Hastings Law Journal Volume 51 | Issue 1 Article 4 1-1999 Institutional Signals and Implicit Bargains in the ULP Strike Doctrine: Empirical Evidence of Law as Equilibrium Michael H. LeRoy Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Michael H. LeRoy, Institutional Signals and Implicit Bargains in the ULP Strike Doctrine: Empirical Evidence of Law as Equilibrium, 51 Hastings L.J. 171 (1999). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol51/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Institutional Signals and Implicit Bargains in the ULP Strike Doctrine: Empirical Evidence of Law as Equilibrium by MICHAEL H. LEROY* I. Introduction Law is not simply a prediction that preexists the sequential, hierarchical, and purposive interaction of institutions. It is, instead, a product of that interaction-an equilibrium, that is, a balance of competing institutional pressures. It is a stable equilibrium when no implementing institution is able to interpose1 a new view without being overridden by another institution. In a recent Harvard Law Review article, Professors William Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey offered a bold extension of legal process jurisprudence. Stripping away the pretense that "law is a closed system of objectively discoverable rules,"2 they focused on the judiciary's purposive political role as a coordinate branch of government: [L]aw is an equilibrium, a state of balance among competing forces or institutions.