70-3166 ATTUQUAYEFIO, J r ., Re Sumo, 1931- THE ANTECEDENTS OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN DIPLOMACY (A THEORETICAL STUDY OF INTERTRIBAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN TRADITIONAL AFRICA).
The American University, Ph.D., 1969 Political Science, international law and relation s
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
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RE SUMO ATTUQUAYEFIO, JR.
...... j 19701 THE ANTECEDENTS OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN DIPLOMACY (A THEORETICAL STODY OF INTERTRIBAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN TRADITIONAL AFRICA)
by Re Sumo Attuquayefio, Jr.
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in
International Relations
Signatures of Committee: r
Chairman;
Dean c of International Service
Date:
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
^he American University AUG 7 1969 Washington, D.C. WASHINGTON. D. C. TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION: THE TRADITIONAL AFRICAN POLITIES: WORKING HYPOTHESES...... 1
II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF TRADITIONAL AFRICA...... 17
III. WAR IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM...... 39
IV. TRADITIONAL AFRICAN DIPLOMACY...... 72
V. LAW AND POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM...... 95
VI. TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS...... 110
VII. THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY...... 141
VIII. CONCLUSION;...... 178
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 184 CHAPTER I
THE TRADITIONAL AFRICAN POLITIES: WORKING. HYPOTHESES
Introduction
Africa is a vast and diverse continent. It is vast as to Size and diverse as to physiography, climate, re
sources, and the composition of its population.
The continent, before the coming of the European, was dominated largely by "tribes". In peopling the con
tinent, the "tribes" traversed zone after zone of con
trasting climate, soil, and vegetation, not only to
ecologically adjust but also to strike a sort of ecolog
ical equilibrium with their environment. A perpetual movement across the vast land mass of the continent could be readily imagined, and it could be easily conceived that
land or territorial claims were made which were highly
prized and coveted. Survival must have been, more likely
than not, the major factor in the migrations. I It is highly likely that once they had acquired land
the "tribes" began to further their culture: "they brought in cereals and began cultivating them, learned how
to raise cattle, adapted metal tools and weapons to their
own use, undertook mining and smelting and forging on a
1 continental scale, borrowed crops from other lands, in troduced soil conservation and terrace agriculture where hillsides needed these, discovered the medicinal value of a host of herbs and plants, and worked out their own explanations of mankind and the universe."'*' The ground work for African culture and civilization was laid.
It is not improbable that in that struggle for territorial land some "tribal" political systems were able to incorporate and assimilate others or to evolve new patterns in power and efficiency. If one allowed the existence and knowledge of metallurgy, then it could be asserted that potentially the "tribes" equipped with the new techniques for making tools and weapons were at a superior advantage and they could augment their own food supply, especially in Western Africa, to support a growing population.
Furthermore, it could be hypothesized that with the discovery and spread of metals, the trend towards
■*-Basil Davidson, Which Way Africa? The Search for a New Society. Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1964; p. 27.
^The knowledge of metallurgy was not initially universal throughout Africa. It had however, spread to virtually every African Society between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries.
2 urbanism, possibly in the Nile region and Eastern and u Western Sudan, increased, and another population expan- t * sion began which reached an eventual culmination in the
establishment of states and empires.
The expansion in the numbers of Africa's "tribes"
or peoples involved a corresponding expansion in terres
trial or land space. Additional lives could be supported
only by cultivating new plots of land and finding new
pastures for growing flocks and herds. Conceivably,
those "tribes" that were better equipped often expanded
at the expense of those that were not so fortunate. And
the latter, it is also conceivable, did not always sub
mit passively to expulsion or extinction; rather, it would seem, they sometimes adopted and adapted the tech
niques of the encroaching comers, or lived symbiotically
with them. In the long run various cultures met. Prox
imity gave opportunity for exchanging of experiences and
for pooling of technical knowledge.
But contact could not likely have been always ami
cable. For each and all were competing for the same sort
of land, and there was not an infinite supply. Presum
ably, wars of conquests were fought to establish primacy
and paramountcy in environments already held by earlier
3 cultures and civilizations.
The aggressive attitude of some of the "tribes" eventuated in migrations and, in some cases, the crea tion of mixed cultures - spiritual and material. No doubt divergent traditions developed to reflect differ ent experiences, and also different responses to differing environments. In the sequel, however, the political framework.requisite for the consolidation of social organizations, for maintaining authority and for prosecut ing war or defense was forged. It may be said that in the relations■of traditional African "tribes" the acquisition of the art of metallurgy was quite instrumental in deter mining the course of subsequent development and the rela tions of the political systems.
THE PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFRICAN POLITIES
Although the historical and cultural settings of the traditional African polities varied greatly, they had cer tain common features in the patterns of their development.
The initiative for bringing these polities into being came, probably, from, the rulers.'*' These rulers, inmost
■*"The term "rulers" is here used to mean kings, em perors, elders, and collective leadership. Where there were no rulers someone almost always rose to a position of pre-eminence as to demand obedience and respect, and some following. See Lucy Mair, Primitive Government. Baltimore, 1962; passim.
4 instances, came from established patrilineal, matrilineal princely or "professional" families, or usurpers from lower-class origins, who essayed to create new dynasties or to conquer new territories. They- were often conquerors, who attempted to subdue various territories and establish their own rule over them.
Usually., such rulers emerged during periods of crises, or disintegration of the existing political system or of acute upheaval within it. Usually, they had their own vision of political goals, peace and order, and attempted to transmit them to their newly established political regimes or to, at least, partsoof the conquered territor ies .
The resultant differentiae of political goals fre quently led to intrigues and open warfare and, therefore, the rulers had to secure; allies, whether passive or active, who could help them achieve their goals. In order to utilize these allies to mobilize necessary re sources and to implement their policies both as to in ternal and external conditions, the rulers had to forge various instruments of power - political and administra tive, diplomatic - strategic - with which to perpetuate the political system.
5 THE MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS
The political systems which underwent and those which survived this push and pull of the political
struggle of "tribal" reshuffling of the African Conti nent may be classified into two broad categories: iriini- mal and maximal.
Minimal political systems may be simply defined as
systems espousing little or no "formal" centralized
political structures; maximal political systems as those with recognizable hierarchies of political power and ex
plicit patterns of bureaucratic authority.
Despite this distinction, these political systems manifested the following basic characteristics:
First, each operated within a territorial
domain.
Second, there existed in each some special
ized form of administration or government.
Third, each maintained a population within
its boundaries.
•*-The concepts "minimal and maximal" are used here to overcome the difficulties inherent in the. state - state less dichotomy of Fortes and Evans - Pritchard, African Political Systems, Oxford, 1940, 5-6. Southall's dichotomy between pyramidal and hierarchical systems approximates the writer's conception of minimal and maximal political sys tems. See Aidan Southall, Alur Society. Cambridge, 1956, pp. 250-251.
6 Fourth, each had the capacity, potential
or manifest, to enter foreign relations.
Both minimal and maximal states, in short, defined or were able to define, through their types of government, both the mode of life within and the mode of conduct out side the territoriality of their political society.
A major implicate of the above characteristics is sovereignty. The sovereignty of the traditional African
State, not unlike that of the modern state, has deep his torical roots. Without going into detailed analysis, it could be hypothesized that adjustment and adaptation to the geographical environment ostensibly brought home to the African peoples the meaning and significance of ter restrial space, because space defined social organization and delimited its community character.
The collectivity occupying a given terrestrial space or territory regarded itself as the owner of that space
or territory and any infringement of its integrity be came automatically a casus belli. Historical occupation
of territory, in other words, defined the international
order.
■^•Sovereignty here means the total or integral in dependence - political, economic, cultural, military - and internal development of the traditional African State.
7 Territory may have been a major stake of conflict in inter-African politics. It was vital to the agricul turalist as well as the pastoralist in their scheme of things. It: offered possibilities for all, and what was more important, it bore the sacred remains of the ances tors. To the rulers and the collectivity, possession of the soil seemed to provide the essential basis on which to develop,: and to exercise political power. Hence, the exclusiveness and strong individualist tendencies of traditional African polities.
Closely associated with this exclusivism was the tendency of, each "tribal" polity to exclude from its jurisdiction any exercise of alien sovereignty. Each polity may have feared encroachments by another, pro portionate to the degree of cultural difference and bellicosity and also of the capacity to embark upon a successful invasion.
Thus, the reduction of terrestial space into dis tant political units, composed of human groups, not only seem to have demarcated the zones of sovereign independ ence but also to have progressively widened the zones of
3-The resistance of many traditional African states to the incidence of colonialism lends some support to this postulate.
8 peace. In the order of their simply juxtaposed existence, the plurality of "tribal" African polities would appear to have fostered, more or less intensely, a reality of power politics.
THE PROBLEM OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE TRADITIONAL
AFRICAN STATES
Prima Facie, international relations may have com menced in traditional Africa as soon as societies evolved and political communities came into close contact with one another. These political communities by the inner: logic of their evolution necessarily ..represented separ ate loyalties and orientations. The coexistence of separate loyalties and orientations posited by a galaxy of differentiated political systems would seem to pos tulate incompatibilities in the preservation, continu ation or disposition of their elements and resources.
The different political activities and orientation attendant upon such a coexistence would almost inevit ably lead to "stress" conditions and, therefore, to conflict and hostility. Without any formal institu tional structure to grapple with problems with which they would have to deal, the rulers of the political
9 systems would re.spond to the external demands in the only way that would most effectively facilitate the continuity of their polities.
Operationally, in a milieu of such empirically, and even theoretically autonomous differentiated polit ical systems and constitutions, development of power relations between units would most likely emerge. And in these situations, the age-old questions of political existence would arise: "Who conquers whom?" "Who must yield?" "What must be sacrificed?" If and when such systems clashed then each would have a probable future which would be determined in the outcome. A basis for international relations would appear to be provided by the coexistence of the autonomy of political goals, orientations, and attitudes of the political systems.
The myriad constellations of traditional African polit ical systems would seem to have comprised an inter national political system, as their political orienta tions, organizations, and activities frequently gener ated incompatibilities unfavourable to perpetuating the conditions necessary for their continuous peaceful co existence.
10 THE POLICIES OF THE RULERS
In the kind of political system that we have called maximal there was often a single individual who was recog nized as supreme authority. This authority had some con trol over the regulation of public affairs, and decisions
taken were either made by him or in his name. This was
true of all the known political kingdoms of traditional
Africa.’*' The ruler, aided by subordinate "chiefs" and
other persons, was responsible for organizing manpower
resources for public works, for the initiation and con
duct of warfare, for defense, and for keeping the peace,
among other things. In effect, the ruler was responsible
for mobilizing the resources of the country for public
purposes.
To do this effectively some sort of planning was usually necessary which often took the form of decision making on behalf of the community as a whole. Here we
see the beginning of "policy" formulation. Community
decision-making was therefore tantamount to policy-mak
ing,, and reflected the objectives of the rulers, the
*-See for example the selections in Fortes and Evans- Pritchard, African Political Systems. Oxford, 1940; James Gibbs, Jr., Peoples of Africa. New York, 1965; and Lucy Mair, Primitive Government, Baltimore, 1962.
11 elders and the total society.
In the type of political system that we call mini mal usually no one person or body of persons was recog nized as having general authority to decide matters affecting the total community. This was due to the nature of the subdivisions (lineages) of the political
system, which permitted, as it were, the existence of what seem to have been different "political units" for
different purposes. Nevertheless, on occasion, "dif
ferent subdivisions of the whole" either coordinated
their purposes or took "collective action for the pur-
poses for which they (were) autonomous." Discussions
of this kind were no less matters of policy.
Because of their authority to take decisions, the
rulers and their compatriots could be described as the
ultimate sources of all social phenomena as indeed of
all social conflict. For, it was largely by their actions
- internally or externally.7 that social reality was
•*~Lucy Mair. ibid.. p. 106.
^Policy does not necessarily imply "a set of clearly defined theoretical objectives" as some people would have us believe. Its ultimate implication is simply political wisdom, or the ability to manage political problems.
12 approached. They were substantially the political actors who were engaged in deciding questions on peace and war,
cooperation and conflict. Mirambo and Nyungu-Ya-Mawe as
individual rulers of East African empires had to decide
whether to live at peace or at war with the Arab traders
of East Africa.^ Shaka, the Zulu king, also "made all
trade with Europeans pass through bis hands; and later
only important people were allowed to buy certain goods
from traders."^
The rulers were the ones, furthermore, who had to
promote and, if necessary, develop the political goals
and activities of their polities. And they were the
ones determining which political events to encourage and
which to ignore. In short, they provided the actual
framework for most if not all political activities and
moulded the milieu and setting to which other political
units or groups had to adjust and/or react. Perhaps the
following soliloquy of an African king will suffice to
illumine the agonizing moments, that traditional African
rulers had to, go through in order to uphold and promote
■^See p. 52.
^Max Gluckman, "The Kingdom of the Zulu of South Africa" in Fortes and Evans - Pritchard, African Polit ical Systems, p. 34. f.n.
13 the autonomy of their political systems and the political goals of their societies:
All the nations Are gathered together against us How shall we fight? They are called together against us Whence shall we summon help? The big husky ones, ho! They are called together against us We are reinforced by whom? It is because of Zwide, chief of the Ndwandine people That though I lie down I cannot sleep ,0 Zwide, chief of the Ndwandine people! Though I lie down I cannot sleep. Shaka scatters us among the forests of the Shoshangane land.-*-
THE MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF THE RULERS
If the nations of traditional Africa would not form ulate policies that sought to realize goals and objectives
that would not infringe upon the rights of others, the
problems of international relations - their coexistence - would not arise. Unfortunately a vast majority of them
did with the result that territorial expansion and annex
ation (as. in the case of the Ngoni2), territorial
■^-Quoted by Margaret Read, The Ngoni of Nyasaland. Oxford, 1956; p. 6 . One could abstract from this soliloquy principles of general application to contingent situations in traditional Africa.
2Ibid., pp. 41-42.
14 unification and conquest (as in the case of the Zulu^a)
and Ashanti^ ^)), and expanding a given cultural pattern
(as in the case of Usman dan Fodio^(a) and the Mahdia^k))
became some of the major objectives of the traditional
African rulers.
These objectives usually embraced the subjective or
personal goals of the rulers - namely, maintenance of
their own position of power against all comers and making
certain that the capacity to mobilize human and other re
sources for their own aspirations was always possible.
Kuper writes that the objective of war, for instance,
among the Swazi was not only to extend their boundaries
but also 'to retain tribal independence" and "to secure
3 (a)Eileen J. Krige, The Social System of the Zulus. Longmans, 19654 pp. 1-22. See also Donald R. Morris, The Washing of the' Spears. New York, 1965; pp. 42-64.
3(k)Kwame Arhin, "The Structure of Greater Ashanti ,(1700-1824)' in Journal of African History, viii, 1(1967), pp. 65-85.
4(a)Michael Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria. New York, 1962, pp. 78-95. See also J. D. Fage, An Introduc tion to the History of West Africa. Cambridge, 1955. i 4(b)p. m. 1 Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881- 1898, Oxford, 1958, Chapter I passim. See also G. N. Sanderson, "Contributions from African Sources to The History of European Competition in the Upper Valley of the Nile" in Journal of African History, iii, 1(1962) pp. 69-90.
15 c internal solidarity". Margaret Read also points out that the Ngoni rulers undertook "aggressive military action" to "build up a national sentiment within the military kingdoms by success in warfare in the first place, and by intensive training of all young men in the second, thus integrating the youth from conquered units with those who belonged to the trans-zambezi clans".^
Political and military objectives were by no means the principal preoccupation. Economic and manpower needs also entered into the calculations of the rulers.
Depending upon the political and social organization of the community, raiding for cattle and crops, gold and
slaves comprised the main objectives of some rulers.
Psychological objectives may have been important too.
It seems clear then that the respective goals and
objectives of the various rulers varied greatly. But what is important was that their conception and prosecu tion affected the system of political relations of tra
ditional Africa, with determinable consequences. i . ____ *______
"*H. Kuper, "The Development of the Military Organ ization in Swaziland", Africa. Vol. x, No. 2, p. 176 quoted by Read, op. cit.. p. 41.
6Ibid., p. 42.
16 CHAPTER 2
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF TRADITIONAL AFRICA
A major assumption of the preceding chapter was that there were relations between traditional African Political
Systems, and that those relations were defined by the prob lems of cohabitation and coexistence.
The principal justifications for this assumption that need to be made are (a) that the traditional African world, not unlike the contemporary m o d e m one, was inhabited by polities whose peoples at nodular points were to a great extent in contact with one another; (b) that the polities had objectives and interests which were, by and large, necessarily inconsistent with one another; and (c) that each polity when confronted by other polities in pursuit of an objective employed any available means it considered most effective to overcome the opposition.
A discernible system of international relations seems to emerge here based on the following criteria: (a)
Sovereign, territorial polities with conflicting policies existed in contact with one another; (b) The essential value of each was the perpetuation of its continued ex istence and independence; and (c) the only reliable means
17 open to each polity for the maintenance of this value was through self-help supported by military power and alliances.
In light of the foregoing, an international system^- could be postulated for traditional Africa. The inter national system of traditional Africa comprised a myriad constellation of polities (’’tribes”) everyone of which had
interests of its own in defending or maintaining its rela
tive independent position. Consequently, the system lacked common values other than self-defense and self-preservation within the system. This lack of common values implies that
there was no solidarity, for each polity recognized no
authority and felt no responsibility to any object or per
son external to itself.
The international system of traditional Africa was
thus deprived of those elements that a highly organized and
articulate community would require: a controlling system
of sentiments and codes of behavior by which the conduct of
actors might be regulated in conformity with the well-being
and cohesion of the system; and an institutional structure
capable of giving collective expression of these sentiments
■^An international system may be defined as a system of action and interaction between polities and between indi viduals acting on their behalf. International Politics is the outcome of these interactions.
18 and of implementing them as the collective will of the in ternational system on appropriate occasions.
The major characteristic of the international system, as already indicated, was the dominance and free will of the individual polity; that is to say, the unfettered right of each and every state to concern itself with any issue irrespective of whether it had direct relevance to its own interests or not. This did not necessarily make the tra ditional international system anarchic because in reality the influence of custom and the coincidence of interests
often had been instrumental as mechanisms for bringing about a substantial measure of stabilization or regulari
zation in the relations of the states. The maintenance
of a stabilized and regularized system was thus equivalent
to the maintenance of proper and effective relations.
The continuity and perpetuation of traditional
African political relationships tended in time to be dis
rupted by two factors inherent in the milieu of the in
ternational system. One of these was that most relation
ships derived their reality only from the fact that the
level of authority often changed to be replaced by a new hierachy which was either adventurous, imperialistic, and
expansionist, or which was imbued with essentially
19 different psychological traits. The other potentially dis ruptive factor was that there were no relationship patterns which were permanent, but only those which could be said to exist at certain occasions only. Between these occasions there was often a prolonged interregnum during which the
relationship was just latent. This was due in part to a habituation which either refused to discountenance the
status quo or elected to ignore it, and also in part to
the disposition of the actors to acquiesce in the estab
lished order until it was necessary to invoke the 'reason1
of the relationship when there was need for its fulfilment.
It is perhaps clear that the international system of
traditional Africa embraced a pattern of relations among
the basic polities in the system. And it is perhaps clear
also that the system held the keys to the cause of war and
peace.
The assumption is, of course, that the "tribe", or
the traditional African state owed allegiance only unto
itself, and accepted no imposition that in any conceivable
way tended to compromise or delimit its naturally conceived
substantial sovereignty.
The factors of survival, independence, and territor
ial integrity, among others, appear to have been the over
riding concern of the individual polity within the
20 international system. Such controlling interests were the criteria by which the traditional polity - the "tribal” state - in all probability judged situations and indeed the actions of all other states within the system. The fact that each was endowed with, or assumed, sovereignty made each entity a state, at least for the purposes of the statics and dynamics of inter-tribal and international re lations .
Not every "tribal" state enjoyed sovereign equality, however. There were many states that were compelled by circumstances to accept the status of vassals, or forced to pay tribute to other states. Some states would not recognize the accession of "tribal" government without their being previously informed of the new change. De
Barros Da Asia writing about Benin relations with Ife observes:
When Benin ascends the throne he sends ambassadors to the Oni of Ife with rich gifts announcing that he has succeeded to the Kingdom of Benin and to request confirmation. To signify his assent, the Prince... sends the King a staff and a headpiece of shining brass, in place of a crown and sceptre. He also sends a cross of brass to be worn around the neck, a holy and religious emblem. Without these he is not recognized as
21 ruler or king ...■*• o Sovereignty may, therefore, be regarded as the fulcrum upon which the "tribal" state relied for its participation in the membership of the system. It may be conceived of as the consequence of the politico-cultural self-consciousness of a people, though in the final analysis it tended to be explicitly or implicitly conferred on the state by the other participating members of the system. In other words, a state was fully sovereign, at least, for purposes of inter national politics, if the other states accepted it as equal. The status of sovereignty thus carried with it cer tain implications, the most important of which were inde pendent action, equality, internal jurisdiction, and, per haps, international responsibility for its external actions.
There is some evidence for this last hypothesis from the record of antiquity:
"Through the might of the Lord of All I took the field against the Noba, when the people of Noba revolted, When they boasted and "He will not
^De'Earros Da Asia, quoted by Thomas Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives: An Historical Anthology, London, 1960; pp. 96-97. See also the accounts of vassalage and clientage in Lucy Mair, op. cit., pp. 107-137.
^Sovereignty in this context means the capacity to enter foreign relations.
22 cross over the Takkaze," Said the (people of) Noba, When they did violence to the people of Mangurto and Hasa and Barga, and the Blacks Waged war on the Red Peoples and second and a third time broke their ' oath and without consideration (Ruchsicht) slew their Neighbors and plundered our envoys and our Messengers Whom I had sent to interrogate them, robbing them of their possessions and Seizing their lances, When I sent again and they did not hear me, and re viled m e " ...1
A more recent evidence was the Ashanti invasion of the
Accras for failing to honour their treaty obligations with the Ashanti.
The "tribal" African state was clearly, both in theory and practice, a completely free agent and could achieve in practice a maximum approximation of this total freedom.
It is not surprising, therefore, that political consider- ationstended in particular to dominate the relations of the states.
The question may now be asked: What were the major considerations, that is to say, the determinants of inter-
"tribal" and international relations?
iFrom L. P. Kirwan, "The Decline and Fall of Meroe," Kush, 1960. Quoted by Basil Davidson, The African Past, New York, 1964, p. 55. The passage seems to justify King Ezana's war against the Kushitic States on the Middle Nile in the 4th century.
23 The determinants could best be revealed in a more or less theoretical approach. The "tribe," we recall, was, and is, a political organization of human beings. As such, we may assume, it existed for the purpose of administering to human needs. But since, by and large, it was not completely self-sufficient, the need for a policy vis-a-vis other states that would ensure the "tribe's" survival was often inevitable.
