eedn h rsn oils osiuin Inmy opinion, defending the present socialist constitution. andinsiston capitalism and globalization, with marketization, associate theevilsthe constitution.They ofeliteprivatization reform through amendments to rights implement property callto come outinstrong oppositiontoliberalintellectuals’ ’s Inparticular laging New Lefthas ofsociety’s riches. likelooks toomuch ameansofassistingtheelitein theirpil- protectionproperty that isapplied largely toeliteprivatization because protection ofprivate intotheconstitution, property F the greatest elite. ofthe reforms beneficiaries are theminority by far reforms, fromand eliteprivatization crippled arising privatization ofpublic power. if itdoesn’t take system’s intoaccounttheoneparty role in the ty? Inthiscontroversy, noargument orremedy isofany value f andthepowerless masseswhoare ofallbene- deprived zation, tice must yieldtothereality ofextremely unjusteliteprivati- thepeople’s underwhich callfor socialjus- elite privatization, about willthat anunjustlegalization bring of answer isno, anditsaccompanying ofsocialstability? Ifthe disruption era, b a new withablanket redistri- “economic culturalrevolution,” on willthat bring Iftheanswer isyes, liquidating illicitwealth. reform canbeimplementedonthepremise of rights property points currently underdebate inintellectualcirclesiswhether Oneofthe a hottopicinevery segmentofChinesesociety. hasbecome constitutional, on makingprivate rights property withitsfocus China’s present reform ownership, ofproperty byclan-basedpowermonopolies. trol dependsonabolishing con- bution ofproperty r ofpublic theircontrol atalllevelsturn officials tion ofpoliticalpower, LiuXiaobowrites.While tional rightsmusttakeintoaccountprivatiza- re The ongoingdebateinChinaoverwhetherto BY LIUXIAOBO CHINA’S ROBBER BARONS it must acceptalmostallbenefit goingtoapowerful minori- esources intoprivatewealth,equitable distri- esources or that reason many peopleare notinfavor ofincorporating ution of wealth such as took place during theLandReform ution ofwealth astookplaceduring such cognize private property rightsasconstitu- cognize privateproperty Because ofthelargely unrestrained marketization ofpower distinctive features: withfour lic power hasalways beenessentially privatized, r by politicalpoweracterized for private benefit andproperty ischar- which oppositetothesituationdiametrically inChina, property rights shouldbefor private benefit rights property ( power shouldbefor thecollective good( theconceptthat political tive feature civilization, ofmodern distinc- Communist reforms.The Party system anditscrippled tion ofpublic power inexplainingtheessenceof economy andprivate rights. property easy matter sincetheParty hasbeguntoacceptmarket r is thekey problem tounderstandingthecurrent ofproperty theessenceofChineseCommunist Party’sclarifying power Itcouldbesaidthat regime. into theultimate totalitarian has allowed theChineseCommunist government todevelop re Privatization ofpublic power isnotaspecialproduct ofthe leadstoprivatization through ofproperty which theelite. initselfaprivatization ofpublic politicalpower,system, itisthedictatorial Rather, andfreeproperty competition. talist market systemcentered ontheprotection ofprivate privatization system. Zedong andadesire toconcealtheactualroots oftheelite from theirworshipthe socialistconstitutionarises ofMao theirdefense of the New Leftseemstobeshiftingtheblame; gt o h olciego.UndertheChinesesystempub- ights for thecollective good. ights; but clarifying theessenceofParty’s but clarifying power isno ights; fo )Alo oit’ eore,from4) individualpeopleto All ofsociety’s resources, 3) Any dynastic power transitiontakes placeonly within 2) Dynasticsuccessionandmaintenancerelies principally 1) Public power ismonopolizedby specialpower groups In my opinion, it is necessary tobeginwiththeprivatiza- itisnecessary In my opinion, The roots ofChinese-styleeliteprivatization isnotacapi- rm f of are monopolized undertheprinciple “all property, outwithin theParty.society itiscarried w Inancientsocietytransfer ofpower allowed totake part. theotherstrata ofsociety are not class; the privileged ineffect private power relying onterror.on violence, and willnotallow theexistenceofany opposition party. that willnotshare power withotherpoliticalpowers, or thecollective.” era, but rather is characteristic ofapoliticalsystemthat but rather ischaracteristic era, as carried out within a dynastic clan; in modern inmodern outwithinadynastic clan; as carried tianxia wei gong tianxia wei si ) and ,is ),

