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Files, Country File Africa-Congo, Box 86, ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ Report by Department of State, 27 January 1961, 4
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/113873/ This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication. Citation for final published version: Marsh, Stephen and Culley, Tierney 2018. Anglo-American relations and crisis in The Congo. Contemporary British History 32 (3) , pp. 359-384. 10.1080/13619462.2018.1477598 file Publishers page: http://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2018.1477598 <http://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2018.1477598> Please note: Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite this paper. This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders. CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2018.1477598 ARTICLE Congo, Anglo-American relations and the narrative of � decline: drumming to a diferent beat Steve Marsh and Tia Culley AQ2 AQ1 Cardiff University, UK� 5 ABSTRACT KEYWORDS The 1960 Belgian Congo crisis is generally seen as demonstrating Congo; Anglo-American; special relationship; Anglo-American friction and British policy weakness. Macmillan’s � decision to ‘stand aside’ during UN ‘Operation Grandslam’, espe- Kennedy; Macmillan cially, is cited as a policy failure with long-term corrosive efects on 10 Anglo-American relations. -
200 1. Voortrekkers Were Groups of Nineteenth- Century Afrikaners Who
Notes 1. Voortrekkers were groups of nineteenth- century Afrikaners who migrated north from the Cape colony into the South African interior to escape British rule. 2. ‘Township’ is the name given by colonial and later apartheid authorities to underdeveloped, badly resourced urban living areas, usually on the outskirts of white towns and cities, which were set aside for the black workforce. 3. See, for example, Liz Gunner on Zulu radio drama since 1941 (2000), David Coplan on township music and theatre (1985) and Isabel Hofmeyr on the long- established Afrikaans magazine Huisgenoot (1987). 4. In 1984 the NP launched what it called a ‘tricameral’ parliament, a flawed and divisive attempt at reforming the political system. After a referendum among white voters it gave limited political representation to people classi- fied as coloured and Indian, although black South Africans remained com- pletely excluded. Opposition to the system came from both the left and right and voting rates among non- whites remained extremely low, in a show of disapproval of what many viewed as puppet MPs. 5. The State of Emergency was declared in 1985 in 36 magisterial districts. It was extended across the whole country in 1986 and given an extra year to run in 1989. New measures brought in included the notorious 90- day law, in which suspects could be held without trial for 90 days, after which many were released and then re- arrested as they left the prison. 6. According to André Brink, ‘The widespread notion of “traditional Afrikaner unity” is based on a false reading of history: strife and division within Afrikanerdom has been much more in evidence than unity during the first three centuries of white South African history’ (1983, 17). -
UNITED Nations Distr
UNITED NATiONS Distr. GENERAL SECURITY S/5053/Add.12 8 October 1962 COUNCIL ENGLISH ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FROM THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS OF 21 FEBRUARY AND 24 NOVEMBER 1961 A. Build-Up of Katangese Mercenary Strength 1. In recent months) information has been received from various sources about a bUild-up in the strength of the Katanga armed forces) including the continued presence and some influx of foreign mercenaries. 2. It will be recalled that after the Kitona Declaration) signed on 21 December 1961 (S/5038 L Mr. Tshombe) President of the province of Katanga) made it clear to United Nations officials that he proposed to seek a solution to the mercenary problem "once and for all". This undertaking was put in writing in a letter dated 26 January 1962 to the United Nations representative in Elisabethville (S/5053/Add.3) Annex I)) and was repeated in a second letter dated 15 February 1962. 3. However) in spite of this and further declarations of Katangese spokesmen along the same lines as the above-mentioned letters) evidence ''las forthcon,ing to United. Nations authorities that in fact the pledge with regard to the elimination of mercenaries from Katanga was not being kept. 4. The ONUC-Katanga Joint Corrmissions on mercenaries) set up to certify that all foreign mercenaries had left Katanga in conformity with Mr. Tshombe's decision) visited Jadotville and Kipushi on 9 February 1962) and Kolwezi and Bunkeya on 21--23 February. -
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume 2