"Tribal" policy then, like other foreign policies of states, past and present, was, a priori, an attempt at the maximization of all those dominant, or at most the clearly cherished, elements inherent in the supreme human values of the political society. This was clearly a long-range pur pose for which the "tribe," or the political society, strove rationally or non-rationally, explicitly or implicitly. In * other words, a continuing.criterion in the determination of
"tribal" relationships at any one time was the notion of
"tribal" or "National Interest". Such a criterion gave
"tribal" policy a general orienting base, one might assert, upon which political actions could be justified or pro jected.
"National interest" in the history of "tribes" and nations has been notoriously difficult to define, because
24 it has often embraced too many components. In the case of
African "tribes" the notion of interest possibly reflected
(a) the wishes of the ruler or the community (b) the desire to protect supernatural secrets, and (c) access to sources of wealth and raw materials, to name a few.-*- The follow- * ing passage from the Kano Chronicle may help to throw some light on the notion of interest. It is also illuminating when it is viewed in terms of the art of diplomacy:
The eighth Sarki was Shekkarau (Who reigned A,. H. 689-706 or A.D. 1290-1307) .. .When he became Sarki his men said to him, "Sarki Kano, What do you see in the talk of the people of this city?" He said, "I see nothing between us except things we can settle without fighting." They replied, "If you try to make peace with the people they will say that you are afraid. If they come to you and make smooth talk, turn away from them; then you would not be acting wrongly. If matters do not fall out thus we will fight them, and if we prevail over them we will cut the throats of all their chief men and destroy their god." These.'. counse 1 s prevailed. All the pagans came to the "Sarki with many presents?1 and said: "Sarki and Lord over us, we came to you to say to you one word: do not take notice of what we have done, we pray you, but put away the slanderous counsel of your advisers. If the domains of a ruler are wide, he should be patient; if they are not so,
1-See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the policies of tra ditional African Rulers.
25 he will not obtain possession of the whole country by impatience.1’ The Sarki _said to them, "Your talk is true," and left them their custom and power. They said, "Were it not for fear of what may result we would have told the Sarki the secrets of our god." The chief of them ...said "If we show him the secrets of our god we shall lose all our power, and we and our generation will be for gotten." So the dispute continued till the Sarki died.*- ;
Perhaps a useful way to appreciate the "tribes’" con ception of the national interest is through their organiza tion for international political action. The organization of the Congo government is here considered representative of the more complex or maximal governments, because it sheds some light on what might have been the pattern in the kingdoms. Though the rulers of the Congo did "not employ the most proper means for promoting the welfare of their i subjects," they nevertheless accepted it as a principle, that it was "their interest as well as their duty, to occupy themselves with the care of rendering them happy, and maintaining peace and justice among them.To
^H. R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs (Lagos: 1928), Vol. 3 in Davidson op. cit.. pp. 84-85.
^J. Pinkerton, A General Collection of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages and Travel, Etc., London, 1814, Vol. 16, p. 568.
26 achieve this objective ministers were appointed by the government and "charged with the execution" of the will of the state.
The principal ministers were the Ma-ngovo, the Ma- npontu, the Ma-kaka, the Ma-fuka, and Ma-kimba. The Ma- ngovo was "the minister for foreign affairs, and the in troducer of foreigners at court." The Ma-npotu was the deputy of the Ma-ngovo. The Ma-kaka was the minister of war," and even generalissimo of the armies." The Ma-Kimba was the minister of commerce. The Ma-Kimba was "Grand master of the waters and forests" and inspected all "the boatmen, fishermen and hunters."**
The concept of national interest in traditional
Africa would appear thus to have revolved around the fol lowing criteria: first, the duty of the state or "tribe" to protect its political organization; second, and this is an implicate of the first, the responsibility for the survival of man in the political organization. Holding the society together was always one of the primary ob jectives of the policies of the traditional "tribal" state. Third, the duty of the state or "tribe" to secure the welfare of its peoples and to safeguard its food
*~Ibid.. p. 568.
27 supply.-*- Fourth, the duty of the state to guarantee peace within and without its borders.
These criteria were often readily transformed into moral goals, and any consistent failure to hallow them was
not only deemed reprehensible but also often undermined the
legitimation of the rulers leading to dire consequences
such as for example, the "destoolment" or overthrow of the
1 This should not in any way be interpreted to mean that there was anything approaching what might be called a "state economy". The traditional African economy probably knew nothing like that other than, perhaps, the "family economies," which were predominant. What is meant here is more complex. In all the maximal states where the peoples recognized king ship as having spiritual aspects, the person occupying the "throne" was supposed or believed to have inherited a total relationship with land, people, and resources (cattle, for example), and in virtue of this relationship he symbolized the personality of the state so that its health reflected his health, and his negligence might affect his whole king dom. "Thus it is said that the king of Ruanda must not bend his knee because if he did the extent of the kingdom would become smaller." (Lucy Mair, op. cit.. p. 218). The kings were therefore responsible for maintaining ritual purity of their persons and making such approaches to the supernatural as would guarantee the interests of the welfare of their people since the well being of the land and people was held to be bound up with their own physical condition. The most important gods often invoked in such contexts were those concerned with the welfare of the nation as a whole. The minimal states employed such functionaries as 'mas ters of the fishing spear' (Dinka), the 1Orkoiyot' (Nandi), and the ban of the cattle' (Nuer) to name only a few, who were expected by means of their ritual powers to secure suc cess for their respective states in both peace and war. Securing the welfare and safeguarding the food supply of traditional African peoples did not primarily come from "state economies" but from the performance of state functions with respect to the supernatural. The mentality of tra ditional African peoples allowed such state functions to assume great political significance.
28 government, and/or secession.
It would seem to follow then that the 'puli' of the in
ternational system of traditional Africa derived its force
from no central source other than the "tribal" states them
selves. Whatever dynamism one might, therefore, perceive in
inter-"tribal" and international relations it could not be
seen in any other way than as stemming from the patterns of
assumptions and action accepted by the various "tribal"
states of the system. And any change in the system could
also be perceived as, probably, the modifications the
states, consciously or unconsciously, brought to bear upon their subsequent international roles.
Power was the major instrument for complete actuali
zation of goals and objectives within the traditional
African international system. Power relationships, however, assumed two polar patterns. The first pattern was marked by moderation in scope and means. This pattern of relations normally developed when the polities so act as to limit the
extent of violence they could bring upon one another. A
typical example of this pattern was the cattie-raiding
penchant of "pastoral" Africa. Other polities such as the
Tallensi of the Gold Coast (Ghana) imposed severe limita tions upon the employment of undue violence. Fortes writes
of the Tallensi:
29 Whatever the reason, it was a sin to instigate w a r . (War) .. .was not an in strument of policy, but an act of re prisal. Punishment, not conquest, was its purpose...^
In areas where such a pattern of relations existed, it is- probable that the international system was not radically affected but remained relatively stable.
In relations involving the second pattern, it would appear that the dominant dimension of conflict among the polities assumed an alignment of those who were presumably committed to the preservation of the status quo, on the one hand; and those who were apparently inclined toward chang ing the existing system of power relationships on the other. The proclivities of the Ashantis and the Zulus to ward establishing, each in its respective geographic area, a political ecumene or hegemony would appear to be a clas sic illustration of such a pattern.
Both patterns characterized the relations of the
African polities. So within the international system the relations of the "tribal" states may be seen along a con tinuum of order and disorder, cooperation and conflict,
Fortes, "The Political System of the Tallensi of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast" in African Political Systems, London, 1940; p. 242.
30 amity and discord; for, forces engendering the fluctuation
of political relationships were always present and, in
general, often active.
The historical portraits of most of the African pol
ities seem to illustrate and support the foregoing hypo
theses. The rise of the Mahdist State in the Sudan (1881-
1898) resulted in mixed relations with Abyssinia (Ethiopia).
The value systems of the two polities differed sharply, and were in varying degree, inconsistent with one another.
Their policies also had special aspects but fundamentally
the struggle for power was the requisite for their continued
existence. Depending on the circumstances and calculations
of interests, therefore, the relations of the two states
oscillated between cooperation and conflict. In 1893 when
Menelik, the king of Shoa (Abyssinia) denounced the treaty
of Uccialli which he had concluded with Italy, on May 2,
1889 and which the Italian Government had interpreted as
authorizing them to conduct Abyssinia's foreign relations,
he, fearing attack by Italy, despatched an Abyssinian en voy- to Omdurman with oral proposal of peace between the
two African States.
The Khalifa's reply reflected the conditions of
political struggle existing between the two states. He
31 wrote:
...To the Potentate of the Abyssinians, Menelik. We inform you that Muhammad Al-Tayyih, sent from you to us with a request for peace, has arrived at our court and had informed us orally of your wish, namely your request for peace be tween us. The aforesaid Muhammad Al- Tayyih is returning herewith. If it is your intention to conclude peace be tween us, as your envoy has notified us, then write an official letter with your seal requesting that, so that we may look into it and give you an< ade quate reply. Peace upon him who fol lows the Mahdi.l
Both Abyssinia and the Sudan believed in expansionism;
but the Mahdist state was imbued with a missionary zeal
which blinded it to the dangers of European imperialism,
then unfolding. Hence the Khalifa's haughty reply to Mene
lik. But the latter was better apprised of the threat
from Europe; he had Europeans at his court from whom he
sought and received advice. So in spite of the cold
shoulders he received from the Sudan Menelik still con
tinued to seek an alliance with’the Mahdist state.
On April 15, 1896, after Menelik's victory over the
Italians at Adowa, the king wrote to 'Abdallahi of the
Sudan repeating his proposal for a treaty. 'Abdallahi
answered these overtures as follows:
^Quoted by Peter M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898. Clarendon Press, 1958; pp. 196-7.
32 As regards your desire for the conclu sion of peace between us and you, be it known unto you that there is no incen tive to any European to come to our Islamic territories for the profession of buying and selling or on the pretext of travelling. There is only war be tween us and them. If you are thus and you forbid all Europeans to enter your country except in war, so that there is no connection between you and them, as it is with us, on this condition peace may be concluded between us and you.
Menelik could not, of course, accept Abdallahi's con dition of peace but neither was he, nor the Khalifa for that matter, ready to discontinue contacts, probably because con siderations of their respective national interests dictated keeping the channels of communication open. However, when at the end of 1897 the arrival of the final embassy des patched by Abyssinia coincided with the arrival of
Kitchener's forces at the Atbara, the envoys were "received with great honour and elaborate preparations were made for their entertainment...to avoid giving offence to the Chris tians in the embassy, the animals provided for food were not slaughtered by muslims. The Mahdist law against in toxicants was relaxed to allow date wine to be made for the
Abyssinians. A great firework display was organized by the arsenal."^
*Tbid., pp. 208-209.
2Ibid., p. 289.
33 Later, the Abyssinians in secret audience with the
Khalifa "handed over a French flag (to him)... (and) the am bassador told the Khalifa to raise the flag on the frontiers of his kingdom in order to be an independent king in his kingdom and France would be a protection to him."'*'
Although relations between Menelik and the Khalifa fluctuated wildly, the latter subsequently ceded to
Abyssinia some of the territories of the Bani Shanqul 2 hills. In terms of political science, the relations of
Abyssinia and the Mahdist State articulated the concept of
sovereignty not only as to political differentiation and
orientation but with respect to separate, competitive, and
antagonistic loyalty areas as well. The states existed and wished to continue to exist; so, inspite of their divergent
and inconsistent value systems and policies, which neces
sarily resulted in conflicts of interests and wars, they
recognized the desirability of cordiality in their rela-
V tions, at least.
The other assumptions of this chapter are demonstrable.
Hbwever.;the political struggle of the Ashanti "tribal"
^Loc. cit.
^Ibid., p. 210.
34 states will be cited to serve as a paradigm of international relations of traditional Africa.
In the course of the historical evolution of Ashanti, a number of political units came into existence. Although i politically fragmented, all of them recognized a common descent through membership in seven major clans. These clans did not however, constitute functional or corporate units. The basic descent group existed alongside nuclear territorial units, the village, which usually consisted of an aggregation of several different lineages themselves divided into extended households. Within the territorial units a division between lineages occurred; one lineage was regarded as "royal" in opposition to the remaining
"commoner" lineages, and it was from the former that the village chief was chosen. In time, successive migrations from older and larger villages to new settlements elevated the status of the village chiefs and gave them jurisdic tion over divisional clusters of villages. The contin uance of this process resulted in the emergence of large- scale territorial state units (Aman) headed by permanent chiefs or kings (Amanhene) to whom village chiefs were responsible.
The development of political organization led to the
35 emergence of an indigenous bureaucracy and the proliferation of specific offices concerned with military and political functions. Recruitment to these offices was on the basis of ascriptive criteria, and significant social and political roles were open to only limited number of individuals on the basis of age, sex, and lineage membership.^
The most powerful of these political units was Denkyera, to which most of the other Ashanti states had been forced by military conquest to owe allegiance. Anticipating their own subjection, the other remaining states seeking to maintain and defend their sovereignty and independence began to ally themselves under the leadership of the paramount chief of
Kumasi to resist the advance of another powerful Ashanti state, the Doma.
Alloose alliance was, however, not deemed enough to withstand the respective powers of the Doma and the
Denkyera. So the determination was made at a conference of the allied states to convert the alliance of the Ashanti states into a united nation strong enough to overthrow
Denkyera and to defeat and repulse the Doma.
■^See W. W. Claridge, A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti (2 vols.; London, 1915), I, p. 55. Also R. S. Rattray, The Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland (2 vols.: Oxford, 1932), I, pp. ix-xiii; idem, Ashanti Law and Con stitution, Oxford, 1929.
36 After the successful accomplishment of this objective,
the Ashanti nation entered upon a period of conquest and * expansion which was to culminate in the creation of the
Ashanti confederacy.
The hypertrophy of Ashanti power widened its circle of
goals. Kwahu and Assin were reduced to tributary status, while Brong, Dagomba, and Gonja were obliged to accept the
Suzerainty of Ashanti.'*' This marked the limit of Ashanti
expansion to the north. In the south, Akim, Akwapim, and
Banda were defeated and recognized the over-lordship of the
Ashantihene.
The major effect of Ashanti expansionism and conquest
was that the other states on the Gold Coast, though largely
fragmented into independent kingdoms, began to consolidate
and extend their power. So that from the close of the
seventeenth century to the mid-eighteenth century and after wards political struggle, or international relations, on
the Gold Coast assumed the nature of alliances, diplomacy,
and war tintil the final defeat of Ashanti in the Katamansu
War ofi 7th August, 1826.
^W. Bosman, A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea. Vol. XVI, ed. John Pinkerton, London, p. 193.
37 In conclusion we may say that the convergence of the tendency of the Ashanti political systems toward the de velopment of autonomous goals and objectives, aided, of course, by external conditions, facilitated the full in stitutionalization of the main features of international relations on the Gold Coast.
From the point of view of our over-all hypothesis, it is important to observe that the process of political struggle was brought by the very structure of the coex- i istence of the several polities. The "tribal" states had come into existence, they wished to continue to exist, and they could do so by relying upon pow.er - alliance, diplo macy, federations - to avoid being conquered by their neighbours. The obligatory character of their value sys tems which controlled their juxtaposed existence, and the diversity of these value systems created not only the opposition of compatriot and foreigner but also the re alities of inter-"tribal" and international relations of traditional Africa.
38 CHAPTER 3
WAR IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The preceding chapters have focused on the determinants which seem to have influenced the relations of the states of traditional Africa. The observation there was that terres trial space, population, and resources appear to have consti tuted the possible stakes of conflict and that as objectives of the states governed their collective behaviour as well.
We then stated that the relations of territory, population, and resources had tended to define in the historical evolu tion of the African "tribal" states the imperatives anjl optimum realities of inter-"tribal" and international re lations. The phenomenon of war frequently appeared to negate or affirm these realities, that is to say, the social relations among the states. So in this chapter we will attempt to analyze the incidence and causation of war in,the inter-"tribal" and international relations of tra ditional Africa.
Without claiming to have all the evidence and without making every qualification, we can say that war was the ultimate means by which the political units - the states - sought to make their will prevail in the systems of inter national relations of traditional Africa. It was used as
39 the supreme agent of change by those seeking change in the status quo; and it was also used in defense by those desir ing that status quo. Furthermore, it was used by those seek ing domination, and by others seeking to maintain or estab lish an existing distribution or a new configuration of power which would give them a reasonable chance of preserv ing their independence and other cherished values.
These generalizations are supported by the history of the political development of the traditional African states
- for example, ancient Ghana and its successor states,
Dahomey, Ashanti, Monomotopa, and AmaZulu, to name a few - whose formation and later extensions appear to have been
largely effected through the instrument of war.
The true objects and motives for which the traditional
African states waged war will forever be unknown to us; but
there is some evidence that for most war situations economic
and political reasons predominated. Thus wars in traditional
Africa may be analyzed under two broad categories: economic
and political.
Wars motivated by economic reasons were generally
directed toward the acquisition of wealth and natural or human resources, such as gold, salt, cattle, slaves, and so
forth. The methods of warfare ranged from "raiding" and
40 subjection (vassal status) on one hand to outright conquests
and annexation on the other.
In raiding expeditions there was often no formal mili
tary organization involved; individual warrior, groups would
conduct their war expeditions as well as their defense
against attacks, on their own account; and so there was no national or ’’tribal" mobilization or the "calling up" of warriors, because participation in a raid was largely vol
untary. Moreover, the initiative to proceed on a raiding
venture came either from the warriors themselves dr :from
the "elders" who incited the warriors to go out and capture
cattle, "as they had not seen meat for a long time".'*' If,
however, there was a strong resistance and the raiding
proved very difficult, that is to say deaths had occurred,
the raiding party would send to its "tribe" for help and
the whole expedition would assume the dimension of a full-
scale war until peace was made.
This type of warfare was prevalent among the predom
inantly pastoral states, and frequently raiding avoided
the taking of captives or territorial annexations. The
lGunther Wagner, "The Political Organization of the Bantu of Kavirondo" in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (eds.) African Political Systems, London, 1940; p. 227.
41 immediate causes of war were cattle. But among mixed pas toral-agricultural states, like the Bantu of Kavirondo, the ultimate motives in warfare were not only the raiding of cattle but also the conquest of territory.
"Owing to the necessity of balancing these two aims", writes Gunther Wagner, "Warfare tended to be conducted with cer tain restrictions, above all with pro visions for terminating a period of hostilities and with generally observed rules regarding the treatment of slain warriors and of women and children. Such 'rules of warfare' were more pro nounced in the conduct of hostilities between the various Bantu groups than between Bantu and Non-Bantu. In the latter case, the mutual destruction of the hostile groups was the prominent aim, while in the encounters between groups of Bantu stock the hostile groups conceded their mutual rights of existence and maintained a type of relationship with one another in which warfare functioned chiefly as a regulating and balancing force, making for an approximately even distribution of power and wealth between the tribes.
Nonetheless, raiding expeditions were designed to weaken and
intimidate neighbouring "tribes" and to induce their members
gradually to retreat, so that the vacant territory would be utilized for grazing purposes and the cultivation of food
crops. The territory thus gained came under the jurisdic
tion, of the conquering, state......
*-Ibid. . p. 228.
42 Secondary motives of warfare comprised the taking of captives and the raiding of crops but their relative impor tance differed in different areas. Among the Bantu of
Kavirondo the taking of captives, to quote Wagner again,
was limited mainly to the taking of small boys and girls between the ages of six and ten years, who were adopted and brought up in the family of the warrior who had captured them. As... children were of economic value to the family, the adoption of war captives meant a welcome addition to the family and the clan. The raiding of crops was customary... among (the) pre dominantly agricultural tribes.. ."I*
It seems clear then that the primary motivation for raiding was to gain economic benefit, and, not necessarily to in flict mortal wounds upon the enemy.
With the non-pastoral economies, that is to say pre dominantly agricultural states, the immediate causes of war were often access to raw materials, and opportunities for trade. The ancient Egyptians fought and conquered Nubia so as to gain complete access to that country's gold-bearing regions; and ancient Ghana embarked upon a series of mili tary campaigns presumably to create an empire strong enough to enable its rulers to control the trading opportunities in the gold and salt of the Western Sudan. Military
Loc. cit.
43 organizations were generally utilized by these states be cause their policies tended to favour economic imperialism and conquests. Historically, these states, as well as the predominantly pastoral ones, had generally fought over fer tile lands for cultivation of crops, for grazing, and for settlement; and had waged wars to monopolize trade routes for gold, ivory, and salt. Because of their political and social organization, the taking of captives had generally been important in these wars and also the annexation of ter ritory, although for some, such as the Tallensi of the Gold
Coast (Ghana), "territorial annexation was incompatible with the social structure, nor could captives or booty be taken.
It is however difficult to draw an exact dividing line between the two types of states vis-a-vis their ultimate motivations for war. For each there was no monist answer to the phenomenon of war, nor can one establish, valid for both, a single-cause hypothesis of warfare. Nonetheless there was a common denominator: all the states waged wars to retain their boundaries however ill-defined, to main tain their independence, and to secure internal cohesion
^M. Fortes, "The Political System of the Tallensi of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast" in African Political Systems, Ibid.. p. 242. and solidarity. Such wars were defensive.
Some of these states initiated wars to extend their boundaries: by annexing additional territory and by incor
porating and subjugating weaker polities. Such wars were
aggressive, expansionistic, and constituted instruments of national policy. The four, military campaigns of Shaka Zulu
into Natal, the Ashanti expeditions on the Gold Coast, the
Yoruba-Dahoraey confrontations may be cited as substantiat
ing evidence.
Other states conducted warfare merely for the purpose of
revenge and no other object was sought. Wars occurred when members of one state committed a grave injury, for example murder, against members of another. Usually therefore wars were not instigated, and when a declaration of war was made
the motive was often to right a wrong and not to conquer.
War here "was not an instrument of policy, but an act of
reprisal. Punishment, not conquest, was its purpose."'*'
, It is apparent that, 'although one cannot properly de- s > termine nor generalize about the objects and motives for
which traditional African states conducted warfare, the
facts from, one case to another, appear to differ consider
ably, one can safely assert that the African stateis waged
•**Loc. cit.
45 or went to war for ’’reason of state": political, economic, and psychological.
Politically, and historically, war played a leading role in the formation and extension of many of the traditional
African states. The ancient Ghana empire, for example, emerged in war when a small group of people called the
Sarakolle succeeded in conquering a large number of the states of the Western Sudan and lording it over them. The
Successor empires of Mali, and Songhay were also b o m in war, as were Dahomey and Ashanti. Similarly, war played a prominent role in the political development of Monomotapa, the Mahdist state of the Eastern Sudan, the Abyssinian em pire, and the AmaZulu. The wars fought by all these states were essential agents of change in the international sys tems. Not only did they profoundly modify or completely distupt : the power relations among the states, but they also had important effects in the fields of social structure, political economy, and demography. They also led to the development of new intellectual and political movements in certain areas of Africa.
