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~ Election Season in Russia Published by the European Commission June 1996 newsg ~ Election season in Russia The December 1995 parliamentary elections in Russia left the in Moscow. As the campaigns got under way, the Democracy Communist Party holding a majority of the seats in the Duma. For programme intervened to fund a monitoring team from the the moment it is difficult to predict the long-term effects of the European Institute of the Media (EIM), which was seconded to result, but the picture should become clearer after June's even comment on the fairness and accuracy of media reporting of the more crucial presidential election process. Finally, election. What is clear, funding from the Tac is Bistro though , is that the Russian programme went to the voters turned out in large Democracy Elections Media numbers to participate in Organisation (DEMO) to help their country's second post- galvanise voter support prior perestroika elections. to the election. As Russia gears up for rts Election process goes next democratic test, Tacis under scrutiny news looks at the presidential HMCb! As with any election, the pre­ election and assesses the election phase was rife with impact of three Tacis-funded lltl&OPA NET IYAYUIErO debate about the final out­ campaigns, which were im­ come of the voting . One thing plemented in the run-up to "Wake up! Without your vote there is no future." was certain, though, and that and during the parliamentary was that we were going to elections. These already provide some important indicators for the see how far the democratic process had progressed since the running of the June elections and, more importantly, they confirm demise of the socialist system. that democracy is alive and well in the new Russia. The establishment of the EUEU provided much needed support In May 1995, the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in to the Central Electoral Committee (CEC). The EUEU 's interna­ Europe (OSCE) approached the European Commission for tional observers "had to assess whether the elections were support for their mandate to coordinate valuable election monitor - conducted in a free democratic atmosphere. This involved ing in its Member States. With the Russian Duma elections observing the pre-election phase, behaviour at the polling stations imminent, the European Commission responded wrth a substan­ and the process of collecting and counting the votes," said Gilbert tial commitment from the Tac is Democracy programme to finance Dubois, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European the establishment of the European Union's Electoral Unit (EUEU) Commission in Moscow. (continued on page 2 ..,._) In this issue Tacis Technical Office ... 6 Essential rail repairs ... 8 Moldova and more ... see inside opening windows of helping opportunity in St Petersburg food aid stay on \ . track and reach those in need 1 (..,. continued from page 1 ) Dubois explained: "It was a complex multi-form operation "Wake up, without your vote there is no future ... you decide on conducted under the wings of the OSCE with the Council of the 17th December" were distributed in strategic locations Europe and the European Parliament. " The Democracy around St Petersburg. programme's funding of ECU 349,000 made it possible to This clarion cry was used in all audio-visual material produced by ensure that the efforts of representatives from all groups involved DEMO. Two videos and six radio clips were given free air-time on could be consolidated and coordinated. It provided an equipped local television and radio stations to ensure that the message office, information tools and extensive expert advice to increase reached the widest audience possible. the efficiency and success of the operation. In addition, Tacis provided the CEC with experts to help analyse their structure Eye-to-eye: monitoring the media and performance, and to develop a voter and civic education The EIM's media monitoring team was based in Moscow and programme. "If it had not been for Tacis, the programme would backed by Tacis funds of ECU 90,000. Their purely non-political certainly have been somewhat limited in scope," said Dubois. remit included briefing and debriefing international observers, raising awareness of instances of unfair and unbalanced report­ More than 437 observers oversaw a sample of 703 polling ing, and judging standards of media coverage. stations in 68 out of the 225 electoral regions. There was almost unanimous agreement on the fairness of the voting procedure, Major economic interests had the power to "turn television stations particularly in light of the huge scale of the operation: 92,000 into instruments of propaganda," said the EIM . 