International Conference on Stony Brook, NY, July 15 - 19, 2012

Schedule of Talks

Sunday, July 15 9:00 Asu Ozdaglar (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) - Dynamics in Near-Potential Games 9:45

9:45 - 10:15 Coffee Break Session A: Session B: Session C: Session D: Session E: Session F:

Mechanism Design Matching Knowledge Networks Reputation Computation Nick Bedard Umut Dur Adam Penelope Zehao Hu Dieter (University of (University of Dominiak Hernandez (University of Balkenborg Western Texas at (Virginia (University of Pennsylvania) (University of Ontario) Austin) Polytechnic Valencia) Vanishing Exeter) 10:15 The Tuition Institute & Strategic Beliefs But Polyhedra and - Strategically Exchange State sharing of a Persisting Nash 10:45 Ignorant University) costly Reputation equilibrium Principal "Agreeing to network components: Disagree" Type An elementary Results under construction. Ambiguity Jing Chen Alexander Ziv Hellman Guillem Thomas Pawel (MIT) Teytelboym (Hebrew Martinez Norman Dziewuski Epistemic (University of University of (University of (Oxford) (University of Implementati Oxford) Jerusalem) Valencia) Almost-Rational Oxford) 10:45 on and The Strong stability Deludedly Small world Learning of Equilibria in - Arbitrary- in contractual Agreeing to networks Nash large games 11:15 Belief Auction networks and Agree games Equilibrium with strategic matching without complementarie markets Absolute s Continuity Ville Korpela Takeshi Bassel Manuel Francesc Vianney (University of Suzuki Tarbush Munoz- Dilme Perchet Turku) (Brown (University of Herrera (University of (U. Paris 7) Bayesian University) Oxford) (Rijksuniversit Pennsylvania) Nash Equilibria 11:15 Implementati Assignment Agreeing to eit Reputations with - on with Games with disagree: a Groningen) through uncertainties; 11:45 Partially Path- syntactic Productive Switching Generalization Honest Dependent approach Exchange Costs of Lemke Individuals Preferences Games in Howson Networks algorithm 11:45 - Coffee Break 12:00

12:00 Srihari Govindan (University of Rochester) - Competition for a Majority 12:45

12:45 - Lunch Break 14:15

14:15 Adam (Tauman) Kalai (Microsoft Research) - Dueling Algorithms 15:00

15:00 - Coffee Break 15:15 Session A: Session B: Session C: Session D: Session E: Voting Solution Concepts Incomplete Information Contracts Auctions Peter Tai-Wei Hu Fabien Yutaka Suzuki Eiichiro Kazumori Coughlin (Northwestern Gensbittel (Hosei University) (SUNY at Buffalo) (University of University) (Toulouse School Hierarchical Global Information Aggregation Maryland) Critical of Economics) Pollution Control in Large Double 15:15 Probabilistic Comparisons Repeated Games in Asymmetric Auctions with - Voting between the with Incremental Information Interdependent Values 15:45 Models Nash Information on Environments: A Noncooperative One Side. Continuous-type, Theory and Three-tier Agency Rationalizability Framework

Yingni Guo Michael Trost Xavier Venel Martin Ina Taneva (Yale (Max Planck (University Szydlowski (University of Texas at University) Institute of Toulouse 1 (Northwestern) Austin) 15:45 Information Economics) Capitole) Incentives, Project Disclosure of Private - Sharing and An Epistemic Stochastic games Choice and Information in Auctions 16:15 Voting Rationale for with a more Dynamic with Two-Dimensional Order- informed Multitasking Types Independence controller.