The expansion of the Zulus under Shaka, for example, was a major aspect of international relations in Southern
Africa. This expansion was the immediate reason for major wars in the area but the significance of those wars should
46 not be underrated, since they brought total change within and beyond the boundaries of what might be called the "Zulu international system". The wars partially or totally de stroyed many of the local social structures in the "Zulu" geographical environment and also created new centers of power patterned after the Zulus but far removed from Zulu control.
Among the motives for this expansion, political inter ests seem to have been quite decisive. At the beginning of
Shaka's rise to power there were numerous political units within the international system, and their relations were characterized by incessant warfare. Shaka's political motivation was seemingly to regulate the situation by bring ing each political unit under Zulu control, replacing sev eral discordant foreign policies by a single cohesive one.
However, since political conquest and extermination rather than mere political amalgamation and submission marked the policy of Shaka, the main concern appears to have been a desire for preponderance of power more than anything else.
The innovations made in, and the reorganization of, the army all seem to suggest a psychological predilection for power and an intense political motivation. Economic con sideration seem to have been quite subordinate in the policy of conquests pursued by Shaka and his Zulus.
47 Dingiswayo of the Mtetwa nation followed more or less a similar policy. When Dingiswayo assumed office, the Mtetwa were surrounded by weaker political units; he
incorporated drafts from these clans into his own forces and set out on a course of political amalgamation that went "far be yond a simple attempt to enhance the Mtetwa. His objective was political sub mission, and once he had attained'this goal, he left each clan in peace. At most, he would replace a recalcitrant chieftain with a pliant one, or designate a particular heir, and he sought to strengthen the bonds of this novel con federation by a series of dynastic marriages
The environmental setting may have provided the impetus for Dingiswayo's political ambitions. "The coastal strip
(of Southern Africa) was full of people, and... the crowd ing had disturbed the previous pattern of movement and a measure of desperation was already visible in the incessant warfare."^ Apparently Dingiswayo sought to bring some order into the anarchic situation, and the only way he could realize that goal was through hegemonic control. He drafted all the men of the conquered states and organized them into
•t Donald Morris, op. cit., p. 42.
^Loc. cit.
48 a strong regiment and with this he expanded his empire. It seems clear that the only constant factor at all stages of expansion in. the "Zulu" geographical environment was the
"will to power" and desire to achieve a "national mission."
But the motivation to war did not proceed solely from the desire to achieve a "national mission" or "the will to power." It was also related to economic interests. The
FONS (DAHOMEY) went to war with the maritime states of
Whydah and Ardrah in the Seventeenth Century because they wanted to monopolize and control the trade in firearms and slaves that these maritime states had with the Europeans.*-
Economic considerations seem .to have been decisive also in the origins of the Moroccan invasion of ancient Ghana in the Sixteenth Century. Morocco was actuated by a desire to control and break the monopoly Ghana held on the trans- saharan trade, especially the trade in gold.
Sometimes, too, motivations varied in the course of one and the same undertaking. At the outset of Ashanti expan sion wars of conquest were a legitimate political weapon.
It would appear that prior to 1700 the Ashantis were pri marily interested, because of spatial contiguity and cultural homogeneity, in organizing all the twi-speaking or Akan
^-Archibald Dalzell, History of Dahomey, op. cit., p. 60.
49 1 peoples into a great power structure. But between 1700 and
1824 Ashanti military activities were motivated by a number of considerations. To the North-west of Ashanti, lay the
Brong empire. The Brongs were traditional enemies of the
Ashanti. Close by was the important trading center of
Bontukn where the Ashantis ’’exchanged gold and Kola for slaves and assortment of goods coming in from the countries of the Niger Bend and the Maghreb.”^ Then there was Takyi- man, the source of Ashanti gold weights and measures.
Takyiman was also rich in gold, and lay on the route to the
Bontuku trade center. In the north and north-east the
Gonja and Dagomba states dominated; Salaga in Gonja was an emporium where Ashanti exchanged kola and slaves for merchan dise. Yendi the capital of Dagomba provided a market for cloth and thread that were superior to those of Ashanti and it was also the source of iron. Dagomba also controlled the trade-route to the Hausa states inr.the north-east and there fore the movement of Hausa merchants to and from Salaga.
Ashanti trade subsequently was dependent to some extent on
Dagomba. The south and south-east of Ashanti were dominated
^See the interesting analysis of Kwame Arhin, "The Structure of- Greater Ashanti (1700-1824)” in Journal of African History, viii, I (1967); pp. 65-85.
^Ibid.
- 50 by a myriad constellation of Akan political units mainly
Fanti; in the south-east were other Akan political group
ings, and Ga, Ada, and, beyond, Eweland.
In the early eighteenth century, Ashanti conducted a
series of wars of expansion first to the north, "incorpor
ating or making tributary states like Bono, Banda, Gonja,
and Dagomba. Then, with the trade of the interior profitably
secured, she turned south... The south was important for
reasons generally known: the coastline was dotted with
European trade posts where firearms and European goods
could be obtained. The Accras and Akwamus controlled
access to the east coast trade posts, and the Fantis con
trolled the western posts. Thus Ashanti military expedi
tions to the coasts were motivated by a desire to maintain
direct commercial relations with European trade posts and * to control Euro-African trade on the coast. Both political
and economic interests had therefore a certain influence on
the wars of the tAshanti.
A similar amalgam of interests can be seen in the i ephemeral East African empires that sprang up in the
•**01iver and Fage, op. cit., p. 123.
51 nineteenth century. Lured by the prospect of material wealth that Arab caravans carried charismatic leaders like 1 9 Mirambo and Nyungu - Ya-Mawez appeared on the East African scene, first, to resist the encroachments and the demands of
Arab merchants trading with the states of East Africa; and, second, to capture the caravan trade for themselves and to control the main arteries of Arab commerce and communication.
Warfare, however, was the chief instrument the consequences of which resulted in the creation of new hegemonies in a great portion of East Africa.
Often, too, the causes and motives for war derived from
ideological and religious origins. The wars /TihadZ of Usman 3 4 5 dan Fodio, El-had j Omar, and the Mahdi were apparently motivated by religio-ideological considerations and inter
ests .
The purposes of these wars were to reconstruct the
Kenneth Ingham, op. cit., p. 62. o Aylward Shorter, "Nyungu-Ya-Mawe and the 'Empire of the Ruga-Rugas'" in Journal of African History, Vol. ix, op. cit., p. 235-259.
3 Michael Crowder, op. cit., pp. 80-83.
4John D Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa, New York 1963; pp. 9-14, 102, 121, 125. 5 See Holt, the Mahdist State of the Sudan, already cited.
52 political and social order of the Western and Eastern Sudan in consonance with the ideals and precepts of Islam. But . to realize their political, religious, and social ambitions these men of Africa had to resort to military .force and wars of conquest.
In some instances, too, demographic motives were de cisive. Oral history attributes the cause of most inter-
African wars to density and pressure of population. If two different groups of peoples could not occupy the same space they fought continuously until one group had been conquered, driven out, or the relation of forces, that is to say tech niques of warfare, between them had reached parity. Where
such a balance had existed, hostilities had continued but
of unvarying intensity. Many illustrations can be given.
Contact between the Matabele and Shona led to frequent wars and incessant raids; so also were the contacts between the
Ngoni and the Bemba and Yao. The emergence of the Masai
in the geographical environment of East Africa led to fre
quent raids and warfare which resulted in a number of
political and social adjustments by many of the states in
that environment. Robert F. Gray, writes about the Sonjo:
"...Since the arrival of the Masai the Sonjo have dwelt in villages which are fortified with encircling hedges of
53 closely planted thorn trees."'*' Their constitution also underwent some modification. An age grade set was insti tuted. The boys in this set were "actually integrated into the military system by being taught to understand and give
the signal indicating the approach of enemies... and give warning in case of a surprise Masai raid; they (the boys) were trained to give signals by imitating birds or animal
cries which were then relayed to the village, so that a company of warriors could come to the rescue.The
Arusha also "adopted their age-group system exactly to
that of the Kisongo (Masai) ; and they even followed Masai
values and ideas as the apotheosis of what was good and
proper.Other examples are provided by the Swazi
adaptations to Zulu principles of organization, and
Ashanti imitation of Fanti Asafo military structure.
Several other.political factors made war a possibil
ity in the system of international relations of traditional
^Robert F. Gray, "The Sonjo - A Marketless Community" in Buchanan and Dalton (eds.) Markets in Africa, New York, 1965; p. 44. o Loc. cit.
H. Gulliver, "The Arusha-Economic and Social Change" in Markets in Africa; Ibid., p. 253.
54 Africa; the most important being the non-fulfillment of treaty obligations, violation of diplomatic emissaries and envoys, and maltreatment of the nationals of other "tribes" 1 or states.
Psychological elements also tended to influence the incidence of war in the relations of the states. Among most of the traditional African states the incidence and causa tion of war may be ascribed to fear, suspicion, contempt, ambition of political leaders, or to antagonistic policies of the states. Gunther Wagner writing about the Bantu of
Kavirondo observes:
' "The attitude towards any neighbour ing tribe as a whole was chiefly characterized by a feeling of suspicion, to which was added either fear or contempt.... Contempt and de rision (W)ere far more common attitudes to wards other tribes and find expression in numerous sayings and proverbs. Within the group of Bantu tribes, expressions of con tempt center(ed) chiefly round minor differ ences in custom, foods eaten or refused, peculiarities of dress or ornament, and mannerisms... of walking or drinking, To tribes of non-Bantu stock despicable qual ities and Sinister intentions (W)ere usually attributed... the ElKony (W)ere ridiculed for their weakness in warfare, while numer ous derogatory comments (W)ere passed on the Teso..."^
lSee Chapters 4 and 5 for some details.
Gunther Wagner, op. cit., pp. 225-226.
55 The obvious implication here is that such attitudes tended to create the conditions of, or to be conducive to, warfare, as they could hardly encourage friendship or good neighbourliness. So warfare in such situations might be viewed as in defense of national or '’tribal" honour, or
simply as the desire to demonstrate one's valour, prowess,
and fearlessness. The point to note is that the use of
force in this instance might be to depolarise the dis
torted impressions and to project a more favourable
"National" image.
Having said all this, to what does one attribute the
readiness, frequency and/or intensity of war among the tra
ditional African states? First, the constitutional and
social structure of the national actor systems might have
been influential in determining the intensityliand frequency
of warfare in Africa. There is some evidence that the
social and political system of the Masai, Nandi, Ngoni,
and the Zulu had something to do with their militarism and
readiness to war. Margaret Read's observation on the Ngoni
of Malawi may be made generally applicable to most of the
states. She writes: "Since large numbers of warriors were
mobilized every year, these trained armies demanded an out
let, and the policy of aggression served the dual purpose
56 of raiding enemy territory and maintaining a defense force.Most of the states, like the ones mentioned above, relied heavily on principles of militarism to the extent that military organization was inseparable from political structure. Consequently war was most often sought rather than avoided. Second, the various aspects of "distance"
- political, social, technological, psychological, and strategic - between any pairs of the states seemed to be more or less correlated with the expectancy of war.. The phenomenon of war frequently reared its ugly head between the states if the distance between them was not insurmount able and not too great. Thus a permanent state of war could only exist between states spatially contiguous to each other. War expeditions or raids were limited to the immediate neighbours, and states living too far away were regarded as too remote to be either friends or foe. States in closer proximity tended to live in a constant state of war or tension with each other.
It is apparent that, since war more often than not, broke out between states in closer economic or social con tact, the long-run capacity of a state to survive seemed to
^■Margaret Read, the Ngoni of Nyasaland, Oxford, 1956; p. 42.
57 depend on how it adapted its assumptions and constitution to pressures from the outside or how it adapted the pres sures of the external environment to its constitution and assumptions. The entire political, social, and economic fabric of the state was often generally involved in such an adjustment.
The phenomenon of war thus seemed to derive its essence partly from the assumptions and components of domestic policy and partly from the nature and structure of the international system. However, it would appear that the external conditions of the international environment tended to exercise more influence upon the phenomenon of war than the internal assumptions or policy of the state. The state often adjusted to these conditions, even at the ex pense of its assumptions,in order to survive.
^ The question now arises: How did the states seek to survive in a system of relations that frequently or im plicitly posed the possibility of war? or to put it differently, what mechanisms did the states utilize to regulate their collective behaviour?
•**To the Tallensi it was a sin to wage war but this was secondary so long as their survival was in question. See Fortes, op. cit.. p. 242.
58 By means of defensive alliances, treaties of peace and friendship, the "tribal” states of traditional Africa sought to control the outbreak of war or to prevent it. Usually the alliances were formed by two or more states who wished to take collective action in anticipation of danger or need.
Sometimes many more states allied together; but in such an alliance there was often a trend toward a confederation of some sort. The Ashanti and Fanti confederacies are illus trative. The alliances, which were tantamount to balance of power structures, tended to assure an aggressor that if it did not mend its ways it would encounter a combination of states.
Treaties of peace and friendship were negotiated prior to, during, or after a war. The conduct of negotiations r varied greatly, however. Among the Wabena, for example, peace treaties were effected as follows:
One of the contending parties would send a delegation / to inform the other that he was desirous of peace. If the other party was favourably disposed, he would also send a
■i delegation to assure his adversary of his friendship.
^R. Numelin, the Beginnings of Diplomacy: A Sociological Study of Intertribal and International Rela tions, London, 1950; p. 175.
59 The Ovambo who fought their neighbours mainly over
"territory, water-rights, interference with visiting sub jects, cattle raids, and so forth" approached their cus tomary peace proposals in this manner:
"After consultation with his council lors the chief appoints an aged member of the tribe as peace messenger. The person selected for the purpose is so advanced in age as to preclude him from taking part in any feud or fight. An ox with black or red flanks and a white line along the centre of the back is next picked out of the herd. Accompanied by a young lady and a young boy the messenger proceeds with the Ox to the Kraal of the rival chief for whom it is intended as a peace offering. On arriving at the Kraal the latter first inspects the Ox before accepting it. The coloration of the animal represents a wood or forest with the path of peace. The age of the messenger is an indication of this chief’s weakness, namely, that he has no young men to fight. The young girl had before the departure of the peace mission been adorned with ornaments only worn by the rich... Among them were in cluded several of the much treasured shells known as Omba. These ornaments are a personal offering to the chief who re moves them from the girl’s person with his hands. The boy is merely to assist the old man in driving the Ox and in further evidence of the want of eligible fighters. The fact that the peace messenger and his assistants return empty handed is proof that the road between the two countries is clear and that the two tribes are again on friendly terms." 1
^■Ibid., p. 176.' From C. H. L. Hahn, The Ovambo, quoted by Numelin.
60 Many more illustrations can be furnished but the fore going should suffice. However, it should be mentioned that peace treaties were often ratified, especially after pro longed conflicts, by ritual ceremonies which confirmed the importance and significance of the peace treaty. And they were also arranged in times of complete peace for the pur pose of establishing perpetual friendship and of preventing the outbreak of war.
After a war, the conclusion and negotiation of peace also varied greatly. Among the Kavirondo, for example, peace-making after a war was negotiated by the vanquished taking a dog and cutting it in halves. The representatives of each side then held respectively the forequarters and hindquarters of the divided dog, meanwhile swearing the oath of peace and friendship over the halved dog which they held in their hand.^ Some of the ’’tribes in Uganda when desiring to make peace with other tribes slaughtered a sheep, and the representatives of each side exchanged pieces of the flesh. An old man belonging to the side which had been worsted, and which was suing for peace, must . then go to the chief of the conqueror and proceed to sweep up the cattle kraal. This was accepted as a kind of
•4l. Johnston, The Uganda Protectorate, ii, p. 752 Quoted by Numelin.
61 I
submission.The Kpelle of Liberia followed a different
procedure. "The party... who desires peace places white
hens outside the palisade of the other. On this the mes
senger must kneel down calling out: 'Ma', 'Forgive us ! 1
If the chief of the other side agrees, he says: 'I give my hand as a pledge; go into the town!' The peace mes
sengers are invited to the camp or the village where the
actual discussions are begun. All the prisoners of war
are called out and those who have lost the fight can re
deem the prisoners; those who are not redeemed become the
property of the conquering chief. 'if, 1 says Westermann,
,nthe one party did not send white hens to the other and
so ask forgiveness the war would never stop.'"^
Peace was also made by compensation and the payment
of reparations after a war or to prevent one. The kinds
of compensation or reparation arranged between "tribal"
states differed, however. Some states used cattle, others
preferred agricultural products including kola, and gold,
cowries and salt.
It may now be established as a fact of general appli
cation that traditional Africans did not wage wqr
^L o c . cit.
^Loc. cit.
62 precipitously or arbitrarily. The reasons for war were frequently submitted and attempts made to reach an under standing or accommodation. Oyo gave as her reason for deciding on an invasion of Dahomey in the eighteenth cen tury the latter*s failure to fulfill her treaty obligations to the former. Denkyera's interception of Ashanti merchant convoys (circa. 1863) in what was technically a time of peace provided the Ashantis with a reason to go to war.
Since wars frequently arose because of failure to reach compromise and often only when attempts at conciliation and amicable settlement of disputes had proved unsuccess ful, one can say with a degree of certainty, that tra ditional Africans did not generally conduct their wars without notice and without consultations. Among the
Bavenda when war was decided upon the "war-note" was / drummed out for the benefit of the adversary, and then messages were despatched to all the different sections of the state to put them in readiness for the war.** "Also among the tribes of Nyasaland, if a chief decide (d) to make war upon another, he usually sen(t) a messenger stat ing his cause of complaint and offering him a bullet,
■^Stayt, The Bavenda, p. 71, adapted from Numelin already cited. where guns (we)re used, or a spear, and a hoe. If the chief
thus addressed retain(ed) the bullet and sen(t) back the hoe, it mean(t) that he accept (ed) war; if he kep(t) the hoe
and return(ed) the bullet it mean(t) that he wish(ed) peace and (was) yield(ing) to the other's demand.
It would appear that the resort to war was not made without a formal declaration or without some kind of diplo matic negotiations. The declaration of war was conveyed by war emissaries while a diplomatic mission to negotiate and
conclude peace was entrusted to peace envoys. There were many exceptions of course, but the general tendency was to
seek alternative solutions that would make war unnecessary.
Finally, there were rules and conventions of warfare.
Women and children were, in most cases, spared during war- * , « fare. The Bantu of Kavirondo had rules regarding the
treatment of slain warriors and of women and children.
The Masai, the Nuer of Sudan, and the Bari in Nigeria
observed similar rules with respect to women and children in
time of'iwar. There were also rules for terminating all
^Johnstone, British Central Africa, p. 469, Adapted from Numelin.
^See Chapter 4.
^See Gunther in Fortes and Pritchard, p. 228 already cited. conflicts and hostilities. Such rules of warfare were how ever more pronounced between some groups of states than be tween some others. Between two different ethnic stocks mutual destruction often constituted the prominent aim, while in the encounters between groups of similar stock the hostile groups tended to concede, though not always, "their mutual rights of existence and maintained a type of relationship with one another in which warfare functioned chiefly as a regulating and balancing force, making for an approximately even distribution of power and wealth between the tribes."
The Ashantis even imposed severe restrictions upon the con- » duct of their generals. If an Ashanti general exceeded his instructions he was generally asked to pay reparations and was held responsible for all consequences. "Thus when
Amankwa Tia who was supposed to wage war on Denkyera exr ceeded his instructions in attacking Elmina he was asked by the Asantenene to be personally responsible for the indem nity."^
It seems therefore that the aim in warfare was not always to be wantonly destructive or to deprive the enemy
of its chances of making or suing for peace or to deny a ......
■^Loc. cit.
^W. E. Ward, A History of Ghana, London, 1958; pp. 276-7. state's existence altogether. Rather the aim, as in the case of the Azande, "was to get the enemy to withdraw so that vic tory might be claimed with as little loss on your side as possible." The Azande accordingly "left a gap in the rear" so that an enemy who preferred survival could always escape.
"Moreover, there was a further convention, that fighting should begin about 4p.m., so that those who were getting the worst of it could withdraw under cover of darkness."*- There were many exceptions, certainly; but the evidence suggests a generally observed rules of warfare.
European appearance on the African political scene, however, revolutionized the rules and conventions of war fare. The introduction of firearms increased the military capabilities of many an African state, with the result that wanton destruction and pillage became the epitome of mili tary prowess. African states sought alliances with the
Europeans and placed themselves under their protection. This was possible because the Europeans exploited inter-African conflicts and grievances by siding with one side against another, by intervening in domestic politics, and by com pensating "friends" with gun-powder, guns, and other.
*"E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "Zande Warfare", Anthropos, 1957, vol. 52.
66 cherished European goods.
The Europeans of course achieved their objectives through a combination of warfare and treaty-making. And the
African political setting facilitated the process. In the first place inter-"tribal" and international conflicts of interests existed which always provided an incentive to war. Secondly, the incidence of the Slave trade brought severe strains on political relationships and created fears for most African states and at the same time gave additional motivation for warfare. Many African states were eager to acquire slaves to exchange them for firearms so as to pro tect themselves against both African and European encroach ments .
The Europeans manipulated these fears and ambitions by proffering "protection" and alliances to African actors-
elite (leaders) and encouraging them to subordinate their
sovereignties to European governments. The direct inter vention, and, sometimes indirect pressures, employed by
Europeans compelled the African states to yield unwittingly
to their overtures.
Yet the 'alliances of individual African states with
Europeans were dictated by genuine considerations, on the
African's part, of political survival and stable relations
and not, as was the case with the Europeans, by fraudulent
67 intent. An example of this fraudulent relationship is pro vided by the treaty concluded between the British and King
Docemo of Lagos on August 6 , 1861. Article I of this treaty reads:
"In order that the Queen of England may be enabled to assist, defend, and protect the inhabitants of Lagos, and to put an end to the slave trade in this and the neighbour ing countries, and to prevent the destruc tive wars so frequently undertaken by Dahomey and others for the capture of slaves, I, Docemo, do, with the consent and advice of my council, give, transfer, and by these presents grant and confirm unto the Queen of Great Britain, her heirs and successors forever, the port and island of Lagos, with all the rights, profits, ter ritories and appurtenances whatsoever there unto belonging, and as well the profits and revenue as the direct, full, and absolute dominion and sovereignty of the said port, island, and premises, with all the royal ties thereof, freely, fully, entirely, and absolutely...
"Article II. Docemo will be allowed the use of the title of King in its usual Afri can signification, and will be permitted to decide disputes between natives of Lagos with their consent, subject to appeals to British Laws.
.... "In consideration of the cession as be fore mentioned of the port and island and territories of Lagos, the representatives of the Queen of Great Britain do promise..;. . that Docemo shall receive an annual pension from the Queen of Great Britain equal to the net revenue hitherto annually received by him; such pension to be paid at such periods and in such modes as may hereafter be
68 •1 determined."
By an additional article to the above treaty, dated
February 18, 1862 it was agreed that Docemo should receive a pension of 1 , 2 0 0 bags of cowries annually provided he did not break any of the Articles of that treaty., and re- signed all claims upon former farmers of his revenue."