ON THE GROUND 73 CHINA RIGHTS FORUM NO.2, 2003 The other essential qualities of China’s political system, ed the from taking complete control.Although such as political conspiracy and ideological dishonesty,are the Kuomintang authorities recognized private property mere by-products of the privatization of public power. rights, the privatization of public power resulted in a bureau- Political conspiracy is the tool for distributing power within a cratic takeover of property,just another form of elite privatiza- despotic government. Ideological dishonesty serves as a tion.After World War II, the Kuomintang authorities tried to despotic government’s moral disguise.Whether we speak of implement a western-style modern political party system, but the dynastic system of imperial times or the party system of the experiment failed due to lack of cooperation from the modern times, whether it’s the planned economy and collec- -supported Chinese Communist Party.After flee- tives of the era or the marketized power and elite ing to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek passed on his dictatorial power privatization of the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin eras, the to his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, and it was only in the 1980s privatization of public power has not changed one iota – in all that the Kuomintang authorities controlled by the Chiang fam- cases the nation’s political power is transformed into the pri- ily began to genuinely turn toward a modern multi-party sys- vate tool of the elite class.Whether we speak of an individual tem. In the year 2000 Taiwan for the first time implemented a tyrant or an oligarchic dictatorship, whether an elite clan transfer of power through competition between parties. shares privileges only among its members or extends them on In Mainland China, with the support of the Soviet Union, a limited basis to loyalists in other classes, the fact of systemat- the Communist Party used a crippling civil war to replace the ic privatizing of public power remains unchanged. Kuomintang, but did not put an end to the one party political dictatorship. Instead, the Communist Party creatively devel- The Historical Basis of Clan Rule oped the nationalist party system by transforming the In the imperial era, public power circulated within a clan Kuomintang’s one-party rule (dang tianxia), composed of a (jia tianxia), and power was legitimized through violence. mixture of bureaucratic resources and a party system, into a Whichever clan was victorious in battle took over the throne new one-party rule composed of a more peculiar mixture of and retained power until a new clan wrested it away through property cooperatives and privatization of power. In addition, violent means. Starting when the Qin Emperor united China highly effective ruling methods resulting from the combina- through violence, China’s 2000 years of imperial history was a tion of a peaceful environment, a secretive organizational sys- vicious cycle of clan rule.The Han dynasty was ruled by the tem, deceptive authoritarian ideologies and technological Liu clan, the Tang by Lis, the Song by Zhaos, the Ming by Zhus, advancement allowed the Communist Party’s control to greatly and two foreign clans, those of Timuchin (the clan of Genghis exceed that of the Kuomintang era. Khan) and Aisin Gioro, ruled the Yuan and Qing Dynasties.The civil service exam system was nothing more than a means for Starting when the Qin Emperor united the ruling clan to absorb serfs.Although backward ruling methods prevented clans from actually taking complete con- China through violence, China’s 2000 trol of all property,and private ownership continued to exist years of imperial history was a vicious among the people, the formal system of clan rule still only rec- cycle of clan rule. ognized ownership of property and individual persons by the ruling clan. The spread of party organizations and units to the grass Although the revolution of 1911 overthrew dynastic rule roots allowed the party’s influence to permeate all of society, and replaced it with a modern political party system, China’s to the point that the entire