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S B A L Fortress Jordan: Putting the Money to Work
Sultan Barakat and Andrew Leber The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high- quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars.
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BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER Saha 43, Building 63, West Bay, Doha, Qatar www.brookings.edu/doha Fortress Jordan: Putting the Money to Work Sultan Barakat & Andrew Leber1
A lot can change in a year. In late August 2013, the strategic “rents” of foreign donor support with the U.S. administration contemplating air to make ends meet. It has lobbied for such strikes against Syria’s Assad regime following aid by constantly selling itself as an “island chemical weapons attacks against civilians in the of stability” in a troubled region, a security suburbs of Damascus, Jordanian officials were bulwark against violent extremism, or a “model publicly adamant that their country would play reformer” (both politically and economically) in no supporting role. Yet barely a year later, on an authoritarian neighborhood. The Kingdom September 23, 2014, government spokesman has been broadly successful in this strategy, and Minister of Information Muhammad al- securing over $12 billion in loan guarantees, Momani announced that Jordanian aircraft development assistance, and military aid, with had bombed targets deep within Syria as part promises of more to come, just since the first of a U.S.-led coalition combating the jihadi tremors of the Arab Spring once again called Islamic State (IS) group. into question the Kingdom’s stability.3 While Jordan’s participation certainly reflects The authors contend, however, that merely deeply held fears of the IS threat within buttressing Jordan with ever greater amounts Jordan’s political and security establishment, of cash will not secure its long-term stability, it also reminds the international community, and that the Kingdom’s direct participation in in particular the United States, of the country’s the anti-IS coalition undermines its ability to most valuable exports: regional security and provide security in a fractured and uncertain stability. Jordan has been a reliable Arab ally to region. If Jordan and its allies want stability and Western powers for decades, and serves as a key security, they should improve their development base for regional humanitarian and diplomatic efforts qualitatively as well as quantitatively. In activity. Its competent military and intelligence particular, they should work to strengthen the services provide an effective security buffer for Kingdom’s resilience through the development Israel and the Gulf alike. Jordan has also hosted of a strong, inclusive economy that takes millions of refugees, most recently from Syria advantage of the influx of willing labor and with over 600,000 registered by the UNHCR, the widespread destruction of industrial and though the country has likely taken in many commercial capacity in Syria and Iraq.4 more.2 Based on a series of interviews conducted Since its inception, the resource-and-export- with current and former government officials, poor Kingdom of Jordan has relied heavily on political figures, and prominent businessmen
1 Sultan Barakat is a Senior Fellow and the Director of Research at the Brookings Doha Center. He is also the Founding Chairman of the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit at the University of York in the United Kingdom. Andrew Leber is a Research Assistant at the Brookings Doha Center. The authors would like to thank all those who took time out of their schedules to be interviewed for this paper. Bruce Reidel, Ibrahim Sharqieh and an anonymous reviewer provided constructive as well as helpful feedback and comments. 2 See Cynthia Orchard and Andrew Miller, “Protection in Europe for Refugees from Syria,” Forced Migration Policy Briefing Number 10, Refu- gee Studies Center, University of Oxford, September 2014,
1 in Jordan, as well as foreign diplomats and and a threat. Lastly, the government must also humanitarian officials in August and September coordinate with potential investors at home of 2014, the authors have identified four key and abroad and slash red tape to encourage the aspects of such a strategy. First, meaningful growth of productive, large-scale industry and steps towards more representative, transparent trade exports. governance would go a long way toward resolving the growing divide between state The ultimate goal of these recommendations, and society. Second, greater emphasis should which are expanded upon in this paper, is be placed on foreign assistance that underpins further, and more effective, economic reform. long-term investment in the country’s Instead of relying on aid to prop up an uncertain economic future rather than serving as a short- status quo, the Jordanian government and its term palliative for economic ills. Furthermore, allies would be best served by developing a Jordan’s government should find a formula believable economic vision that can inspire the that incorporates the willing labor of Syrian country’s citizens. refugees rather than shunning them as a burden
Fortress Jordan: 2 Putting the Money to Work Jordan: Uneasy Stability