On the same day that the treaty of 1861 was concluded a British Proclamation was issued announcing that Lagos had o been taken as a possession of the British crown.
A similar fate befell the Basutos. On October 5, 1843
Moshesh, king of the Basutos signed a treaty of friendship and alliance with the British Governor of the Cape of Good
Hope, and on the 13th December 1843 the Basutos were admitted into the allegiance of Britain. In 1868, after a
series of wars with the Orange Free state, the Basutos
"petitioned" for British protection and they were immed
iately "declared to be British subjects, and their territory
to be British." On 11th August 1871 Basutoland was annexed
to the British Colony at the Cape .4
*-Sir Edward Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 2 vols., London 1894; p. 410. o Loc. cit.
3l q c . cit.
4 Ibid.. pp. 329-330.
69 Thus the consequences of European intervention in inter-African wars and politics were territorial annexation, conquest, and colonization, and the loss of much of the in dependent structural and constitutional preeminence of traditional African political systems.
What was the function of war then in the systems of international relations of traditional Africa?
War served as an instrument by which most of the tra ditional states were established and maintained. It was employed by .the states as a means of protecting their t frontiers and territorial integrity. By its formal expres sion it symbolized the unity of the state and the political loyalty of its people, and it provided some impetus for political integration.
War, furthermore, contributed to the expansion of cul ture and institutions and to the historic transitions of
African civilization. The obverse of this is that war -led to the disintegration and demise of many polities within the traditional African international system. It often resulted
in economic and demographic losses, weakening the African
societies, and contributing to the eventual occupation of
Africa by Europe.*' .....
**For more information on the negative consequences of inter-African, Euro-African wars, see Infra Chapter 7.
70 War was, however, one of the means for maintaining a
"balance of power" among some of the states within the tra ditional international system. It, moreover, contributed towards the establishment of new political regimes, and towards the spreading of techniques and ideas.
In short, the functional role of war in traditional
Africa was that it transformed and defined the inter national system: by preserving peace and stability be tween the states and by maintaining the international system of independence and territorial integrity of the states.*1
•^The European-African wars and subsequent colonization eventually resulted in a reduction of the number of active actors within the international system but that did not too radically transform the system. The Europeans assumed the responsibility of maintaining and exercising the external political functions of the traditional states.
71 CHAPTER 4
TRADITIONAL AFRICAN DIPLOMACY
The study of the international relations of traditional
Africa reveals the relative significance of the process of dynamics and change in the political relations of the Afri can peoples. The predominant patterns of behaviour were hegemony, imperialism, and war coupled with social and
economic behaviour. In spite of this inner dynamic, the
international order may appear to have been well systema
tized: there were mechanisms capable of bringing the general level of conflict toward some tolerable equilibrium
point where a condition of 'peace* was accepted as prevail
ing. That is to say, when the dynamics of the international
system were perceived by the national actors (rulers) as
tending to be 'destructive* they resorted to an approach
that allowed a 'constructive' management. The inter
national system had thus the capacity to cope with stress
ful disturbances that appeared to endanger the structure t of relations.
The mechanisms available to the actors within each
traditional international system consisted of techniques
for the regulation of the volume and variety of stressful
disturbances and/or adjustment and settlement of conflict.
72 These techniques were political and military. The choice of technique to use was made by the decision-makers
(rulers and other elite groups) in terms of the objective sought, the motivations, and the circumstances intrinsic to the situation.
Political techniques of action by means of the instru ment of. diplomacy constituted the principal form by which political relationships between African "tribal" states were largely regularised. The means of diplomacy comprised compromise, persuasion, and the use of force."** Depending upon their power and objectives the "tribal" states would emphasize strongly any of these means to reflect the nature of their foreign policy. Diplomatic correspondence was one of the channels through which these traditional
African polities communicated with one another.
The diplomatic capacity of traditional African states is less easily approached. Every polity touched by the problem of spatial coexistence had relations with other states, for weal or woe. But as long as they remained at peace with each other, they must have somehow managed to live together. - The capacity to construct relations on a
■^Economic tribute, gifts, and other incentives were also used to maintain amicable and cordial relations and to avert war or other hostile act.
73 basis other than physical constraint or the use of force imply rationality and calculability in the dealings of the traditional African polities, with their concern for self preservation and survival. Subtle political techniques must have been used to thrash out conflicting interests and claims of the polities.
The usefulness of political techniques, that is to say diplomacy, as a regulatory mechanism tended, however, in practice to depend upon the cooperative or antagonistic policies of the polities involved. There is evidence that when in the eighteenth century Dahomey was apprised of the
imminent invasion of their land by the Oyo of Yorubaland
'"the king used all his efforts to obtain an accommodation,
and offered them any reasonable compensation to refrain
from hostilities; but it was difficult to satisfy their (the
Oyos) demands. They claimed, in consequence of an old
treaty, an annual tribute..."' Later, after some persuading,
'"the Eyoes consented to an accommodation, and compromised
the matter for a tribute..."'^
Here, the function of diplomacy was to play down
political forces that otherwise would have militated against.
^Robert Norris, Memoirs of the Reign of Bossa Ahadee, King of Dahomey, London, 1789; p. 11.
74 the coexistence of the states or the normalization of their mutual relations. Thus a primary tendency of traditional
African diplomacy was both to widen the areas of agreement and to increase the objectives of cooperation among the par ticipating states.
The purposes for which the techniques of diplomacy were applicable in traditional Africa varied, however. As the
"tribal" states were concerned with their own self-preser vation and security, they often tended to employ the art of diplomacy to (a) create alliances; (b) to create or re establish bonds of friendship; (c) to protect and promote the welfare of nationals abroad; and (d) to redress a wrong by appealing to principles of morality, law, humanity, and culture.
An illustration of the last two points is provided by the despatch from Uthman Idris, king of B o m u to Al-Zahir
Saf-al-din Barquq, the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt. It reads:
.. .After greetings we have sent you as ambassador, my cousin, Idris Ibn Muhammad, because of the calamity we suffered. The Arabs who are called Judhama and others have taken captive our free subjects - women and children and old people, and our relatives, and other muslims. Among these Arabs are polytheists and apostates; they have raided the muslims and killed a great many of them in a war which broke out be tween us and our enemies and on account of this war they have killed our prince Umar
75 ibn Idris, a martyr (for the faith) - he is our brother, the son of our father al-Hajj Idris son of al-Hajj Ibrahim; and we are the sons of Saif ibn - Dhi Yazan, the father of our tribe, the Arab, of the family of Quraysh, as we have been in formed by our learned men. These Arabs have harmed all our land, the land of Bornu, continually up to the present, and have captured our free sub jects and relatives, who are Muslims, and are selling them to the slave-dealers in Egypt and Syria and elsewhere, and some they keep for themselves. Now God has placed in your hands the government of Egypt, from the Mediterranean to Aswan; and our people have been treated (there) as merchandise. Send messengers to all your lands, to your Amirs, and your Wazirs, and your Qadis, and your governors, and your men of learning (Ulama), and the heads of your markets; let them examine and inquire, and discover. When you have found our people, let them remove them from the hands of those who hold them captive, and put them to the test. And if they say - 'We are free men - we are mus lims ' - believe them, and do not regard them as liars. But when the matter becomes clear to you, release them, and let them return to their liberty and to Islam. In truth, some of the arabs in our country haye turned to evil ways, and are not living at peace. They are ignorant of God1s book and of the Sunna of our prophet, and they continue in their wicked ness. But do you fear God, and reverence him, and do not abandon our people to be bought and sold as slaves. . . 1
■^Thomas Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives: An Historical Anthology. London, 1960; pp. 77-78. The correspondence reached the Sultan during the year 794 A.H. (A.D. 1391-2).
76 It would appear that traditional African diplomacy tended to utilize the forces of moral suasion, law, and cul tural ideas to maximize the foreign policies of the rulers, if and when the situation warranted. The essence was flexibility and adaptation to altered conditions and cir cumstances .
One could detect a certain degree of rigidity of tra ditional African diplomacy, however. This type of diplomacy often focused on a particular line of policy and emphasized force and power without consideration to the motives, inter ests and feelings of other nations. The nation pursuing this type of diplomacy usually had a preponderance of power and wished to impress other nations with this actual power or wanted them to believe it possessed that power. The following correspondence from Mai Idris Alooma of Bornu to the Sultan of Bulala of the lake Chad region is relevant:
If my note reached you in safety, and you read it at leisure, know that my de sire is that you should send to me an upright and sensible man to hear what I have to say about the true reason of our coming here, and return to you.l
The sense of disrespect and hostility running through this diplomatic correspondence is obvious. Apparently it was designed to create bad relations with Bulala so that
XIbid.. p. 107.
77 Bornu could have a practical justification for an invasion, which finally came when Bulala refused to countenance the n o te.
ICano*s relations with Zaria, Kororafa, and even B o m u exemplified the same policy of power diplomacy. Kano, under the thirteenth Sarki, was a conquering nation. The
Sarki ‘"hardly lived in Kano at all, but scoured the country round and conquered the towns... He sent to the Kwararaf a and asked why they did not pay him tribute. They gave him two hundred slaves..."' *■
This was diplomacy - a kind of "machtpolitik" - which the king of B o m u consistently and continuously pursued to realize his foreign policy goals and objectives. The rigid ity of this type of diplomacy derived from the fact that it was predicated more or less upon the raison d 1 etat. or the exclusive needs of the polity. Its theoretical basis was that it demonstrated not only the strength of the state but also increased opportunity for pressure, and thereby gave the state a superior leverage in negotiations. It was not always a successful diplomacy, however. The diplomatic re lations of the Mahdis of the Sudan illustrate this. When
•*Tbid.. p. 79.
78 the Mahdia began, the tendency was to generalize the initial accumulation of national power into a universal empire. And all the states not holding allegiance to the Mahdis were declared "enemies of God",’*' to be brought under the control of the Mahdis. A series of diplomatic admonitions were issued to such states. A few samples are included here:
Become a Muslim and peace will be unto you... If on the other hand you choose disobedience and prefer blindness - no doubt about your falling into our hands as we are promised the possession of all the earth - God fulfills his promises... Let not the devil hinder y o u .*
This correspondence was addressed by the Mahdi to King
Yohannes of Abyssinia. Another note despatched to the lat ter during the same period, 1884-1885, reads as follows;'
...Religion fell into the hands of the Turks, who changed it and replaced it with infidelity. They annulled the laws of the merciful and revived the ways of Satan... When God determined to cut short a state of affairs, he called me forth as the Mahdi.-.
Imbued with such opitimism and orientation the Mahdis of the Sudan could not, in principle, entertain peaceful
•k*. N. Sanderson, "Contribution from African Sources to the History of European Competition in the Upper Valley of the Nile," in Journal of African History, III, (1962) p. 69.
^L oc. c i t . 3 Loc. cit.
79 diplomatic relations with their neighbours except on their terms. Witness this 'proclamation* to the rulers of
Misiriya of the Sudan:
...Out of loving kindness towards you we have written proclamations to you... so that you may answer God's summoner and set forth on the hijra... you are not to listen to the erring chiefs... if you follow their words, without doubt an in tolerable punishment will befall you in this world and the next, your land will be ruined and your women, wealth, and children taken captive, for the hand of the Mahdia is stretched out over to you... In view of the opposition of your (fel low) chiefs to the faith and their failure to follow the Mahdia, we have deposed them and (have appointed an) agent over all the Misiriya
The records show that traditional rulers of the Sudan who proved recalcitrant or outrightly discountenanced such ultimata were frequently invaded by the hordes of the
Khalifa. One of the "tribes’*, the Ta 'aisha were strongly censured for not responding to the repeated summons of the
Khalifa "'to enter the path of the Mahdia"1... <
"'If this is because you deny the Mahdia, then you have gone out of Islam and become infidels (God protect us from your condition!). If it is because you have no faith in the promise of God and choose blindness rather than guidance,
^Holt, op. cit., p. 141.
80 then if God will, the fate that befell the faithless and
erring in ancient times and recently shall befall you. If
it is because you deem yourselves too great to follow us
and envy what you have seen, (wishing) to do likewise - do you not know that the divine power is good in what it brings
to pass and that God places his secret in the weakest of his >
creatures?'"*•
Abdallahi goes on to threaten the traditional rulers with ruin and destruction: ' "if you have power to fight the
Mahdia, then make ready - and you shall not avail, for you
are weak and lack might. You have seen what the Mahdia has
done to those who were stronger and more numerous and wealthier than you; so what of you, in your fewness and 9 weakness and lack of might?"1 i, The traditional rulers of the Sudan were urged to fall
in with the Mahdia otherwise they would be confronted with
retribution. If they would concede, they were promised
safety for themselves and all their possessions and would
find nothing but what would please them.
'"But if you rely on delaying in your land, and if
your wealth and children and homes are dearer to you than
*Tbid., pp. 143-144.
^Ibid., p . 144.
81 God and His Apostle and the holy war for His sake, then God is greaterl upon you, 'God is greater!' upon you, 'God is greater!' upon you. Prepare to fight God and His Apostle and, if God will, you shall be most miserably destroyed and go into the fire and the wrath of - God. Wheresoever you turn your faces on the earth, the power of God encompasses you about and the chains of power are upon your necks."
After holding the rulers responsible for their behav iour, and warning them that they were incapable of resist ing his forces, Abdallahi continued in the following vein:
Your expedient is flight and dispersion throughout the lands. Then do not flee by yourselves and leave the women, the infants, the old people, the widows, the orphans, and those who lack strength. For you are the (chiefs) over them... To flee by yourselves and leave them does not befit your long employment by them. So, since these weak ones belong to you and you employ them for your own pur poses, you are bound to take them in your company and carry them with you. To him who has no bull, you shall give a bull to carry him and his children. To him who has no ass, you shall give him an ass; and to him who has no cow, you shall give a cow to carry himself and his children. Do not leave them in the land, so that the might of the soldiers of God shall be poured upon them, for you have de tained them all this time, keeping them.
■^•Ibid.. p . 148.
82 from the way of guidance. So to flee by yourselves and leave them behind would be disgrace to you among the tribes and also you would be asked concerning them on the day of resurrection, between the hands of God... If God will, the Mahdis shall take you all. Neither the distance of the lands nor dispersion in the valleys shall save you from its grasp; for no conqueror conquers God and no fugitive escapes Him. Our duty is but to convey the message and you have the choice of treading the path _ of the Garden or the Fire. And farewell.
This ultimatum was followed by an expeditionary force against the "tribes". They were conquered and their posses sions confiscated. It should, however, be mentioned that this rigid, matchpolitik, diplomacy of the Sudanese
Khalifas was modified somewhat when Europe began to show a political interest in North-East Africa. And a more conven tional approach to diplomatic relations was adopted for instance, towards Abyssinia. .*
Obviously, the states varied considerably in the extent and manner in which they participated in diplomacy; but it could be said that all the "tribal" polities of traditional
Africa maintaining political relations with neighbouring states had diplomatic instruments for the preservation of peace and for pursuing their objectives. The means and the
%olt. Op. cit., pp. 144-145.
83 style may differ but for each polity the ultimate end of diplomacy was to create a desirable condition not unconducive to stability and peace.
TRADITIONAL DIPLOMATISTS
The types of diplomatic instruments largely used by
African "tribal" states allow us to characterize traditional diplomacy as concerned with two diametrically opposed but related levels of political activity: peace and war. Tra ditional diplomatists may be divided into two broad cate gories - peace envoys and war emissaries.
Peace envoys had as their particular responsibility the negotiation and conclusion of peace. They conveyed messages of friendship, sought alliances, and executed treaties.
Whenever there existed a status mixtus between two polities, that is to say, when neither a condition of war nor peace prevailed but all the same there were stresses and strains enough to undermine the regularization of stable relations, a peace envoy might be despatched from one state to another with an eirenicon or symbol of peace to attempt to transmute the condition of tension into one of cordiality and amity.
War emissaries had a different function. They were entrusted with the uneviable task of transmitting to the l potential or actual enemy the odious message of declaration
84 of war, and also of notifying friendly and potential allies i of the imminent outbreak of war.
Of the two diplomatists the peace envoy was naturally the more welcome. Both, nonetheless, enjoyed a certain number of special privileges throughout traditional Africa.
They were often personally inviolable, and their inviolabil ity frequently had the character of being more or less sacred or sacrosanct. In Uganda, Zululand, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria, to name just a few areas, the envoys were always treated sacred. Among the Wabena of Southern Africa an envoy was given protection from region to region and from district to district until he reached his destina tion. As the symbolic representatives of their countries all envoys were more often than not accorded easy transit through hostile territories, especially when they displayed in their possession recognized symbols - a "linguist staff" or some such kind of accreditation - of a diplomatic mis sion. Their maltreatment was tantamount to declaration of war.
The importance attached to the function of diplomatists in traditional Africa is seen in the fact that a breach of their immunity or inviolability was frequently met with a
1-See p. 59 for illustration.
85 retaliation in kind and, sometimes, war. Indeed, almost all
African "tribes" considered it a criminal act to violate an
envoy bearing the emblem or insignia of political authority:
formality, hospitality, courtesy were thus integral aspects
of traditional African diplomacy. ■*"
Supplementing the functions of envoys were heralds,
couriers, and messengers - they were interchangeable - whose
principal duties were diplomatic errands. These transmitted messages to rulers or to important personages, and they were
engaged in connection with carrying invitations to friendly
states for courtesy visits and for participation in politi
cal or military events. These "errand boys" also were in violable as to their persons because the messages they con
veyed were often important and, moreover, they walked in
the aura of their sovereign authorities. To illustrate the
type of messages despatched through messengers the follow
ing letter from Muhammad Bello, Sultan of Sokoto (1817-1837)
to the Emir of Bauchi is appended:
To the Emir of Bauchi, Ya'qub bin dadi, a thousand valedictions and a thousand greetings.
4*or a very detailed study along these lines, see R. Numelin's The Beginnings of Diplomacy: A Sociological Study of Intertribal and International Relations, London, 1950, which has greatly inspired this entire thesis.
86 After which, the reason for (this mes sage) is to inform you of our circumstances, and of what we are engaged in today of the important affairs of Islam and of the Mus lims . That is, that we have gone out in the direction of the North, because of the affair of the beasts, and the foray against Tadaghaw with Al-Jilani. We have taken our equipment, consisting of tents of hide, and waterskins, and all that is required for a j ou m e y . We have ordered the expedition for the twentieth of Sha 'ban and we commanded those of the brethren who adjoin us to follow us, and to march out with us bringing their beasts and military equipment. There is not to stay behind a single one of the owners of beasts, nor of the Ghazis, whoever he might be, excepting those who have embarked upon the campaign against Banagha. The result is that we have imposed upon the community at the present time one of two alternatives; either they should join the Ghazis or the Banagha front, and besiege it until we arrive, if Allah so wills; or for whoever may prefer the expedition to Tadaghaw to accompany us. As for the cattle-owning herdsmen, not one of them must fail to join us. Unless there is no help for it... As -for what is required of you yourself, you must follow our example when this reaches you - and gird up your skirts for the sacred war (Jihad) against the infidels upon your most important fronts and "let them find strength in you", and do not give way, and "do not be discouraged, for you shall have the upper hand," or rather "a morning upon the road of Allah, or a day's march is better than this world, and what is in it." So do not turn aside from your resolve but be heroes of Allah. Incumbent on you too is the multiplication of your beasts, and the seeking out for them of grazing-ground that are suited to them, since they are instruments of the sacred war. Greetings."1
1-From Basil Davidson, The African Past, op. cit.. pp. 326-7. Q *7 There can be little doubt that this letter must have
been sent through a messenger because it gives the location
- "in the direction of the North" - of the expedition and
does not suggest a course of action likely to have required
some negotiation for its fulfillment. An envoy or emissary would have other responsibilities besides merely delivering notes and messages. Traditionally, envoys and emissaries
attempted to inform themselves of the objectives of the
government to which they were accredited or assigned and to
assess the power available for the pursuit of those objec
tives. Furthermore, they attempted to familiarize them
selves with, and to evaluate, the feuds, rivalries or
opposing trends within the government for possible exploi
tation by their own states. Messengers had little time at
their disposal for any comprehensive garnering of informa
tion; they only symbolized urgency and expeditiousness.
Envoys, on the other hand, combined their diplomatic func
tions with intelligence reconnoitering and espoinage. In
the kingdom of Dahomey, for example, when an Agbadjigbeto
(a high official or ambassador) was sent to a neighbouring
state on a mission, his entourage or legation often in
cluded persons b o m in that area so that their work might
be made relatively easy. If it were impossible to spy or
investigate thoroughly the country in question, the
88 Agbadjigbeto must undertake repeated journeys until the in
formation his state were seeking was complete. He may stay
in the country for several months and regularly receive
other emissaries sent by the king of Dahomey, presenting
them simply as merchants. Once they were emplaced, these
intelligence-diplomatists would inform themselves about
everything and every situation including the supernatural
2 and the war plans of the enemy.
Diplomatic agents were often also engaged for social
purposes. Roscoe^ reports that the king of Bunyoro employed
diplomatic emissaries for exogamous marriages. The negoti
ations for such marriages entailed so much finesse and
delicacy that much diplomatic aptitude was required to
determine the actual reasons behind the desire for the
marriage. Inter-,ltribal,, relations based on matrimony at
the highest level generally conduced to the maintenance of
peaceful relations between different polities. Diplomatic
practice among some polities even required that peace be
concluded by means of marriage. The Wabende practice was
■^Hazoume*, Le Pact de sang an Dahomey, Ch. Ill, pp. 20, 22, 25.
2 Ibid., p . 25.
^J. Roscoe, The Bakitara or Banyoro, Cambridge, 1923.
89 that after a war the "chief" of the vanquished "tribe" would give his daughter as a wife to the victor to legalize the conclusion of peace. This was known as "peace mar riage".*- Diplomatic relations, one could say, was scarcely confined largely to political matters.
At this juncture it must be mentioned that diploma tists and diplomatic agents of traditional Africa were frequently ad hoc representatives enjoying, de jure or de facto, a sovereign capacity to make or sue for peace. They returned home as soon as their mission was accomplished.
But this does not suggest the absence of institutionalized diplomacy. On the contrary, formal embassies, especially in areas of relatively "high" civilization, were exchanged between states and codes of diplomatic conduct were form ulated. The Ancient Egyptians were known to have exchanged ambassadors with foreign countries and they ware also among the first to have ever established codes of diplomatic practice with neighbouring African and foreign states. 9 There is also evidence that the Sudanic empires exchanged ambassadors with the Maghrib states of North Africa, especially Morocco; and Abyssinia sent ambassadors to and
*\J. H. Speke, Journal of the Discovery of the source of the Nile. London, 1863, p. 100.
2 See Thomas Hodgkin, "Kingdoms of the Western Sudan" in The Dawn of African History, London, 1965, Roland Oliver (ed.) received ambassadors from Constantinopole. The Mahdhist
Sudan also exchanged embassies with Abyssinia.