VOLUME TWO Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report The report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was presented to President Nelson Mandela on 29 October 1998. Archbishop Desmond Tutu Ms Hlengiwe Mkhize Chairperson Dr Alex Boraine Mr Dumisa Ntsebeza Vice-Chairperson Ms Mary Burton Dr Wendy Orr Revd Bongani Finca Adv Denzil Potgieter Ms Sisi Khampepe Dr Fazel Randera Mr Richard Lyster Ms Yasmin Sooka Mr Wynand Malan* Ms Glenda Wildschut Dr Khoza Mgojo * Subject to minority position. See volume 5. Chief Executive Officer: Dr Biki Minyuku I CONTENTS Chapter 1 Chapter 6 National Overview .......................................... 1 Special Investigation The Death of President Samora Machel ................................................ 488 Chapter 2 The State outside Special Investigation South Africa (1960-1990).......................... 42 Helderberg Crash ........................................... 497 Special Investigation Chemical and Biological Warfare........ 504 Chapter 3 The State inside South Africa (1960-1990).......................... 165 Special Investigation Appendix: State Security Forces: Directory Secret State Funding................................... 518 of Organisations and Structures........................ 313 Special Investigation Exhumations....................................................... 537 Chapter 4 The Liberation Movements from 1960 to 1990 ..................................................... 325 Special Investigation Appendix: Organisational structures and The Mandela United -
Inkanyiso OFC 8.1 FM.Fm
21 The suppression of political opposition and the extent of violating civil liberties in the erstwhile Ciskei and Transkei bantustans, 1960-1989 Maxwell Z. Shamase 1 Department of History, University of Zululand [email protected] This paper aims at interrogating the nature of political suppression and the extent to which civil liberties were violated in the erstwhile Ciskei and Transkei. Whatever the South African government's reasons, publicly stated or hidden, for encouraging bantustan independence, by the time of Ciskei's independence ceremonies in December 1981 it was clear that the bantustans were also to be used as a more brutal instrument for suppressing opposition. Both Transkei and Ciskei used additional emergency-style laws to silence opposition in the run-up to both self- government and later independence. By the mid-1980s a clear pattern of brutal suppression of opposition had emerged in both bantustans, with South Africa frequently washing its hands of the situation on the grounds that these were 'independent' countries. Both bantustans borrowed repressive South African legislation initially and, in addition, backed this up with emergency-style regulations passed with South African assistance before independence (Proclamation 400 and 413 in Transkei which operated from 1960 until 1977, and Proclamation R252 in Ciskei which operated from 1977 until 1982). The emergency Proclamations 400, 413 and R252 appear to have been retained in the Transkei case and introduced in the Ciskei in order to suppress legal opposition at the time of attainment of self-government status. Police in the bantustans (initially SAP and later the Transkei and Ciskei Police) targeted political opponents rather than criminals, as the SAP did in South Africa. -
Questions Concerning the Situation in the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville)
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE) 57 QUESTIONS RELATING TO Guatemala, Haiti, Iran, Japan, Laos, Mexico, FUTURE OF NETHERLANDS Nigeria, Panama, Somalia, Togo, Turkey, Upper NEW GUINEA (WEST IRIAN) Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela. A/4915. Letter of 7 October 1961 from Permanent Liberia did not participate in the voting. Representative of Netherlands circulating memo- A/L.371. Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, randum of Netherlands delegation on future and Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory development of Netherlands New Guinea. Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, A/4944. Note verbale of 27 October 1961 from Per- Togo, Upper Volta: amendment to 9-power draft manent Mission of Indonesia circulating statement resolution, A/L.367/Rev.1. made on 24 October 1961 by Foreign Minister of A/L.368. Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Indonesia. Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory A/4954. Letter of 2 November 1961 from Permanent Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Representative of Netherlands transmitting memo- Togo, Upper Volta: draft resolution. Text, as randum on status and future of Netherlands New amended by vote on preamble, was not adopted Guinea. by Assembly, having failed to obtain required two- A/L.354 and Rev.1, Rev.1/Corr.1. Netherlands: draft thirds majority vote on 27 November, meeting resolution. 1066. The vote, by roll-call was 53 to 41, with A/4959. Statement of financial implications of Nether- 9 abstentions, as follows: lands draft resolution, A/L.354. In favour: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, A/L.367 and Add.1-4; A/L.367/Rev.1. Bolivia, Congo Brazil, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Re- (Leopoldville), Guinea, India, Liberia, Mali, public, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo Nepal, Syria, United Arab Republic: draft reso- (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, lution and revision. -
Trc-Media-Sapa-2000.Pdf