Formed in the wake of the First World War, and elections law. Against this, King Abdullah first the Emirate of Transjordan and then the II has raised the specter of religious tyranny subsequent Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan should “unqualified” Islamists come to power in have endured numerous internal fault lines. Jordan, especially in the wake of the increasingly One major division runs between “East Banker” autocratic behavior of Egyptian president—and tribal communities who view themselves as the Muslim Brother—Muhammad Morsi.6 country’s “original” inhabitants and the more numerous Palestinian Jordanians, the legacy of Given the Muslim Brotherhood’s historic successive waves of refugees following the 1948 antipathy toward Israel, Palestinian Jordanians’ and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars. To generalize, East desires to one day return to their homeland, Bankers have traditionally formed the bedrock and East Banker fears that Israel will seek to of the Hashemite monarchy’s ruling coalition turn Jordan into a permanent alternative and have consequently been overrepresented homeland for Palestinians, the Kingdom’s in the public sector, while Palestinian often fraught yet strategically vital relations communities have instead tended to dominate with Israel only exacerbate these tensions. It the private sector. Recently, divisive identity is a relationship built far more on tacit high- politics have been fueled in part by East Banker level understanding than any degree of popular perceptions that palace-led reform efforts, support—in a recent poll conducted by Jordan both economic and political, benefit a new University’s Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), Palestinian technocratic elite at the expense of Jordanian respondents identified Israel as far East Banker influence and jobs.5 and away the greatest threat to security and stability in the Middle East.7 Additional tensions relate to the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s political marginalization, There is also the economy, a perennial weakness despite being the country’s single largest of the Kingdom. At the macroeconomic level, opposition group. Regime-Brotherhood relations, Jordan’s economy has performed relatively well, once cordial, have grown increasingly acrimonious given the circumstances (see Figure 1). Foreign as the Brotherhood refuses to even pay lip service grants and remittances from Jordanians abroad to what it considers the country’s contorted have kept GDP growing by about 3 percent as 8 and unrepresentative election laws, boycotting budget deficits have narrowed. Nonetheless, elections in 2010 and again in 2013. The group unemployment officially stood at 12.6 percent, was a key force in mobilizing restrained anti- skewing as high as 18 percent in marginalized government demonstrations in 2011 and 2012, areas such as Ma‘an and Tafileh, where efforts calling for democratic reforms to the constitution to reduce economic disparity between urban
5 Curtis R. Ryan, “Identity Politics, Reform and Protest in Jordan,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11, no. 3 (2011), 569-570. 6 Sarah Daniel, “Jordanie: Un entretien avec le roi Abdallah II” [Jordan: an interview with King Abdullah II],” Le Nouvel Observateur, 11 January 2013,
3 centers and outlying regions (mainly through sure on Jordan’s meager water resources. public employment) have faltered since 2008.9 Imports outweighed the country’s meager Over the past few years, commentators have exports by a substantial $10.8 billion in the first frequently cautioned that the Jordanian regime three quarters of 2014, a deficit exacerbated by was once again “hovering on the brink” due to the loss of trade routes to Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, popular demonstrations or the burdens of the 12 and Europe (see Figure 2).10 Syrian crisis. Yet more sober observers have noted the regime’s overall stability and even Additionally, the prolonged stay of Syrian consolidation of power. Gregory Gause, for refugees (see Figure 3) on the heels of many example, has pointed to the monarchy’s ability thousands of Iraqi refugees over the past de- to deflect public anger by acceding to limited cade (around 30,000 registered Iraqi refu- reforms while continuing to shore up a new gees still reside in Jordan), has taken a toll. base of support among Amman’s economic Many Jordanian citizens perceive Syrians to elite.13 With the Syrian conflict dampening the be depressing wages, taking jobs, and driving appetite for disruptive, wholesale changes, the up prices for rent, food, and energy. Despite regime now faces little domestic pressure. Most price hikes due to the country’s subsidy reduc- opposition groups have fallen out over political tion program, the state electricity company differences, been subtly co-opted by the regime, lost $1.7 billion in 2014. 11 The 9-10 percent or quietly subdued by state security forces.14 On population increase has also increased pres- the international level, Jordan has also benefited
Figure 1: Jordan's Annual GDP Growth, 2005-2014 Jordan's Annual GDP Growth, 2005-2014 9.0% 8.0% 7.0% 6.0% 5.0% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: World Bank, Jordan Central Bank, 2014 (Note: 2014 growth estimated based on Q1-3 figures)
9 Official unemployment numbers in Jordan, like most unemployment statistics, suffer from underreporting due to those who fail to register as “unemployed.” Hussein Shraim (President of Zarqa Chamber of Commerce), interview with the authors, Zarqa, Jordan, 1 September 2014; “Table 2.3: Jordanian Population Age 15+ Years by Activity Status, Urban-Rural, Governorate & Sex (Percentage Distribution),” Department of Statistics, Jordan, 2013,
Fortress Jordan: 4 Putting the Money to Work Figure 2: Jordanian Trade Losses by year ($US Billion)
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: Central Bank of Jordan (Note: 2014 losses estimated based on Q1-3 figures)
Figure 3: Number of Registered Syrian Refugees Number of Registered Syrian Refugees
700000 600000 500000 400000 300000 200000 100000 0 July July July May May May March March March January January January September September September November November November 2012 2013 2014
Source: UNHCR, 2015
5 from the apparent notion among its allies’ that role in the region without significantly risking it is “too strategic to fail.”15 Any true threat to internal stability, given enough guarantees of its ongoing stability is thus likely to bring a foreign aid and military support.17 However, rush of foreign assistance, as in the aftermath considering the current economic and social of the Arab Spring and throughout the Syria woes of two of the United States’ other strategic crisis—Jordanian officials’ claims of receiving allies in the region—Egypt and Yemen— little ‘effective’ support notwithstanding.16 Jordan’s ruling elite should be wary of assuming that foreign backing is enough to ward off Unfortunately, this political breathing room domestic instability. Instead, both Jordan and has allowed Jordan’s regime and its allies, its allies are doubling down on this long-term especially the United States, to avoid focusing bet through the Kingdom’s overt participation on the country’s internal development. The in the fight against IS. sense among the monarchy and its allies is that Jordan is in a position to take on nearly any