In the Gold Coast area we find Ashanti resident agents in Dagomba, Akim, Akwapim, Abura, Cape Coast and
Elmina; and the Ivory Coast exchanging embassies with
Ashanti.^ The functions of the Ambassadors included nego tiating peace treaties, alliances, and collecting tributes.
There was no uniform protocol, however. Some polities would not permit ambassadors and other diplomatic agents to address the rulers direct except through a "linguist".
Others required prostrating before, and kissing, the hand of the ruler. Still, many others insisted on neither of these formalities. Yet all accepted hospitality and courtesy as a norm. Elaborate court ceremonies character
ized most of the "higher" civilizations.
As to its form, diplomacy was both a verbal and written art in traditional Africa. Nonetheless, the
language of diplomacy was neither vague nor ambiguous. The
rulers were known to have phrased their words to inspire
certainty and conviction and conveyed precisely what they
had in mind. Therefore, their diplomatic representatives
■4cwame Arhin, "The Structure of Greater Ashanti (1799- 1824) in Journal of African History VIII. 1 (1967); p. 76. See also W. E. Ward, A History of Ghana. London, 1948.
91 frequently were required, for the purpose of practical politics and effective diplomacy, to possess the following general characteristics:
(1 ) eloquence and oratorical talent;
(2 ) forensic skill and persuasion;
(3) decorum in manners and courage;
(4) good memory and capacity for precision;
(5) patience to endure indignities and
humiliations, if necessary.
A diplomatic representative could not accomplish much in traditional Africa without being humble and mannerly; he could be of very little use if he lacked the ability to marshal his words correctly and with facility. And he could not negotiate effectively without being convincing, persuasive and patient. African peoples thus usually employed respectable, elderly men who were known to be fluent and eloquent in speech and were well acquainted with the neighbouring tongues.
All these qualities could be taken for granted but not inability to be precise in the delivery of diplomatic mes sages. The penalty for such imprecision ranged from amputation of a limb on one hand to outright death on the other. The practice of the Buganda is here considered gen-
92 erally representative. Among the Buganda if an envoy com mitted an error in delivering his message or wilfully and deliberately changed the wording of it, he was not only subjected to severe humiliation but he was also liable to lose an ear at the command of the king.*- Truthfulness, pre cision, and courtesy were indeed the essential attributes required of all traditional African diplomatists.
It is evident from the foregoing that the polities of traditional Africa conducted diplomatic relations, the major purpose of which was the reduction of destabilizing influ ences, so as to bring about peaceful and stable order be tween and among themselves. True, some used non-violent methods to settle their differences and others employed force. But, fundamentally, the principal instrument was political diplomacy rather than military.
Political techniques of action in resolving inter-
"tribal" and international disputes seem to have been more broadly preferred because it entailed little cost. However, military action, as power or warrior diplomacy, was univer sally accepted by all the polities as capable of producing final solutions to all disputes especially when the formal,
1-Sir H. H. Johnston, The Uganda Protectorate. London, 1902, p. 752.
93 non-violent instruments of diplomacy had failed to yield
cooperation and agreement.
Any conflict of interests or any disputes in the sys
tem of international relations of traditional Africa was
amenable, one might observe, to settlement. But the
decision whether a dispute was settled at all, and, if so,
peacefully, did not primarily depend on the internal charac
teristics and structure of the controversy but rather on
the rulers1 general and,subj ective view of the actual or
desirable relations between the polities. Consequently,
political and military techniques of diplomacy were the
rulers' instruments for furthering their over-all goals
and aspirations within the international system, with war,
of course, as the final arbiter of all disputes.
94 CHAPTER 5
LAW AND POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The content of political relations in traditional Africa was defined by the character of the respective polities.
They all assumed sovereign status, implying the territorial ity of statehood, homogeneity of peoples and independence from external control.
Territoriality was crucial to "tribal" exclusiveness or
statehood. Historically, it formed the base upon which the political and legal order of the "tribal" state was founded.
It also became identifiable with the "tribe" and its spatial delimitation became coterminous with sovereignty.
Territorial sovereignty thus was held valid against all
other polities, especially when it rested on the strength of
continuous possession and undisputed exercise of political
authority. Within the configuration of territoriality, the
tribal state was therefore free to exercise sovereignty in
any manner it deemed fit and to control whatever went on in
its territorial domain.
Thus territoriality became the framework of indepen
dence' and security; in it the bonds of memories, the ideals
and aspirations that conjured up attachment to the native
95 soil were forged. And as long as it delimited the con stituency of the polity and provided resources, one of the principal objectives of traditional' diplomacy-*- and, of course, war, consisted of the defense of the territory, or the acquisition of more territory.
It is this highly symbolic meaning which traditional
Africans attached to territory that made it readily possible for any violation of their territory to degenerate into a serious outburst of political struggle. Territory provided supply centers for the rulers and peoples inhabiting it, and served as a source of power for their political, military, and economic development. Thus, the possible stakes of political struggle were frequently terrestrial space, popu lation, and resources, which also served as the objectives of the polities. The inter-relations of territory, popula tion, and resources not only tended to govern the collective behaviour of the polities, but to a great extent also defined the optimum realities of inter-tribal and inter national conduct. War both affirmed and negated the real ities of social relations between the polities. But the trend of inter-tribal or international politics was not
■*-See Chapter 4, Supra.
96 always towards war, or, even conflict. True, the relations of the tribal states were frequently controlled by the arbitrary use of power. But there is evidence that the rulers invoked the rule of law to stabilize their social relations and to modify their respective legal positions in the international system. They concluded agreements or treaties to regulate reciprocal interests and to coordinate their common efforts.
One such treaty was entered into by the Fante Kingdoms of the Gold Coast. These Fante Kingdoms having realized that their frequent internecine warfare was undermining their respective forces against the powerful Ashanti Nation decided in 1876 to conclude a treaty of alliance among i themselves. Since the treaty was concluded before the Gold
Coast became a full-fledged British Colony, it would be use ful to quote it at length. This treaty was later trans formed into a constitution, serving the fundamental law of what came to be known as the Fanti Confederation.
The object of the treaty were defined as follows:
"(1) To promote friendly intercourse between all the kings and chiefs of Fanti, and to unite them for offen sive and defensive purposes against their common enemy.
(2) To direct the labours of the confederation
97 towards the improvement of the country at large.
(3) To make good and substantial roads throughout all the interior districts included in the confederation.
(4) To erect school houses and establish schools for the education of all children within the confederation and to obtain the services of efficient school masters.
(5) To promote agricultural and industrial pur suits and to endeavour to introduce such new plants as may hereafter become the sources of profitable commerce to the country.
(6 ) To develop and facilitate the working of mineral and other resources of the country...If^ This treaty was signed and ratified by thirty-three (33) Fanti States
in 1876 except one which refused to enter into the new
relationship.
The Fanti polities were not the only ones which
attempted to modify their social relations by.the rule of
law. The trend of politics between the several Accra King
doms was also towards new principles -and standards by which
2 to regulate their collective behaviour.
■Hferd, op. cit.. pp. 253-258.
^Loc. cit.
98 The Egyptian-Hittite treaty of the second Century B.C.
is also recalled. The text of this treaty is one of the most
important diplomatic instruments of antiquity. The high con
tracting parties agreed, inter alia, to cessation of hostil
ities between them and to be friends forever. The treaty was made binding upon succeeding governments. Then both parties
- the king of the Hittites and the Pharaoh of Egypt - de
clared their adherence to former treaties concluded by their
predecessors. Two clauses then followed which specified the
tenure of a defensive alliance between the two countries
directed against their enemies.'*'
Three major generalizations might be made as to the
purposes and functions of treaty-making in traditional Africa,
First, treaties were used to transform the loose structure of
inter-tribal and international relations into a mould of
firmer integration. Second, they offered a possibility for
the parties involved to order their peaceful relations,
especially at the conclusion of war. And, third, they were
employed to settle finally potential and actual conflicts
between the parties.
■^H. R- Uhll, The Ancient History of the Near East. London, 1913, p. 265.
99 It could be said that the treaty was one of the prin cipal ways political relationships were stabilized in tra ditional Africa. The great West African States of Oyo and
Benin settled their conflicts by means of treaties. Such treaties were usually concluded by sacrifice of goats or cattle to the earth or to the most powerful God, followed by a solemn oath to live in peace.^ The Masai and the 2 Wanyamwesi, the Kavirondo, the Karamojo, the Wachaga, and the Nandi^ settled their conflicts by way of treaties. The object of peace which it was the intention to achieve was often sealed with the sacrifice of animals.
Treaties were, however, not common phenomena in tra ditional Africa; they only became common place = instruments of legal change when Europe and Africa met.**1 Nevertheless, where they did occur, one can be sure, they always served important purposes and functions. Indeed, they usually reflected the concern of the parties involved that progress was better achieved through the rule of law than by the sway t of force. More than that they evinced quite clearly the
lp. Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria. London, 1926, p. 820. Idem, Life in Southern Nigeria, pp. 241, 267.
^Sir A. C. Hollis, The Nandi. London, 1905, p. 84.
^Johnston, op. cit., p. 884.
^See Chapters 3 and 7.
100 voluntary will of the polities to adapt law to meet the exigencies of particular circumstances of concrete situ ations .
But not all treaties concluded between traditional
African polities manifested a free will. Some, of course, were entered into under duress. The treaty of Fomena 14th
March 1874 signed by Ashanti and the other states on the
Gold Coast after the defeat of Ashanti at the Katamansu
War is illustrative. In this treaty the Ashanti renounced the state of Elmina and its allied utribes" and they were to withdraw their troops from cape coast. The road from
Kumasi to the Pra River was to be kept clear and all trade routes were to be kept open.
It is apparent then that in inter-tribal and inter national relations of traditional Africa the treaty served as an essential regulator of political behaviour. However, the treaty, not unlike the m o d e m contractual arrangement, regulated only the rights and duties of the contracting par ties . As such they did not impose legal obligations upon non-parties without their consent. Some treaties, as already
^Since the Coastal "tribes" allied with the British to defeat the Ashanti in the Katamansu War, it should be men tioned that the treaty of Fomena contributed the basis of relations between Britain and Ashanti and, later, the colonization of the Gold Coast. See Ward, op. cit., pp. 276-277.
101 indicated, were, of course, concluded under pressure. Yet the fact that they arose tinder duress did not deny their validity. Traditional African rulers frequently reacted sharply to any effort, tacitly or explicitly, designed to change the needs of order and obligation established by treaties that were imposed by duress or constraint. Oyo gave as one of its reasons for invading Dahomey in the eighteenth century the failure of the latter to honour an old treaty obligation. In 1876 the Ashanti also attacked the Accras when the latter unilaterally broke their treaty
2' of friendship and alliance with them.
It is here submitted that power politics did not play too overwhelming a role in the international relations of traditional Africa but was on occasion supplemented with legal rules which allowed the polities to compromise and agree voluntarily to make concessions conducive to their well-being. The fact that the "tribal" states would go to t * ♦ war on account of the violation of a treaty seems to suggest that treaties and other contractual agreements were con ceived of as imposing certain rights and duties upon the states in their relations to each other. Inter-tribal
^Norris, op. cit., p. 11.
^Ward, op. cit.. p. 186
102 treaty-making was thus tantamount to inter-tribal or inter national law.
International law is here seen as a consensus gentium determined by the conditions arising out of the interests of the polities. As such its form and substance was largely affected by the individuality and political nature of the «< relations of the polities. Thus the positivity of inter national law was linked inextricably to the distribution of power within the international system and the conception of social order accepted by the rulers. This often allowed the rulers to legally justify their institution of war to punish alleged violations of treaty obligations. From the practice of the tribal states, it may be said then that the system of international law established by them did not seek to pre vent war per se but rather to regulate a limited range of peaceful relations between themselves. It was, therefore, more of a law of coordination and reciprocity*- than as a system of basic justice among the polities.
International law was not necessarily universal through out traditional Africa, primarily because the heterogenous structure of inter-tribal and international relations
^For a definition of international law of reciprocity and co-ordination, see Georg Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, Vol. 1, London, 1960.
103 precluded the development of solidarities and a common con sciousness iij the higher interest of the total African
1 collectivity. However, the independent existence of the polities coupled with the presumption to a sovereign status and territoriality would seem to suggest the rudiments of international customary law. The at least relative sta bility and order which emerged from territoriality, inde pendence, and sovereignty most likely codified these assumptions as norms of state practice, and making that practice universally accepted as "law".
In the traditional System of inter~"tribal" and inter national relations, international customary law thus served to regulate the rules of coexistence between the "tribal" states by laying down the principle of territorial sover eignty. rThe states were entitled to the right of non-inter vention in their "reserved domain". They were, immune from jurisdiction by other states and their peoples enjoyed pro tection from arbitrary interference with their lives,
1 o properties, or other economic interests. This seems to
^The OAU approximates this goal in contemporary Africa.
?Most "tribal" wars or conflicts were often the results of the violations of the person or property of a member of one "tribe" by a member of another "tribe". Lucy Mair ob serves that "the Mugabe (the Nkole king) was expected to organize retaliatory raids against anyone who raided the cattle of his clients". Mair. op. cit.. p. 167. W.E. Ward, have been the basic foundation of the independent coexistence of the polities.
If it were so, then it stands to reason that without the rules of international customary law to define,or delimit their jurisdictions, the traditional African polities would have found it difficult to regulate their political relations and it would have been perhaps impossible to avoid frequent disputes with each other over implementation of their sovereignties. Seemingly, it was this application of, and mutual respect for, the rules of international customary law that established and made possible the relatively stable co existence of the traditional African polities in the first place.
It is apposite to mention that most of the accepted rules of international custom oftentimes owed their genesis to decisions or acts of the individual rulers of traditional
Africa, The practice of some of these rulers to police trading centers and markets in order to protect traders and commercial agents transacting business within the confines of their territorial jurisdiction tended to induce other rulers to institute similar and parallel requirements of
A Hi story: 7 OfrGhana, London, 1958, gives the impression that some of the causes of the Ashanti-Fanti wars could be traced to maltreatment of Ashanti merchants on the coast by the Fanti, pp. 208-222.
105 order. Such unilateral acts of ’’tribal" governments, though discretionary, often contributed to the material of inter national custom. The jural community thus created was however restricted to the mutual relations of the participating polities.
The application and efficacy of custom seem nonetheless to have depended upon its inherent reason, its criterion of justice, and its moral and social utility, as well as on the recognition by the polities of its general acceptance as
"law”. The role of the "tribal" state was thus decisive in the historical formation of international customary law.
The consolidation of custom into law is also revealed in other areas of the "tribal" state practice, as for example diplomatic exchange. Custom did not of course posit a jusi;
legationum for the "tribal" African state, that is to say the right to send and receive diplomatic agents. Rather it re
served to the "tribal" state the legal right to refuse to receive such officials. The "tribal" state, in other words, remained free to decide for itself whether it desired to maintain diplomatic relations with any other state within
the traditional African international system or to grant
safe conduct and immunity to envoys and messengers. The
law governing such exchanges most likely derived from
reciprocity.
106 Without exaggerating the importance of custom in inter-
"tribal" and international relations, its underlying prin ciples regulated the conduct of the relations of the polities as well as their spatial coexistence. But the treaty re mained the most progressive instrument in the international legal relations of the "tribal'1 states. The treaty, often bilateral but sometimes multilateral in form, generally en acted new codes of behaviour for the members of the inter national system. There was usually no question as to the capacity of a polity to contract and assume obligations under the treaty. Accordingly when a contracting party violated the terms of a treaty either because the initial importance attached to the treaty had diminished, or time and situational factors had compelled non-fulfillment of it, the common recourse which was open to the other contracting party was either to ignore, in its turn, the conditions of the treaty, or wage war. For once consent had been given and the treaty had been concluded with appropriate ceremony, no reservations or conditions of necessity as an excuse for non-fulfillment of obligations under it could be entertained.
The possible presumption was that a polity had the constitutional and legal capacityhto contract and this allowed for the immediate ratification of all treaties con cluded on the spot. Procedures for ratification and method
107 of execution varied from region to region; but in general they assumed the form of symbolic ceremonies the importance and significance of which were immediately obvious to .the contracting parties. Since such ceremonies had a measure of mystical balance embedded in them, the treaty was fre quently imbued with a plethora of sanctity and, therefore, its breach became a casus belli.
At certain nodal points of the traditional African international system the treaty, where its use was unequiv ocal, performed the important fuic tion of arresting political forces tdiich otherwise might have militated against peaceful change, and so had a stabilizing effect on relations. It brought together "parties" already conscious of their interdependence and gave them the opportunity to define, order, and develop that interdependence. Where it existed, international treaty law brought some degree of legal construction upon the relations of the polities and created,:so long as it lasted, security and calculability in their international life. But a general international law was not universally achieved largely because the struc ture and particularism of "tribal" politics inhibited the comprehensive development and applicationcaf the rule of law throughout the traditional international system.
108 Invariably, the structure of international law reflected not only the structure but also the conceptual practices,
attitudes and customs of the historical experience of
inter-"tribal" and international relations.
109 CHAPTER 6
TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The perpetuation and continuity of the polities of tra ditional Africa seem to have been contingent upon the extent to which political authorities were able to mobilize re sources for the administrative, military, and economic activities of the society. Resources - manpower, land, water, salt, cattle, gold, ivory, etc. - were, however, not evenly distributed; and, even, if they were there was not an infinite supply. This obviously may have influenced the development of the traditional African economies, and, pos sibly, the economic policies of the traditional rulers.
There is no clear proof of how resources may have affected the growth of the traditional economies and the policies of the rulers, but some empirical generalizations could be made.
In the beginning the amount of resources needed for the total development of the traditional polities was perhaps negligible; the polities were, presumably, relatively self- sufficing. And any disparity in resources available to the rulers may not have raised problems. But as knowledge advanced and techniques improved the relative importance of
110- different resources also may have changed. Presumably, most polities did not yet have any.pressing need to secure re sources at each other's expense or to monopolize their exploitation or to search for new markets or promote foreign trade in order to gain them.
The domestic economies functioned in such a way that the amount of resources needed was not considerable. A policy of autarky may have been the predominant economic policy of the rulers, until, probably, a shift in the rela tive strength and economic maturity of the polities actuated some of them to look beyond their boundaries for food sources and other necessary materials. t The result was apparent in the policies of the rulers to acquire richer and more prosperous territories and to acquire also exclusive or preferential control over the exploitation of the resources of those territories.
These policies were implemented through a variety of means, the most common being:
(1) The establishment of zones of economic influ ence to ensure the constant flow of manpower resources, food and minerals;
(2) Control over transit or caravan routes to make certain that the rulers were not denied necessities or
111 luxuries;
(3) Pillaging or raiding, merely to redress an imbalance in the domestic economy; and
(4) Conquests and vassalage.
There are many cases illustrating these policies of the traditional African rulers. However, in order not to be overwhelming, three examples will be provided from the records of ancient, medieval, and eighteenth century Africa. The ancient records of Egypt reveal that from very early times the Egyptians traded with Punt and other African States quite amicably. But during the reigns of Pepi II and Hatshepsut the peaceful economic policies of Egypt were radically changed. Late in the third Millennium B.C., Pepi II des patched two imperial expeditions into the Nubian lands of
Wawat and Irthet to exploit the riches of those lands and to conscript manpower resources for the services of Egypt.
These expeditions prepared the way for later conquests.
Queen Hatshepsut and her coeval, Tuthmosis III, continued these policies, resulting in sustained trade with Punt as well as constant tribute from conquered Wawat. Trade with
Punt yielded the following:
Dried Myrrh, 1685 heket, gold - gold, 155 deben, 2 kidet, 134 slaves, male and female; 114 oxen and calves; 305
112 bulls; total 419 cattle; beside vessels laden with ivory, ebony, (skins) of the southern panther; every good thing of (Punt) -1
Tribute from Wawat in Nubia consisted of:
13 male slaves;... 4 4 -oxen and calves; 60 bulls; total 104; beside vessels laden with every good thing of this country; the harvest of this place like wise. ^
The medieval record reveals Askia Muhammad, emperor of
Songhay in 1493, as retaining control over twenty-four vassal states he had inherited from his father, who had in turn in herited them as a result of the policies of a previous mon arch. The point is worthy of note that these vassal states had "previously enj oyed authority over the king of Mali.
Their vassal status however reduced them to providers of
"fodder for the horses" (of the king)... Each owed a duty that was exacted every year at the time of low water on the river... And provided canoes... and one hundred spears and one hundred arrows every year for each family of them...
East African rulers realizing that the Arabs were mak ing a very lucrative trade in ivory at the middle of the
■Kj. H. Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, Chicago, 1906, Vol. I and II, Pars. 358 ff., 486.
2Ibid., Vol. II, pars. 486-487.
^From Basil Davidson, The African Past, Universal Library, 1964; p. 93.
^Ibid.. pp. 93-94. 1770's began to demand and exact tributes of all traders whose caravan routes passed through their territories.'*'
Other African rulers in West, Central, Northeast and
Southern Africa implemented similar policies, often leading
to conflict and war.
The most common means used by the majority of the
polities, however, was simple exchange (barter) conducted
principally by individuals or groups of individuals. A
classic example can be seen in Herodotus' narrative of the
Carthaginians1 trade "with a race of men who live in a part
of Libya beyond the Pillars of Heracles."^ This pattern of
trade also characterized early European commercial rela
tions with Africa.
The economies that gave birth to this type of external
trade had triple characteristics: agricultural, pastoral,
and mixed. They were all of a subsistence character, how
ever. The agriculturists produced food stuff, including
maize, oil palm, millet, cassava, kola nuts, yams, peanuts,
sweet potatoes, bananas, and cassava. The pastoralists
produced meat and skins, while in the mixed economies
■*-See Kenneth Ingham, A History of East Africa, New York, 1962; p. 38ff.
. ^See The Histories of Herodotus, Penguin Books, 1954.
114 foodstuffs, animal produce, fish, and some industrial pro ducts predominated. These primary products were inevitably reflected in commerce and trade.
However, the overwhelming predominance of primary pro duction gave rise to very little trading relations between the various tribal polities on the whole. In fact, for most areas commercial intercourse between polities appear to have been virtually non-existent prior to the coming of the
Europeans. Even the more primitive forms of barter were absent. Within a "tribe" friends might exchange gifts in the form of foodstuffs or iron implements or weapons, and tributes might be paid to the chief or ruler. There might, too, be cases where a "tribe" sent presents to a neighbour ing "tribe" whose friendship was desired or worth cultivat ing or whose enmity they wished not to incur. In this way goods might circulate to a limited extent beyond the con fines of a polity, but this was the exception rather than the rule. Self-sufficiency appears to have been, if not in reality, one of the pronounced features of the traditional polities. Trade, in short, was not the dominant source of material livelihood.
Nonetheless, most traditional economic structures
appear to have been able to adapt to changes and opportun
ities in their external environment, although their domestic
115 economies, as already mentioned, were not fundamentally geared to producing for selling in an external market.
Evidence for this is provided by the development and lon gevity of the caravans and long distance trade routes in trans-saharan, east, and central Africa.
