japanese occupation. Dutch colonial cultural policy, which bloomed at the beginning of the twentieth century, and Japanese occupying cultural policy should not be understood as fundamentally different to post-independence cultural policy, but as its precursors. 1. Culture and Government in Indonesia from 1900 to 1945 Scott writes that ‘in order to understand the project of colonial power at any given historical moment one has to understand the character of the political rationality that constituted it’ (1995, p. 204). Although forms of the state in Europe were not simply replicated in the colonies, Scott argues that colonial rule was linked to the ‘structures, projects, and desires’ (1995, p. 198) of Europe and, in particular, changes in the way that 49 imperial powers understood and undertook government. In his article ‘Colonial Governmentality’, Scott uses the example of the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms of 1832 in Sri Lanka to explore how changes in political rationalities in Europe had corollaries in the colonies. He demonstrates how power was redirected from producing ‘extractive-effects on colonial bodies’ to ‘governing-effects on colonial conduct’ (1995, p. 214). An effect of this transformation of power was the ‘reconstruction of colonial space’ (1995, p. 204). However, the construct of colonial space should not be considered a one-sided project with the results completely determined by European colonisers. We need to acknowledge that the ‘conditions’ of the colonised country, including local practices and differences, also affected colonial practice (Gouda, 1995, pp. 9,21; Stoler, 1989, p. 135). The emergence of cultural policy in Indonesia is tied to how Dutch colonial government constructed colonial space and the opposition of Indonesian nationalists. In order to understand the emergence of cultural policy, a series of steps similar to those outlined by Scott need to be undertaken, beginning with the broad liberal rationalities of government in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century and narrowing down to the specific elements of Dutch colonial government within which culture was articulated. The governmentality group of scholars identify two features of the liberal rationality of government that are particularly important to the birth of cultural policy: the liberal approach to security and the conceptualisation of government as managing ‘natural’ processes. Once these elements have been discussed in the context of the liberalism, it is then possible to explore their different treatments by the Dutch colonial administration, Indonesian nationalists and the occupying Japanese. Liberalism is commonly defined as a political doctrine concerned with ensuring the liberty of individuals, in particular from the encroachment of the state (Hindess, 1996, p. 123). Following Foucault, a number of scholars1 have taken a view of liberalism that emphasises its use of governmental methods to secure a specific ‘form of life’ (Dean, 1991, p. 13) concerned with creating a society of free individuals. Essential to liberalism is the notion of ‘naturally occurring’ processes that cannot be known by the state, but are essential to government, the exemplar of these processes being the economy (Dean, 1999, 1 See Dean (1999, pp. 48-55,113-31), Gordon (1991), Hindess (1996, pp. 123-31), and Rose (1996a; 1996b). 50 p. 50). In a liberal rationality of government, securing individual liberty is essential to securing these ‘natural’ processes. Foucault argues: The setting in place of ... mechanisms of modes of state intervention whose function is to assure the security of those natural phenomena, economic processes and the intrinsic processes of population: this is what becomes the basic objective of governmental rationality. Hence liberty is registered not only as the right of individuals legitimately to oppose the power, the abuses and usurpations of the sovereign, but also now as an indispensable element of governmental rationality itself (Foucault on 5 April 1978, quoted in C. Gordon, 1991, pp. 19-20). The state’s concern with security extends then to ensuring that people have developed the thoughts and behaviours the state deems appropriate for free and independent people in order for the ‘natural’ processes to properly function (Hindess, 1996, p. 130). Forms of indirect regulation, such as education, are therefore central to governance. In the case of groups considered to deviate from the norm of ‘free and independent’ people, the state is obliged to guarantee the security of the processes considered beyond the state. Thus Mitchell Dean writes in his discussion of liberal notions of security, ‘regulation made in the service of security has to be structured in such a way as to lead indigent and other troublesome groups to exercise a responsible and disciplined freedom in the market and in the family’ (1999, p. 116). The colonised at the beginning of the twentieth century, as was briefly mentioned in the introduction, are defined as lacking the capacity for self-government in liberal rationalities of government. Barry Hindess, in his article ‘The Liberal Government of Unfreedom’, analyses how liberal forms of government defined their populations through the concept of ‘authoritarian rule’. Hindess argues that ‘authoritarian rule’ was justified in the case of the colonised (and is still justified in the case of the unemployed and minors) as ‘the capacities required for autonomous conduct and the social conditions that foster and sustain them can be developed in [these populations] only through compulsion, through the imposition of more or less extended periods of discipline’ (2001, p. 101). In the Dutch Indies, a racial hierarchy defined the populations that were subjected to colonial ‘authoritarian rule’, as shall be explored below, including colonial cultural policies. The policies of the Japanese also divided the inhabitants of Indonesia into racialised populations in a hierarchy that contrasted markedly to the colonial construct. Following Foucault’s observation that governing populations made war genocidal in the 51 twentieth century through posing killing at the level of entire populations (1990, pp. 136- 7), it also entrenched racism within modern methods of government.2 The cultural policy link between the colonial administration, the occupying Japanese and the nationalists is the common ‘improving’ or ‘civilising’ function attributed to culture. Culture was understood as being able to change the attributes of populations through addressing the behaviours of their members as individuals, making it an ideal field for governmental programs. The use of culture by both of the administrations and the nationalists was governmental in their purported desire to ‘improve’ the indigenous populations/Indonesians, although towards very different ends and using different models of improvement. However, there are also shared techniques and methods. An important shared component that enabled culture to do its civilising work is what Tony Bennett has termed ‘strategic normativity’. ‘Strategic normativity’ refers to the way in which culture has ‘functioned to lay open the ways of life of different sections of the populace to reformist programs of government’ (1998, p. 91). Drawing from Robert Young (1995, p. 29), Bennett notes how culture is usually thought of as opposed to something or as itself internally divided. The resulting sectors are rarely on equal terms. Instead, there is typically a hierarchical ordering of relations between sectors. He states: It is this hierarchical ordering of the relations between the different spheres of culture that results in a strategic normativity in which one component of the cultural field is strategically mobilised in relation to another as offering the means of overcoming whatever shortcomings (moral, political or aesthetic) are attributed to the latter. This results in the establishment of a normative gradient down which the flow of culture is directed in reformist programs through which cultural resources are brought to bear on whatever might be the task to hand. (1998, p. 92) This chapter explores the relationship between the use of culture by the colonial state and by Indonesian nationalists