15 Journalist and commentator Issandr El Amrani deserves credit for first making this argument with respect to Egypt, see “Too Big to Fail,” Egypt Independent, 27 July 2010,
Fortress Jordan: 6 Putting the Money to Work Not Jordan’s Fight
Jordan’s public role in the air strikes against means” and called on the Arab world to “be IS contrasts greatly with the government’s courageous to stand up and face ISIS head cautious handling of the Syria conflict. The on.”20 His stance has already paid dividends, government has not officially acknowledged with President Obama pledging to increase Central Intelligence Agency training programs annual U.S. aid to Jordan from around $660 and Gulf operations to arm rebel groups within million to a full $1 billion.21 Jordan’s borders. Even the ejection of Syrian Ambassador to Jordan Bahjat Suleiman was Still, the country’s participation came as a carefully stage-managed to convey that Jordan surprise to many Jordanians. Prime Minister took issue only with the specific ambassador, Abdullah al-Nasour claimed as late as not the Assad regime as a whole.18 September 6 that Jordan would not “fight others’ wars,” while Interior Minister Hussein To be sure, taking the fight to IS reflects grave al-Majali stressed that there were “no real concerns within the ruling elite and security security threats” to Jordan’s borders even after establishment about home-grown terrorism air strikes had begun with the government citing and potential spillover of the Syrian conflict. border provocations as a key motivation.22 The The consensus view of the Jordanian experts and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s governing senior officials attending a closed-door meeting Shura Council had already rejected Jordan’s organized by CSS was that participation participation on the grounds that the country’s in coalition airstrikes was “necessary… to interests were not at stake, while several lower- protect Jordanian national security” and that house parliamentarians had signed a petition the country’s decision-makers “had no other to the same effect. Even the broadly supportive choice.”19 Likewise, as donor fatigue sets in, CSS report contained several reservations, the specter of IS or other Islamic extremists from the complete lack of a broader political threatening the Kingdom’s borders provides strategy for ending the Syria crisis to the a potent reminder of Jordan’s fragility and uncertain staying power of the United States need for international support. In a December and coalition’s other Western members. interview with CBS, King Abdullah’s rhetoric on this point reached new heights. He labeled Air strikes against IS have thus far shown the fight against IS “a third world war by other mixed results, halting the group’s advances
18 Amjad Abdulhadi (former director of the Office of Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit), interview with the authors, Amman, 1 September 2014. 19 “Markaz al-dirasat al-istratijiyya: al-‘urdun wa suriyya wa al-harb al-rahina nahu buna’ jadwal ‘amal wataniyy” [Center for Strategic Stud- الراهies: Jordan and Syria and the Current War—Towards a National Agenda], al-Dustur, 6 October 2014,
7 but falling short of “rolling back” its in recent months on charges related to the new presence.23 Meanwhile, even Western capitals law, including deputy leader Zaki Bani Ershid. are increasingly concerned about potential King Abdullah has meanwhile toughened his “blowback” in the form of returning jihadis or criticism of the group’s activities.28 IS sympathizers perpetrating domestic terror attacks.24 These concerns are even sharper Popular anger over Israeli actions in Jerusalem has in Amman, given that Jordan is adjacent to raised the stakes even further. Jordan’s lukewarm both Syria and Iraq and home to a small but official response to Israel’s continued demolition vocal contingent of jihadi Salafis, as many of Palestinian homes, construction of housing as 2,200 of whom have travelled to Syria to units, and initial provocations at the Jordanian- participate in the conflict.25 Jordan’s courts administered holy sites has provided Islamist have seen numerous cases against jihadi Salafis and opposition movements with ammunition to and suspected returning fighters over the past challenge the government’s legitimacy. This may year. Analysts also saw the hand of Jordanian explain the government’s exceptionally harsh security services in the June release of jihadi reaction to a further provocation regarding the ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and al-Aqsa Mosque amidst a backdrop of rising 29 the acquittal of radical cleric Abu Qatada, Israeli-Palestinian violence in Jerusalem. Now, likely with the tacit understanding that each even the Jordanian government’s potential $15 would commit to pushing an anti-IS line billion dollar gas deal with Israel, viewed by among Jordan’s Salafis.26 Maqdisi was brought Jordanian energy officials as key to meeting up on new charges in October, however, after the country’s energy needs over the next few criticizing the anti-IS coalition as a “crusader years (see Figure 4), is under fire. At the time war against Islam.”27 The Ministry of Religious of writing, the Jordanian government claimed to Endowments and Islamic Affairs has banned have halted negotiations, citing the impact of an several preachers from the nation’s mosques Israeli anti-trust ruling against the multinational and referred some to the State Security Court consortium developing Israel’s offshore gas for having pro-IS sympathies. fields. Yet popular demonstrations had criticized the purchase of Israeli gas on political grounds, The regime is also clamping down further with 79 out of 150 parliamentarians signing a on what it considers to be dangerous dissent, petition to scrap the deal. Some parliamentarians especially after enacting new anti-terrorism even levied normally unheard-of accusations laws this past June. Specifically, the security of interference by the palace and intelligence forces have arrested dozens of Muslim Brothers services in parliamentary affairs.30