country ultimately became the party system was little more than traditional clan rule in a dif- property of one person.Tens of millions of people became the ferent form. From the moment it entered China, the political experimental objects of Mao Zedong’s personal ambition, and party system operated along Leninist lines diametrically oppo- the party devolved into little more than an organ for determin- site to the western concept of peaceful competition through ing succession. In fact, Mao was by no means averse to family votes, and depended on gaining and maintaining control succession; if his son Mao Anying had not been killed in the through violence. Public power monopolized by a clan , China would probably have had a family dynasty became monopoly by a party,and transition of power from like ’s under Kim Il Song, with party rule reverting one party to another was accomplished through violence just to clan rule under the Mao family.Mao’s strong support of as it had been from one clan to another. Likewise, internal Jiang Qing and Mao Yuanxin during his final years indicates power shifts under party rule became an amalgam of clan and that he was in fact strongly inclined toward clan rule. factional rule. In the eyes of a party chieftain, the most desir- After the death of the ultimate party boss, Mao Zedong, the able transition of power was naturally within ones own family Deng Xiaoping era came about through usurpation, with sev- from father to son. But lacking that opportunity,the next best eral oligarchs joining together to form a power balance within thing was to ensure that power remained within the party and the party and ruling out the possibility of clan succession. was not shared with any other party or political power. Succession determined by the party bosses became the chief The nationalist party system created in China under the means of power transfer under Communist Party rule, and the leadership of Sun Yat-sen was developed further by Chiang periodic rejuvenation of the elite class was mainly carried out Kai-shek into “one nation under one party under one leader” within the party.But party ownership of public power did not through the Kuomintang. Only the chaos of wartime prevent- change at all; it simply shifted from individual totalitarianism of elitelegitimizes thesourceofitspower. the newalso atraditionalconceptthrough which generation but was ty that eliteprivatization was notonly afact oflife, re seeking revenge from himwas alow-life andatraitortothe hisactionsLiPenghad enjoyed.Through implied that anyone means ofclaimingentitlementto thepower andinfluencehe was forced tostress hisrevolutionary credentials asa ment, tohisretire- prior andLiPeng himself, to exculpate herself, was obliged toopenly acceptinterviews from themedia Lin, Zhu Li’s wife, their private property.As aresult ofthisarticle, managed astate-owned totransform company electric into W e Public discontentwithLiPeng’s familypetitions. was already c peopledefraudedintheXinguodaGroup caseraisedthe nary theordi- Justover ayear ago, scandals. members incorruption June 4thbloodbath andfor ofhisfamily theparticipation ment hewould becomeatarget ofrevenge for hisrole inthe apparently outoffear that following hisimminentretire- ents, Recently LiPeng paidahigh-profile par- tohisbirth tribute The Invisible Power Structure r but rather isthenatural system, current means anaccidentalproduct ofChina’s isby no ofthe The rise “Princelings” Vi begun promoting thebloodline of “Heroic EldersProducing oftopofficial thechildren hadalready Cultural Revolution era, the During the natural result ofChineseCommunist Party rule. but rather is an accidentalproduct ofChina’s system, current b descendants have assumedpower distri- internal through such the veterans their oftheRevolution have gradually diedoff, andotherplunder.As ofbribes for thesharing arrangement senior official andonetycoon–that provides asystematic ly eliteclanstypical- spoils amongeliteclansandindividuals.The m class. divisionofspoilsamongtheprivileged internal allthemore easily becomingaprivate toolforto oligarchy, the unimpeded. eliteescapehereditary tocontinue satisfying theirdesires whilethevillainsamong be thefirst tobeledthealtar, whohave managed toascendelitestatus will “commoners” these campaignrequires lamb, asacrificial anti-corruption oran struggle ifaninternal “Slave oftheParty.” Inaddition, hemust himselfintoa first turn turf controlled by theelite, hecantake throughhierarchy for which himselfashare ofthe zation by anew generation oftheCommunist Party. ieti oebr20,whenChina’s Market Stock vident inNovember 2001, at Rtr u oe,L eg”indemonstrations and LiPeng!” ourmoney, “Return hant, esult ofChineseCommunist Party rule. to fsol.h ieo h Piclns isby nomeans ofthe rise “Princelings” ution ofspoils.The