16:15 - Coffee Break 16:45

16:45 Jerome Renault (University Toulouse 1) - Limit values for Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games, and a distance for belief spaces 17:30 Monday, July 16 9:00 Abraham Neyman (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) - Stochastic games with short-stage duration 9:45 9:45 - Coffee Break 10:15 Session A: Session B: Session C: Session D: Session E: Session F: Experimental Repeated Games Cooperative Games IO Theory Applications Alexander Bo Chen Usha Sridhar Pierre Nicolas Raphael Matros (Southern (Ecometrix Fleckinger (Alexandre) Boleslavsky (Lancaster Methodist Research) (Paris School Klein (University of University) University) Pareto of Economics) (University of Miami, School 10:15 All-Pay Auctions A Folk Optimal Incentives for Bonn) of Business) - vs. Lotteries as Theorem for Allocation in Quality in Strongly Grade 10:45 Provisional Fixed- Repeated Coalitional Friendly and Symmetric Inflation and Prize Fundraising Games with Games with Hostile Equilibria in Education Mechanisms: Unequal Exponential Informational Bandit Quality Theory and Discounting Payoffs Environments Games Evidence Leandro Chaves Jonathan Giorgos Bruno Utku Ozan Shah Rego Lhost Stamatopoul Oliveira Candogan Mahmood (Federal University (University of os (Universidade (Massachusetts (University of Pernambuco) Texas at (University of do Porto) Institute of College Mixed Austin) Crete) Strategic Technology) Londdon) 10:45 Equilibrium, Worth the Cooperative optimization Flows and Two New - Collaborative Wait? oligopoly in R&D Decompositio Economic 11:15 Dominance and Cooperation in games with Investment ns of Games: Models for Burning Money: a Repeated boundedly Harmonic and Privacy an experimental Prisoner's rational firms Potential study Dilemma with Games Search Kim Kaivanto Marie Laclau Andreas Ryoji Sawa Ce Huang (Lancaster U.) (HEC Paris) Nohn (University of (Southwestern Community Level Communicatio (Public Choice Wisconsin- University of Natural Resource n in Repeated Research Madison) Finance and Management Network Centre, Turku, An Analysis of Economics, Institutions Work Games with Finland) Stochastic China) 11:15 in (Game) Theory Private Monotonicity Stability in Directed - as Well as in Monitoring of Power in Bargaining Search for 11:45 Practice: Lottery Games with Games with Differentiated Allocation of Restricted Behavioral Goods Fishing Sites Communicatio Agents Implements n Correlated Equilibrium 11:45 - Coffee Break 12:00 12:00 Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University) - Dynamic allocation under limited liability 12:45 12:45 - Lunch Break 14:15 14:15 Pierre Cardaliaguet (Université de Paris Dauphine) - On Long Time Average of Mean Field Games 15:00 15:00 - Coffee Break 15:15 Session A: Session B: Session C: Session D: Session E: Session F: Solution Concepts Knowledge Networks Auctions Political Economy Applications Zsombor Romeo Amrita Hanzhe Yun Wang Christina Zoltan Balanquit Dhillon Zhang (University of Pawlowitsch Meder (University of (University of (University of Pittsburgh) (Paris School of (Maastricht the Philippines) Warwick) Chicago) Bayesian Economics) 15:15 University) Common Belief Employee Optimal Persuasion with Meaning, free - Optimal Revisited referral, social Auction Multiple will, and the 15:45 choice for proximity and Design Under Receivers certification of finite and worker Competition types in a Biblical infinite discipline game horizons Peter Matthias Lang Juan Escobar Tânia Oliveira Jiawen Li Streufert (Max Planck (University of (University of (University of (University of Institute for Chile) Porto) York) Western Research on Self Dynamics of A non- 15:45 Ontario) Collective Governance in Human cooperative - Specifying Goods) Social Decisions approach to the 16:15 nodes as sets The Fog of Networks of Talmud solution of actions Fraud - Information for bankruptcy Mitigating Fraud Transmission problems by Strategic Ambiguity 16:15 - Coffee Break 16:45 16:45 Ludovic Renou (University of Leicester) - Repeated Nash Implementation 17:30 Tuesday, July 17 9:00 Eric Maskin () - Evolution and Repeated Games 9:45 9:45 - Coffee Break 10:15 Session A: Session B: Session C: Session D: Session E: Session F: Stochastic Games Signaling Mechanism Design Matching Learning/Evolution Fairness János Flesch Aaron Bodoh- Alejandro Wonki Jo Cho Axel Bernergård Yaron Azrieli (Maastricht Creed Francetich (University of (Stockholm School (The Ohio State 10:15 University) (Cornell (Stanford GSB) Rochester) of Economics) University) Subgame- University) Endogenous Probabilistic Finite-Population A general - perfection in free Conversations, Informational Assignment: A Mass-Action and existence result

10:45 transition Privacy, and Asymmetries in Two-fold Evolutionary for envy-free games Taboos Dynamic Axiomatic Stability assignments Mechanisms Approach Yehuda Levy Fei Li Ilan Lobel Peter Troyan Jun Honda Steven Brams (Hebrew (University of (NYU) (Stanford (U. of Vienna) (New York University) Pennsylvania) Optimal Long- University) Equilibrium University) 10:45 A Discounted Dynamic Term Supply Strategyproof selection for N-Person Cake- symmetric - Education Contracts with Matching with Cutting: There coordination 11:15 with No Signaling with Asymmetric Sales Minimum May Be No Stationary Nash Dropout and Inventory Quotas games with an Perfect Division Equilibrium Information application to the minimum-effort game Guillaume Tomás Gwenaël Piaser John Nash Panayotis Karol Vigeral Rodríguez (IPAG Business (Princeton Mertikopoulos Szwagrzak (Université Paris- Barraquer School, Paris) University) (CNRS) (University of 11:15 Dauphine) (European Information Plans and Work Higher Order Rochester) A zero-sum University Revelation in for Further Learning and Efficient, fair, - stochastic game Institute) Competing Studies of Evolution in and group

11:45 with compact A Model of Mechanism Cooperative Games strategy-proof action sets and Competitive Games Games Using (re)allocation in no asymptotic Signaling the 'Method of networks value Acceptances'

11:45 - 12:00 Coffee Break 12:00 Robert Kohn (New York University) - Parabolic PDEs and Deterministic Games 12:45

12:45 - 14:15 Lunch Break 14:15 - Celebration of Michel Balinski's 78 years 18:00