23 See experts polled in Nathan Jensen, “Experts Mixed on Effectiveness of U.S. Airstrikes Against ISIS,”The Washington Post, 12 Novem- ber 2014,
Fortress Jordan: 8 Putting the Money to Work Figure 4: Sources of Energy in Jordan
Domestic Production 3.4%
Imports 96.6%
Source: Jordan's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Wealth, 2012 (Latest Available Numbers)
In short, Jordan’s participation in the anti- than $10,000 (the other being Morocco), the IS coalition has only increased the country’s only one that directly borders Syria as well as vulnerability to internal radicalization while Iraq, and one of only a few hosting more than exposing its leadership to further criticism a token number of refugees. In the unlikely that it defers to the priorities of its foreign yet catastrophic event of further population (and especially Western) allies. Admittedly, displacement, where would refugees go? The an Arab Center for Research and Studies poll West Bank? Israel? Saudi Arabia? showed in November that a healthy majority of Jordanians supported the coalition and its This does not mean that Jordan has nothing aims, but most Jordanian respondents viewed to offer. It simply means that its allies should the main beneficiaries of the air strikes as Israel, envisage a smarter role that safeguards and the United States, and Iran—the same three exploits the Kingdom’s strategic assets—its countries they identified as the greatest threats ability to gather intelligence, provide border to the security and stability of the region.31 security, host refugee populations, and act as Jordanians will now have to weigh these views a humanitarian hub—instead of putting them against the knowledge that theirs is the only at risk through direct combat. Supporters coalition nation to have had a service member of Jordanian participation can point to few captured by IS, with a real likelihood of his unique contributions or successes by Jordan’s being tortured or publicly executed.32 air force, while detractors can easily point to the as-yet uncertain fate of captured pilot Muadh It would be difficult for Jordan to reverse al-Kasasbeh. Jordan’s decision-makers would course given the King’s harsh rhetoric in do well to adopt a longer view, de-emphasize entering the fight, but it makes little strategic direct support for the fight against IS, and sense for the country to continue its front-line focus instead on addressing internal political participation in the latest U.S.-led intervention grievances, specifically by providing a credible of uncertain aims, scope, and duration. Of all economic vision. In the short term, the coalition the various coalition partners striking targets should publicly maintain Jordan’s active role in in IS-controlled territory, Jordan is one of only the alliance while privately curtailing Jordanian two with a nominal per-capita GDP of less sorties to limit future exposure.
31 “Istitla‘a al-ra’i al-‘am al-‘arabi hawl al-tahaluf al-dawli did tanzeem ‘Da’ish’,” [Public Arab Opinion Poll Regarding the International Coalition Against ISIS], Arab Center for Research and Studies, November 2014,
9 Toward Better Governance
Most interviewees were pessimistic about the where pressure for further political change likelihood of further reform, emphasizing might come from. As noted previously, much Jordan’s security and economic concerns of the opposition that forced some concessions instead. “Just accept the political reforms that in 2011-2012 is internally divided, subdued have happened,” said one official and former due to the specter of Syria, or split up into a opposition journalist exasperatedly, referring myriad small, competing parties, in part due to the constitutional amendments agreed to in to current election laws. Washington has all the months following initial protests. “We’re but abandoned democracy promotion, which trying to balance a very complex situation!”33 was never on the agenda of Jordan’s key Gulf allies. The Israeli government likewise prefers However, a new constitutional amendment, negotiating with the King and a limited rushed through parliament in late August, governing elite rather than a broader spectrum granted the King full legal power to appoint the of Jordanian society, much of which stands head of the army and the General Intelligence firmly opposed to any cooperation with it. Directorate (GID), completely bypassing the advice, much less the consent, of the elected Yet even participants in the aforementioned parliament. Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour CSS round table referred to a “dangerous lack of and other commentators claimed this was trust between state and street,” which has been necessary to “insulate” sensitive positions exacerbated by Jordan’s participation in the from populist feelings prior to the further war against IS.36 If the country’s ruling elite is empowerment of political parties and the truly intent on minimizing Jordan’s risks in the parliament.34 Regardless, the amendment only face of IS, then it must discard its expectation increases the direct power of the palace while that citizens will be defined by al-walaa’ wa al- the King is also pushing to re-activate and intima’, or complete loyalty, and permit some expand the Ministry of Defense, which would real openings for their participation in and provide yet another royally appointed position. criticism of government, rather than simply The amendment also ties the King to the waxing poetic about the importance of doing actions of his political appointees more closely, so.37 This would only increase the resilience making it harder to shift blame in the event of of the Jordanian political system. Conversely, a scandal.35 concentrating more power in the hands of the King makes the country more vulnerable if Extensive political reform seems unlikely some misfortune should befall him. so long as Jordan’s ruling elite views itself as more beholden to foreign allies than its public. Those allies who still maintain some rhetorical There are few signs of progress, and it is unclear support for democratization in the Middle
