FOUR CENTRAL ISSUES IN POPPER’S THEORY OF SCIENCE By CARLOS E. GARCIA-DUQUE A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2002 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would not have been able to finish this project without the help and support of many persons and institutions. To begin with, 1 wish to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Chuang Liu, chair of my doctoral committee for his continuous support and enthusiastic encouragement since the time when this dissertation was nothing more than a inchoate idea. 1 enjoyed our long discussions and benefited greatly from his advice and insightful suggestions. 1 am also very grateful to the other members of my committee, who all made significant contributions to the final product. 1 wish to thank Dr. Kirk Ludwig with whom 1 have had extensive discussions about several specific problems that 1 addressed in my dissertation. His valuable suggestions made my arguments more compelling and helped me to improve substantially Chapter 5. Dr. Robert D’Amico has posed deep questions that led me to refine and better structure my views. My conversa- tions with Dr. Robert A. Hatch about specific episodes in the history of science and their relationship with my topic were inspirational and prompted me to develop new ideas. I completed my doctoral studies with the endorsement of the Fulbright Program and the support of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Florida. 1 also want to thank the Universidad de Caldas and the Universidad de Manizales for granting me a leave of absence long enough to successfully finish this academic program. Last, but not least, 1 want to thank my family as well as my closest friends for encouraging my interest in philosophy and for trying to make my life easier and less lonely through the hardships of a very prolonged absence. 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS v ABSTRACT3 vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Motivation 4 1.2 Method 4 1 .3 Main Themes of the Chapters 6 2 SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 11 2.1 The Problem of Induction 15 2.2 Popper’s Solution 19 2 . 3 Criticisms of Popper’ s Solution 39 FALSIFIABILITY 57 3.1 Deductivism and Falsifiability 58 3.2 Falsifiability Defined 68 3.2.1 Falsifiability and Falsification 71 3.2.2 Falsifiability: Second Definition 3.3 Criticisms of Popper’s Notion of Falsifiability... 80 3.3.1 Kuhn: Testing vs. Puzzle Solving .80 3.3.2 Lakatos: Sophisticated Falsificationism... .91 3.3.3 Feyerabend: Epistemological Anarchism 105 3.3.4 Derksen: Falsifiability is Fake Cement..., 116 4 CORROBORATION 123 4. 1 Corroboration and Probability of Events 125 4.2 The Notion of Corroboration 130 4.3 Corroboration and Logical Probability 133 4.4 Corroboration Revisited 139 4.5 Criticisms of Popper’s Notion of Corroboration 154 4.5.1 Putnam; Theory is not an End for Itself 1 55 4.5.2 Lakatos: Corroboration is a Measure of Verisimilitude 165 4.5.3 Derksen on Corroboration 171 4.5.4 A Whiff of Induction 175 5 VERISIMILITUDE 177 5.1 The Theory of Objective Truth 178 5.2 Popper’s Notion of Verisimilitude 182 5.3 Refining Verisimilitude 188 5 .4 Criticisms of Popper’ s Notion of Verisimilitude 194 5.4.1 Tichy: all False Theories are Equally Verisimilar 196 5.4.2 Miller: No Two False Theories are Comparable by Verisimilitude 200 5.5 Reply to Tichy and Miller 203 5.6 The Quantitative Measure of Verisimilitude 211 5.7 Verisimilitude as a Surrogate for Truth 222 5.8 Are there True Theories? 226 5.8.1 The Epistemic Status of Scientific Theories 235 5.8.2 Aiming at Verisimilitude Rather than Truth 237 6 EPILOGUE 244 LIST OF DEFINITIONS 255 REFERENCES 257 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 264 IV KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS The main works of Popper are cited in the text as follows: OS The Open Society and its Enemies PH The Poverty ofHistoricism. LScD The Logic ofScientific Discovery CR Conjectures and Refutations: the Growth ofScientific Knowledge OK Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach RSR “The Rationality of Scientific Revolutions” NV “A Note on Verisimilitude” UQ Unended Quest: an Intellectual Autobiograph. QSP Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics OU The Open Universe: an Argumentfor Indeterminism RAS Realism and the Aim ofScience WP A World ofPropensities SBW In Search ofa Better World: Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years KBM Knowledge and the Body-mind Problem: in Defence ofInteraction ME The Myth ofthe Framework: in Defence ofScience and Rationality EPE The World ofParmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment EPS All Life is Problem Solving Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy FOUR CENTRAL ISSUES IN POPPER’S THEORY OF SCIENCE By Carlos E. Garcia-Duque December 2002 Chair: Chuang Liu Department: Philosophy Karl Popper’s