18:30 - 22:00 Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn) Wednesday, July 18

9:00 - Celebration of Michel Balinski's 78 years 15:00

15:00 - Coffee Break 15:15

Session A: Session B: Session C: Session D: Session E: Session F: Repeated Games Voting Networks Incomplete Information Auctions Political Economy

Juan Ignacio Zhengjia Norma Jeanne Yumiko Cheng Li Block Jiang Olaizola Hagenbach Baba (University of (Washington A Complete (University of (CNRS, Ecole (Aoyamagak Miami) University in Geometric the Basque Polytechnique, uin Profiling, St. Louis) Representatio Country) France) University) Screening and 15:15 Codes of n of Four- One-way flow Certifiable Pre- Four Unit- Criminal - Conduct, Player network Play Price Recruitment 15:45 Private Weighted formation Communication Auction Information, Voting under Procedures and Repeated Systems constraints Games

Johannes Alessandra Federico Elena Inarra Brian Baisa Uri Weiss Horner Casella Valenciano (University of the (Yale) (The Center for (Yale (Columbia (University of Basque Country) Rank The Study of University) University) the Basque On Payoff Dependent Rationality, The How fast do Vote trading Country) Irrelevant Beliefs Preferences Hebrew 15:45 equilibrium with and Asymmetric and and University) - payoffs without party flow networks Discrimination Auctions The International 16:15 converge in leaders Criminal Court repeated May Encourage games? Occupation

16:15 - Coffee Break 16:45

16:45 Jose Rafael Correa (Universidad de Chile) - Preannounced Pricing Policies with Strategic Consumers 17:30 Thursday, July 19

9:00 William Sudderth (University of Minnesota) - Perfect Information Games with Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs 9:45

9:45 - Coffee Break 10:15 Session A: Session B: Session C: Session D: Session E: Session F: Stochastic Games Learning and Networks Bargaining Auctions and Theory Evolution Discontinuous Games Kimmo Berg Heinrich Emerson Ilwoo Rupei Xu Jie Zheng (Aalto Harald Nax Melo Hwang (University of (Tsinghua University (JHU) (California (University of Minnesota--Twin University) School of The Institute of Pennsylvania) Cities) The Robustness Science) Evolution of Technology) Bargaining Strategyproof of Bubbles in a 10:15 Characterizati Stability Price with Cost Sharing Finite Horizon - on of in competition, Investment on Auction Game Model of 10:45 Equilibrium Decentralized free entry, and the Outside Mechanism for Incomplete Paths in Matching welfare in Option Public Service Information Discounted Markets congested Facilities Stochastic markets Games

Svetlana Daniel Wood Brian Rogers Leyla Derin Sofia Moroni Michael Boyarchenko (Clemson (Northwestern) Karakas (Yale University) Richter (University of University) Cooperation in (Johns Online Auctions (New York 10:45 Texas, Austin) Stable Anonymous Hopkins with a Deadline University) - Preemption Conventions Dynamic Social University) Choice Theory 11:15 games under in Hawk- Networks Bargaining via Levy Dove Games Under Equivalence uncertainty with Many Institutional Players Challenges

Sergei Evan D Sadler Martina Rida Laraki Alberto Pinto Levendorskii (NYU Stern Nikolaeva (CNRS and Ecole (University of (University of School of Gogova Polytechnique) Porto) Leicester) Business) (EBS A Unified On the Stopping time Social Learning Universität für Approach to convergence to 11:15 games under with Network Wirtschaft Equilibrium Walrasian prices - Knightian Uncertainty und Recht) Existence in in random 11:45 uncertainty Incentive Discontinuous matching Contracts and Strategic Games Edgeworthian Institutional economies Labor Market Design 11:45 - Coffee Break 12:00

12:00 Karl Schlag (University of Vienna) - Decision Making in Uncertain and Changing Environments 12:45

12:45 - Lunch Break 14:15

14:15 Marco Scarsini (LUISS) - Existence of equilibria in countable games: an algebraic approach 15:00

15:00 - Coffee Break 15:15

Session A: Session B: Session C: Session D: Repeated Games Finance Cooperative Games Voting

Asaf Plan Maryam Sami José Manuel Zarzuelo Semin Kim (University of (Stony Brook (The Basque Country (The ) Arizona) University) University) Ordinal versus Cardinal 15:15 Returns to scale in Reputational Extending the Nash Voting Rules: A Mechanism - the generation map Concerns and Solution to Choice Design Approach 15:45 of repeated games Financial Contagion Problems with Reference Points

Priyanka Sharma Josune Albizuri Jean Guillaume Forand (Texas A&M (Basque Country (University of Waterloo) University) University) Useless Prevention vs. 15:45 Is more information Monotonicity and the Costly Remediation - always better?: A case Aumann-Shapley cost- 16:15 in credit markets sharing method in the discrete version

16:15 - Coffee Break 16:45

16:45 Bernard DeMeyer (Université de Paris 1) - Risk aversion and price dynamics on the stock market 17:30