33 Former minister of media affairs and communication, interview with the authors, Amman, 2 September 2014. 34 Abdullah al-Hadidi, “Al-Nasour: al-hukumat al-barlaminiyya hadaf al-t’adeelat al-dasturiyya” [Ensour: goal of constitutional amendments is parliamentary government], al-Ra’i, 7 September 2014,
Fortress Jordan: 10 Putting the Money to Work East—particularly the United States and the • Increasing transparency regarding how European Union—should encourage small monies are allocated to the Royal Court, but tangible reforms, seeking to outmaneuver army, and intelligence services, as officers those allies—namely in the Gulf—who and security officials often perceived as view any democratic opening as potentially siphoning off funds. Allies providing Jordan destabilizing. Such practical measures should with military and security aid—chiefly the include: United States—should publicize how their aid dollars are requisitioned and spent. • Providing a greater role for elected municipal governments. This would allow regional • Actually revising the country’s single, councils to advocate for their respective non-transferable vote election law, much communities, work to ensure that key as it seems like a tired refrain. At a bare grievances are heard in the centers of power, minimum, this should include doubling and reduce citizens’ sense of alienation from the amount of proportional representation state affairs. This will require prioritizing in the parliament. With a cautious eye twin draft laws for decentralization and to the long-run, the government should governorate-level councils on the royally- look to settle the issue of proportional defined legislative agenda.38 The government versus tribal representation by exploring should also look towards more imaginative political models whereby the lower house methods of decentralization, such as of parliament is permitted progressive relocating key government ministries towards amounts of proportional representation outlying regions instead of concentrating and the Senate serves to secure more all national institutions (and their second- symbolic representation for key areas. order economic effects) in the capital.
• Loosening press restrictions contained within the country’s press and publications law and reigning in the security services’ harassment of journalists. Continuing to censor dissent will not make it disappear— but it will further isolate the palace and security services from popular concerns.
• Expanding political and financial backing for the Jordanian Anti-Corruption Council, allowing it to steadily combat corruption by methodically pursuing cases, thereby improving public trust in government. The public needs to see concrete outcomes on cases in order to gain a sense of closure. The monarchy should lead by example, reviewing the issue of state lands registered to the monarchy that were later parceled out for various development projects—a key point of contention among the country’s East Banker communities.
38 Rula al-Hroub (member of parliament for Stronger Jordan Party), interview with the authors, Amman, 3 September 2014.
11 Shoring Up Jordan
Even if Jordan’s allies are unwilling to risk of donor money will draw increased scrutiny. leveraging foreign aid to encourage political reform in the Kingdom, all sides seem frustrated With this in mind, both the Kingdom and its with the current aims and mechanisms of aid strategic allies have a clear interest in ensuring provision. In interviews, Jordanian officials that future aid dollars help to fundamentally generally stressed that international support, strengthen Jordan’s institutions and economy given the burden of Syrian refugees and over the long term. A generous Gulf necessary defense spending, was insufficient, Cooperation Council (GCC) grant brokered in misdirected, and often benefitted the Western 2012 can serve as a model in this respect, as it agencies, companies, and NGOs tasked with is providing $3.75 billion over several years to implementing projects.39 On the other hand, help expand and refurbish infrastructure such some foreign officials expressed exasperation as roads, schools, hospitals, water networks, 41 with the sense that Jordanian counterparts etc. were exaggerating their country’s challenges The United States should take a similar approach to wring more funds out of the international as it renews its 5-year Memorandum of community while using these strategic “rents” Understanding with the Kingdom. While U.S. to sidestep the needed substantive reforms in 40 assistance is set to hit $1 billion annually, more public spending or the economy. of these regular, predictable levels of aid should Neither side is necessarily wrong. Western and be channeled into productive investments Gulf countries should certainly move to accept in Jordan’s economic infrastructure. If the significant numbers of Syrian refugees in a show Jordanian government appeals for additional of solidarity with burdened host countries, at money, it should be for projects that could be least to the level of Germany or Sweden, which game-changers for the economy, particularly have committed to hosting around 80,000 energy projects such as bringing a nuclear and 60,000 refugees, respectively. If Jordan’s power plant online by 2019 or the exploration 42 allies remain unwilling to do so, then they of shale oil reserves. should accept a fair measure of inefficiency and A flood of investment money, though, will corruption as a cost of relying on a relatively do little good if stymied by the inefficiencies resource-poor country like Jordan to handle and limited capacity of Jordanian bureaucracy. the problem. At the same time, the Jordanian For example, almost half of the Gulf grant’s government should know that for as long as funds for 2014 went unspent because the the Syrian refugee crisis continues, delays or overburdened Ministry of Planning and discrepancies in the processing and allocation International Cooperation (MPIC) has
