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2Majors and Minors.Qxd.KA APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND STATISTICS Spring 2007: updates since Fall 2006 are in red Applied Mathematics and Statistics (AMS) Major and Minor in Applied Mathematics and Statistics Department of Applied Mathematics and Statistics, College of Engineering and Applied Sciences CHAIRPERSON: James Glimm UNDERGRADUATE PROGRAM DIRECTOR: Alan C. Tucker UNDERGRADUATE SECRETARY: Elizabeth Ahmad OFFICE: P-139B Math Tower PHONE: (631) 632-8370 E-MAIL: [email protected] WEB ADDRESS: http://naples.cc.sunysb.edu/CEAS/amsweb.nsf Students majoring in Applied Mathematics and Statistics often double major in one of the following: Computer Science (CSE), Economics (ECO), Information Systems (ISE) Faculty Bradley Plohr, Adjunct Professor, Ph.D., he undergraduate program in Princeton University: Conservation laws; com- Hongshik Ahn, Associate Professor, Ph.D., Applied Mathematics and Statistics putational fluid dynamics. University of Wisconsin: Biostatistics; survival Taims to give mathematically ori- analysis. John Reinitz, Professor, Ph.D., Yale University: ented students a liberal education in quan- Mathematical biology. Esther Arkin, Professor, Ph.D., Stanford titative problem solving. The courses in University: Computational geometry; combina- Robert Rizzo, Assistant Professor, Ph.D., Yale this program survey a wide variety of torial optimization. University: Bioinformatics; drug design. mathematical theories and techniques Edward J. Beltrami, Professor Emeritus, Ph.D., David Sharp, Adjunct Professor, Ph.D., that are currently used by analysts and Adelphi University: Optimization; stochastic California Institute of Technology: Mathematical researchers in government, industry, and models. physics. science. Many of the applied mathematics Yung Ming Chen, Professor Emeritus, Ph.D., Ram P. Srivastav, Professor, D.Sc., University of courses give students the opportunity to New York University: Partial differential equa- Glasgow; Ph.D., University of Lucknow: Integral develop problem-solving techniques using equations; numerical solutions. tions; inverse problems. campus computing facilities. Yuefan Deng, Professor, Ph.D., Columbia Zheng Su, Assistant Professor, Ph.D., Stanford University: Computational fluid dynamics; University: Biostatistics. About half of the Applied Mathematics parallel computing. Michael Taksar, Professor Emeritus, Ph.D., majors enter graduate or professional Daniel Dicker, Professor Emeritus, D. Eng. Sci., Cornell University: Stochastic processes. programs, primarily in statistics, opera- Columbia University: Civil engineering. Reginald P. Tewarson, Professor Emeritus, tions research, computer science, and Eugene Feinberg, Professor, Ph.D., Vilnius Ph.D., Boston University: Numerical analysis; business management. Others go directly University: Operations research. biomathematics. into professional careers as actuaries, Stephen Finch, Professor, Ph.D., Princeton Alan C. Tucker, Distinguished Teaching programmer analysts, management University: Applied statistics. Professor, Ph.D., Stanford University: trainees, and secondary school teachers. Combinatorics; applied models. Recipient of Robert Frey, Research Professor, Ph.D., Stony the State University Chancellor’s Award for While some career-oriented course Brook University: Operations research. Excellence in Teaching, 1974. sequences are listed below, students are James Glimm, Distinguished Professor, Ph.D., Yongmin Zhang, Assistant Professor, Ph.D., strongly encouraged to seek faculty Columbia University: Mathematical physics; University of Chicago: Computational fluid advice in coordinating their career plans nonlinear physics. dynamics; numerical analysis. with their academic programs. In the David Green, Assistant Professor, Ph.D., MIT: Wei Zhu, Associate Professor, University of spring of their junior year, all students Computational biology. California, Los Angeles: Biostatistics. contemplating graduate studies, upon John Grove, Adjunct Professor, Ph.D., Ohio graduation or at a later date, should con- State University: Conservation laws; computa- sult with the Department’s graduate tional fluid dynamics. Affiliated Faculty Hussein Badr, Computer Science placement advisor, who assists them in Jiaqiao Hu, Assistant Professor, Ph.D., Michael Bender, Computer Science choice of schools and provides information University of Maryland: Stochastic models. about Graduate Record Examinations, Pradeep Dubey, Economics Xiaolin Li, Professor, Ph.D., Columbia University: etc. Students considering secondary Computational applied mathematics. David Ferguson, Technology and Society school mathematics teaching can major in Brent Lindquist, Professor, Ph.D., Cornell Abraham Neyman, Economics Applied Mathematics and Statistics or in University: Computational fluid dynamics; Steven Skiena, Computer Science Mathematics. reservoir modeling. Recipient of the State University Chancellor's Award for Excellence in Jadranka Skorin-Kapov, College of Business Teaching, 2002. Judith Tanur, Sociology Nancy Mendell, Professor, Ph.D., University of Adjunct Faculty North Carolina, Chapel Hill: Biostatistics; statis- tical genetics. Estimated number: 2 Joseph Mitchell, Professor, Ph.D., Stanford Teaching Assistants University: Computational geometry. Recipient Estimated number: 30 of the State University Chancellor’s Award for Excellence in Teaching, 1996. 