International Conference on Game Theory Stony Brook, NY, July 15 - 19, 2012 Schedule of Talks Sunday, July 15 9:00 Asu Ozdaglar (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) - Dynamics in Near-Potential Games 9:45 9:45 - 10:15 Coffee Break Session A: Session B: Session C: Session D: Session E: Session F: Mechanism Design Matching Knowledge Networks Reputation Computation Nick Bedard Umut Dur Adam Penelope Zehao Hu Dieter (University of (University of Dominiak Hernandez (University of Balkenborg Western Texas at (Virginia (University of Pennsylvania) (University of Ontario) Austin) Polytechnic Valencia) Vanishing Exeter) 10:15 The Tuition Institute & Strategic Beliefs But Polyhedra and - Strategically Exchange State sharing of a Persisting Nash 10:45 Ignorant University) costly Reputation equilibrium Principal "Agreeing to network components: Disagree" Type An elementary Results under construction. Ambiguity Jing Chen Alexander Ziv Hellman Guillem Thomas Pawel (MIT) Teytelboym (Hebrew Martinez Norman Dziewuski Epistemic (University of University of (University of (Oxford) (University of Implementati Oxford) Jerusalem) Valencia) Almost-Rational Oxford) 10:45 on and The Strong stability Deludedly Small world Learning of Equilibria in - Arbitrary- in contractual Agreeing to networks Nash large games 11:15 Belief Auction networks and Agree games Equilibrium with strategic matching without complementarie markets Absolute s Continuity Ville Korpela Takeshi Bassel Manuel Francesc Vianney (University of Suzuki Tarbush Munoz- Dilme Perchet Turku) (Brown (University of Herrera (University of (U. Paris 7) Bayesian University) Oxford) (Rijksuniversit Pennsylvania) Nash Equilibria 11:15 Implementati Assignment Agreeing to eit Reputations with - on with Games with disagree: a Groningen) through uncertainties; 11:45 Partially Path- syntactic Productive Switching Generalization Honest Dependent approach Exchange Costs of Lemke Individuals Preferences Games in Howson Networks algorithm 11:45 - Coffee Break 12:00 12:00 Srihari Govindan (University of Rochester) - Competition for a Majority 12:45 12:45 - Lunch Break 14:15 14:15 Adam (Tauman) Kalai (Microsoft Research) - Dueling Algorithms 15:00 15:00 - Coffee Break 15:15 Session A: Session B: Session C: Session D: Session E: Voting Solution Concepts Incomplete Information Contracts Auctions Peter Tai-Wei Hu Fabien Yutaka Suzuki Eiichiro Kazumori Coughlin (Northwestern Gensbittel (Hosei University) (SUNY at Buffalo) (University of University) (Toulouse School Hierarchical Global Information Aggregation Maryland) Critical of Economics) Pollution Control in Large Double 15:15 Probabilistic Comparisons Repeated Games in Asymmetric Auctions with - Voting between the with Incremental Information Interdependent Values 15:45 Models Nash Information on Environments: A Noncooperative One Side. Continuous-type, Theory and Three-tier Agency Rationalizability Framework Yingni Guo Michael Trost Xavier Venel Martin Ina Taneva (Yale (Max Planck (University Szydlowski (University of Texas at University) Institute of Toulouse 1 (Northwestern) Austin) 15:45 Information Economics) Capitole) Incentives, Project Disclosure of Private - Sharing and An Epistemic Stochastic games Choice and Information in Auctions 16:15 Voting Rationale for with a more Dynamic with Two-Dimensional Order- informed Multitasking Types Independence controller. 16:15 - Coffee Break 16:45 16:45 Jerome Renault (University Toulouse 1) - Limit values for Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games, and a distance for belief spaces 17:30 Monday, July 16 9:00 Abraham Neyman (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) - Stochastic games with short-stage duration 9:45 9:45 - Coffee Break 10:15 Session A: Session B: Session C: Session D: Session E: Session F: Experimental Repeated Games Cooperative Games IO Theory Applications Alexander Bo Chen Usha Sridhar Pierre Nicolas Raphael Matros (Southern (Ecometrix Fleckinger (Alexandre) Boleslavsky (Lancaster Methodist Research) (Paris School Klein (University of University) University) Pareto of Economics) (University of Miami, School 10:15 All-Pay Auctions A Folk Optimal Incentives for Bonn) of Business) - vs. Lotteries as Theorem for Allocation in Quality in Strongly Grade 10:45 Provisional Fixed- Repeated Coalitional Friendly and Symmetric Inflation and Prize Fundraising Games with Games with Hostile Equilibria in Education Mechanisms: Unequal Exponential Informational Bandit Quality Theory and Discounting Payoffs Environments Games Evidence Leandro Chaves Jonathan Giorgos Bruno Utku Ozan Shah Rego Lhost Stamatopoul Oliveira Candogan Mahmood (Federal University (University of os (Universidade (Massachusetts (University of Pernambuco) Texas at (University of do Porto) Institute of College Mixed