39 Senior Ministry of Planning official, interview. 40 Western diplomat, interview with the authors, Amman, 3 September 2014. This divide is also embodied in the numbers referred to for Syrian refugees in the country – Jordanian officials point to some 1.5, even 2 million Syrians in the country, while most outside observers refer to the official number of around 620,000 registered Syrian refugees. 41 $5 billion was initially pledged, with funding split between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. Qatar has yet to disburse any funds of its pledged $1.25 billion. 42 For more on Jordan’s nuclear ambitions and the difficulties contained therein, see Nicholas Seely, “The Battle Over Nuclear Jordan,”Mid - dle East Report 271 (Fall 2014),
Fortress Jordan: 12 Putting the Money to Work struggled to complete enough applications or private interests. Several interviewees also for them.43 Capacity-building is thus a key pointed to the importance of a kind of “executive area where U.S.- and perhaps EU-supported planning council” that, isolated from the day- training can complement existing GCC to-day fundraising and compliance pressures financial backing, ensuring that Jordan’s of the MPIC, could strategically guide and economy benefits quickly while Jordanian expedite development investments.45 bureaucrats gain experience.44 Foreign aid agencies should acquire their implementation As for Israel, while it is unlikely to provide and project management needs from local Jordan with direct economic assistance, companies and NGOs wherever possible— Netanyahu’s administration should broaden UNHCR’s partnership with Jordan-based its support for the Kingdom beyond security IrisGuard and the Cairo-Amman bank to ease service-coordination. While the stalled Israeli- the dispersal of cash payouts is a good example. Palestinian peace process shows few signs of MPIC officials should demand the same when progress, Israeli officials must keep in mind they negotiate foreign aid agreements. the spillover effects of its actions in Gaza, Jerusalem, or the West Bank, especially given For its part, Jordan’s government should work mounting Jordanian-Israeli tension in recent to increase the transparency of the negotiation months.46 If Israel can ultimately settle the and provision of aid. This will strengthen matter of natural gas supplies to the Kingdom, public confidence that development projects it should also quietly coordinate with Jordan to and budget support are improving their daily provide additional water at favorable prices in lives, not being siphoned off due to corruption the event of a desalination surplus.47
43 “Al Rai’s Qadamani on Gulf Cooperation Council’s Grant to Jordan,” The Jordan Times, 1 December 2014,
13 Refugees: Benefit, not Burden
With no end to the prolonged Syrian conflict Jordan had no Minister-level position respon- in sight, it is becoming increasingly evident that sible for refugee affairs, despite the country’s the vast majority of the refugees now residing long history of hosting refugees.51 This is some- in Jordan as a result are facing a protracted what understandable, given Jordanian society’s stay. Clearly, this does not sit well with many sensitivity to formalizing refugees’ status. Still, Jordanian officials, given rising tensions between Jordan’s government should establish a cabinet- the refugees and the communities hosting level official who can serve as the main point of them over mounting competition for jobs and contact for humanitarian agencies as they liaise increased housing and food prices, to say nothing with numerous government bodies such as the of acute water shortages. Polls conducted by Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and the CSS have shown growing popular support Planning, as well as the GID. for closing Jordan off to refugees (see Figure 5), which likely prompted the government to Officials should also permit the World Bank effectively do so in early October.48 On October to undertake an economic and social impact 28, Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh stated flatly assessment of the presence of Syrian refugees, that “the limits of our abilities have been reached” similar to that already completed in Lebanon. in addressing an international conference on the While the government may be wary of such Syrian refugee crisis.49 an analysis showing that Syrian refugees are having a positive impact on Jordan’s economy, As noted previously, the international an objective assessment would reduce community has a clear obligation to support squabbling over the level of the government’s Jordan in serving as a “shock-absorber” for needs. An in-depth analysis would likewise refugees, as King Abdullah bluntly reminded assist the government in effectively distributing his audience at the September meeting of the assistance to affected communities. United Nations General Assembly.50 Yet the Jordanian government also has an obligation Finally, to think a bit more outside the box, both to coordinate support activities within the the Jordanian government and donor nations Kingdom, both to ensure proper receipt and would do well to start viewing the potential disbursal of funds and to provide assistance to contributions of the Syrian refugee population communities hosting refugees. as a development opportunity, rather than solely treating refugees as a burden or security Aid practitioners and Jordanian parliamentar- threat. While their presence exacerbates ians alike noted their surprise at the fact that Jordan’s economic difficulties, it did not create
48 “Istitla‘ lil-ra’i al –‘am,” Center for Strategic Studies. 49 “Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs & Expatriates Affairs His Excellency Nasser Judeh at the International Conference on ‘Syrian Refu- gee Situation—Supporting Stability in the Region’,” Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Washington, D.C., 28 October 2014,
