DOCSLIB.ORG

Turkey, NATO & and Nuclear Sharing: Prospects After NATO's Lisbon

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Turkey, NATO & and Nuclear Sharing: Prospects After NATO's Lisbon Arms Control Association (ACA) British American Security Information Council (BASIC) Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) Nuclear Policy Paper No. 5 April 2011 1 Mustafa Kibaroglu Turkey, NATO & and Nuclear Sharing: Prospects after NATO's Lisbon Summit In the run-up to the Lisbon summit meeting of NATO on November 19-20, 2010, where the new Strategic Concept of the alliance was adopted, the status of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in five European countries, namely Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey was a significant topic of debate, and remains so afterwards. Some have suggested the speedy withdrawal of these weapons while others have endorsed their extended stay on the continent for as long as there are nuclear threats to the alliance.2 Turkey, as a host, has long been supportive changes in the deployment of theater of retaining U.S. nuclear weapons on its nuclear weapons in other NATO states is territory for various reasons and also more doubtful. expected others to continue to deploy these weapons as part of the burden sharing and This being the case for the allied countries solidarity principles of the alliance. Turkey in general, and from Turkey’s perspective in believes that the presence of U.S. nuclear particular, this paper will present primarily weapons in Europe strengthens the U.S. the views in the political, diplomatic, and commitment to transatlantic security, and military circles in Turkey with respect to the contributes to the credibility of the extended prolonged deployment of the U.S. tactical deterrent. It therefore maintains a policy nuclear weapons on Turkish soil. It that implicitly supports deployment in concludes that Turkey, preferably together Turkey, one that has remained the same for with other NATO members, should take the decades, and continues under the current initiative in asking the United States to draw Justice and Development Party (known as them down and remove them entirely, in the AKP, for its Turkish acronym) government. interests of Turkish security and alliance Whether it would survive significant cohesion. Nuclear Policy Paper No. 5 - Kibaroglu – Turkey, NATO & and Nuclear Sharing page 1 Turkey’s official stance toward the location, the Incirlik base near Adana on the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on its eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey.5 All soil other nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from the bases mentioned above. Moreover, It is not the practice of NATO members to the Turkish Air Force no longer has any discuss nuclear deployments in Europe; operational link with the remaining tactical details remain classified. Even the identity nuclear weapons deployed at Incirlik.6 F- of host states is a secret, so there are 104s have not been in service since 1994. F- inevitable tensions for any politician to 4s are still in service after modernization of admit to such deployments. But Turkey has some 54 of them by Israeli Aerospace unique sensitivities that have prevented Industries in 1997. Yet, only the F-16 discussion even in private of its hosting of “Fighting Falcons” of the Turkish Air Force U.S. nuclear warheads. Turkey’s stance is participate in NATO’s nuclear strike largely unchanged since the first U.S. exercises known as “Steadfast Noon,” nuclear weapons were deployed in Turkey during which crews are trained in loading, 3 in February 1959. unloading and employing B61 tactical nuclear weapons. The Turkish aircraft in Profile of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey these exercises serve as a non-nuclear air By the mid-1980s, “the United States [had] defense escort rather than a nuclear strike 7 store[d] some 500 nuclear warheads in force. Turkey, and as many as 300 of them [were] Significance of nuclear weapons for Turkey bombs for aircraft. U.S. nuclear bombs [were] stored at four airbases—Eskisehir, Even in the absence of an imminent nuclear Murted, Erhac, and Balikesir—for use by threat to Turkey’s security, the view among four Turkish Air Force units. The Turkish both civilian and military Turkish security squadrons consisting of nuclear-certified elites does not seem to have changed since aircraft as F-104s, F-4s, and F-100s, [were] the Cold War. One explanation for the armed with four types of bombs with yields uniformity of their views lies in the prestige up to a couple of hundred kilotons. The U.S. attributed to nuclear weapons. There are Army also [had] nuclear weapons in specific reasons that explain why Turkish Turkey, [which were] allocated for support government officials and civilian and of the Turkish First and Third Armies. military bureaucrats want to retain U.S. Custodian detachments at Cakmakli, nuclear weapons on Turkey’s soil, first and Ortakoy, Corlu, Izmit, and Erzurum store[d] foremost being the perceived threat from the about 190 warheads for obsolete 1950s- still uncertain international security vintage Turkish Army Honest John short- environment. Turkish government officials’ range missile launchers (four battalions) and views were expressed (in not-for-attribution 4 32 eight-inch guns.” notes) as follows: Turkey still hosts U.S. tactical nuclear “Nuclear weapons continue to preserve their weapons on its territory, albeit in much critical importance for the security of the smaller numbers. They are limited to one [North Atlantic] alliance, yet they are page 2 Nuclear Policy Paper No. 5 - Kibaroglu – Turkey, NATO & and Nuclear