108 http://www.stonybrook.edu/ugbulletin Spring 2007: updates since Fall 2006 are in red APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND STATISTICS Courses Offered in Applied Sample Course Sequence for the Mathematics and Statistics Major in Applied Mathematics and Statistics See the Course Descriptions listing in this Bulletin for complete information. Freshman Fall Credits Spring Credits AMS 101-C Applied Precalculus First Year Seminar 101 1 First Year Seminar 102 1 AMS 102-C Elements of Statistics D.E.C. A 3 AMS 161* 3 AMS 151* 3 D.E.C. 3 AMS 110 Probability and Statistics in D.E.C. 3 D.E.C. 3 the Life Sciences D.E.C. 3 CSE 110* 3 AMS 151-C, 161-C Applied Calculus I, II Total 13 D.E.C. 3 Total 16 AMS 201 Matrix Methods and Models AMS 210 Applied Linear Algebra AMS 261 Applied Calculus III Sophomore Fall Credits Spring Credits AMS 210 3 AMS 301 3 AMS 300 Writing in Applied AMS 261 4 AMS 310 3 Mathematics D.E.C. 3 Elective 3 AMS 301 Finite Mathematical D.E.C. 3 AMS Upper-Division elective 3 Structures D.E.C. 3 AMS Upper-Division elective 3 Total 16 Total 15 AMS 303 Graph Theory AMS 310 Survey of Probability and Statistics Junior Fall Credits Spring Credits AMS 311 Probability Theory AMS Upper-Division elective 3 Upper-Division elective 3 AMS 312 Mathematical Statistics Upper-Division elective 3 Upper-Division elective 3 AMS 315 Data Analysis AMS Upper-Division elective 3 Related Area course** 3 AMS Upper-Division elective D.E.C. 3 AMS 318 Theory of Interest or ECO 321 3-4 Elective 3 AMS Upper-Division elective 3 AMS 321 Computer Projects in Applied Total 15 Total 15-16 Mathematics AMS 322 Groundwater Modeling AMS 326 Numerical Analysis Senior Fall Credits Spring Credits AMS 300 1 Related Area course** 3 AMS 331 Mathematical Modeling Upper-Division elective 3 Related Area course** 3 AMS 335 Game Theory Upper-Division elective 3 Elective 3 AMS 341 Operations Research I: Related Area course** 3 Elective 3 Deterministic Models Related Area course** 3 Elective 3 Elective 3 Total 15 AMS 342 Operations Research II: Total 16 Stochastic Models AMS 345 Computational Geometry * See A. 1. for alternate course selections. AMS 351 Applied Algebra **Consult the department for appropriate courses. AMS 361 Applied Calculus IV: Differential Equations AMS 394 Statistical Laboratory Acceptance into the Applied Requirements for the Major in AMS 410 Actuarial Mathematics Mathematics and Statistics Major Applied Mathematics and AMS 421 Statistical Quality Control and Qualified freshman and transfer stu- Statistics (AMS) Design of Experiments dents who have indicated their interest The major in Applied Mathematics and AMS 441 Business Enterprise in the major on their applications are Statistics leads to the Bachelor of AMS 475 Undergraduate Teaching accepted directly into the major upon Science degree. Practicum admission to the University. Students Completion of the major requires who did not apply for the major and approximately 60 credits. AMS 487 Research in Applied those who were not accepted into the Mathematics major when they entered the University A. Study Within the Area of the Major AMS 492 Topics in Applied Mathematics may apply directly to the Department 1. AMS 151, 161 Applied Calculus I, II only after completion of AMS 161 or AMS 210 or MAT 211 Applied MAT 132 or 142 or 127; AMS 210 or MAT Linear Algebra 211; and CSE 110 or 114 or 130 or ESG AMS 261 or MAT 203 or MAT 205 111 or MEC 111 or 112. Applied Calculus III http://www.stonybrook.edu/ugbulletin 109 APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND STATISTICS Spring 2007: updates since Fall 2006 are in red Note: The following alternate calcu- B. Study in Related Areas Recommendations for lus course sequences may be substi- To gain a background in fields that Students Majoring in tuted for AMS 151, 161 in major generate mathematical applications, Applied Mathematics and Statistics requirements or prerequisites: a minimum of 14 additional credits The Department encourages students to MAT 125, 126, 127 are chosen from among the course have a broad exposure to many types of or MAT 131, 132 offerings in appropriate social mathematical reasoning and to its diverse sciences, the natural sciences, and roles in the social and natural sciences. or
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