The caravan trade systems provided great commercial wealth for the rulers and their peoples. In the Sudan, there were two main types of caravans, the large annual ones which consisted of between 500 and 2000 camels, and the small ir regular ones consisting of from 5 - 100. The exports of - these caravans into the Sudan comprised the following: s. bleached and unbleached calicoes and cotton prints of vari ous colours, mostly from Britain; silk used for embroidery, muslin and linen from France; beads mainly from Italy; sword blades from Germany and England; writing paper, looking glasses, needles, razors, snuff-boxes, scissors, knives, and trinkets from most of the European countries. There were also shawls and bomuses from Morocco; red caps, red sashes and trousers from Egypt and Tunis; long striped carpets and coarse silk from Tripoli; religious books, spices, perfumes and cowries. In addition there were such Saharan exports as tobacco, dates, and salt into the Sudan.
Exports from the Sudan and other West African countries
into the Saharan and Barbary states included: cloth from *
116 Kano and Nupe; hides and leather goods such as saddles, waterskins and sandals; ostrich feathers, ivory, gum, wax, gold-dust, Kola-nuts, and slaves.
The medium of exchange varied from place to place.
Barter was widely used in all commercial relations. In some
trade centers gold was exchanged for a fixed weight of salt,
a piece of Kano or European cloth or a number of Kola nuts.
Various types of currencies were used. Throughout the
Sahara, Sudan, Timbuctu, and Kano the currencies in circula
tion were French Francs and Spanish or Austrian or Maria
Theresa dollars. The latter two were minted in Vienna and
imported via Morocco.
The currency most widely accepted as legal tender from
the western boundaries of B o m u to the Senegambia, and from
the Oasis of Air and Timbuctu in the north to the Guinea
Coast in the south was cowries. Only in Bomu, Wadi, and
Bagirmi were cowries not accepted as proper currency. There
the most widespread currency consisted of strips of cotton
of different sizes for petty trading, while all major trans
actions such as those involving ivory, slaves, and horses i were done by barter. The structure and volume of trade in Central Africa varied through time. Caravans or long-distance trade was unknown prior to the arrival of the European in the fifteenth century. Local trade, beyond the village level, was con ducted over greater distances either between culturally different political units within an empire or between neighbouring polities. Transactions were made at trading centers or market places located close to the borders of the trading countries, or at the capital of the state. The organization of the trade, and the maintenance of peace, were, as in the West African and Sudan areas, in the hands of the political authorities in whose territories the market place was located. The goods exchanged embraced foodstuffs, specialized products from local industry, and products from markets specialized in the long-distance trade, such as
European goods, salt, or copper. Standards of values and currencies were in general use.-**
The East Africa Coast until the coming of the Portu guese in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, also enjoyed a period of remarkable prosperity. The main trade commodity was ivory which was exported to India .and "even further
**J. Vansina, "Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa" in journal of African History, iii, 3(1962), pp. 375-388.
118 afield as far as China, and there can be no doubt that this was the fundamental reason for the continued Arab interest in East Africa, since the Southern Arabs from time immemorial had dominated the carrying trade of the western and northern parts of the Indian Ocean.Even during the Portuguese domination of the coast from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, ivory continued to rank as an important export. In the sixteenth century, 30,000 pounds of ivory passed through the port of Sofala annually. 2 There were of course, other articles of commerce, gold, tortoiseshell, and slaves. The commercial polities on the coast were so prosperous that "all the way down the coastline of Somaliland, Kenya and Tangan yika, there sprouted urbanized Islamic communities, building in stone or coral rag, and wealthy enough, for example, to import such luxury goods as the stoneware of Siam and the porcelain of late Sung and early Ming China. ^ "The Kilwa t , sultans of this period even minted their own copper coinage.
^G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, "Islam and Christianity in East Africa Before the Mid-nineteenth Century," in African Ecclesiatical Review. July, 1960.
2r . W. Beachy, "The East African Ivory Trade in the 19th Century," in Journal of African History, viii, 2(1962), pp. 269-290. o Oliver and Fage, op. cit., pp. 98-9.
119 Kilwa lived... on the Rhodesian and perhaps also the Katanga trade, placing its governors in the gold-port of Sofala, and levying large duties on the sea-borne traffic in both direc tions. Malindi and Mombasa had been known at least since the twelfth century for their mines of highly concentrated
iron ore, which was exported to India for the manufacture of
steel blades for swords and daggers. Mogadishu had its weaving industry, producing coarse cotton goods and camel- hair cloth for the Egyptian market.”*^
The geographical extension of this established trade of
the East Africa Coast did not embrace the interland to any
significant degree. There are some indications, however,
that the coastal Somalis traded inland with the Galla peoples
to the South of the Abyssinian Kingdom. And, again, to the
South of Kilwa, land and sea routes linked the coast with
the gold-producing regions of Rhodesia and probably with the
Luba and copper-miners of Katanga.^
But it was during the nineteenth: century'.wheii! the great
development of East African Ivory Trade took place that the
interior states became actively involved. Ivory caravans made regular trips to Usagara, Masailand, and Kikuyu coun
tries, and Tabora in central Tanganyika (Tanzania) became a
•^Ibid., p. 99. o ^Loc. cit. 120 prominent trading center for ivory.
Although trade, as in West Africa, was done mostly by individuals, in some areas "Such as Bunyoro, Buganda and
Ankole, the ivory trade was largely controlled by the ruler with whom negotiations were carried on; one tusk of every pair belonged de jure to the king, who also possessed the right to purchase the remaining one. Ivory also fell into the ruler’s hands in the form of tribute from subject states. "The arrival of BaSoga and Bakedi chiefs bearing rich presents of ivory was a common occurrence at Mutega' s
Court... But in those tribes where the chiefly system was lacking, as among the Akamba, Akikuyu, and Masai, the ivory, especially, if it happened to be a very large tusk was deemed to be the property of many, and the purchase was thus a long and tiresome process."’*'
The trade was very lucrative. The Pangani state alone exported 35,000 pounds of ivory in 1856. Quantitative data on the volume of trade are difficult to establish. One record indicates that 6,000 tusks were exported annually other records assess the volume of ivory exported from the whole east coast at 25,000 frasilah or 850,000 pounds
■*-Beachev. op. cit., p. 275.
^Ibid., p. 269.
121 1 approximately.
The mechanisms of trade and the circulation of trade goods were more-elaborate than the classic traditional forms but still basic. Caravans would enter the countries, as already mentioned, with consignments of trade goods to bar ter for ivory. They would bring great quantities of beads, copper and brass,' guns and powder in exchange for ivory.
Other trade articles included scissors, looking-glasses, picture books, rings, daggers; naval and cavalry Sabres, and o cooking pots. q
Trade in beads seems to have been stimulated alongside ivory trading. This, however, required that the dealers be came very conversant with the change in tastes. "In 1886 -
7 count Teleki," writes Beachey, "discovered that the Dorobo no longer preferred the so-called Masai beads, and that the
45 hundred weight of these which he carried were practically useless.
Obviously the composition of trade varied. Cloth of various kinds was■circulated in large quantities: Merikani
(a white inexpensive cotton); Kaniki, a blue cotton cloth
•^Loc. cit.
^Ibid., pp. 273-4.
3l q c . cit.
122 made in Surat and Gujerat; and such exotic cloths as bandar, assilia, barsati and dobwani from Muscat. That trade was brisk and perhaps very profitable is revealed by Ma record of one caravan in the 1880's carrying 27,000 yards of merikani made ^llrKsloads of thirty to forty yards each, and, 1 in addition thousands of yards of other kinds of cloth."
There was a market for almost any kind of article be cause the peoples of each polity had preference for certain types of goods: copper and brass, iron-wire, guns and powder, parasols (especially in Uganda), and opera glasses, and so forth.
One could collect different prices, however, for all the transactions on the East Africa Coast and in the inter- / ior. The value of ivory, for example, was determined according to its size and quality by the Africans. The
Arabs preferred the "steel-yard" scales or the frasilah unit of value." One unit equalled thirty-four to thirty-six
pounds. In the Southern Sudan and some parts of East Africa,
for example in Karagwe, cattle was the unit of value which
led eventually to cattle raids by ivory dealers. With the
stolen cattle, they purchased more ivory.2
3-Ibid.. p. 273.
2Ibid.. p. 275.
123 The demand for East African Ivory continued unabated throughout the nineteenth century. The major European firms which dealt in Ivory were Hansing and Co., O'swald and Co.,
Wiseman and Co., and Meyer and Co. These firms acted as wholesale importers of goods which they supplied to the
Indian market s. Despite the great demand for ivory the world market price did not suffer from fluctuations although the African price fluctuated in terms of trade goods. The price "rose from ten pounds of ivory for one pound of beads in 1848 to almost weight, for weight in 1859; then at the time of the Franco-Prussian War there was another rise, and the price levelled off. For the remainder of the century, there.was little variation in price, either in the interior or on the world market."2
The supply of ivory in East Africa seemed inexhaustible and sometimes very cheap at that. Ivory could be obtained
for two or three strings of beads andv.profit sometimes ex ceeded or amounted to' :two thousand per cent. Estimates of exports in the nineteenth century range from 40,000 pounds
a year to 200,000 pounds. In 1859, 488,600 pounds of ivory valued at £ 144,666 were exported. Cloves were the next
•^Ibid.. pp. 277-8.
2Loc. cit.
"V
124 major item, worth jr 5 5 ,000 exported.
Even at the time of the Franco-Prussian War when the price of ivory had risen from £.39 to £ . 6 8 per hundred weight, ivory exports still stood around 400,000 pounds, and re mained at this level almost to the end of the century, except for a bad year in 1885 when they fell to 260,000 pounds. In
1850-1891 they climbed up to 950,000 pounds, the result of the release of ivory supplies accumulated in the hinterland during the blockade of the German East African Coast in the previous year. By 1894 the figure had reverted to 412,920 pounds, and, it continued at this point until the late
1890's. In 1899 the volume of exports declined to a little over 100,000 pounds and, then, at the turn of the century rose to just over 150,000 pounds. Ivory exports from the
Sudan (Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) were also high: in 1853 the volume was 202,400 pounds; in 1858 if rose to 440,000 pounds, dropped to 383,000 pounds in 1859, and continued slightly below that level - 367,000 pounds •ralS71.**
In common with the states of the Western Sudan, Central and East Africa, the states of the Guinea and Gold Coast enjoyed quite a remarkable period of commercial prosperity. t There were two major systems of international trade linking the Guinea and Gold Coast to the Sudan. The dominant
libid.. p. 287.
125 4 traders were the merchants of the Hausa states, whose activ ities in the east were supplemented in the Southwest by the
Yoruba. In the western sector of West Africa, Mande mer chants were dominant. These two trading systems converged at the northern sector of the Gold Coast (Ghana); and from between the fourteenth to the fifteenth century both the
Mande and Hausa merchants were already visiting Bono and
Gonja for gold and other commodities.
Thus before the advent of European participation in the West African trade, there was already a network of trade routes linking towns and villages throughout almost the length and breadth of West Africa, that is, between the
Sahara and the Coast. Regular markets were held, often arranged in daily cycles, as in Central Africa, so that competition with neighbouring markets would be avoided.
Although much trade was to some extent purely local in char acter, for example the exchange of foodstuffs for local manufactures within a particular area, the operations of the
Mande, Hausa, and Yoruba merchants were truly international.'*'
The staples of the trade were largely luxuries rather than necessities. The principal exception to the trade in luxuries alone was the trade in salt, which was carried into
^Oliver and Fage, op. cit., p . 108.
126 the hinterland from the sea and from the Sahara by way of the
Sudan. There was also a trade in cattle and in horses from the Sudan into Guinea. The major exports from Guinea were gold-dust, which reached the Sudan and ultimately the Mediter ranean from workings in the Gold Coast region and the earlier workings in Wangara;"^ Kola-nuts, which reached the Maghrib;
and ivory "though the ivory trade was nothing like as impor
tant as it became in European times when part of the Guinea i Coast West of the Gold Coast became known as the Ivory
Coast
A different situation existed in Southern Africa. Here
the states did not have the tradition of caravaneers nor the
experience of long-distance trade except for Sporadic barter with Europeans during the eighteenth and nineteenth centur
ies.
One consequence of the European irruption into tra
ditional Africa*s Systems of trade was that the commercial
lines of exploitation were intensified. The Europeans
brought hardware and textiles in exchange for gold, pepper
and ivory in that order of priority, and regular trading
intercourse and alliance with maritime chiefs and peoples
1Ibid., p. 109.
2 Loc. cit.
127 developed. Trade was profitable to both sides, in spite of the Portuguese involvement in slaving concerns, and the piracy of men like John Hawkins, in the sixteenth century.
Initially the early European trade in the sixteenth century had had little effect on African Systems of trade generally.
In the seventeenth century, however, this situation changed with the demand of labour by the European plantations in the
Americas and the Caribbean. From this came the over-sea slave trade as a system, which was to dominate European-Afri can commercial relations from the middle of the seventeenth century until the middle of the nineteenth.
The question now needs to be raised: Did inter-African and European-African trade seriously affect the political relations of the traditional polities concerned or in any way increase or give rise to inter-tribal and international tension?
There is some evidence that the existence of trade be tween any two or more states in traditional Africa reflected a general condition of 'peace1 in the milieu of intertribal and international relations. Without this general condition trade either ceased or was carried on in areas where the
peace remained uncompromised. The relative absence of war between Kano and Gonja in the fifteenth century resulted in
128 prosperous and better trade relations between the two coun-
1 tries. The longevity of the caravan trade in Trans-Saharan and East Africa and the several other networks of long-dis tance trade in Western and Central Africa suggest that the general conditions in each area were less hazardous and that the continuance of trade invariably depended upon and was re lated to the extent to which peaceful relations were main- tained in the international environment. Bovill tells us that the Caravan trade in the Sudan and the Sahara reached its peak when the Songhay Empire under the Askias dominated the Sudan and the Sahara and maintained political stability o and order in those areas. He also describes the conse quences that followed the overthrow of the Songhay Empire in the early 1590*s by the armies of Morocco when the latter sought to control the Sudan's gold trade for themselves.
With its administrative machinery destroyed, the Songhai empire dissolved into competitive "tribal" kingdoms, which the Moroccan's lacked the capacity to govern or police for themselves. In the resultant chaos, the trade in gold and other commodities ceased to flow into the major commercial centers. Other more stable trade-routes had to be used
^Thomas Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives; An Historical Anthology, London, 1960; pp. 89-90.
^E. W. Bovill, The Golden Trade of the Moors. London, 1958; pp. 165-90. idem, Caravans of the Old Sahara. Lon don, 1933. ■ 129 ; suggesting that commercial intercourse was contingent upon peaceful relations.
The variability of the flow of trade is thus seen to be linked to the pattern and type of relationship existing be tween the traditional African States at any one time. If a condition of chaotic hostility and instability prevailed lines of commercial exploitation often tended to disappear or resolve into desuetude. But the reverse was nearly always so when friendliness or peace and stability obtained.
Enough diachronic or empirical data exist to substantiate the argument that the ebb and flow of trade in traditional
Africa, especially in the Western Sudan, were determined by the political conditions prevailing in the international environment. ^
The tendency for trading relationships to fluctuate be tween conditions of hostility (war) and conditions of friendliness (peace) is to be sought in the apparent contra dictions in the existence of trade and trading centers gen erally. First, because of the near autarchic level at which traditional African economies operated, any pattern of trade
1-For more information on the possible connexion between the existence of trade and political conditions in tra ditional Africa, see the two books of Bovill already cited and Y. Urvoy, Histoire de 1*empire du Bornou. Paris, 1949; pp. 75-84. ,
130 or exchange of goods and services which linked one tribal
state to another frequently implied, as already mentioned, that self-sufficiency was essentially unrealizable, or that a highly felt need had developed or, further, that a new v value preference had entered into the social, economic, psychological and political orientation of the state(s).
The emergence of such imperatives had the tendency of com
pelling the traditional economic structures to react, broadly speaking, to changes and opportunities in the external or international environment. Thus the Kipsigis, the Guro, the Nandi and Gusii engaged in a special kind of
external trade not so much to acquire subsistence goods as
to amass prestige items. Social but not economic consid
erations greatly affected their trading behaviour.^- In
times of extreme shortage or famine most tribal states would
enter into trade relations or even engage in plunder and
pillage.
Although the problem of self-sufficiency was involved
to some extent, neither barter, trade, nor other systems of
exchange defined non-self-sufficiency so much as their ex
istence revealed some of the various mechanisms by which
For further discussion of this kind of trading see the selections in Paul Bohannan and George Dalton (eds.), Markets in Africa. Doubleday, 1965.
131 culturally defined non-self-sufficiency was compensated or rectified. The desirability of structuring relations based on trade thus was a calculated 'national1 objective in spite of the fact that trade was not in most cases an integral part of the economy. The states and individuals established trade relations, it would seem, if there was an awareness of broad inequalities in the nature, quantity, and quality of resources available or unavailable to them. But for the
'imbalance' to be redressed so that the states concerned might maximize their value preferences, a condition of peace and stability inevitably appeared necessary.
Substantiating evidence for these hypotheses is not altogether inconclusive. In Hausaland, the long wars be tween Katsina and Gobir, and then between the Fulani states
of Katsina and the Habe state of Moradi caused trade and commerce to decline because of the danger and insecurity,
posed to merchants and their merchandise. The Kipsigis
( would exchange and trade with Gusii, Luo, and Masai only
following the "announcement of a Kalvet (literally peace, but also the word used for barter) and this was, in turn,
generally arranged only when famine or other circumstances
lHenry Barth, Travels in North and Central Africa. Lon don, 1857, Vol. I, pp. 278-80, 296. See also H. R. Palmer, "The.Kano-Chronicle," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. 1908, Vol. 38, p. 90.
132 of severe want Induced trade... All barter was conducted on the shores of a river boundary between the normally hostile tribes..."'*'
The foregoing would appear to imply support for the corresponding hypothesis, which is that trade and other sys tems of exchange dwindled where a certain measure of unstable and hostile tendencies predominated. Thus it would seem traditional African economic structures showed some calcul- ability and mutual adaptability to one another, even though geographical proximity tended to have little influence on <
2 systems of trade within the international environment.
Second, since commercial intercourse frequently took place within the territorial domain of a state and since commerce attracted peoples of different nationalities to congregate at the market place or trading center, -political authorities, in order to forestall undue ’tribal1 antagonism, animosity, and, therefore, war, always sought to provide a
"Market Peace". The markets and trading centers, in the
Sudan and Western Africa especially, were policed to assure
^■Robert A. Manners "The Kipsigis - Change and Alacrity" in Markets in Africa, already cited, pp. 23*7^8.
■‘The Masai of East Africa could profitably engage in international trade with Arusha, the Sonjo, the Kipsigis, and other neighbouring ’tribes’. But Masai prejudice against the sale of cattle would not permit such development.
133 the safety of traders and customers. Because of the built- in explosiveness of the situation the trading center or market place was often used as the center also of juridical activities. In some areas political authorities actually established themselves as courts in or near the market place; in others their presence assured that when a trader found an adversary, the case could be brought before their attention at the trading center. These courts, apart from being extremely important politically served as arbitrating facilities for settling disputes among sellers and buyers within the market or trading place itself. The control of the state, .where this applied, over markets and trading * centers can thus be interpreted in one sense as a calcu lated attempt tO-promote friendly and peaceful relations between buyers and sellers and so to obviate the necessity of incurring the displeasure of their respective states.
Finally, as trading centers and markets often servedspecial functions of cultural articulation in traditional Africa - it is still so even today - there was often the danger of cultural antagonisms developing to the point of breaking out into open hostility and war. Accordingly, the trad- ditional governments as indicated took a political as well as an economic interest in the centers of trade. To the
134 ordinary people, these centers provided legitimate avenues for courtship, entertainment, news and relaxation as well as trade. To the political authorities, they were avenues for channeling trade and providing outlets for the market ing of traditional goods and services. They also served as vital links, that is to say the very nodes, inifhe communica tions network. The so-called 'bush-telegraph1 worked in part through the centers of trade and marketing. Trading centers provided ample opportunity also for the pooling and exchange of ideas. Paradoxically, they often carried the germs of hostility and war. Disputes inevitably arose and
cultural-ideological animosities developed, because differ
ent 'tribes' participated in the systems of trade. Success
ful trade however, demanded some degree of political
stability; so the policing of markets and trading centers
and the adjudication of disputes to preserve the peace
constituted an integral part of the policies of the tra
ditional African States.
There is little doubt that trade was a vital element
in'the development of most of the traditional African States.
It is certain that the wealth of Ghana, and of its successor
empires in the Western Sudan, derived primarily from its
control of gold; exports to the north and of the distribution of salt and other imports in the south. The polities of
Kilwa, Malindi and Mombasa appear also to have thrived on
trade and commerce.
But wealth breeds envy and jealousy, and so the power, r wealth, and material improvement of most of the states in
vited raids and invasions from their perhaps less prosperous
neighbours. The Moroccan invasion of the Western Sudan in
the sixteenth century would fall into this category.
It is apparent that trade in precontact Africa was an
expression of peaceful relations and stability between tri
bal states and peoples. But it is also apparent that trade
relations tended to be very much erratic as they reflected
changes or disturbances in the international system. Yet
so long as political conflicts remained limited, trade in
traditional Africa exercised a pacifying influence in inter
tribal and international relations.
The coming of the Europeans however brought a new
dimension into the relations of the traditional African
States. From the middle of the fifteenth century to the
middle of the nineteenth, the commercial relations between
Africa and Europe were dominated by the slave trade. The
disruptive pressures of this trade especially in the seven
teenth and eighteenth centuries revolutionized the system of
136 international relations and brought radical changes not only to the traditional African economies but also to the balances of power among the states.
The principal effect of this development in the seven teenth and eighteenth centuries was that the great Trans-
Saharan Trade dwindled into insignificance, with concomitant impoverishment of trading centers such as Timbuctu and
Djenne. The Songhay Empire of Gao finally collapsed, for the forces of international commerce no longer centered com pletely bn the Sudan but upon the states of Guinea and the
European traders at the coast. The Empire of Benin, which prior to the coming of the Europeans had already reached the coast, /'proved unable to withstand the strains imposed on it" by the exigences of constant wars to acquire slaves
for European purchase. For the same order of reasons there were great revolutionary changes in the African states just
inland from the coasts.’ The ground was laid for the emer gence of new centers of power, such as the Ga (Accras),
Akwamu, Ashanti and Dahomey. Each of these states embarked upon policies of war and empire-building "in an attempt to
engross the whole trade of their hinterland'/2 - with the European factors at the coasts. The growth of new states intensified power struggles for passages to European trade forts and factories and for control of sources of wealth.