Sharing regarded more as political weapons. Our potent symbol of Turkey’s belonging to the country is committed to the vision of a West and the U.S. nuclear weapons world free of nuclear weapons, and thus we stationed in Turkey have been seen, in this support every effort in that direction. … respect, as a symbol of Turkey’s privileged Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that status within NATO. In this context, there is attaining such a goal will not be possible an unexpressed fear that an American any time soon, and that more time and decision to withdraw nuclear weapons from patience will be needed to realize this Turkey could weaken Turkey’s position objective. Hence, so long as these weapons within the alliance, and hence undermine to do still exist in other parts of the world, it is an extent the attraction of NATO member- indispensible for NATO to preserve a safe, ship in the minds of many. This perspective secure, and effective nuclear arsenal that remained prevalent in the higher echelons of will be capable of deterring all sorts of the Turkish state mechanism through enemies in order to ensure the security of all dozens of governments formed by various of its allies. … [In NATO’s new Strategic political parties coming from different ideo- Concept] our country want[ed] to see an logical dispositions and diverse worldviews explicit confirmation of the commitment [of for half a century. It has been so even with the alliance] to the preservation of an the AKP in power since 2002, which has effective and credible deterrent by way of brought a new approach to Turkish foreign maintaining a combination of conventional policy making by opening many of the and nuclear weapons capability. In addition taboo-like issues to public debate. The AKP to that, our determination for the government has taken a series of bold and preservation of the transatlantic link and courageous steps in Turkey’s long- solidarity as well as fair risk and burden established security strategies, such as the sharing to continue to constitute the Cyprus issue as well as the relations with fundamental principles of the nuclear Middle Eastern neighbors in particular, in a- strategy of the alliance will persist.”8 ccordance with the “zero conflict” doctrine, which is a brainchild of the current Foreign The above quote emphasizes that while Minister Ahmed Davutoglu. Notwith- Turkey supports nuclear disarmament, in standing its reformist attitude toward many the foreseeable future it wants to maintain traditional foreign policy issues of Turkey, nuclear weapons on its soil for both security the AKP government as well has preferred 9 and political reasons. to shy away from displaying its well-known pragmatism in the area of U.S. nuclear Logic behind deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons that are stationed in Turkey. weapons in Turkey The decision to deploy nuclear weapons in There is, indeed, a very simple logic Turkey was first taken at the North Atlantic connecting Turkey’s membership within Council meeting of the alliance during the NATO and the deployment of U.S. nuclear Paris summit in December 1957. At that weapons on its territory. For a long time, the time, there was the right-wing and conser- Turkish political and security elite10 has vative Democratic Party (known as DP, for viewed Turkey’s NATO membership as a Nuclear Policy Paper No. 5 - Kibaroglu – Turkey, NATO & and Nuclear Sharing page 3 its Turkish acronym) government under the This all ensured that politicians focused Premiership of Adnan Menderes, which upon issues that were related to the most came to power with the first multi-party immediate concerns of the ruling elite, such general elections in the country in 1950 and as strengthening the economy and consolidated its government with the maintaining order in the country. Strategic following general elections in 1955. Prime matters, such as the hosting of U.S. nuclear Minister Menderes was said to be lukewarm missiles (Jupiters) or the atomic bombs to the idea of deploying nuclear weapons in stationed in several bases all over Turkey, Turkey, possibly due to the possible were left to the military and maybe a negative consequences of such a decision handful of civilian experts who had no for Turkey in its relations with the Soviet desire whatsoever to discuss these issues Union, which had expressed its oppo- publicly, for fear of losing control.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • NATO and the Frameworks of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
    NATO and the Frameworks of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament: Challenges for the for 10th and Disarmament: Challenges Conference NPT Review Non-proliferation of Nuclear and the Frameworks NATO Research Paper Tim Caughley, with Yasmin Afina International Security Programme | May 2020 NATO and the Frameworks of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Challenges for the 10th NPT Review Conference Tim Caughley, with Yasmin Afina with Yasmin Caughley, Tim Chatham House Contents Summary 2 1 Introduction 3 2 Background 5 3 NATO and the NPT 8 4 NATO: the NPT and the TPNW 15 5 NATO and the TPNW: Legal Issues 20 6 Conclusions 24 About the Authors 28 Acknowledgments 29 1 | Chatham House NATO and the Frameworks of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Summary • The 10th five-yearly Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) was due to take place in April–May 2020, but has been postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. • In force since 1970 and with 191 states parties, the NPT is hailed as the cornerstone of a rules-based international arms control and non-proliferation regime, and an essential basis for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. But successive review conferences have been riven by disagreement between the five nuclear weapon states and many non-nuclear weapon states over the appropriate way to implement the treaty’s nuclear disarmament pillar. • Although the number of nuclear weapons committed to NATO defence has been reduced by over 90 per cent since the depths of the Cold War, NATO nuclear weapon states, and their allies that depend on the doctrine of extended nuclear deterrence for their own defence, favour continued retention of the remaining nuclear weapons until the international security situation is conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkey, NATO & and Nuclear Sharing
