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Sergiu HART CURRICULUM VITAE Personal Academic Education Sergiu HART Kusiel{Vorreuter University Professor (Emeritus) Professor (Emeritus) of Economics; Professor (Emeritus) of Mathematics Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Feldman Building, Givat-Ram, 9190401 Jerusalem, Israel phone: +972{2{6584135 ² e-mail: [email protected] fax: +972{2{6513681 ² web page: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart CURRICULUM VITAE Personal ² 1949 Born in Bucarest, Romania ² 1963 Immigrated to Israel ² Married; two daughters Academic Education ² 1967{1970 B.Sc., summa cum laude, Mathematics and Statistics, Tel-Aviv University ² 1970{1971 M.Sc., summa cum laude, Mathematics, Tel-Aviv University; Thesis: \Values of Mixed Games," Supervisor: Robert J. Aumann ² 1972{1976 Ph.D., summa cum laude, Mathematics, Tel-Aviv University; Dissertation: \Cooperative Game Theory Models of Economic Equilibrium," Supervisor: Robert J. Aumann Academic Positions ² 1968{1976 Grading Asistant, Teaching Assistant, and Instructor, Department of Mathematics and Department of Statistics, Tel-Aviv University ² 1976{1979 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Department of Operations Research, and Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University ² 1979{1982 Senior Lecturer, Department of Statistics, School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel-Aviv University 1 Sergiu Hart { C.V. 2 ² 1979{1980 Fellow, Institute for Advanced Studies, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem ² 1982{1985 Associate Professor, Department of Statistics, School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel-Aviv University ² 1984{1985 Visiting Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Harvard University ² 1985{1991 Professor, Department of Statistics, School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel- Aviv University ² 1990{1991 Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Harvard University ² 1991{2016 Professor, Department of Economics and Department of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem ² 1991{1999 Founding Director, Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem ² 1993{ Alice Kusiel and Kurt Vorreuter University Professor, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem ² 2006{2007 Fellow and Research Group Co-Director, Institute for Advanced Studies, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem ² 2012 Fellow, Institute for Advanced Studies, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem ² 2016{ Professor Emeritus of Economics and Professor Emeritus of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Honors Prizes and Awards ² 1998 Rothschild Prize in the Social Sciences ² 2018 Israel Prize in Economics and Statistics ² 2020 ACM SIGecom Test of Time Award Academies ² 2006 Member of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities ² 2019{ Chair of the Humanities Division of the Israeli Academy of Sciences and Humanities ² 2012 Member of Academia Europaea ² 2016 Foreign Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Sergiu Hart { C.V. 3 Societies ² 1985 Fellow of the Econometric Society ² 1999 Charter Member of the Game Theory Society ² 2000{2005 Member of the First Council of the Game Theory Society ² 2013 Fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory ² 2017 Fellow of the Game Theory Society ² 2017 Member of the Advisory Board of the Game Theory Society Distinguished Lectures ² 2000 Cowles Lecture, Yale University ² 2003 Walras-Bowley Lecture, Econometric Society ² 2008 Presidential Address, GAMES 2008: The Third World Congress of the Game Theory Society ² 2009 Harris Lecture, Harvard University ² 2011 Kwan Chao-Chih Distinguished Lecture, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing ² 2012 ACO Distinguished Lecture, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta ² 2013 Don Patinkin Lecture, Israeli Economic Association O±cer ² 2005{2006 President of the Israel Mathematical Union ² 2006{2008 Executive Vice-President of the Game Theory Society ² 2008{2010 President of the Game Theory Society Academic Committees ² 1991{2007 Member of the Academic Committee, Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem ² 1992{2000 Member of the International Advisory Board, New Economic School, Moscow Sergiu Hart { C.V. 4 ² 2006{2011 Member of the Scienti¯c Advisory Board, Hausdor® Center for Mathematics, University of Bonn ² 2008{2019 Chair of the Academic Committee, Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem ² 2020{ Member of the Academic Committee, Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Other ² 1975 Pras Bitachon Israel ² 1994{ A±liated Member, Institute for Decision Sciences { Center for Game Theory in Economics, Stony Brook University ² 2002 Distinguished Honorary Professor, Qingdao University, Qingdao, China ² 2010{2015 Awarded ERC (European Research Council) Advanced Investigator Grant Conferences (Chair and Organizer) ² 1994 \Game Theoretic Approaches to Cooperation," NATO Advanced Study Institute, Stony Brook University, U.S.A. (with Andreu Mas-Colell) ² 1995 \GAMES 95: International Conference on Game Theory and Applications," Jerusalem, Israel (with Abraham Neyman) ² 1996 \International Conference on Game Theory and Applications," Stony Brook University, U.S.A. (with Andreu Mas-Colell) ² 2012 \Game Dynamics Workshop," The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel ² 2013 \Interface of Computation, Game Theory, and Economics," Leibnitz Center for Informatics, Dagstuhl, Germany (with Eva Tardos and Bernhard von Stengel) Editorial ² 1981{1994 Associate Editor, Mathematics of Operations Research ² 1988{1998 Member of the Editorial Board, Games and Economic Behavior ² 1989{2005 Member of the Editorial Board, International Journal of Game Theory ² 2008{ Advisory Editor, Springer Book Series in Game Theory Sergiu Hart { C.V. 5 Supervision of Graduate Students Tel-Aviv University ² Dov Monderer Ph.D. 1986 ² Jonathan Shalev M.B.A. 1988 ² Gilad Koren M.Sc. 1988 ² Eitan Israeli M.Sc. 1989 ² Aviad Heifetz M.Sc. 1990 (co-supervised with Dov Samet) ² Amit Pazgal M.Sc. 1990 The Hebrew University of Jerusalem ² Nir Dagan Ph.D. 1995 (co-supervised with Eyal Winter) ² Mor Amitai Ph.D. 1996 ² Igal Milchtaich Ph.D. 1996 (co-supervised with Uzi Motro and Bezalel Peleg) ² Sigal Leviatan M.Sc. 1998 ² Amotz Cahn M.Sc. 1999 ² Ziv Gorodeisky M.Sc. 2002 ² Tomer Wexler M.Sc. 2005 ² Yakov Babichenko M.Sc. 2007 ² Ziv Gorodeisky Ph.D. 2008 ² Omer Lev M.Sc. 2010 ² Yakov Babichenko Ph.D. 2012 ² Ziv Hellman Ph.D. 2012 (co-supervised with Dov Samet) ² Nadav Amir M.Sc. 2014 ² Ohad Navon M.Sc. 2015 ² Yannai Gonczarowski Ph.D. 2018 (co-supervised with Noam Nisan) ² Tomer Siedner Ph.D. student Sergiu Hart { C.V. 6 ² Ran Ben-Moshe M.Sc. student May 2021.
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