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China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?

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China and North Korea: Comrades Forever? CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: COMRADES FOREVER? Asia Report N°112 – 1 February 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. AN ENDURING RELATIONSHIP .............................................................................. 1 A. THE CONFUCIAN CONTEXT ...................................................................................................1 B. BROTHERS IN ARMS ..............................................................................................................1 C. EXPLOITING THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY................................................................................2 D. FROM PATRON TO LIFELINE ..................................................................................................2 E. THE NUCLEAR DISPUTES ......................................................................................................4 1. The first nuclear crisis................................................................................................4 2. The second nuclear crisis...........................................................................................5 III. CHINA’S PRIORITIES................................................................................................. 6 A. CAUTIOUS CONSERVATISM ...................................................................................................6 B. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES.................................................................................................7 1. Territorial integrity ....................................................................................................8 2. Non-interference in internal affairs............................................................................9 3. Use of force................................................................................................................9 4. Support for developing countries...............................................................................9 C. DOMESTIC STABILITY .........................................................................................................10 1. Collapse and chaos in North Korea .........................................................................10 2. Prevent mass migration............................................................................................11 D. REGIONAL STABILITY .........................................................................................................11 1. Not another nuclear neighbour ................................................................................11 2. Averting conflict......................................................................................................12 3. Maintain the regional status quo..............................................................................13 IV. THE LIMITS OF CHINA’S INFLUENCE ............................................................... 14 A. NORTH KOREAN MISTRUST ................................................................................................14 1. History .....................................................................................................................14 2. Ideology ...................................................................................................................15 B. POOR ACCESS IN THE NORTH ..............................................................................................16 1. Party to party relations.............................................................................................16 2. Military to military relations....................................................................................16 C. CHINA’S MILITARY RESTRUCTURING..................................................................................17 D. THE NORTH KOREAN DECISION MAKING PROCESS ..............................................................18 V. WHAT IS CHINA PREPARED TO DO?..................................................................... 19 A. NUCLEAR DISPUTE..............................................................................................................19 1. Negotiations.............................................................................................................19 2. Sanctions..................................................................................................................20 B. PREVENTING ILLICIT TRANSFERS ........................................................................................21 1. Export controls.........................................................................................................21 2. Border controls ........................................................................................................22 3. Sea and air interdiction ............................................................................................24 C. ECONOMIC REFORM............................................................................................................24 D. REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS .................................................................................................27 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 29 APPENDICES A. MAP OF CHINA …...............................................................................................................31 B. MAP OF NORTH KOREA…...................................................................................................32 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................33 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA...............................................................34 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................36 Asia Report N°112 1 February 2006 CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: COMRADES FOREVER? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY China’s influence on North Korea is more than it is willing though the crackdown on North Korea’s banking activities to admit but far less than outsiders tend to believe. in Macao in September 2005 demonstrated that China is Although it shares the international community’s not completely immune to outside pressures to rein in bad denuclearisation goal, it has its own concept of how behaviour, Beijing is unlikely to shut down the North’s to achieve it. It will not tolerate erratic and dangerous remaining banking activities in the country. behaviour if it poses a risk of conflict but neither will it endorse or implement policies that it believes will create China opposes sanctions on North Korea because it instability or threaten its influence in both Pyongyang believes they would lead to instability, would not dislodge and Seoul. The advantages afforded by China’s close the regime but would damage the nascent process of relationship with the North can only be harnessed if better market reforms and harm the most vulnerable. It also assessments of its priorities and limitations are integrated has reasons related to its own quest for reunification with into international strategies. Waiting for China to compel Taiwan – not to mention human rights issues in Xinjiang North Korean compliance will only give Pyongyang and Tibet, and its own economic interests in Sudan and more time to develop its nuclear arsenal. elsewhere – for opposing aid conditionality and infringements on sovereignty and being generally China’s priorities with regard to North Korea are: reluctant to embrace sanctions. avoiding the economic costs of an explosion on The bilateral relationship affords China little non-coercive the Korean Peninsula; influence over Pyongyang. Viewing it as one sustained by history and ideology ignores powerful dynamics of preventing the U.S. from dominating a unified strategic mistrust, fractured leadership ties and ideological Korea; differences. Pyongyang knows Beijing might not come securing the stability of its three economically to its defence again in war and fears that it would trade weak north eastern provinces by incorporating it off if it felt its national interest could benefit. North Korea into their development plans; One factor shaping China’s preference for the status quo reducing the financial burden of the bilateral in North Korea is the presence of two million ethnic relationship by replacing aid with trade and Koreans in the country including an estimated 10,000 to investment; 100,000 refugees and migrants at any one time. Although refugee flows are perceived to present one of the greatest winning credit at home, in the region and in the U.S. threats to China in case of political or economic collapse for being engaged in achieving denuclearisation; in the North, most Chinese analysts and officials are sustaining the two-Korea status quo so long as it can unconcerned about the short-term threat posed by border maintain influence in both and use the North as crossers. Meanwhile, genuine political refugees are now leverage with Washington on the Taiwan issue; and quietly leaving China and being resettled in South Korea without Chinese opposition – sometimes even with avoiding a situation where a nuclear North Korea its assistance – so long as they depart without causing leads Japan and/or Taiwan to become nuclear embarrassment.
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