v tal uprie andultimately resulted inadivisionof utually supportive, eekly published revealing anarticle how the Liclanhad r implement a division of labor – each clanhasatimplement adivisionoflabor leastone –each olution.The caseofLiPeng effectivelyolution.The proclaimed tosocie- uu os”nakedly presaging the ideology ofeliteprivati- tuous Sons,” Privatization ofpower andprivatization ofassetswere Now personaspires toapositionintheparty ifanordinary the government. currently holdpositionsinthe upper levels of “Princelings” r whospecializein toscholars their own efforts.According from only and 4.5percentbecamerich outside ofChina, ofbeingrelatedvirtue topersonsoroperating businesses Onlythe ChineseCommunist 5.5percentwere by Party. rich f with assetsofat least10million people have assetsofat least100 million with assetsof10million circulation reveals that at present Chinahas5millionpeople Chinese SocialSciences Academy.The version for internal Office State and CouncilResearch Office, Central Research was recently produced jointly by the of All ClassesofSociety” amountsofstatemore assets. enormous establishing private companiesandthereby privatizing even from controlling to state-ownedled toachange enterprises Chinese Communist Party’s eliteinterest groups hasgradually theincreasing clandomination ofthe framework, tives” underthe “three representa- Inrecent years, of elitepower. todenotethemaingroup controlling thelocallevel “XX clan” peoplerefer cityandcountyordinary tothe province, each Likewise in are already ofcommonparlanceinChina. part ZhuandZengclans Li, Jiang, to theDeng,Ye,Yang, Chen,Wan, r the elite’s control oflarge companiesandlarge capital isthe and tioning outthehighestpositionsamongeliteclans, faction istheresult ofpor- political power ofthe “Princeling” ly f clanintheCommunist Partyeach elitehasadivisionoflabor to apportioning power iseven iswhy more clan-based.That theelite’s approach inpolitics, treasures islargely clan-based; a theelite’s approach to business, In are delineated by clans. thenontheeconomicfront eliteinterest groups “Princelings,” andthe the “Liusu clique” the “Qinghua clique,” political power stillinvolve struggles the “ clique,” Ifitissaidthat factors oneoftheimportant istheclan. groups, withintheleadershipanddelineation ofinterest struggles Nowadays whenpeopleinChinatalkabout power elite. party isstillnothingcompared withclancontrol ofthe enterprises but clancontrol ofprivate clan control ofeliteinterest groups, reveals only thetipoficeberg ofincreasing Electricity” Communist Party’s elitepower exampleof “Li structure.The in thehiddenclaninfluenceat every level oftheChinese f f Butin increasing clancontrol ofChina’s private enterprises. hnhr,we stillhave tosay that increasing clancontrol of than harm, toward hasdonemore good clancontrol ofprivate enterprises If we say that inregards toChina’s development thetendency The EconomicCostofClanRule act thedistinctively Chinesefeature ofclancontrol isnottypi- ound that more than90percentwere from theeliteclansof fami- andwhy withineach or economicandpoliticalbenefit, but rather ied intheopenclancontrol ofprivate enterprises, sacigtehgetlvl fgvrmn,more than200 thehighestlevelsesearching ofgovernment, References esult ofdividingthemarket upamongtheclans. pportioning state-ownedpportioning society’s assetsandplundering

there enormous are bothbusinessmen andofficials.The A research report entitled report A research “The Present EconomicSituation In recent years economistshave leveled at subtlecriticism yuan rmr.O hs,20,000 Ofthese, or more. yuan , the report’s survey yuan . Among those