'The media watch polling stations across 11 time zones. was complementary to the observation programme," said Dubois. Casting the vote "Its different viewpoint resulted in a more comprehensive picture of As the election campaigns were reaching their most crucial stage, the campaign scene." However, according to Jeremy Lester, who a distinct and widespread lack of enthusiasm among the Russian is responsible for the Tacis Democracy programme, "the results public was discernible. To help counter voter apathy, the Founda­ have shown that the role of television was far from decisive, and tion for the Development of Parliamentarism in Russia joined forces voters often applied their firsthand and local experience in deciding with DEMO to promote voter how to cast their ballots". He awareness in the final stages of the declared that "the experience of election campaign. The project the December parliamentary elec­ was centred around St Petersburg tions will certainly stand us in good and facilitated by ECU 73,000 of stead for the important presiden­ Bistro funding . tial elections in June 1996. A collaborative effort on the part of DEMO' s objective was very clear the international community - to persuade voters to make a clearly underlines the importance choice by taking up their right to attached to democracy and helps vote. Nearly one-third of likely to provide a more complete voters were undecided and ana­ picture of the election process." lysts forecasted that this group would be the crucial factor in the The conduct of the December final outcome of the election. An impressive 65 per cent of the Russian electorate took up their elections suggests that Russia is 'This bloc had the potential to democratic right to cast a vote for one of the 43 competing parties. adapting quickly to the demands swing the election in any direc­ of parliamentary democracy. tion," said Brian Whitmore, a 1995 Parliamentary Election Although there remain some political analyst working for .,.. Every Russian citizen over the age of 18 creases in the system and the citi­ DEMO. DEMO took on the task was eligible to vote . zens' understanding of their role of promoting objective informa­ .,.. The election could only be validated with a within that system, the Russian tion about the political situation voter turn-out of more than 25 per cent. people expressed their will clearly and all the political parties. .,.. The 1995 elections saw a 65 per cent turn­ and did so in large numbers. Whether June will see a summer "Certainly, among the young, out of the Russian electorate . blooming or wilting of democracy the overall mood was one of .,.. There were 43 competing parties . remains to be seen, but the mood apathy and a feeling that their .,.. 92,000 polling stations were set up, spanning among those involved at Tacis is vote did not matter," said 11 time zones. optimistic. Nicholas Lunt of Ogilvy Adams & Rinehart, who helped to launch Whatever the result, Tacis will be the St Petersburg voting campaign. This included a student contributing again. Election observation and media monitoring will conference and a rock concert (co-sponsored by the Dutch be the principal activities. Both before and after the elections, General Consulate) on 15 December, both of which were trans­ DEMO will be helping to involve more young people in the politi­ mitted on television in the two days prior to the election. Posters, cal culture of their country and to assist in the preparation of the leaflets and stickers proclaiming the campaign's clarion cry of next generation of political leaders. 2 ....,. Power to the pipelines A high-level working group, chaired by the European Commission and attended by representatives from the New Proved World Oil Reserves at end 1995 Independent States of the former Soviet Union, met in Brussels % Share of total on 17 -19 April of this year to discuss the complex issues relat­ ing to the NIS oil and gas pipeline networks. The working group, an initiative of the European Commission within the framework of the Tacis Programme, was formed •. ... .. ~ 0.7 0.2 following an agreement between the Prime Ministers and Ministers of the NIS at a conference on oil and gas pipeline management, held in Brussels in November 1995. In the pres­ ence of Commissioner Hans van den Broek, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed, which would provide for the formula­ World Oil Production in 1 995 tion of a working programme. It was envisaged that this working 967.4 programme would address as many of the key technical issues Million tonnes as possible, related to the construction, financing and operation 644.7 of the pipeline networks. It was also stressed that these networks must link the NIS themselves and provide producers 48.5 with the means of exporting directly to markets in the EU. 1l i i i i i - 7.0 The April meeting of the working group was attended by senior officials from NIS and Turkish government energy authorities and the oil and gas industry, international institutions, EU Member States and the European Commission. The group has been charged with carrying out an assessment of real energy World Oil Consumption in 1995 prospects for each country, realistic export targets which could 958.4 845.2 Million tonnes be achieved by the year 2010, and the requisite legal conditions which need to be established in order to promote regional energy trade.
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