GRAHAMSTOWN Jan 5 Sapa THREE OF DE KOCK'S CO-ACCUSED TO CHALLENGE TRC DECISION Three former security branch policemen plan to challenge the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's decision to refuse them and seven of their former colleagues, including Eugene de Kock, amnesty for the 1989 murder of four policemen. De Kock, Daniel Snyman, Nicholaas Janse Van Rensburg, Gerhardus Lotz, Jacobus Kok, Wybrand Du Toit, Nicolaas Vermeulen, Marthinus Ras and Gideon Nieuwoudt admitted responsibility for the massive car bomb which claimed the lives of Warrant Officer Mbalala Mgoduka, Sergeant Amos Faku, Sergeant Desmond Mpipa and an Askari named Xolile Shepherd Sekati. The four men died when a bomb hidden in the police car they were travelling in was detonated in a deserted area in Motherwell, Port Elizabeth, late at night in December 1989. Lawyer for Nieuwoudt, Lotz and Van Rensburg, Francois van der Merwe said he would shortly give notice to the TRC of their intention to take on review the decision to refuse the nine men amnesty. He said the judgment would be taken on review in its entirety, and if it was overturned by the court, the TRC would once again have to apply its mind to the matter in respect of all nine applicants. The applicants had been "unfairly treated", he said and the judges had failed to properly apply their mind to the matter. The amnesty decision was split, with Acting Judge Denzil Potgieter and Judge Bernard Ngoepe finding in the majority decision that the nine men did not qualify for amnesty as the act was not associated with a political objective and was not directed against members of the ANC or other liberation movements. -
We Were Cut Off from the Comprehension of Our Surroundings
Black Peril, White Fear – Representations of Violence and Race in South Africa’s English Press, 1976-2002, and Their Influence on Public Opinion Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität zu Köln vorgelegt von Christine Ullmann Institut für Völkerkunde Universität zu Köln Köln, Mai 2005 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The work presented here is the result of years of research, writing, re-writing and editing. It was a long time in the making, and may not have been completed at all had it not been for the support of a great number of people, all of whom have my deep appreciation. In particular, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Michael Bollig, Prof. Dr. Richard Janney, Dr. Melanie Moll, Professor Keyan Tomaselli, Professor Ruth Teer-Tomaselli, and Prof. Dr. Teun A. van Dijk for their help, encouragement, and constructive criticism. My special thanks to Dr Petr Skalník for his unflinching support and encouraging supervision, and to Mark Loftus for his proof-reading and help with all language issues. I am equally grateful to all who welcomed me to South Africa and dedicated their time, knowledge and effort to helping me. The warmth and support I received was incredible. Special thanks to the Burch family for their help settling in, and my dear friend in George for showing me the nature of determination. Finally, without the unstinting support of my two colleagues, Angelika Kitzmantel and Silke Olig, and the moral and financial backing of my family, I would surely have despaired. Thank you all for being there for me. We were cut off from the comprehension of our surroundings; we glided past like phantoms, wondering and secretly appalled, as sane men would be before an enthusiastic outbreak in a madhouse. -
The Rollback of South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare
The Rollback of South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Program Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt US Air Force Counterproliferation Center Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama THE ROLLBACK OF SOUTH AFRICA’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM by Dr. Stephen F. Burgess and Dr. Helen E. Purkitt USAF Counterproliferation Center Air War College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama The Rollback of South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Program Dr. Stephen F. Burgess and Dr. Helen E. Purkitt April 2001 USAF Counterproliferation Center Air War College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm . Contents Page Disclaimer.....................................................................................................i The Authors ............................................................................................... iii Acknowledgments .......................................................................................v Chronology ................................................................................................vii I. Introduction .............................................................................................1 II. The Origins of the Chemical and Biological Warfare Program.............3 III. Project Coast, 1981-1993....................................................................17 IV. Rollback of Project Coast, 1988-1994................................................39 -
Objecting to Apartheid
