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Mar 1968 - the Vance Mission to South Korea

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Mar 1968 - the Vance Mission to South Korea Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 14, March, 1968 United States, Korea, South Korea, Page 22588 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Mar 1968 - The Vance Mission to South Korea. Meanwhile, the South Korea National Assembly had on Feb. 6 passed a resolution deploring the fact that the Republic of Korea (i.e. the South Korea Government) had not been represented at the Panmunjom talks between the U.S. and North Korean representatives on the Pueblo seizure; asserting that the U.S. authorities had under-rated the North Korean raid on Seoul 16 days earlier [see below]; and accusing the U.S. authorities of taking inadequate action to deal with possible North Korean incursions in the future. A South Korea Note was handed on the same day to the U.S. Ambassador, Mr. William J Porter, which, it was understood, repeated these charges, while students demonstrated outside the American Embassy in Seoul. It was announced in Washington on Feb. 9 that Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, former Deputy Secretary of Defence, would proceed to Seoul immediately for consultations with the South Korea Government as President Johnson's personal representative [Mr Vance had recently acted as President Johnson's Mediator with the Greek and Turkish Government over the Cyprus dispute—see 22435 A.] U.S. Government officials stressed that Mr. Vance's mission was not connected with the Panmunjom discussions between U.S. and North Korean representatives on the Pueblo, but was intended to demonstrate to the South Korea authorities the close and continuing interest of the United States in the security of the Republic of Korea. Mr. Vance arrived in Seoul on Feb. 11, and on Feb. 12–15 had meetings with President Pak Chung Hi, as well as with General Chung Il Kwon (the Prime Minister), Mr. Kyu Ha Choi (Foreign Minister), and other South Korea officials. The talks ended with the publication of the following communique (cross-headings inserted): U.S. Support for Korean National security. ―… President Pak and Mr. Vance fully exchanged views concerning the grave situation that has arisen as a result of the increasingly aggressive and violent actions of the North Korean Communists over the past 14 months in violation of the Armistice Agreement, and most recently the attack directed at the official residence of the President and the illegal seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo in international waters. ―They agreed… that these aggressive actions seriously jeopardize the security of this area and, if persisted in, can lead to renewed hostilities in Korea. While reaffirming the sincere desire of their countries for a peaceful solution to these problems in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter, they agreed that, if such aggression continues, the two countries would promptly determine what action should be taken under the mutual defence treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea. They reaffirmed the commitment of the two countries to undertake immediate consultations whenever the security of the Republic of Korea is threatened. They noted the extraordinary measures which have been and are being taken to strengthen the Korean and American forces in this area so as to leave them in a state of readiness to deal with any contingency which might arise.‖ Annual Meetings of U.S. and South Korea Defence Authorities. It was agreed that the ROK Ministry of National Defence and the U.S. Defence Department would hold annual meetings at ministerial level ―to discuss and consult on defence and security matters of mutual interest and common concern.‖ U.S. Assistance for South Korea. After saying that President Pak had expressed his appreciation to President Johnson for the latter's action in recommending to the U.S. Congress an additional $100,000,000 of U.S. military assistance to South Korea, the communique ended: "[President Pak and Mr. Vance] ― recognized the need for continuing modernization of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea. They also discussed the subject of supplying small arms to the Korean veterans’ forces in order to strengthen the defence capabilities of the country. They agreed that a meeting of U.S. and ROK military experts should be held in the near future to discuss military assistance matters in general….