U.S. Leadership Needed to Improve Maritime Security in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov Luke Coffey and Brent Sadler

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U.S. Leadership Needed to Improve Maritime Security in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov Luke Coffey and Brent Sadler BACKGROUNDER No. 3614 | MAY 3, 2021 KATHRYN AND SHELBY CULLOM DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY U.S. Leadership Needed to Improve Maritime Security in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov Luke Coffey and Brent Sadler his spring, Russia has been conducting a sizeable KEY TAKEAWAYS military buildup along its border with Ukraine T and in occupied Crimea. Most of these deploy- A sovereign and secure Black Sea and Sea ments seem spontaneous and unrelated to any scheduled of Azov are critical to keeping the region training exercises. Russia’s activity has not been limited free from Russia’s maligned influence. to the land. There has also been a Russian buildup at sea. Recently, four Russian warships from the Baltic fleet have moved to the Black Sea. In addition, 15 vessels from the Caspian flotilla have just arrived in the Sea of Azov. Russia’s mounting aggression around Ukraine’s border at land and sea directly This means a total of at least 50 Russian warships are 1 threatens U.S. and NATO security interests. now operating in the waters around Ukraine. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Moscow has essentially turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian The U.S. should think outside of the box lake, with one exception: Ukraine’s port at Mariupol. If as it builds a strategy to counter Russian this port were neutralized, Russia would then move on aggression and work with NATO to in the hope of a similar outcome in the Black Sea. This enhance the security in both seas. is a direct threat to U.S. and NATO security interests. This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg3614 The Heritage Foundation | 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE | Washington, DC 20002 | (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. BACKGROUNDER | No. 3614 MAY 3, 2021 | 2 heritage.org Many of the recent NATO-level initiatives regarding the Black Sea have not met expectations. The economic, security, and political importance of the Black Sea and the broader region is only now becoming more important. Often overlooked in the debate about the Black Sea is the situation in the Sea of Azov. This small, shallow body of water, connected to the Black Sea by a narrow strait, has been important for centuries. The U.S. needs to be a leader inside NATO to help Ukraine enhance security in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The U.S. can do this by: (1) increasing its naval presence in the Black Sea; (2) pushing for a bigger NATO maritime presence in the Black Sea; (3) conducting a Limits of the Sea Review on the Sea of Azov; (4) consider conducting a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) through the Kerch Strait; (5) work closely with Black Sea NATO members Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey to improve regional security; and (6) improving Ukraine’s and Georgia’s maritime and naval capabilities. Importance of the Black Sea The Black Sea sits at an important crossroads between Europe, Asia, and the Caucasus.2 Many important oil and gas pipelines, as well as fiber optic cables, crisscross the sea. Throughout the history of the region, the Black Sea has proven to be geopolitically and economically important. Even for a country located thousands of miles away, like the United States, the Black Sea is important. For the U.S., the Black Sea’s strategic importance is primarily derived from two issues. The first is America’s treaty obligations under NATO. Three of six Black Sea countries (Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey) are in NATO and fall under the alliance’s security guarantee. Another two countries (Georgia and Ukraine) participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Second, one of America’s biggest geopolitical competitors and adversaries, Russia, is very active in the region, constantly undermining the interests of the U.S. and its allies. It is also worth noting that Black Sea countries have demonstrated a greater political will to deploy troops in support of NATO operations than countries in other regions. For example, over the past few years, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine collectively contributed one-third of all the European forces serving in NATO’s Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. In the Black Sea, the main U.S. goals are: l A sovereign Black Sea. Across the Black Sea region, national sover- eignty is being undermined by illegal occupation. Between Russia’s illegal occupation of Georgia’s Abkhazia region and Ukraine’s Crimea, BACKGROUNDER | No. 3614 MAY 3, 2021 | 3 heritage.org Detail Area MAP 1 The Black Sea Region MOLDOVA UKRAINE Under control of Russian-backed ROMANIA separatists RUSSIA Abkhazia Tskhinvali region under Russian under Russian Danube River occupation occupation Danube-Black Crimea Sea Canal