    Arms Control Association (ACA) British American Security Information Council (BASIC) Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) Nuclear Policy Paper No. 5 April 2011 1 Mustafa Kibaroglu Turkey, NATO & and Nuclear Sharing: Prospects after NATO's Lisbon Summit In the run-up to the Lisbon summit meeting of NATO on November 19-20, 2010, where the new Strategic Concept of the alliance was adopted, the status of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in five European countries, namely Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey was a significant topic of debate, and remains so afterwards. Some have suggested the speedy withdrawal of these weapons while others have endorsed their extended stay on the continent for as long as there are nuclear threats to the alliance.2 Turkey, as a host, has long been supportive changes in the deployment of theater of retaining U.S. nuclear weapons on its nuclear weapons in other NATO states is territory for various reasons and also more doubtful. expected others to continue to deploy these weapons as part of the burden sharing and This being the case for the allied countries solidarity principles of the alliance. Turkey in general, and from Turkey’s perspective in believes that the presence of U.S. nuclear particular, this paper will present primarily weapons in Europe strengthens the U.S. the views in the political, diplomatic, and commitment to transatlantic security, and military circles in Turkey with respect to the contributes to the credibility of the extended prolonged deployment of the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO and Nuclear Disarmament
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization www.nato.int/factsheets Factsheet October 2020 NATO and Nuclear Disarmament NATO Allies are strongly committed to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, which play an important role in preserving peace in the Euro-Atlantic region. NATO actively contributes to effective and verifiable nuclear disarmament efforts through its policies and activities, and the commitments of its member countries. Allies recognise the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery, by state and non-state actors. NATO designs its partnership programmes to provide effective frameworks for dialogue, consultation, and coordination on a wide range of arms control-related issues, including nuclear disarmament. NATO’s Role in Nuclear Disarmament Disarmament is the act of eliminating or abolishing weapons, either unilaterally or reciprocally. It may refer either to reducing and limiting the number and types of arms, or to eliminating entire categories of weapons. NATO’s policies in this field support consultation and practical cooperation on nuclear policy issues, including arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. NATO supports and facilitates policy-making among members, and consultations with partners and other countries, and aids in the implementation of international obligations. All NATO Allies are parties to the most important of the global treaties on WMD, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. NATO consults and cooperates with relevant international organizations, including the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the European Union.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO Nuclear Deterrence
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization www.nato.int/factsheets Factsheet February 2020 NATO Nuclear Deterrence Nuclear deterrence has been at the core of NATO’s collective defence for 70 years. In an uncertain world, nuclear weapons continue to play a critical role in NATO’s deterrence and defence. The purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. Nuclear weapons are unique, and the circumstances in which NATO might contemplate the use of them are extremely remote. However, if the fundamental security of any Ally were to be threatened, NATO has the capabilities and resolve to defend itself – including with nuclear weapons. NATO is committed to creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in line with Allies’ commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of nuclear weapons available to NATO in UK MOD - Crown Copyright Europe has been reduced dramatically, by around 90 percent. However, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance and Allies will continue to take all steps necessary to ensure NATO’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and effective. Nuclear Forces Three NATO members - the United States, France and the United Kingdom – have nuclear weapons. The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the Alliance’s security. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. NATO’s nuclear deterrence also relies on US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and supporting capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies.