‖ Participating in the talks on the American side, in addition to Mr. Vance, were Mr Porter, the U.S. Ambassador, and General Charles H Bonesteel, commander of the U.S. and U.N. forces in Korea. Increase in North Korean Infiltrations in Demilitarized Zone during 1967. - North Korean Attempt to assassinate President Pak. As stated by Mr. Goldberg in his speech to the security Council [see above], the report of the U.N. Command in Korea for 1967 had shown a tenfold increase in the number of incidents in the demilitarized zone involving armed infiltrators from North Korea–the number of such incidents in 1967 being 566, compared with little more than 50 in 1966. As also stated by Mr. Goldberg, 153 individuals–the great majority South Korea soldiers–had been killed during 1967 by North Korean infiltrators. At the beginning of October U.S. military sources reported that 215 North Korean soldiers had been killed and 51 captured during the first nine months of 1967 in border incidents and infiltrations into the demilitarized zone–the comparative figure for the whole of 1966 being 106 North Korean soldiers killed and captured. It was also stated that in the previous 12 months some 20 American soldiers had been killed in ―hit-and-run‖ attacks in the demilitarized zone, mostly carried out at night. [The demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea is 2 1/2 miles deep and runs for 151 miles across the Korean peninsula from coast to coast; the village of Panmunjom, meeting-place of the Mixed Armistice Commission, is in the demilitarized zon. A report published by the South Korea Ministry of Public Information on Feb. 5, 1968, stated that violations of the armistice agreement by the North Koreans had ―increased drastically‖ during 1967, and that the number of North Korean violations since the 1953 armistice amounted to 5,331. Among many instances cited of violations during 1967 was one on Aug. 28 when Communist troops–subsequently driven back by a counter-attack–infiltrated 2 1/2 kilometres south of the military demarcation line and tried to attack camps housing the Support Command for the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom. On the night of Sept. 5 Communist espionage agents attempted to blow up a passenger train south of Chosong-noi station, in Kyonggi-do province; because of mis-timing, however, the train was only derailed and no casualties were caused. Following a number of border clashes during July and August, with casualties on both sides, the U.S. and South Korea authorities constructed in the autumn of 1967 a barrier across the entire demilitarized zone from coast to coast, with the object of making infiltrations by the North Koreans more difficult. Details of the defensive barrier remained classified, but the U.S. Army stated that it was not similar to the electronically-equipped barrier which was being built along the demilitarized zone in Vietnam [see page 22573]. According to some press reports, the Korean anti-infiltration barrier was a barbed-wire fence with booby-trap mines and machine-gun posts. Apart from the border clashes and infiltrations, there were also two naval incidents in 1967. On Jan. 19 a North Korean shore battery shelled and sank a South Korea naval patrol vessel near the eastern end of the demarcation line off the east coast, 28 of the 79 crew members being missing, believed killed. According to the North Koreans, the ROK naval vessel had intruded into North Korean waters, whilst the South Koreans said that the sinking bad occurred a few miles south of the sea boundary. On April 17 South Korea jet fighters sank a North Korean patrol craft off the west coast of South Korea, a few miles south of the seaward extension of the armistice line; several members of the crew were drowned and others picked up. A commando group of 31 heavily-armed North Korean infiltrators, disguised as South Korea soldiers or civilians, penetrated on Jan. 21, 1968, into the heart of Seoul, 35 miles south of the demilitarized zone, and got to within 500 yards of the Presidential palace before they were intercepted by South Korea police. In a gun battle five of the North Korean commandos were killed, one was captured, and the remainder fled northward pursued by South Korea troops who later killed 22 more of the infiltrators. Fifteen South Koreans–nine soldiers, one police officer, and five civilians–were killed in exchanges of fire with the North Korean commandos. The only prisoner taken–a North Korean second lieutenant –said that his unit had received special training for guerrilla and subversive activities in South Korea, and that its mission had been to blow up the Presidential palace in Seoul and assassinate President Pak Chung Hi and top officials; he added that his unit had penetrated the barrier across the demilitarized zone by using wire-cutters. The raid on Seoul was the first of its kind since the end of the Korean War in 1953. (New York Times - U.S. Information Service - Times - U.N. Information Centre, London - South Korea Ministry of Public Information, Seoul) (Prev. rep. Korean Incidents, 21789 B.) .
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