"In the early eighteenth century, Ashanti, learning from the Akwamu experience, began to expand to the north (of the
Gold Coast), incorporating or making tributary states like
Bono, Banda, Gonja, and Dagomba. Then, with the trade of the interior profitably secured, she turned south to seek direct contact with the European traders. Further east,
Oyo had begun her southward expansion early in the seven teenth century. During the eighteenth century her para- mountcy over her more southerly Yoruba kin was established, and much of the Nigerian slave trade became diverted from
Benin to ports like Badagri and Lagos. Precariously situ ated between the Yoruba empire.of Oyo and Ashanti rule, there emerged the new state of Dahomey, initially stimulated by the need to resist attacks from Oyo, to which in fact it long paid tribute. Nevertheless Dahomey too was attracted
southward by the trade with the Europeans, to establish con- 1 tact with the coast at Whydah."
The power politics generated by this especial irruption of European-African commerce set in motion a whole series of
1Ibid.. pp. 122-123.
138 organic reactions. Forced to defend themselves against slaving raids and pillage and eager to share in or monopolize the import of European goods, notably firearms, many states of traditional Africa conquered their neighbours or reduced them to vassal status so as to break through to the sea, the line of European contact. The alliances formed by Europeans with African kings, chiefs and merchants for the purpose of pillaging and raiding for slaves did not serve to make trade as a promoter of stable international relations.
In the hinterland and along the Seaboard, "now a gate way to livelihood and wealth as never before, new African
States crystallized from small clans and scattered peoples.
> These began to form a girdle of political and economic self- defense - a new monopoly - against the Sea-traders on one side and the in-land traders on the other. As time went by, this girdle became impenetrable. From a mere skein of
^iddle-men" chiefs and groups along the seashore, it broadened to include stronger peoples further into the countryside...Coastal monopoly and "protectionism" became at certain points as thick as two or three hundred miles from south to north. Its dominant powers counted new political and economic systems..."*-
*-Basil Davidson. The African Past, op. cit.. pp. 207-8.
139 Most of these changes stemmed from the inner dynamic of
Africa's political development; some took place, however, as the consequence of direct and indirect pressures from the
European connection along the coasts. But whatever the reason, it seems certain that pre-contact African trade tended more to create degrees of economic solidarities and peaceful relations between the states than European - African commerce, which destabilized political relations and set
"tribe" against "tribe" and state against state. In conclu sion, it may be said that trade in traditional Africa gen erally conduced to peaceful international relations only in conditions devoid of undue stress and power polities. The presence of these conditions definitively affected the political relations of the states and increased inter-
"tribal" and international tension.
140 CHAPTER 7
THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY
Our discussion has so far shown that traditional Africa political systems were open and not closed systems, meaning that they were susceptible to influences not only from their immediate intrasocietal milieu but also from the extrasocie- tal or international environment.
These influences tended to impose "stress-demands" upon the political systems and to galvanize them, as it were, for weal or woe, toward transformation. Theoretically, stress- demands imply both change and stability, and, they also im
ply consequences for the political system if it fails to control, modify, or cope with, them. So to regulate the
flow of stress^demands appropriate responses by the politi
cal system is necessary. The responses, of course, may take any number of forms - depending upon the information
available to the political system, as to the threat of
stress-demands, and also upon how the information is trans
lated or coverted into concrete political goals.
Traditional African political systems, like other
political systems, had an established repertoire of responses with which to confront stress-demands. Internally,
141 stress-demands were controlled and met by the equilibrium
-constitutional arrangements and structural relationships, and so forth-in the social structure. If these failed a revolt might ensue or a subordinate chief or some essential personality would be liable to secede. Externally, the political system would respond to stress-demands by means of diplomatic techniques or the use of armed force, or both, to maintain the existing order or to create a new one.
Stress-demands or pressures from within the African continent compelled many of Africa's political systems to shift from "primitive" forms of political organization to forms that can be called states and empires. The founding of these states and empires, apart from leading directly to the conquest of other political units, brought stresses and strains to many. "At one end of the spectrum there were changes of imperial structure in the Western Sudan or the plateau lands of what is now Rhodesia; at the other, at the extreme, of 'minimal government', new conditions encour aged simple village headmen to become 'kings and nobles', the better, to wield their power but also, no doubt, the better to defend their people."^-
■1-Basil Davidson, Which Way Africa? Baltimore, 1964; p. 28.
142 The examples can be multiplied. One may establish the universality of stress-demands throughout the length and breadth of the continent, "and among peoples large or small.
Thus the little Anuak Clans of the West Ethiopian border- s lands, obtaining muskets from their neighbours, developed an aristocracy. The chiefless peoples of the Tanganyika plains, facing a time of troubles, acquired chiefs. The numerous and enterprising clans of the Ashanti, persecuted by their neighbours, came together in a union made indis soluble by ritual object - the famous golden stool-invented for the purpose. Menaced by the slave trade, the scattered peoples of the Niger delta founded city states and engaged in that curious trade themselves. Harried by Zulu regiments, the clans of the Drakensberg foothills formed themselves in to the Basuto nation. And it was the same with the arts of peace. New technologies passed from people to people.
Social norms, expanded or contracted according to the pres sures of the times.
All this, really, is just a way of saying that Africa's huge diversity of experience and environment has found a full reflection in the political and economic structures of daily life. Here in this capacious continental home there has been room for many contrasting phases of social growth to ex ist at one and the same time. There has been tolerance for
143 1 many exceptions to the broadest rule of group behaviour .11
There were many and important pressures or influences penetrating Africa from the outside also.
"Of those Islam was among the greatest. It won the loyalty of a number of West African leaders and some of their peoples at least from the eleventh century A.D.: five tombstones of Spanish marble more than 900 years old, found near Gao on the Middle Niger and carrying Muslim inscrip tions in Arabic, bear witness to this. Other disciple^ of Muhammad converted the little towns and trading settlements of coastal East Africa; in time the peoples of these places built a notable Muslim civilization of their own. Operating radically in the political field, Islam helped to break down tribal barriers and form new states. All such influences and ideas and techniques from outside Africa, entering the continent over many centuries through its peripheral borderlands in east and north, were additions to the stock of African thought and behaviour. These additions could be absorbed and used, and often were, without destroying the general fabric of traditional society. They mod ified the fabric, introduced new strands and colours and patterns, provoked new forms and fashions; yet the overall effect was almost always one of rein forcement and renewal, not of destruc tion. The European colonial impact, however, was not like this. Its impact, generally, was altogether different both in kind and in degree. Nothing like it had been seen or known before; and nothing afterwards could even be at all the same
hoc. cit.
144 again. The reasons are various. They lay partly in the sheer destructive ness of the methods employed. Yet there was something in this conquest that was even more ruinous of existing society than forced labour, firearms, and the rest could ever be by themselves. This new factor was the expansive nature of European civilization,
For Africa, the result of "this new factor" was an unre lieved disaster. It began as an encounter, first, with the
Portuguese in the fifteenth century, followed by the English and the French,and, a little later on, the Dutch. These encounters were few and far between. They were accompanied by bloody raids and running fights and piracy from European
ships, but soon settled to a more or less regular trading partnership.
This partnership was initially free of slaving activ
ities but the subsequent active involvement of the Portuguese
in them drew the rest of the Europeans to do the same. How
ever, early European relations, beginning with the Portu guese in the fifteenth century, with African leaders were
characterized by good manners and diplomatic finesse. The
respect that the early Portuguese showed toward African
leaders enabled them to reach agreements for the construe- i tion of a series of coastal forts, beginning with Elmina in
3-Ibid., pp. 33-34.
145 1482, for a profitable trade. The approach often took the , form of a meeting or conference with African leaders. At
Elmina, for example, the Portuguese, under the leadership of Diego da Azambuja, met with King Caramansa to discuss the purpose of the Portuguese presence on the Elmina Coast.
The diplomatic tact employed by the Portuguese is reflected in the substance of the following speech by Azambuja: "that, on account of the good report which the King (of Portugal)
... had received about them (the people of Elmina), and of the good treatment which they above all. the men of that land (Elmina) gave to his vassals, who were accustomed to come to trade there, his highness had sent him (Diego da
Azambuja) there,to treat with them and forever to secure peace and friendship... and forasmuch as a house was neces sary, because it was reasonable that the merchandise, which they were now bringing, and would in future arrive, might always remain there continuously, fresh and secure, he
(Azambuja) asked them (the king and peoples of Elmina) to * give place and license and even assistance, so that it might be built at the mouth of the river, because from such a house and from the Christians (the Portuguese?), who would be stationed in. it, they would always find and re ceive protection, profit and favour."^
^Adapted from J. L. Blake, Europeans in West Africa. Hakluyt Society, 1942, Vol. 1; p. 7 Africans and furthered a promising commercial partnership. Embassies were exchanged between Portugal and a number of the African States, and the monarchs on both sides habitu ally wrote to one another. The courtesies they showed each other were more than mere politeness. In 1497 King Esigie of Benin sent an ambassador to the king of Portugalf "This ambassador was a man of good speech and natural wisdom. Great feasts were held in his honour, ’and he was shown many of the good things of these kingdoms. He returned to his land in a ship of the King's, who at his departure made him a gift of rich clothes for himself and his wife: and through him he also sent a rich present to the king of such things as he understood he would greatly prize. More over, he sent holy and most catholic advisers with praise-worthy admonitions for the faith to administer a s t e m re buke about the heresies and great idolatries and fetishes, which the Negroes practise in that land..."1 In 1512 King Manuel of Portugal wrote the following despatch to King Nzinga Mbemba (baptised Affonso) of the Kingdom of Congo: "Most powerful and excellent King of % r o m Ruy de Pina, Chronica del Rey Dom Joao II, Chap. 24; translated in J. L. Blake, Ibid.. pp. 78-79. 147 Many Congo, we send to you Simao da Silva,, nobleman of our house, a person in whom we most trust... We beg you to listen to him and, trust him with faith and belief in every- i thing he says from our part...11 Later in the sixteenth century when King Affonso needed help he communicated with the King of Portugal as follows: Sir, your kindness has been kind enough to write to us saying that we should ask... anything we need, and that we shall be pro vided with everything, and as the peace and the health of our Kingdom depend on us, and as there are among us old folks and people who have lived for many days, it happens that; we have continuously many and differ ent diseases which put us very often in such, a weakness that we reach almost the last i extreme; and the same happens to our children, relatives and natives owing to the lack;in this country of physicians and sur geons who might know how to cure properly such* diseases... (Y)ou... (may) send us two physicians and two apothecaries and one surgeon, so that they may come with their drug stores and all the necessary things to stay in our kingdoms, because we are in ex treme need, of them all and each of them... Because of this relationship, the attitudes and policies of African monarchs towards the commercial agents (factors) and envoys of European powers were, also, cordial., Their ^-Quoted by Basil Davidson, "Congo Destinies" in African Independence, Peter Judd (ed.), New York, 1963; p. 43. ^Ibid., pp. 193-4. 148 treatment can be seen generally to be epitomized by the substance of this letter from Duarte Pires to the King of Portugal:... "Sir, with reference to what you say about my being in very great favour with the king of Benin, it is truly so; because the King of Benin is pleased with what I said in favour of your high ness, and he desire to be your good friend and speaks of nothing save what concerns Our Lord and your interest; The favour which the king of Benin accords us is due to his love of your highness; and thus he pays us high honour and sets us at table to dine with his son, and no part of his court is hidden from us but all the doors are open..."1 European diplomacy at this time did not impose any ser ious stress-demands upon the international system and its subsystems. The traditional subsystems of the international system had enough environmental capacity to cope with and respond to the stress of the Christianity, and even the political intervention, which followed Portugal's contact. This was a period of mutual discovery and cordiality, of friendship and alliance,aarid so the nature of the African international system was left practically undisturbed. iFrom a letter dated October 20, 1516 in Blake, op. cit., p. 123. 149 However, a new discovery was to be made which would have dire consequences for the international system. This discovery, c. 1650-1885, would lead first to traffic in humanity, and later to attempts at acquiring territories in Africa. The resultant new relationship had a decisive impact upon the international system. The national actor systems were over-loaded with stress-demands largely in the form of requests for supplies of human beings for enslavement in Europe's new mines and plantations of Brazil, the Caribbean, Central and North America. And in response they waged wars, conducted raids, and undertook to plunder and destruction. Anarchy reigned supreme while law and diplomacy were over thrown. There was "equilibrium change", that is to say the essential rules of traditional African politics were com pletely discarded: where before traditional rules .of war fare were,cforiexample, strictly observed, now all such rules were jettisoned into oblivion. The international system was completely thrown into a chaotic state of affairs. European diplomacy arduously cultivated this development by creating new values for the actors elite - kings, chiefs, merchants - and for national actor systems as a whole. These new values - firearms, gun powder, and less destructive goods 150 - were to become the needs of the traditional political sys tems. Thus the objectives of the national actor systems were also to be set by the needs of the environment. The resultant effect was that the citizens of the national actor systems began to see the values which Europe suffused into the traditional environment as legitimate values. For this reason, some of the essential rules of the national actor systems could not be effectively enforced. Tension developed in most hierarchical relationships of the subsystems of national political systems. Here and there a fatal sequence of cause and effect developed, and the old order and stability of many an African polity were plunged into chaos and destroyed. The kings, chiefs, and their peoples realized that they must have firearms in order to defend themselves from their neighbours and from the Europeans; but they also found that they could procure fire arms from the Europeans only if they delivered slaves in return. Such tendencies of course lessened to some extent the integrative factors operating within national actor systems, and imposed severe stress upon the regulatory capacity of the national systems. The gross effect was serious and con tinuous dismantlement of the structure of many national sys tems and the international system as well. 151 Nonetheless, the impact of European contact greatly varied. In the various regions of the international System the values and standards which Europe brought into the environment were more or less internalized by the actors - elite of national systems participating in the "European- African System" and were fed back to those who were not actively involved. The effect was two-fold. There was a serious dislocation of the pattern and structure of social life. And new political structures, where none existed be fore, sprang up. There was also great physical destruction. The following narrative epitomizes the general phenom enon of disruptive pressures which some regions of tha^v- International System experienced as a result of Europe's impact: "The present unsettled state of the (inland) country (of Sierra Leone) is owing to the influence of one Bilali, a native of the Kissy country, and formerly a slave among the Soosoos. About twenty Seven years of age he ran away from his master, Almamy Muraineh, ... and founded a settlement... to which numerous fug itives have, from time to time, betaken themselves. By numerous accessions of that class of. person, Bilali has succeeded in form ing a powerful party, and in rousing a large portion of the Servile population, not only to a devotion to the idea of liberty at any price, but a strong attachment to himself and a hatred of all who hold slaves; and he is by no means 152 scrupulous as to the price he pays for their support. On the other hand, the slave-holding chiefs, in various parts of the surround ing country,!., have formed a combination against him, alleging, when appealed to in favour of Bilali on the ground of the abstract right of every man to personal liberty, the same argument that is always used by oppressors, viz., granting that Bilali has just cause for rebellion, granting that he is wise in periling his personal case and security for the sake of liberty, still his course (as they hold) is producing a confusion in the country, which will eventually beget a state of things much worse than that against which he and his allies have risen. Standing on the basis of this, ... they are anxious to crush Bilali, but it seems that their combination is powerless against him...... (T)he country gives sad evidence of the dire results of war. We were surrounded by lamentable illustrations of a war which had lasted during a whole generation; and it is difficult for one at a distance to frame any clear idea of a state of society induced by this protrac ted contest, kept up by determined slave holders in the vain hope of reducing to servitude a man to whom there is no equal in the country for military prowess, tact, and ability."1 The actors-elite operating within one other region of the. International System responded in a similar manner, % r o m Edward L. Blyden, M.A., "Report on the Expedition to Falaba, January to March 1873:" Proceedings of Royal Geographical Society 1872-1873, Vol. 17, p. 117. Quoted by. Basil Davidson, The African Past, op. cit., pp. 351-352\ 153 although in that system relations were initially with Arabs. European presence however brought the same negative and destructive response: war. Eventually, the actors-elite proved, in most cases, unable to maintain the rules of their regulatory subsystems. W. F. W. Owen writing about Quilimane (on the coast of modern Mozambique) 1821-1826 observes: "Contending tribes are now constantly striving to obtain by mutual conflict prisoners as slaves for sale to the Portuguese, who excite these wars and fatten on the blood and‘wretchedness they produce. The slave trade has been a blight on its prosperity; for at pres ent Quilimane and the (neighbouring regions in the Lower Zambesi) do not supply themselves with sufficient c o m for their own consumption... It is really melancholy to contem plate the devastations that the monopoliz ing spirit of mankind has produced on the east coast of Africa; Whereever we went, even in the most obscure harbours, we could trace the remains of former wealth and civilization, contrasted strongly with present poverty and barbarism."J- The splintering impact of the European-African relations, and the wars to which the resultant slave trade had given rise, took their full effect. On July 6, 1526, King Affonso of the Congo, realizing the evils of the trade as.regards ■: . 1-From Capt. W. F. W. Owen, R.N., Narrative of Voyages to Explore the Shores of Africa, Arabia and Madagascar (2 vols., London: 1833) quoted by Davidson, Ibid., pp. 306-7. 154 his domain, wrote the following letter to the king of Portugal: To the most powerful and excellent Prince Dom Joao, King our brother. Sir, your highness should know how our kingdom is being lost in so many ways that it is convenient to provide for the neces sary remedy, since this is caused by the excessive freedom given by your factors and officials to the men and merchants who are allowed to come to this Kingdom to set up shops with goods and many things which have been prohibited by us, and which they spread throughout our Kingdoms and Domains in such an abundance that many of our vas sals, whom we had in obedience, do not comply because they have the things in greater abundance than we ourselves; and it was with these things that we had them content and subjected under our vassalage and jurisdic tion, so it is doing a great harm not only to the service of God, but the security and peace of our Kingdoms and state as well. As we cannot reckon how great the damage is, since the mentioned merchants are taking every day our natives, sons of the land and sons of our noblemen and vas sals and relatives, because the thieves and men of bad conscience grab them wishing • to have the things and wares of this King dom which they are ambitious of; they grab them and get them to be sold; and so great, sir, is the corruption and licentiousness that our country is being completely depop ulated, and your Highness should not agree with this nor accept it as in your service. And to avoid it we need Your Highness to help and assist us in this matter, command ing your factors that they should not send here either merchants or wares, because it is OUR WILL THAT IN THESE KINGDOMS THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY TRADE OF SLAVES NOR 155 OUTLET FOR THEM...1 The dismantlement of traditional African Society of course occurred in different ways: military, economic, social, and political. It clearly varied with time and place and person, but not infrequently it was severe. Gen erally speaking, it can be said that the raids and wars occasioned by the unique European - African relations - the slave trade, to be more precise - brought "disastrous results... to... the physical assets of (Africa) such as crops, herds, villages and towns. The constant threat of slave raids and wars produced a chronic state of uncer tainty in which it was pointless to produce more than the minimum amount of food needed for domestic consumption, or to build houses and towns more elaborate than the minimum needed to provide elementary shelter from the elements. There was no point in expanding production, in planning and building for the future. Tomorrow all might be destroyed, and the builders and planners might be enslaved or killed. Life could only be lived in the present. Society could not progress because fear and uncertainty were ever stronger O than the desire for improvement." ■^Abstracted from Davidson, Ibid., pp. 191-2. ^J. D. Fage, History of West Africa. Cambridge, 1955; pp. 86-87. Such would be the Impact of Europe upon Africa from about 1600 to about 1900. Yet for a greater part of this period, and as long as the Africans remained strong and un divided, the Europeans were obliged to accept African diplomatic practices and to pay tariffs and customs. In the Kingdom of Quit eve (inland Mozambique and frontier with Rhodesia), the Portuguese were compelled to "prostrate themselves (before the King) lying on one side almost sitting, and without looking on him speake to him, at every fourth word clapping their hands according to the custome.'. ."■*■ At Kilwa, as the following letter shows, they paid tariffs like everybody else: The duties, which the king of Mombasa receives from the merchants who go to Sofala are the following: any merchant who comes to Mombasa and brings a thousand pieces of cloth pays to the king duties of entrance for each thousand pieces of cloth one mitqal of gold; and then they divide the thousand pieces of cloth into two halves; and the king takes one half; and the other half remains with the merchant; and, whether he carries them beyond (Mombasa) or sells them in the city, he has to take this half to the king: and the king sends his to be sold at Sofala or at Kilwa. . And the duties which the king of Kilwa has are: that any merchant who wishes to % r o m Joao dos Santos, Ethiopia Oriental. Quoted by Davidson, op. cit., p* 157. In other parts of Africa the Europeans conformed to the styles of Protocol- and court etiquette. 157 enter the city pays for each five hundred pieces of cloth he brings,... one mitqal of gold as entrance duty; and, after pay ing this Mitqal for the five hundred pieces of cloth, the king takes two- thirds of all the merchandise, and the merchant one-third; and the third which remains to the merchant must not be taken from the city, and the whole merchandise remaining in that third is again valued, and pays for each thousand mitqals thirty mitqals for the king of Kilwa. And from that place the merchant departs for Sofala; and, on arriving there, he must pay for every seven pieces of cloth one piece for the said King of Kilwa. And when any one returns from Sofala, he is obliged to stop at Kilwa; and he must pay to the king for each thousand Mitqals of gold, he carries with him fifty mitqals of gold,... (I)f he passes Kilwa, and does not enter it, he must however go to Mombasa, and if he does not carry with him a clearance to show that he has paid at Kilwa, there they take these fifty mitqals out of every thousand mitqals, and send them to the king of Kilwa. And the duty on ivory which they also pay to the king of Kilwa is: that for each bahar he pays twenty mitqals of gold in Sofala; and when they come to Kilwa, he pays further for each seven tusks one,..."1 i Not only the Portuguese but the other Europeans as well - English, French, and Dutch - were obliged to pay these tariffs and customs duties. At Whydah in Dahomey the "king laid on any European ship "these impositions: First, of *-From Diogo de Alcancova-s letter to the king of Por tugal of Nov. 20, 1506, trans. in G. M. Theal, Records of South-eastern Africa, 1898, vol. .1, p. 62. Abstracted from Davidson, Ibid., pp. 137-8. 158 having the refusal of all goods; Secondly, the value of twenty slaves from every ship, small or great, as a duty; and thirdly, forces his own upon them at an advanced price.. In the Senegambia "when a ship arrives" writes Captain Heatley in 1789, "she comes to an anchor at Gillofree Port, in the kingdom of Barra... You send your boat on shore to acquaint the Alkaide or Mayor of the town of your arrival; he in common returns with the Boat, and receives from you Anchor age-money, ten gallons of Liquor for the King, value 30s. and two iron Bars for himself, value • ' -s 7s. and perhaps presents, a few Bottles of Wine, Beer, Cyder, etc. He immediately dispatches messengers with the Liquor as above to the king, informing that such vessel is arrived, and only waits to pay his customs, intending to proceed up the river (Gambia). The King consults his Councillors for a proper Day to receive the same and sends word to the Alcaide accordingly. After a Detention of * four, five, six and seven days, he sends his people to re ceive his custom, 140 Bars in'merchandise, Amount Sterling on an. Average. fie,,,"2 •^From John Atkins, A Voyage to Guinea, etc. London, 1735, p. 168. o In E. Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America. Carnegie Institution, Wash ington, D. C.: 1931, vol. 2, p. 593. 