    [Show full text]
  • Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture
    Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE 1776 Eye St, NW | Suite 600 | Washington DC 20006 www.nti.org Steve Andreasen, Isabelle Williams, Brian Rose, @NTI_WMD Hans M. Kristensen, and Simon Lunn www.facebook.com/nti.org Foreword by Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn ABOUT THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE The Nuclear Threat Initiative works to protect our lives, environment, and quality of life now and for future generations. We work to prevent catastrophic attacks with weapons of mass destruction and disruption (WMDD)—nuclear, biological, radiological, chemical, and cyber. Founded in 2001 by former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and philanthropist Ted Turner, who continue to serve as co-chairs, NTI is guided by a prestigious, international board of directors. Ernest J. Moniz serves as chief executive officer and co-chair; Des Browne is vice chair; and Joan Rohlfing serves as president. www.nti.org Cover: A Dutch F-16 takes off from Leeuwarden Airbase in the Netherlands in 2011. PHOTO BY ROBIN UTRECHT/AFP/GETTY IMAGES Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture Steve Andreasen Isabelle Williams Brian Rose Hans M. Kristensen Simon Lunn Foreword by Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn January 2018 The views expressed in this publication are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of NTI, its Board of Directors, or other institutions with which the authors are associated. © 2018 Nuclear Threat Initiative All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission of the publisher and copyright holder.
    [Show full text]
  • The Future of US Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Implications for NATO
    The Future of U.S. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Implications for NATO Drifting Toward the Foreseeable Future Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ph.D. A report prepared in accordance with the requirements of the 2005-06 NATO Manfred Wörner Fellowship for NATO Public Diplomacy Division 31 October 2006 UNCLASSIFIED US NSNW and Implications for NATO Larsen ii US NSNW and Implications for NATO Larsen Table of Contents List of Figures vii List of Tables vii Foreword ix Methodology x Disclaimer x Executive Summary xi I. Introduction 1 Background to Today’s Situation 2 Defining Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 6 Findings 8 II. Historical Background 11 Historical Summary of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe 12 Recurrent Themes in Alliance Nuclear History 16 Modernization Episodes in Europe 21 The Nuclear Planning Group 22 The High Level Group 23 The Montebello Decision and SNF Modernization 25 The End of the Cold War 27 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives 30 Russian Response to the PNIs 33 Arms Control and Relations with Russia in the 1990s 35 Key Nuclear Documents 37 Summary 38 III. Is There a Future for Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons? 39 Recent Developments 40 Current Status of NSNW in States of Interest 42 United States 42 Russia 46 Issues Regarding NSNW 48 Arguments For and Against Future Roles for NSNW 49 Arguments For 49 Arguments Against 50 Future Roles for Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 51 Political 51 Extended Deterrence 51 Arms Control 52 Military 52 Escalation Dominance 52 Target Coverage 53 Counter NBC 54 Supporting the Strategic Nuclear Arsenal 54 Robustness 54 iii US NSNW and Implications for NATO Larsen Hedging 54 Summary 55 IV.