Austin) Crete) Strategic Technology) Londdon) 10:45 Equilibrium, Worth the Cooperative optimization Flows and Two New - Collaborative Wait? oligopoly in R&D Decompositio Economic 11:15 Dominance and Cooperation in games with Investment ns of Games: Models for Burning Money: a Repeated boundedly Harmonic and Privacy an experimental Prisoner's rational firms Potential study Dilemma with Games Search Kim Kaivanto Marie Laclau Andreas Ryoji Sawa Ce Huang (Lancaster U.) (HEC Paris) Nohn (University of (Southwestern Community Level Communicatio (Public Choice Wisconsin- University of Natural Resource n in Repeated Research Madison) Finance and Management Network Centre, Turku, An Analysis of Economics, Institutions Work Games with Finland) Stochastic China) 11:15 in (Game) Theory Private Monotonicity Stability in Directed - as Well as in Monitoring of Power in Bargaining Search for 11:45 Practice: Lottery Games with Games with Differentiated Allocation of Restricted Behavioral Goods Fishing Sites Communicatio Agents Implements n Correlated Equilibrium 11:45 - Coffee Break 12:00 12:00 Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University) - Dynamic allocation under limited liability 12:45 12:45 - Lunch Break 14:15 14:15 Pierre Cardaliaguet (Université de Paris Dauphine) - On Long Time Average of Mean Field Games 15:00 15:00 - Coffee Break 15:15 Session A: Session B: Session C: Session D: Session E: Session F: Solution Concepts Knowledge Networks Auctions Political Economy Applications Zsombor Romeo Amrita Hanzhe Yun Wang Christina Zoltan Balanquit Dhillon Zhang (University of Pawlowitsch Meder (University of (University of (University of Pittsburgh) (Paris School of (Maastricht the Philippines) Warwick) Chicago) Bayesian Economics) 15:15 University) Common Belief Employee Optimal Persuasion with Meaning, free - Optimal Revisited referral, social Auction Multiple will, and the 15:45 choice for proximity and Design Under Receivers certification of finite and worker Competition types in a Biblical infinite discipline game horizons Peter Matthias Lang Juan Escobar Tânia Oliveira Jiawen Li Streufert (Max Planck (University of (University of (University of (University of Institute for Chile) Porto) York) Western Research on Self Dynamics of A non- 15:45 Ontario) Collective Governance in Human cooperative - Specifying Goods) Social Decisions approach to the 16:15 nodes as sets The Fog of Networks of Talmud solution of actions Fraud - Information for bankruptcy Mitigating Fraud Transmission problems by Strategic Ambiguity 16:15 - Coffee Break 16:45 16:45 Ludovic Renou (University of Leicester) - Repeated Nash Implementation 17:30 Tuesday, July 17 9:00 Eric Maskin (Harvard University) - Evolution and Repeated Games 9:45 9:45 - Coffee Break 10:15 Session A: Session B: Session C: Session D: Session E: Session F: Stochastic Games Signaling Mechanism Design Matching Learning/Evolution Fairness János Flesch Aaron Bodoh- Alejandro Wonki Jo Cho Axel Bernergård Yaron Azrieli (Maastricht Creed Francetich (University of (Stockholm School (The Ohio State 10:15 University) (Cornell (Stanford GSB) Rochester) of Economics) University) Subgame- University) Endogenous Probabilistic Finite-Population A general - perfection in free Conversations, Informational Assignment: A Mass-Action and existence result 10:45 transition Privacy, and Asymmetries in Two-fold Evolutionary for envy-free games Taboos Dynamic Axiomatic Stability assignments Mechanisms Approach Yehuda Levy Fei Li Ilan Lobel Peter Troyan Jun Honda Steven Brams (Hebrew (University of (NYU) (Stanford (U. of Vienna) (New York University) Pennsylvania) Optimal Long- University) Equilibrium University) 10:45 A Discounted Dynamic Term Supply Strategyproof selection for N-Person Cake- symmetric - Stochastic Game Education Contracts with Matching with Cutting: There coordination 11:15 with No Signaling with Asymmetric Sales Minimum May Be No Stationary Nash Dropout and Inventory Quotas games with an Perfect Division Equilibrium Information application to the minimum-effort game Guillaume Tomás Gwenaël Piaser John Nash Panayotis Karol Vigeral Rodríguez (IPAG Business (Princeton Mertikopoulos Szwagrzak (Université Paris- Barraquer School, Paris) University) (CNRS) (University of 11:15 Dauphine) (European Information Plans and Work Higher Order Rochester) A zero-sum University Revelation in for Further Learning and Efficient, fair, - stochastic game Institute) Competing Studies of Evolution in and group 11:45 with compact A Model of Mechanism Cooperative Games strategy-proof action sets and Competitive Games Games Using (re)allocation in no asymptotic Signaling the 'Method of networks value Acceptances' 11:45 - 12:00 Coffee Break 12:00 Robert Kohn (New York University) - Parabolic PDEs and Deterministic Games 12:45 12:45