Fortress Jordan: 14 Putting the Money to Work Figure 5: Jordanians Opposed to Receiving Further Syrian Refugees 79% 71% 73% 71% 64% 65% 55%
Sep-11 Oct-12 Dec-12 Apr-13 Jun-13 Nov-13 Aug-14 Source: Jordan Center for Strategic Studies, 2014 Source: Jordan Center for Strategic Studies, 2014 them.52 Syrian refugees clearly want to work, new economic activity, the provision of permits whether to supplement dwindling essential should be presented as complementing—rather support from the UNHCR and the World than competing with—overall efforts to expand Food Programme, to set aside money for the employment. Syrians will inevitably enter the future, or to reclaim dignity by supporting country’s informal economy, especially as donor themselves rather than relying exclusively on funding for cash handouts and food assistance handouts. falters. Yet by formalizing their participation, the Jordanian government can better keep Jordan’s Ministry of Labor should work track of the situation while strengthening the to implement the International Labour country’s overall labor regime. Such programs Organization’s recommendation to grant work could also serve to shift some refugees away permits to Syrians in specific sectors such from the Syrian border in an orderly fashion, as low-skill manufacturing, agriculture, or reducing the Jordanian government’s security construction, where they are less likely to be concerns in this respect. This would also provide seen as directly competing with Jordanians for clear development opportunities to governorates 53 desirable jobs. As the income and consumption further afield. of these workers (and Syrian investors) creates
52 For example, even prior to the refugee crisis Jordan’s economy employed some 400,000 Egyptian laborers, as well as tens of thousands of Indonesians and Bangladeshis in the country’s textiles mills (including the country’s Qualified Industrial Zones) despite high unemploy- ment. 53 Salem Ajluni and Mary Kawar, “The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Labour Market in Jordan: A Preliminary Analysis,” International Labour Organization, 30 April 2014,
15 Emphasizing the Economy
Ultimately, it cannot be stressed enough that overwhelmingly driven by unmet aspirations, if what the King and senior Jordanian officials both political and economic.55 truly fear is the threat of IS-style extremism, then their first priority should be to develop Curbing terrorism and promoting social the economy and make it more inclusive. harmony is not a matter of addressing abject They should seize on the diminished regional poverty through handouts, but of providing “market-share” of Jordan’s conflict-ridden opportunities for individuals who see a stark neighbors—particularly in manufacturing mismatch between their economic expectations and tourism—to promote growth at home. and the unappetizing realities in front of them. Weeks before the announcement of air strikes It is this same climate of unmet expectations in Syria, a senior official at Jordan’s National that has led Jordan to make an outsized Center for Security and Crisis Management contribution to the global jihadi movement, stressed to the authors that “[IS] cannot be including the founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu defeated militarily—you have to destroy Musab al-Zarqawi (of Zarqa, Jordan). popular support for them…. The issue is not Sustained pledges of support to Jordan can [IS], it’s how you face the home front…if we certainly shore up the foundations of its don’t build our society, if we don’t have enough economy, but no matter how well-targeted, socio-economic investment, then no matter 54 foreign capital alone will not produce what we pay in defense it will not be enough.” an economic miracle in the Kingdom. While the King has referred to the economy Furthermore, as the World Bank has warned, as the country’s greatest problem in the continued reliance on foreign aid ties Jordan’s past, chronic economic concerns have never economic well-being to the economic and 56 elicited as dramatic a response as the current political fortunes of donor countries. That campaign against IS. To be sure, economic even the entrenched welfare states of the Gulf reform requires layers of policy, strategy and may consider reigning in spending due to negotiation over the long term rather than falling oil prices underlines the risks of such rapid, clear-cut orders and targets. Still, finding dependence. a way to provide unemployed Jordanians The United States, Europe, and the Gulf with “acceptable employment” and cut down monarchies can encourage investments in on regional inequalities will do far more to Jordan by highlighting key opportunities address the roots of violent extremism than any (such as the country’s free zones and Qualified number of arbitrary arrests or airstrikes. IS is Industrial Zones) or bringing in delegations of reportedly tempting impoverished Jordanians potential investors. These partners can also work with $1000 monthly salaries, but individuals to improve access to Jordanian goods in their that join extremist groups continue to be home markets. Likewise, targeted development
54 Senior official at the National Center for Security and Crisis Management, interview with the authors, Amman, 3 September 2014. 55 See analysis by Mohammed Abu Roman, “Da‘ish wa Nusra hadnan daf’ian lil-shabab!” [ISIS and Nusra Offer “Warm Embrace” for Youth!], al-Araby al-Jadeed, 3 November 2014,