    [Show full text]
  • US Nuclear Weapons in the Netherlands: a First Appraisal
    US Nuclear Weapons in the Netherlands: A First Appraisal nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2021-01-15/us-nuclear-weapons-netherlands-first-appraisal January 7, 2021 1/22 During the Cold War, Dutch units had responsibility for nuclear-capable Honest John rockets that were deployed in West Germany. This is an Honest John on display in the National Military Museum at the site of the former airbase at Soesterberg. (Photo from Wikipedia Commons). Published: Jan 15, 2021 Briefing Book #736 Edited by Cees Wiebes and William Burr For more information, contact: 202-994-7000 or [email protected] January 1960 Agreement Led to Nuclear Sharing Arrangements Public Access to Key Historical Records in Doubt after Dutch Courts Affirm Secrecy Regime for U.S. Nukes Washington, D.C., January 15, 2021 – The stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe remains a controversial issue on both sides of the Atlantic. One of the less well- known cases involves the Netherlands, which first accepted atomic weapons shortly after the two governments signed a secret stockpile agreement in January 1960. That accord is part of a compilation of declassified documents posted today – most for the first time – by the National Security Archive. 2/22 That the U.S. has authorized deployments to numerous NATO states is one of those secrets everybody knows – Dutch former Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers acknowledged the facts of the matter involving his own country in 2013. Nevertheless, the arrangements are an official secret, as is the number of weapons currently in the Netherlands, and obtaining access to the historical record is a major challenge for historians.
    [Show full text]
  • Withdrawal Issues What NATO Countries Say About the Future of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe
    Withdrawal Issues What NATO countries say about the future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe Susi Snyder & Wilbert van der Zeijden March 2011 Acronyms used in this report DCA- dual capable aircraft NAC- North Atlantic Council NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NPG- Nuclear Planning Group NPT- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty WS3- Weapons Storage and Security System TNW- tactical nuclear weapons NoNukes is IKV Pax Christi’s campaign for a world free of nuclear weapons. IKV Pax Christi is the joint peace organization of the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) and Pax Christi Netherlands. We work for peace, reconciliation and justice in the world. We join with people in conflict areas to work on a peaceful and democratic society. We enlist the aid of people in the Netherlands who, like IKV Pax Christi, want to work for political solutions to crises and armed conflicts. IKV Pax Christi combines knowledge, energy and people to attain one single objective: there must be peace! The NoNukes campaign informs, mobilizes and speaks out for nuclear disarmament. We do so through research, publications, political and public advocacy. The written contents of this booklet may be quoted or reproduced, provided that the source of the information is acknowledged. IKV Pax Christi would like to receive a copy of the document in which this report is quoted. You can stay informed about NoNukes publications and activities by subscribing to our newsletter. To subscribe, or to receive additional copies of this report, please send your request to [email protected]. Authors Susi Snyder is the Nuclear Disarmament Programme Leader for IKV Pax Christi.
    [Show full text]
  • ITALY's NUCLEAR CHOICES Leopoldo Nuti
    UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 25 (January / Enero 2011) ISSN 1696-2206 ITALY’S NUCLEAR CHOICES Leopoldo Nuti 1 University of Roma Tre Abstract: Italy’s military nuclear policy throughout the Cold War was an attempt to foster the country’s aspirations to a position of parity among the other European powers. The issue of its own rank and collocation in the international hierarchy of powers had been central in its foreign policy since the birth of the country, and the new generation of politicians that shaped Italian foreign policy after the Second World was no less aware of this critical factor than their predecessors. The nuclearization of NATO made it inevitable that only those countries which had access to nuclear weapons would ultimately make the crucial decisions for the future of the alliance. The Italian government reached the conclusion that its only way to a nuclear status of some sorts would be through a close cooperation with NATO and the USA. Between 1955 and 1959, the acceptance of US nuclear weapons on Italian soil eventually evolved into a pattern that formed the basis for Italian nuclear policies for the next 10 years or so. Italy was very reluctant to ratify the NPT and this led to a strong behind the scenes alliance with the other main Western European opponents, the Federal Republic of Germany and a wide ranging series of contacts with all the other possible opponents to the treaty, from Japan to India. In 1979, Italy accepted the new Euromissiles on its territory. Again, Italy considered nuclear weapons as its winning card and the tool has to be used to shorten the gap with the other major European partners.