159 As the kings and merchants continued to impose higher duties upon European shipping and exacted higher prices for African goods, the Portuguese and other Europeans de cided upon direct political and military intervention to supplant the trade monopoly of the Coastal powers. But steady European encroachment met with some strong resist ance. In Senegal, "the king of Almamny" writes C. B. Wadstrom, "enacted a law, that no slave whatever should be marched through his territories. On the gold coast, the Danish fort (Christiansborg Castle) was seized and occupied by the king of the Akwamu in 1694, allowing the Danes back into their fort on payment of a heavy fee in gold. Such acts were typical of the African impatience with the arrogantly monopolizing attitudes so often adopted by the European factors and companies. By the middle of the nineteenth century the long years of enmity, suspicion, violence and double-dealing had produced an atmosphere of bitter hostility between African and European traders. By 1890 the invasion of many coastal and near coastal regions ^C. B. Wadstrom, Observations on the Slave Trade... made in 1787 and 1788... London, 1789. King Affonso of Congo also passed a law restricting the purchase of goods and slaves in his kingdoms. See Davidson, op. cit., p. 193. 160 was in full spate. Europe was now set about the conquest and colonization of Africa. And European agents freely incited, and avidly participated in, inter-African Wars. Pathological behaviour characterized the traditional African international systems because many of the subsystems (the states) of each international system sought alliances with the European powers in order to survive and perpetuate themselves. Early in 1607 the Monomotapa, being confronted with the revolt of his powerful vassal states, appealed to the Portuguese for an alliance; in return the Monomotapa signed a treaty making a ’’donation to the king of Portugal of all the mines of gold, copper, iron, lead and pewter which might be in the whole of his kingdom.The Portu guese subsequently used this alliance as the vehicle to large-scale intervention by force. Between 1628 and 1629 they invaded the kingdom of Monomotapa; and the Manure, the king, signed a new treaty with the Portuguese. The provisions of this treaty, May 24, 1629, include the follow ing: "First that this kingdomsis delivered to him (i.e., the Portuguese Captain) in the name of the king of Portugal, our Lord, of whom he shall acknowledge himself % r o m G. M'. Theal, Records of South-eastern Africa, 1900, vol. 2, p. 249. 161 to be a vassal... That he, the said king, shall allow all the religions of whatever order who may be in his Zimbahe to build churches and in all the other lands in his dominions... That ambassadors who come to speak to him shall enter his Zimbahe shod and covered, with their arms in their belts, as they speak to the king of Portugal, and he shall give them a chair on which to seat themselves without clapping their hands; and other Portuguese shall speak to him in the manner of ambassadors, and shall be given a Kaross to sit upon... He shall make his lands free to the Portuguese... Throughout all his kingdom he shall allow as many mines to be sought for and opened as the Portuguese like... Within a year he shall expel all the Moors (i.e., Swahili and Arab traders from the coastal towns) from his kingdom, and those who shall be found there afterward shall be killed by the Portuguese, and their property shall be seized for the king of Portugal..."1 Two years lat^r the king of Portugal writes politely to the conquered Monomotapa Manura: "Most noble and powerful king of Monomotapa, I, Dorn Philipe, by the grace of God king of Portugal, of the Algarves, and of the sea on both sides of Africa, Lord of Guinea and of the conquest, navigation, and commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and India, etc'., greet you well, as one whom I love and esteem as a brother. I have seen the letter which you wrote to me by the ships of last year, 1630, and having gathered therefrom, as my viceroy of the state, of India also wrote to me, how ^Ibid.« Vol. 4, p. 225. 162 the wars and disturbances in your kingdom had ended, and how my captains gave the investitute and possession of it... X think fit to inform you that I received great satisfaction from all this..." The ultimate result of all this intervention, of the general growth of European trade and influence, was to lead to a crucial undermining of traditional African powers and eventually to a fatal headlong clash with European strength. Any effort of national actor systems to prevent the unfold ing incidence of European imperialism from materializing either proved futile or was met with force. In most in stances the traditional national actor systems could not even persuade the Europeans to desist from their wanton violence and destruction. Carl Peters, the imperial German agent in East Africa, is reported to have replied to over tures for peace from the ruler of Gogo. "The Sultan shall have peace... Plunder the village, set fire to the houses, o and smash everything to pieces that will not bum." The order was carried out. •*-Loc. cit. See also Davidson, op. cit., pp. 165-166. ^Basil Davidson, 'ICongo Destinies" in Peter Judd (ed.), African Independence, op. cit., p. 56. 163 Already the times had changed. East, Central, North, South, and West Africa were about to enter a new but fate ful phase of imperialistic relationship. The diplomatic methods used were a mixture of treaty-making and forcible intervention to procure territorial concessions and settlements for European powers. However, to couch their actions within the realm of legitimacy, the Europeans induced the actors-elite of national actor systems to sign treaties recognizing the "protection" and/or sovereignty of European powers. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the race for treaties .1 hysterically conducted by the Europeans reached its cre scendo. France concluded various treaties with the "chiefs," of the Ivory Coast between 1787 and 1865.** From 1890 to 1891 representatives of the government of the Republic of France again concluded several - nineteen in all - other "treaties of protectorate" with various "chiefs" of the Ivory Coast. France achieved these objectives "by a large and constant expenditure, and by a succession of military 9 expeditions..." On the whole the list of treaties . *-Sir Edward Herts let, Map of Africa by Treaty, Vol. 2, London, 1894; p. 575. 2Ibid., p. 583. 164 concluded from 1818 to 1891 by France with African "chiefs" totalled four hundred and forty-four (444). The articles of these treaties covered French sovereignty and protection, exclusive right to trade, cession of land for French factory, non-cession of territory to foreign firms, and exclusion and 1 non-admission of other foreign powers. The hysteria for the scramble of Africa had begun. Germany, acting with stupendous force and swiftness, made extensive annexations, in the eighteen months from the end of 1883 to the beginning of. 1885, in four widely-separated * % parts of the continent - South-West Africa, Togoland, the Cameroons, and East Africa. Dr. Nachtigal, the German Con sul General of West Africa effected in 1884 a number of 2 treaties in Togoland and Cameroons for Imperial Germany. About the same year a proclamation of a German protectorate over Namaqualand and Damaraland (South-West Africa) was made.3 in 1885 the Germans under Carl Juhlke concluded numerous treaties "with Taveta, Chagga and other tribes in the Kilimanjaro District. Between November and December ; ;______a •^Lo c . cit. 2Ibid.. p. 317. ^Loc. cit. 165 1884 and May and July 1885 the German colonization Society concluded about eleven treaties with the chiefs on the East African Coast."** In 1895 and 1896 the British declared a protectorate over Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole and Busoga, and over much of East Africa without agreement with any of the rulers.^ In 1890 F. E. Lochner signed a treaty with the "Paramount Chief" of the Barotse by which the latter accepted British "protection"; and in the same year Sharpe and Thomson obtained concessions from the principal "chiefs" who ruled the lands between Lake fyasa and the borders of Katanga.^ in 1884 Britain assumed direct authority over Basutoland. In 1835 various treaties were effected with the "Kaffir Chiefs" by which their territories were declared to be annexed to the Cape colony. On May 14, 1887, a British proclamation declared Zululand a British possession; in December 1888 Zululand was extended to include former territories of other tribes.^ Between 1807 and 1891 the British entered into a number *~Loc. c i t . - ^ingham, op. cit.. pp. 152, 155. ^Davidson in Judd, op. cit.. p. 56. ^Hertslet, op. cit.. pp. 533-535. r 166 of "treaties with Sierra-Leone Monarchs engaging, among other things, not to cede any portion of their territory to any other power, or to enter into agreement or treaty with any foreign government, except with the consent of the British government. Identical methods brought the Gold Coast, Benin, the Niger Delta, and the Gambia under British protection and Sovereignty. Italy too signed a few treaties with Abyssinia. In 1859 a commercial treaty was effected between "His Majesty King of Sardinia, etc., and the Desesmach Negussie of Ethiopia".^ In 1883 Italy concluded another treaty with Shoa covering: peace and friendship; appointment of diplo matic and consular officers; liberty of commerce; national treatment in commerce, agriculture, and manufacture; and ad valorem duty of five percent on Italian merchandise.^ Such was the manner in. which it appears the African continent was partitioned among European powers. But it must not be assumed that the whole venture was in any way peaceful. It was not. Most national actor systems 1Ibid., p. 520. ^lbid., pp. 6-7. ^Loc. cit. 167 submitted to being subjected to European protection and suzerainty only after having been forcibly coerced or de feated in war. In fact the characteristic attitude of the actors-elite to European demanded over-rule is reflected ,in the following letter from Macemba, ruling chief of the Yao in East Africa, to Hermann.Von Wissmann when the latter commanding the German forces demanded submission by this ruler: "I have listened to your words but can find no reason why I should obey you - I would rather die first. I have no rela tions with you and cannot bring it to my mind that you have given me so much as a pesa (fraction of a rupee) or the quarter of. a pesa or a needle or a thread. I look for some reason why I should obey you and find not the"smallest. If it should be friendship that you desire, then I am ready for it, today and always; but to be your subj ect, that I cannot b e ... If it should be war you desire, then I am ready, but never to be your subj ect... I do not fall at your feet, for you are God’s crea ture just as I am... I am Sultan here in my land. You are Sultan there in yours. Yet listen, I do not say to you that you should obey me; for I know that you are a free man... As for me, I will not come to you, and if you are strong enough, then come and fetch me..."l Invariably massive military operations were instituted l-From the German version of the Kiswahili original in Archives of the Reichskolonialant, Ho. 747, Deutschen Zentralarchiv, Potsdam. Trans. Davidson, op. cit., p. 357. 168 to check such objections. The British, in alliance with Gold Coast chiefs, fought several wars with the Ashanti be fore the latter submitted to British suzerainty and hegemony at the end of the nineteenth century, In Buganda and Zulu land it was the same. The defeat of the Zulu under Cetewayo in 1879 led to the treaty of 1882 by which it was agreed that: "he (Cetewayo) should be restored to Zululand on certain specified conditions, one of which was that he would not make any Treaty or Agreement with any chief, people, or government outside his ter ritory without the consent and approval of the British Government; and another that he would not sell, or in any way alienate, or permit, or countenance any sale or alienation of any part of the land in his territory."1 Furthermore ‘ Cetewayo declared "as an additional condition" that "he would observe and respect the boundaries of the territory placed tinder the appointed chief Usibedu, as also those of the territory which Her Majesty's government had de cided should be set apart as reserved territory, with a British Residence Commissioner. "2 With this kind of imperialism the ground for colonial ism and "colons" was prepared. And the whole fabric of the traditional systems was undermined or threatened with com plete dissolution. Traditional African rulers had two ■4tertslet, op. cit., p. 532. 2Ibid.. p. 533. choices with which to combat the new European diplomacy; to hold firm or to adjust themselves to circumstances they * could no longer hope to control. In either case the re sult was the same; Europe used subtle pressure - alliances with willing chiefs and elders - or outright force to gain over-all control. Legally, the procedure generally followed by Euro peans in making contractual engagements with national actor systems was less in keeping with treaty-making "law” of Europe of the eighteenth or nineteenth century. The con temporary practice required, it seems, the agent to have the status of a diplomatic envoy, with competence to nego tiate. He must also be appointed by his state and this appointment must be evidenced by letters of credence, properly authenticated in accordance with customary inter national law. But to negotiate, it was necessary for him to have a special full-power. The explorers and chartered companies who exacted the treaties of Africans had neither the authority of agency nor a commission to discuss matters relating to even friend ship for their monarchs. Their total behaviour was there fore arbitrary and their acts protanto null and void. They were merely interested in the form and material of the 170 treaties - as they gave legitimacy to their concerns - and not the procedural "laws" conditioning their negotiation. • * Thus they provided the treaty forms-*- to the Africans and then exacted their signatures. However, in the event that the actors-elite declined to entertain such deceptions European diplomacy, as represented by the explorers and commercial agents, threatened and used force. The "Kaffir Wars" and the Shona and Matabele Wars, to cite a few ex amples, against Europeans in Southern Africa were partly if not largely the result of discrepancies arising from these so-called treaties. -*-Here is a sample of a typical treaty form: "After the years1 experience, we, the under signed ______, fully_recognize the benefit accorded to our country and people by our intercourse with the National African Co.(Ltd), and, in recognition of this, we now cede the whole of our territory to the National African Co.(Ltd), and their administrators, for ever... The National African Co. (Ltd) will reserve to themselves the right of excluding foreign settlers. Any .palaver that may exist with any other tribe at any time, or in the event of any dispute arising between the ______and territory, shall Xat once be referred to the National African Go.(Ltd) or their representatives at the time..." This is form No. 1 under which the NAC concluded several treaties. For other forms, see Hertslet, op. cit.. pp. 457-458; also P. T. Moon, Imperialism and World Politics, New York, 1944, p. 101, for an interesting account of European treaty-making in Africa. The records show that the French and the Germans used much more force against those who would not sign "treaties" than the British, who used commerce and other subtle means to advance their interest. 171 The interesting thing about these treaties is that they were never ratified, and the European agents who often "negotiated" them did not, as already indicated, have "full power" from their governments nor were they, in most cases, authorized by them. And there was frequently no reciprocal burden on the Europeans to undertake to abide by the terms of the agreement. Consequently, all their diplomatic moves con cerning the acquisition of territories were more often than not denounced in their respective parliaments as "unauthor ized acts". The European governments validated these acts only during the international hysteria for the scramble for Africa. During this period, 1884-1893 it was required of all chartered companies and other agencies to notify their governments of all treaties made and to obtain official approval. Some of these treaties were not given validity by the governments concerned. One would argue then that the contracting engagements between Europeans and Africans did not have any validity in law. First, the Europeans, as free individuals acting largely on their own initiative or on behalf of trading and commercial companies, lacked the capacity to conclude treaties ■^Hertslet, op. cit.. pp. 450-457. 172 under international law, primarily because they did not possess international personality nor were they in any way in possession of ’’letters patent". Secondly, there was not, in broad terms, any consensus idem between the parties, that is to say, a mutual willingness to assume and enter into legal obligations. If even there were it is most unlikely % that African rulers would have agreed voluntarily to cede all their territory, lands, mines, and other sovereign rights exclusively to the Europeans. Obviously, national actor systems as sovereign units could, and most often did, conclude contracts with the Europeans for the benefit of commerce and for protection against aggressive neighbours. But such consensual engage ments were purely optional and outside the pale of inter national law, public or private; they were strictly in conformity with the expression of sovereignty attached to each African polity and so in consonance with their "munici pal" or "tribal" systems of law. If the Europeans had had even a limited capacity under international law, there would certainly be no question as to the validity of their acts. As things stood they were merely objects of international law with no power to commit their respective states. One could argue further that the Intention, although 173 the Europeans must have presumed it, to create legal obli gations was non-existent with the Africans. The fact that national actors appended their marks to the treaty sheets of German, French, Belgian, and English agreeing to the same objects and concessions for which each of these nationalities had previously negotiated would seem to sug gest the serio-comic nature of the whole transaction.'*' The only "legality" which such treaties assumed was, for the European governments which subsequently decreed their rati fication, as useful instruments, during the scramble,■for preempting one European nation from embarking upon adven tures in another's "sphere of influence". It cannot be presumed that the traditional actor systems were, in any conceivable sense, willing to limit their jurisdiction or to restrict and extinguish their sovereignty in favour of European national systems. The tenability of this hypothe sis is upheld by the fact that Europeans largely resorted to •v force in their quest for territories and other concessions ^During the race for treaty-making in Africa, Stanley collected some five hundred treaties with Congo chiefs on behalf of Leopold's International African Association founded in 1876. These treaties, as the records show, were "scraps of paper" by which the Congo cshiefs "promised" to accept the suzerainty of the Assoc, in return for general benefits. De Brazza working for the Societe de Geographie also signed a number of treaties with some of the same chiefs, 1872-1882.' 174 in traditional Africa. The Berlin Conference (18.85), which later legalized, this particular diplomatic behaviour of European governments in Africa, sanctioned the European predilection to outright annexations of African territories, * without regard to any ethnic distribution or political boundaries. Nevertheless, the threat or the use of force would tend to impeach, that is, prior to formal conquests, the validity of the treaties exacted from the Africans; but acquisitions stemming from wars of conquests would not be without validity, perhaps, in international law. It is hard to exaggerate the impact of all the diplo- r matic operations upon intertribal and international rela tions of traditional Africa. The first major effect was that the old order ceased to exist and the international systems completely destroyed. There was a total "System Change" resulting eventually in profound entropies of national actor systems and later in the final demise of the traditional systems of international and inter-"tribal" relations. For, superimposed upon each traditional international system was a "Vincular" European System which was dominant, directive, and given to authoritarian rules. It whittled away all the essential executive, legislative, and judicial powers of the traditional national actors and arrogated them to European 175 actors, allowing only a residuum of primary role function to the former with which to transmit and maintain the relevant rules of the traditional national systems. The imposed authoritarian rules of European system, how ever, served relatively as uniform systems of law regime for each locus of European conquest, although adaptations were made to circumstances .peculiar to individual localities. The Belgians in the Congo, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, the French and British in their respective areas, and the Afrikaners in South Africa, all established direc tive, hierarchical systems but with vastly different rules as to their structure and functions. Nonetheless each hierarchical system was a political system which operated directly upon individuals rather than levels of organization. Therefore, traditional national actor systems became merely territorial subdivisions of the European system rather than independent political systems. The authoritarian rules of the hierarchical system were accordingly transmitted primarily to individuals - kings, chiefs, elders - and not to functional actors such as "tri bal councils", guilds, and "secret societies". Within a given territory or region of the international system the European system was able to integrate the role 176 functions and values of the family of systems constituting its new, hierarchical system. But because the regime of each European system developed policies, such as "politique d' evolue", "assimilation", and "apartheid", the trend to ward a solidary system for each European area of control did not successfully emerge. And since the parameter values of the traditional African national systems had changed the outcome was much anomie, disintegration, and a rather rejuvenated "tribal" ethnocentrism. One may conclude then that European diplomacy in its "occupation" phases tended to stabilize Africa but it also tended to destroy much. Its impact was shattering to both the traditional political systems in their individual setting and the system of relations that their existence evoked. 177 CONCLUSION The preceding analyzes and discussion prompt us to observe that international relations emerge when two or more states become aware of each other, maintain a more or less regular contact, and show a passionate interest in their independence and survival. No one portion of the globe can therefore claim a monopoly of international relations. Yet the development and full emergence of international relations clearly' assume different forms from one region of the world to another. These differences, it would appear, are linked to differences in the level of cultural develop ment and in political and social structure, and also to cir cumstances external to each community. Some of these dif ferences no doubt relate to the manner in which political goals and objectives, and even political functions, are fulfilled in given political systems. The stresses and strains imposed upon the community either from within or without as a result of the fulfillment of political goals and objectives determine very largely the nature of inter national relations and the diplomatic styles of that commun ity. Wars may occur as a concomitant of the stresses and strains of political coexistence and as a result of the 178 patent disharmonies of national interest. In traditional Africa the motivational determinants of international action, as we have fairly demonstrated, were fundamentally both human and,social, and-ranged from self- preservation of the "tribal" polity to the individual ideals, purposes, and ideologies of the elites. The will to survive and to preserve the foundations of cultural life and p'olitical growth - self-preservation - provided the basic motivation for diplomacy and foreign policy. Any means that seemed to bring about the realiza tion of this end was, therefore, prima facie justified. As each "tribal" state, however, tended to approach its own security in a fashion less orthodox, but, perhaps, more vigorous than others would do themselves, inter-"tribal"- state relations often assumed a dimension of discord and conflict. Thus the objects and motives of preserving the "tribal" state frequently determined subsequent choice of instruments and strategies of inter-"tribal" and inter national political relations. Contemporary African States, indeed all m o d e m states, exhibit a parallel behaviour. Furthermore, because of the implications of Self- preservation and security of the "tribal" state, national actors often sought prudently, where the external 179 environment happened to be more favourable, to create new institutions and relationships capable of achieving and maintaining the economic and political effectiveness and defense capabilities of their states. The various regional cooperative efforts of mo d em Africa provide other parallels. The diplomacy or foreign policy of each "tribal" state was accordingly equally linked with the security policies and also with the total social and political system. The type of diplomacy utilized was, however, not always peaceful and war was often inevitable. The concomitant outcome was that most of the states were, of necessity, obliged to adopt policies of alliances and treaties of guarantee. Alliances, however, have a built- in tendency to generate counter-alliances which coalesce into systems of balance of power which, in turn, tend frequently to collapse in a major war. The analysis of inter-"tribal" and international relations of traditional Africa has pro vided some support for this tendency. The dominant interest of the "tribal" state in preserving the continuity of its communal life and safeguarding the inherent possibility of realizing its hopes for the future appear to have determined the tactics or the "diplomatic-strategic" behaviour of the traditional African state in inter-"tribal" and international relations. 180 To the system of traditional African political rela tions, diplomatic-strategic behaviour, comprehending the dialectic of peace and war, was thus very much tangential. For, it was in the circumstances of war and peace that egoistic drives of the elites, or the states for that mat ter, could be seen as being employed creatively to meet new challenges, or merely to expand their territory, and/or their economic resource patterns. This would explain why in most areas of traditional Africa no sharp dividing line existed between peace and war in inter-”tribaln and inter national relations. Yet, although it is true that many of the traditional African political systems had, at one stage or another in their historical evolution, sought to transcend their ter ritorial, ethnic, or economic limits in order to exercise power in a wider domain, it is also true that many had pre ferred to conduct their international relations by reference to customary and positive international law and community ethics and not exclusively on power. Whenever the states elected to abide by moral and legal standards of behaviour, international law and community ethics, though not seriously limiting the; will-to-power and self-aggradisement, had tended to make possible the restriction 181 of the use of force, by individual states and, beyond this, the transformation of the international system from a loose, chaotic structure to an integrated orderly one. The Organ ization of African Unity as presently constituted approxi mates and exemplifies this tendency. These observations lead us to call attention to the significance of law in inter-state relations. It appears t that traditional African international relations was assured a more enduring peace when diplomacy utilized law as an instrument for political construction and community than when it invoked peace through hegemony, balance of power, and empire. Whenever peace was achieved through the medium of force it was almost always imminent that sooner or later its structure would crumble, if not from influences within, then from influences without, unless strict vigilance was maintained. The lesson for contemporary African Society, and indeed the world, is clear. Finally, since inter-"tribal" and international rela tions of traditional Africa defined ipso facto relations between human groups, traditional African diplomacy tended to reflect at all times the constructive and destructive capacities of the human beings who were at the center of the system of relations between the traditional political systems. For it was only by their perceptions, attitudes and total psycho-cultural orientation that decisions on the resources to be utilized and courses of action to undertake in particular situations were frequently made as to the realization of old and new values and the fulfillment of hopes and ambitions. 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