Fortress Jordan: 16 Putting the Money to Work assistance as recommended above would be Jordanian businesses to claim a greater share of pivotal to helping Jordan improve upon its aid- the regional economy. Jordan should also strive dependent, rentier economy. Still, Jordan needs to better define the GCC-Jordan relationship to be receptive to such external efforts, and more to serve Jordanian purposes. It could leverage importantly, to domestic entrepreneurs and its current situation not just to secure more aid investors, as well as those from the Jordanian dollars, but also to press for greater economic diaspora. Specifically, the country must strive to cooperation than the occasional GCC-Jordan improve upon a ranking of 117th on the World economic task force meeting. Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” survey if it is to become an attractive destination for economic The Ministries of Planning, Labor, Trade, and activity.57 While there are larger issues of Social Development should coordinate with the education and bureaucratic red tape to consider, private sector as represented by regional chambers a key first step would be to give real power to of industry and commerce, to see where targeted the Jordanian Investment Board to serve as investments in industry and infrastructure can an actual “single investment” for potential create jobs and generate exports. The country’s investors, allowing them to avoid the frustration technology startup scene, for example, has of numerous, and often corruption prone, layers provided a clear example of government and of bureaucracy. industry working hand-in-hand to develop an increasingly prominent sector of the Jordanian Additionally, even those interviewees who economy.60 criticized foreign support as being wholly inadequate for building a stronger, more Beyond such coordination, the government resilient country conceded that it falls to Jordan’s should use a combination of tax incentives leadership “to put forward a clear vision for the and the strategic granting of labor permits to economy.”58 Though King Abdullah has ordered cheaper non-Jordanian workers to encourage the preparation of a “Jordan 2025” strategic investments in marginalized areas outside vision focused on the next ten years of Jordan’s of major urban areas. Prominent Syrian economy, details remain murky. Even the businesspeople now residing in Jordan should country’s National Resilience Plan, drafted to also be encouraged to invest in the economy by point to key areas of investment over the next establishing or re-establishing businesses that three years, reads more like a wish list for foreign can employ Syrians and Jordanians alike. aid than a strategy for helping the country’s Much will rely on whether Jordan’s ruling elites economy to grow to stand on its own feet. channel their fears about regional instability and extremism into productive action on the While the International Monetary Fund’s economy. That the Kingdom can do so is not structural adjustment program works to “slim unthinkable. Much of Jordan’s initial drive for down” the state—freezing new hires and steadily modernization and industrialization during the reducing subsidies—Jordan’s ruling elite must 1950s came about despite the 1948 war with do more than clear the way for the market to Israel suddenly cutting the Kingdom off from effectively support inclusive growth.59 With traditional markets and forcing it to absorb a the extensive destruction of industrial capacity huge influx of refugees.61 A similar drive today in Syria and now Iraq, the re-orientation of would pay far greater dividends for the country’s major trade routes, and an available, capable resilience than any amount foreign aid or workforce, there is a clear opportunity for military adventurism.
57 World Bank Group, “Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency,” Doing Business, 29 October 2014,http://www.doingbusiness. < org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB15-Full-Report.pdf>. 58 Ibrahim Badran (former minister of education), interview with the authors, Jerash, 1 September 2014. 59 This is explicitly noted in Jordan’s “National Employment Strategy 2011-2020,” Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Coop- eration, June 2012,
17 About the Brookings Doha Center
stablished in 2008, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) is an overseas center of the Brookings Institution Ein Washington, D.C. As a hub for Brookings scholarship in the region, the BDC advances high-quality, independent research and policy analysis on the Middle East and North Africa.
In pursuing its mission, the BDC undertakes field-orientated research and programming that addresses and informs regional and international policy discussions, engaging key elements of governments, businesses, civil society, the media, and academia on four key areas:
(i) The international relations of the Middle East, emphasizing ties within the region as well as regional ties between the Middle East, the United States, and Asia. (ii) Conflict and post-conflict transitions, including security, peace processes and reconstruction. (iii) Economic and fiscal strategies of Middle Eastern states, including the geopolitics and economics of energy. (iv) Governance and institutional reform, including democratization and state-citizen relations.
Open to a broad range of views, the BDC encourages a rich exchange of ideas between the Middle East and the global community. Since its founding, the BDC has hosted a number of leading scholars from a dozen different countries; put on a variety of events, including high-level roundtables, timely policy discussions, and the annual Doha Energy Forum; and published a series of influential Policy Briefings and Analysis Papers. Brookings Doha Center Publications
2015 Fortress Jordan: Putting the Money to Work Policy Briefing, Sultan Barakat and Andrew Leber Back to Gaza: A New Approach to Reconstruction Policy Briefing, Sultan Barakat and Omar Shaban 2014 Profiling the Islamic State Analysis Paper, Charles Lister Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement Analysis Paper, Sultan Barakat
Brookings Doha Energy Forum 2014 Policy Paper Brookings Doha Center – Brookings Energy Security Initiative Report Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War Analysis Paper, Gregory Gause Dynamic Stalemate: Surveying Syria’s Military Landscape Policy Briefing, Charles Lister
Personnel Change or Personal Change? Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law Brookings Doha Center – Stanford Paper, Roman David and Houda Mzioudet
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution Analysis Paper, Monica L. Marks