under Russian occupation KOSOVO BULGARIA Black Sea NORTH GEORGIA MACEDONIA ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN GREECE Turkish Straits TURKEY SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research. BG3614 A heritage.org there are an estimated 13,700 square miles of territory under illegal occupation in the Black Sea region. Moscow uses these occupations to exert influence in the region. l A secure Black Sea. The U.S. should promote policies in the Black Sea region that support regional security. This includes helping NATO members and partners in the Black Sea to bolster their own naval capabilities. A secure Black Sea region offers many economic, trade, and energy opportunities—and also encourages much-needed foreign investment in the region. l A self-governing Black Sea region. It is in America’s interests that Black Sea countries remain self-governing with little or no influence from outside or regional powers. This is particularly true of Russia’s malign influence and hybrid tactics in Georgia and Ukraine. Strong and stable governments resilient to outside influence are in America’s interest in the region. BACKGROUNDER | No. 3614 MAY 3, 2021 | 4 heritage.org Russian Dominance For Russia, domination of the Black Sea region has always been considered a matter of national survival. Russian Black Sea ports, being Russia’s only warm water ports, have always served the economic interests of Russia. For example, on the eve of World War I, 50 percent of all Russian exports and 90 percent of Russian agriculture exports, passed through the Bosphorus Strait out of the Black Sea.3 Today, an oil tanker passes through the Bosphorus out of the Black Sea every 15 minutes carrying Russian oil or Kazakh oil. (The latter, of course, transits Russia so that Moscow can collect transit fees.)4 Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was an unprecedented act of for- eign-state aggression in the 21st century. It was the first time since 1945 that borders in Europe had been changed using military force. The annexation has de facto cut Ukraine’s coastline in half and has helped Moscow with its long-term goal of turning the Black Sea into a Russian-controlled lake. Additionally, Russia has claimed rights to underwater resources off the Crimean Peninsula that previously belonged to Ukraine. Russia has taken steps to strengthen its grip on Crimea through a major effort at increasing capabilities, especially anti-access and area-denial (A2/ AD) capabilities. As the 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength notes: Russia has deployed 28,000 troops to Crimea and has embarked on a ma- jor program to build housing, restore airfields, and install new radars there. Deployment of the Monolit-B radar system, for instance, which has a passive range of 450 kilometers, “provides the Russian military with an excellent re- al-time picture of the positions of foreign surface vessels operating in the Black Sea.” In addition, “Russian equipment there includes 40 main battle tanks, 680 armored personnel carriers and 174 artillery systems of various kinds” along with 113 combat aircraft. In March 2019, Russia announced the deployment of nuclear-capable Tupolev Tu-22M3 strategic bombers to Gvardeyskoye air base in occupied Crimea.5 In addition, Russia has deployed five S-400 air defense systems with a potential range of around 250 miles to Crimea.6 Furthermore, “local capabilities have been strengthened by the Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) short-to-medium-range surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery weapons system, which particularly complements the S-400.”7 Russia also deploys the Bastion P coastal defenses armed with the P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missile, which “has a range of up to 185 miles and travels at nearly mach 2.5, making it extraordinarily difficult to defeat with kinetic means.”8 BACKGROUNDER | No. 3614 MAY 3, 2021 | 5 heritage.org The importance of the Black Sea for Russia goes beyond the region. Russia also uses Crimea as a springboard for military operations farther abroad, such as in Syria, Libya, and the Arabian Sea. This growing naval presence is being further underwritten by the late 2020 access deal to Port Sudan for up to four warships, effective through 2045, and includes allow- ance for nuclear-powered ship visits.9 For example, Russia has used its Black Sea presence in occupied Crimea to launch and support naval operations in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In the early days of Moscow’s intervention in Syria, the Moskva, a Rus- sian navy–guided missile cruiser, played a vital role in providing air defense for Russian forces.10 Hundreds of thousands of tons of grain and wheat have been shipped from Crimea to Syria to help the Assad regime’s food shortage problems.11 Hundreds of trips have been made between Crimea’s port city of Sevastopol and the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria, to transport military hardware and resupplies.12 It is worth pointing out that Crimea is not the only Russian occupation along the shores of the Black Sea.
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