Playing by Pornography's Rules: the Regulation of Sexual Expression
PLAYING BY PORNOGRAPHY'S RULES: THE REGULATION OF SEXUAL EXPRESSION DAVID COLEt INTRODUCTION Sometimes a sentence is worth a thousand words. In 1964, as the Supreme Court stumbled toward a constitutional approach to obscenity, Justice Potter Stewart suggested that only "hard-core pornography" should be suppressed.' He admitted that the category may be incapable of "intelligibl[e]" definition, but 2 nonetheless confidently asserted, "I know it when I see it." Justice Stewart's sentence captures the essence of the Court's sexual expression jurisprudence, which rests more on the assertion of distinctions than on reasoned analysis. For many years, the Court, unable to agree upon a doctrinal framework for obscenity regulation, simply ruled by per curiam judgments, without offering any explanation for what it was doing.' When the Court did attempt to explain its actions, some suggested that it would have been better off maintaining its silence.' The Court has now put forward a set of doctrinal "rules" that in the end do little more than obscure what is basically Stewart's intuitive approach. In defining obscenity, the Court has advanced an incoherent formula that requires the application of "community t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Craig Bloom, Adam Breznick, Anne Dailey, Jonathan Elmer, Bill Eskridge, Cindy Estlund, Marjorie Heins, Ellen Hertz, Sam Issacharoff, Jules Lobel, Carlin Meyer, David Myers, Dan Ortiz, Gary Peller, Nina Pillard, Larry Rosen, Mike Seidman, Nomi Stolzenberg, Nadine Strossen, Mark Tushnet, Suzanne Underwald, and Franz Werro for their helpful comments and suggestions on various drafts. I was or am counsel for plaintiffs in Finley v.
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