influential theory of science has been widely debated and s theory, vigorously criticized over the last few decades. The central concepts of Popper the those of falsifiability, corroboration, and verisimilitude have been by-words in to literature of the Philosophy of Science during this period. Popper’s challenges orthodoxy and, in some ways, radical views, have generated considerable controversy. There have been sharp criticisms and a few defenders —but even among the defenders one sees mostly appropriations, rather than genuine defense. There has not, however, been any systematic general defense of his central views in the literature. This dissertation attempts such a defense, by way of a careful examination and sympathetic interpretation to of the main themes of Popper’s theory, namely, the role of falsifiability in responding the demarcation problem and solving the problem of induction, the insistence on corroboration as a desirable feature of scientific theories as well as an indicator of empirical progress, and the theory of verisimilitude, according to which the long-term VI aim of science is properly pursued by means of advancing theories which constitute better approximations to the truth than their competitors. The overall strategy is to review carefully the most important criticisms of each of the above themes in Popper’s theory. After providing background for a discussion of the matters at issue, I try to disarm the objections by showing that they misconstrue Popper’s intent; to this end I provide alternative interpretations of how Popper can be properly understood and propose minor revisions to the concepts analyzed (being always respectful of Popper’s original definitions). After dissolving the objections and developing the fundamental notions with the revisions introduced, Popper’s theory of science emerges rehabilitated. vii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION This study deals with a particular portion of Popper’s theory of science, namely its treatment of the problem of induction (including the proposal for a solution) and the notions of falsifiability, corroboration and verisimilitude. These four topics are the cornerstones of Popper’s theory because, properly articulated, they are sufficient to account for the crucial problems of epistemology, not to mention that Popper’s image of empirical science depends entirely upon them. In particular, they supply criteria to admit theories into the body of science or remove them from it; they provide means to select among competing theories and they give an explanation of the growth of scientific knowledge, including its piecemeal approach to the truth. In broader terms, they constitute an alternative to the ideas of logical positivism, offer support to scientific realism, and give birth to an increasingly influential theory (now known as critical rationalism). Given its cardinal importance for a methodology that admits hypotheses into the body of scientific knowledge with only the requirement of compliance with a formal criterion, special attention is given to the logical notion of falsifiability and to its relations with corroboration and verisimilitude. However, in spite of the simplicity that these four topics appear to have, this dissertation does not attempt to analyze fully their many ramifications and complications. It settles for the less ambitious goal of providing a clear construal of each of them and explaining the basic form of their inter-relation with the hope of giving the reader the tools necessary to grasp Popper’s theory at its best. 1 2 Popper committed himself to a clear presentation of his ideas and encouraged others to scrutinize them severely with the implicit promise to abandon any view that did not resist criticism. This seems the appropriate attitude for someone who considered criticism to be “the lifeblood of all rational thought” (“Replies to my Critics,” p. 977) and insisted on the fallible nature of the most sophisticated kinds of knowledge, science included. But the criticisms, which came from all quarters and appeared to be devastating, left the essence of his position untouched, and except for minor revisions and additional explanations here and there Popper did not change, let alone give up, any of his key notions. Since several authors (Johansson, 1975; Stove, 1982; Burke, 1983) consider most of these criticisms successful (actually the myth of a conclusively refuted Popper is widespread), at some point one must ask why Popper did not modify drastically or renounce his central ideas after those criticisms were expressed. For many, this was an indication that despite his pronouncements to the contrary. Popper did not really admit criticism. I suspect that most of the criticisms were less apt than first thought. Although this alternation hardly exhausts all the possible explanations, I am inclined to focus my discussion on it.