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by South East Academic Libraries System (SEALS) OBJECTING TO APARTHEID: THE HISTORY OF THE END CONSCRIPTION CAMPAIGN By DAVID JONES Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS In the subject HISTORY At the UNIVERSITY OF FORT HARE SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR GARY MINKLEY JANUARY 2013 I, David Jones, student number 200603420, hereby declare that I am fully aware of the University of Fort Hare’s policy on plagiarism and I have taken every precaution to comply with the regulations. Signature…………………………………………………………… Abstract This dissertation explores the history of the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) and evaluates its contribution to the struggle against apartheid. The ECC mobilised white opposition to apartheid by focussing on the role of the military in perpetuating white rule. By identifying conscription as the price paid by white South Africans for their continued political dominance, the ECC discovered a point of resistance within apartheid discourse around which white opposition could converge. The ECC challenged the discursive constructs of apartheid on many levels, going beyond mere criticism to the active modeling of alternatives. It played an important role in countering the intense propaganda to which all white South Africans were subject to ensure their loyalty, and in revealing the true nature of the conflict in the country. It articulated the dis-ease experienced by many who were alienated by the dominant culture of conformity, sexism, racism and homophobia. By educating, challenging and empowering white citizens to question the role of the military and, increasingly, to resist conscription it weakened the apartheid state thus adding an important component to the many pressures brought to bear on it which, in their combination, resulted in its demise. -
Glohea 06:Copan 01
6 A Violence of History Accounting for AIDS in Post-apartheid South Africa Didier Fassin I will come and claim you from bones and bullets and violence and AIDS.—Antje Krog, letter-poem “Lullaby for Ntombizana Atoo” On 9 July 2000, the opening day of the Thirteenth International AIDS Conference in Durban, a heated debate broke out in South Africa. The controversy was not over President Thabo Mbeki’s association with Californian dissident circles (Fujimora and Chou 1994), nor his support for the theory that AIDS was caused by poverty rather than of viral origin, nor his claims that antiretroviral drugs were ineffective and toxic (Schneider 2002)—all issues that were already the subject of bitter polemic both within and beyond South Africa (Fassin 2003). On this historic day, the first time an international meeting on AIDS had been held in a Third World city, the argument centered on mortality statistics. The South African Medical Research Council (MRC) had just pub- lished figures on deaths in the country, comparing the data for 1990 and 1999. Over the decade, not only had the number of deaths risen dramati- cally, but also the age profile had changed markedly. The Sunday Times headline on 9 July 2000 (figure 6.1) read, “Young people are dying before their parents.” Malegapuru William Magkoba, director of the MRC and famous within the international scientific community for his condemna- tion of Thabo Mbeki’s heterodoxy, said: “If we had been involved in a major war, that would be the only other thing that could explain the high numbers of young men and young women who are dying in our country” and, because South Africa was at peace, “It can only be explained by the Copyrighted Material SAR Press 113 Didier Fassin Figure 6.1 The violence of statistics. -
ICV20 Lupant.Pub
Emblems of the State of Katanga (1960-1963) Michel Lupant On June 30 1960 the Belgian Congo became the Republic of Congo. At that time Ka- tanga had 1,654,000 inhabitants, i.e. 12.5% of the population of the Congo. On July 4 the Congolese Public Force (in fact the Army) rebelled first in Lower-Congo, then in Leopoldville. On July 8 the mutiny reached Katanga and some Europeans were killed. The leaders of the rebels were strong supporters of Patrice Lumumba. Faced with that situation on July 11 1960 at 2130 (GMT), Mr. Tschombe, Ka- tanga’s President, delivered a speech on a local radio station. He reproached the Cen- tral government with its policies, specially the recruitment of executives from commu- nist countries. Because of the threats of Katanga submitting to the reign of the arbitrary and the communist sympathies of the central government, the Katangese Government decided to proclaim the independence of Katanga.1 At that time there was no Katan- gese flag. On July 13 President Kasa Vubu and Prime Minister Lumumba tried to land at Elisabethville airport but they were refused permission to do so. Consequently, they asked United Nations to put an end to the Belgian agression. On July 14 the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution asking the Belgian troops to leave the Congo, and therefore Katanga. Mr. Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General, considered the United Nations forces had to enter Katanga. Mr. Tschombe opposed that interpreta- tion and affirmed that his decision would be executed by force it need be.