Federal Philosophy of Science: a Deconstruction— and a Reconstruction*
FEDERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: A DECONSTRUCTION— AND A RECONSTRUCTION* Susan Haack† I. A TANGLED TALE When they feel the need to distinguish genuine science—the real thing—from pretenders, or to understand what is distinctive about the scientific method, U.S. courts have sometimes called on Karl Popper’s conception of falsifiability as the hallmark of the genuinely scientific, and his account of the method of science as conjecture and refutation. Sometimes the legal issue before the courts is the interpretation of the Establishment Clause in applica- tion to biology teaching in public high schools, and the question is whether “creation science” is really science, or only religion in dis- guise.1 Much more often, though, the legal issue is one of evidence * This paper is based on a (much shorter) presentation, first given at a conference on “Objective Knowledge: Popper and Beyond,” at the Max Weber Program, Euro- pean University Institute, Fiesole, in March 2009. My thanks to Pamela Lucken for research assistance, and to Mark Migotti and Stephen Urice for helpful comments on draft versions. † Distinguished Professor in the Humanities, Cooper Senior Scholar in Arts and Sciences, Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law, University of Miami. 1 In McLean v. Arkansas, for example, the court reasoned that, unlike the theory of evolu- tion, creation “science” is unfalsifiable, and so is not really science at all, but rather a reli- gious doctrine; hence a statute mandating equal time for evolution and creation science in public high-school biology classes was unconstitutional—in violation of the Establishment 394 2010] Federal Philosophy of Science 395 law, and the question is whether this or that scientific expert testi- mony is reliable enough to be admissible.
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