    [Show full text]
  • December 2020 © Author, December 2020
    ͳͳͲ BELGIUM SHOULD NOT CHANGE STRATEGY ON HER CONTRIBUTION TO NATO’S NUCLEAR ROLE SHARING DIDIER AUDENAERT ʹͲʹͲ ABOUT THE AUTHOR Col. (Ret.) Didier Audenaert is a Senior Associate Fellow at the Egmont – Royal Insti- tute for International Relations in Brussels. Previously, he served for 4 years as NATO expert advisor at Belgian Foreign Affairs and before that for 6 years as Defence Coun- sellor to the Belgian NATO Delegation. He also worked for almost 4 years at NATO Defense College. ABOUT THE EGMONT PAPERS The Egmont Papers are published by Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations. Founded in 1947 by eminent Belgian political leaders, Egmont is an inde- pendent think-tank based in Brussels. Its interdisciplinary research is conducted in a spirit of total academic freedom. A platform of quality information, a forum for debate and analysis, a melting pot of ideas in the field of international politics, Egmont’s ambition – through its publications, seminars and recommendations – is to make a useful contribution to the decision-making process. Table of Contents Introduction / Executive summary . 2 Many challenges in the European security environment . 2 NATO’s deterrence: aggression of any kind is not a rational option . 3 NATO’s “collective defence”: one for all and all for one . 4 Allies remain committed to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament . 5 NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) . 6 NATO’s Nuclear Forces. 6 1. “La France ne dépend d’aucune autre puissance pour ce qui est de sa sécurité” . 7 2. UK: “a nuclear deterrent to autonomously protect the UK”.
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Deterrence in Europe: Points of Convergence, Singularities and Prospects for Cooperation
    Nuclear deterrence in Europe: points of convergence, singularities and prospects for cooperation Recherches & Documents N°04/2021 Emmanuelle Maitre Research fellow, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique January 2021 www.frstrategie.org CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 1 1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE: A CONTRASTING PICTURE .................................................. 2 1.1. Different positions and singularities .................................................................. 2 1.2. An accepted role for NATO’s extended deterrence .......................................... 3 1.2.1. A policy that is regularly formalised and debated .............................................. 3 1.2.2. Capabilities inside and outside Europe ............................................................. 4 1.3. Growing reflection on the contribution of independent nuclear arsenals to European defence ............................................................................................... 5 2. SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENTS TO PERPETUATE CAPABILITIES IN A REMODELLED STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT .......................................................................................................................... 6 2.1. Participation in NATO's nuclear mission: a significant investment for some allies ..................................................................................................................... 7 2.2. Renewing
    [Show full text]
  • Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey
    By Mustafa Kibaroglu Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey ATO is revising its Strategic Concept; 1960s, to the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil. the alliance is due to complete work The issue is contentious within NATO, which makes its decisions by consen- on the document in November. A key sus—an approach that was reaffirmed by N the alliance’s foreign ministers at an April issue in the revision is the deployment of U.S. meeting in Tallinn, Estonia, and by an Experts Group report released in May. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as part of the Although final decisions on the de- ployment of U.S. nuclear weapons prob- alliance’s policy of extended nuclear deterrence. ably are not imminent, the debate has already been joined, and Turkey should Although Turkey has long been in agreement be an active participant. If Turkey con- tinues to sit on the sidelines of that with its allies on the value of these forward de- debate, as it has done until now, it could find itself in an uncomfortable spot: A ployments, it may soon find itself in a delicate decision to remove the U.S. weapons from Belgium, Germany, and the Neth- position on the question of how to continue the erlands would likely leave Turkey and policy effectively. Italy as the only NATO members with foreign nuclear weapons on their soil.1 Such a situation would put pressure on Turkey to reverse its long-standing policy of hosting U.S. nuclear weapons With other NATO countries such as drawal of U.S.
    [Show full text]