ON THE GROUND 75 CHINA RIGHTS FORUM NO.2, 2003 Former Chinese Premier Li Peng and his wife Zhu Lin. The Li family’s corporate interests have been the subject of a number of controversies. Photo: Reuters. the Chinese Communist Party’s elite power cartels has done invested companies compete with domestic private concerns, more harm than good. Objectively speaking, in terms of tradi- but both are equally dissatisfied with excessive administrative tional inheritance practices as well as the current economic interference. Exorbitant trading costs run contrary to the mar- environment and marketization standards, clan control of ket economy principle of free and fair trade. Following China’s private enterprises is only a natural result of tradition and accession to the WTO, one of the focuses of economic reform popular preference, and is arguably especially beneficial in has been to reduce excessive trading costs in accordance with the early stages of marketization.Western commercial society the rules of a free market. similarly moved from family-controlled enterprises to more But the extortionate influence fees that so plague private diversified shareholdings, and commercial regulations are an enterprises are not something that the elite clans at any level of extension from blood-based relationships to contracts government are going to make any effort to address.That’s between strangers. because their privileged positions are the source of their for- tune, and they never have to expend any personal capital.Their The perversity of the Chinese market is control of public power allows them to “bag the big game that its plentiful supply of cheap labor empty-handed” and become wealthy overnight.The most important capital of the clans are “elders” in high positions, in can’t make up for the high trading fees accordance with the main principle of cronyism that, “when a exacted by officials. man becomes powerful, his chickens and dogs do, too.” Some call this making enormous profit from scanty capital. I say it is Under China’s current system the prosperity of a private making huge profit from nothing at all, because the public enterprise depends on developing relationships with those in power held by the elites actually belong to society and should power and buying influence, but private companies still be used for the public welfare rather than as a tool for personal require an enormous investment of private funds at the outset. profit by officials and their families. Bribery is simply a means of defraying the “influence fees” The greatest breach of social justice, as well as the greatest and “system costs” that arise in the unlevel playing field of injury to human conscience and public trust, is the transfor- China’s power-driven market.The perversity of the Chinese mation of public power into a tool for private profit. Ever since market is that its plentiful supply of cheap labor can’t make up the economic reforms began, the elite clans of the Communist for the high trading fees exacted by officials.That is one of the Party have joined together in a common effort to privatize main reasons that businesses routinely evade taxes. Foreign- public assets.With the inability of the dictatorship to win the most otherpeople. y an official orgettingrich? You canmake abetterlivingfor anyway?joining theParty, And what’s wrong withbecoming money orachieve apositionofinfluence.What’s wrong with Pa you definitely haveanything tojointhe inyour profession, Ifyou by want toaccomplish theParty. Chinaisrun practical: they andbecomeextremely abandon sloganeering ship arises, whenthesubjectofParty member- call for political progress,” Even amongstudentswho “enthusiastically member thannot. itisbettertobeaParty what onehopestoachieve inlife, canonly beachievedwhich Regardlessof by joiningtheParty. best way toobtainpersonaladvantage isthrough officialdom, the InChinaundertheCommunist Party, personal aspiration. but rather long-term interest isnotunselfish idealism, dents’ v Pa benefit. personal official tosecuring ashortcut public power hasmadebecomingan occupation ofsocietyasprivatization of Cronyism hasbecomethegeneralpre- personalbenefit. official tosecuring ashortcut society asprivatization ofpublic power hasmadebecomingan Cronyism hasbecomethegeneral preoccupation of justice. ofthegreatest productbankruptcy ofpublic welfare –social but alsointheutter impoverishment ofthehumanconscience, r led tosystemicimpoverishment reflected notonly inthemate- Their morally indefensible accumulation ofpersonalwealth has become thedefining qualitiesofChinese-styleprivatization. have and “self interest above which all” “by fair meansorfoul” class hassetanexampleunder