Dancing with Saddam The Strategic Tango of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations David Schenker THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY Washington, D.C. LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • Oxford LEXINGTON BOOKS Published in the United States of America by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 PO Box 317, Oxford, OX2 9RU, UK Published in cooperation with The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 Washington, D.C. 20036 Copyright © 2003 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Schenker, David Kenneth, 1968- Dancing with Saddam : the strategic tango of Jordanian-Iraqi relations / David Schenker. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7391-0648-1 - ISBN 0-7391-0649-X (pbk.) 1. Jordan—Relations—Iraq. 2. Iraq—Relations—Jordan. I. Title. DS154.16.I72S34 2003 327.56950567 - dc21 2003005605 Printed in the United States of America /""\TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Contents Acknowledgments vii Introduction 1 1 History and Common Identity 5 2 Economics 29 3 Pro-Iraq Elements in Jordan 65 4 The Abdullah Era 91 Conclusion Jordanian-Iraqi Relations and Implications for U.S. Policy 107 Appendix A Saddam Hussein's Letter to the Arab Summit, March 27, 2001 119 Appendix B Palm Oil Case Study 125 Appendix C Text of Marwan Muasher's FTA Letter (to Members of Congress and the Bush Administration) 129 Index 131 About the Author 137 Acknowledgments This study is the product of research conducted during 1999-2001 while I was a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The project was conceived in 1998 during discussions with friends and colleagues—in partic- ular with Professor Abbas Kelidar—and was completed prior to my departure from the Institute in December 2001. The list of those to whom I am indebted is long and starts at the Wash- ington Institute. During my tenure at the institute, Executive Director Robert Satloff was an ideal boss and an excellent editor. Rob's suggestions and sharp editor's pen improved the body of my writings in the years 1998-2001. This study is no exception. The book also benefited from the careful readings and suggestions of Institute deputy director Patrick Clawson. In addition to my colleagues at the institute, I would also like to thank Marin Strmecki and the Smith Richardson Foundation for their generous sup- port of this project. In no small part, this study benefited from the insight gained during two trips to Jordan. In this regard, I am deeply indebted to the dozens of Jordan- ian politicians, businessmen, intellectuals, and royals who spoke with me about a subject that, along with the topic of Jordanian Palestinians, ranks among the more sensitive issues in the Kingdom. Respect for confidentiality precludes the mention of names, but this does not diminish my gratitude. In particular, however, I would like to thank the unabashedly pro-Saddam Khaldoun Abu Hassan, then chairman of the Amman Chamber of Industry. Despite our diametrically opposed views, Mr. Abu Hassan generously volun- teered his time and the resources of his organization to assist with this proj- ect. The chamber's statistics and its chairman's views were an invaluable ad- dition to this study. viii Acknowledgments In addition to these interviewees, I bear a debt of gratitude to Washington Institute Soref Fellow Avi Jorisch, for assisting with (i.e., correcting) my transliterations, and to Ashraf Zeitoon, an aspiring young Jordanian scholar who provided helpful research assistance. Likewise, Institute publications staff Alicia Gansz and George Lopez were, as always, a pleasure to work with. When my first book was published in 2000,1 took the opportunity to thank a cadre of friends and mentors. This group—and a few unnamed but signifi- cant others—remains an important influence in my life and on my thinking, and I am grateful. I would also like to express gratitude to my family for their consistent love and encouragement. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to acknowledge my fiancee and future wife, Jodi Danis. Jodi has for years been my leading supporter and chief counsel. Her patience and perseverance is extraordinary, and I am truly lucky to have found her. Today as I write these acknowledgments, I serve as an adviser in the Of- fice of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon, where among other things, part of my area of responsibility is Jordan. As is customary and obligatory, I should say that this book, which will be published more than a year after my entrance into government, is not a reflection or statement of U.S. government policy. The views expressed herein are mine alone. With the exception of a few minor updates based on public domain ma- terial made in October 2002, the book—including the section on policy recommendations —was written prior to my government service. While the interviews and insight from my colleagues were invaluable, I alone bear responsibility for the content and deficiencies of the text. Transla- tions from the Arabic are mine unless otherwise indicated. Transliteration note: This study employs a system based on that of the In- ternational Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). The only diacritical marks used are 'ayn, indicated by ', and hamza, indicated by ', and only when they appear in the middle of a word. Introduction Of all the states bordering Iraq, none has a set of bilateral relations with Bagh- dad as complex as does the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. These ties exist on several levels. Historically, while the regions that eventually became the modern-day countries of Iraq and Jordan were governed as separate parts of the Ottoman Empire, they came together under the rule of different branches of the Hashemite family from 1921 through 1958. Culturally, Baghdad's tra- ditional orientation has been toward the Fertile Crescent,1 not toward the Per- sian Gulf, as is commonly assumed. And economically, Amman and Baghdad have grown ever closer together, evidenced by Jordan's role as Iraq's princi- pal entrepot, a position it has held for more than twenty years. But, despite the appearance of synergy, the relationship has not been one of equals. Although it has been at war or severely limited or both by interna- tional sanctions since 1990, Iraq is a wealthy state with large reserves of oil, two mighty rivers, and a population of 24 million. Jordan, on the other hand, is a poor state, with less than a quarter of Iraq's population and without much in the way of water or other natural resources. These asymmetries have fos- tered a predictable dynamic. Over the years, Jordan has become economically dependent on Iraq. In turn, Iraqi influence in Jordan has grown strong. The radical nature of Iraqi politics under President Saddam Hussein has placed Jordan in a precarious position. Since its establishment, Jordan's exis- tence has been predicated on the Hashemites' ability to balance between the regional forces of extremism and moderation. Jordan has contended with a Palestinian population widely believed to constitute 60 percent of the King- dom. At the same time, the country has maintained good ties with Iraq, the United States, and Israel. Jordan's relative disadvantage was exacerbated in February 1999 by the death of King Hussein, who had reigned for nearly five decades. Against all 2 Introduction odds, King Hussein had kept the Kingdom afloat among a sea of adversaries, including Palestine Liberation Organization chairman (and later Palestinian Authority ra'is) Yasser Arafat and Syrian president Hafez al-Assad. Since 1979, King Hussein also had to contend with Jordan's sometime friend and sometime foe in Baghdad—Saddam Hussein. On his death, King Hussein was succeeded by his eldest son Abdullah, who, until that point, had served in the military and had little experience in political matters. While succession went smoothly, uncertainty prevailed in the realm. How would Abdullah fare against the likes of Saddam? Almost immediately after his ascent to the throne, King Abdullah set out to address some of the more pressing economic problems facing Jordan. Saddled with debt, plagued with high unemployment, and faced with a sadly stagnant economy, boosting development became the number one priority on Abdullah's agenda. In addition to implementing some deep economic reforms, the new king pursued two initiatives designed to improve the economy. First, he sought to strengthen Jordan's economic relations with the United States. Part of this plan entailed seeking additional foreign assistance dollars. At the same time, the king turned to Iraq—which until that time had been Jordan's largest source of aid—for additional assistance. To this end, in the initial years of his reign, King Abdullah sought to enhance the Kingdom's trade ties with Baghdad. It is easy to understand the Jordanian attraction to Iraq. But economic de- pendence on Baghdad—and by extension on the largesse of Saddam—has not been without its perils to the Jordanian regime. For example, in 2001, Iraq— Jordan's sole supplier of oil—raised its prices from $19 to $21 per barrel. This minor increase amounted to a $170 million overall increase in the King- dom's deficit, essentially making Jordan noncompliant with its International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform program commitments.