privileged ish andunscrupulous self- the tiny profit.The toenjoy enormous eliteminority such Itisthisprivatization ofpublic power that hasallowed them. of public power andhasnotallowed anyone elsetoshare in the Communist Party stillmonopolizesthepoliticalre-sources and haveute property, recognized thereality ofprivatization, topossessanddistrib- membersofsocietyanopportunity nary Even thoughopennessandreforms have gradually given ordi- The MoralCostofClanRule matic ofthisdoomsday mentality. emigration andtransfer ofassetsoverseas –are allsympto- sightedness ofthewealthy habits, classes–theirsquandering behavior.The andhasfueledopportunistic short- upper class, hasspread from theCommunist elitestotherest ofthe assets, rooted inaparanoiacobsessionwithpowermentality, and apocalypticleged status disintegrates beneath theirfeet.This nation tograb benefit asmuch asthey canbefore their privi- ing increasingly andsociopathic intheirdetermi- shortsighted theChineseCommunist elitesare becom- ofthepeople, hearts ial impoverishment ofthepowerless massesandthemoral ersity graduates are competing to join.The reason for thestu- ersity graduates are competingtojoin.The ourself andyour more tosocietythan andcontribute family, rt rt In recent years oneofthethingsChineseCommunist y. y points to with pride is the alacrity with which new withwhich uni- isthealacrity y pointstowithpride That’s the only way you’ll have tomake anopportunity We firstThis article appeared inChineseonHRIC’s T thangoodfordo more allsocialclasses. harm but toareversion optionwill todictatorship.This ical system, tain –itcouldleadnottotheestablishment polit- ofamodern andtheresults are uncer- ofviolentrevolutionprice ishigh, the ofviolentrevolution.And accomplished underthechaos any undertheexistingsystemcanonly regime be change erty, tion ofpublic power public that assetsintoprivate turns prop- movement.Land Reform of aneconomicculturalrevolution intheorderofold there isavery real possibility ment ofill-gottengainsarises, for Oncetheopportunity athorough assess- expedient. porary andany socialstability, term otherstrategy willonly beatem- dictatorship willneverone-party beable toimplementlong- Otherwise, of competitionandoppositionremain peaceful. andcouldensure that themethods ment aslegalexpression, andoppositiontowardcould alsotreat criticism thegovern- v be able tocontaintheconflictbetween different interests and might oroppositiontothegovernment, tolerant tocriticism if ent interests andvalues ofthebureaucracy andthepeople, could integrate andtoagreat extentaccommodate thediffer- ab of thesystem. civil movement –civilorganization – civil authority –outside andcivilorganizationcivil authority willcreate that inturn a persistent movements toanurgent willgive demandfor rise andthese outside ofthesystemtodemandmore civilrights, movements willarise and official accountability.As aresult, of thepeoplebecauseurgent demandfor socialjustice cial systemwillsuffer adramatic lossofcredibility intheeyes people basicsocialjusticeandofficial accountability.The offi- ofmanpredominates over rule oflawwhich rule cangive the Bao Qing judgenorajudicialsystemin Tian-style Mandarin Neither a compensation oftheirlegalrights. for infringement it isdifficult for thepeopletoreceive protection from and av orany effective public toexpress itsdemandsfor rights, va systemunderpri- they are demandingtheir humanrights.The theirdissatisfaction isincreasing and gradually increasing, r pillaging isunbridled through which specialprivilege. tion, reform undereliteprivatiza- ofcrippled the abnormal price but rather is ofsocialchange, price morality isnotthenormal gt osiuns a enaaee;thepeople’s powerights consciousnesshasbeenawakened; is alues within a framework of legal competition. Such asystem Such alues withinaframework oflegalcompetition. ranslated by StacyMosher nefradrc epnefo ihntesse.Likewise, enue for adirect response from withinthesystem. tized public power allows nolegalorganized meansfor the et aif hs ead.Butacommonlaw systemthat le tosatisfy thesedemands. b site(www.renyurenquan.org). nohrwrs ifwe don’t thesystemofprivatiza- change In otherwords, A politicalsystemmonopolizedby willnever oneparty be thepublic’s civicconsciousnessand At thesametime, ofpublic ofthisextreme justiceandpublic lack The price e u Renquan Ren Yu

ON THE GROUND 77 CHINA RIGHTS FORUM NO.2, 2003