By Mustafa Kibaroglu

Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in

ATO is revising its Strategic Concept; 1960s, to the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil. the alliance is due to complete work The issue is contentious within NATO, which makes its decisions by consen- on the document in November. A key sus—an approach that was reaffirmed by N the alliance’s foreign ministers at an April issue in the revision is the deployment of U.S. meeting in Tallinn, Estonia, and by an Experts Group report released in May. tactical nuclear weapons in as part of the Although final decisions on the de- ployment of U.S. nuclear weapons prob- alliance’s policy of extended nuclear deterrence. ably are not imminent, the debate has already been joined, and Turkey should Although Turkey has long been in agreement be an active participant. If Turkey con- tinues to sit on the sidelines of that with its allies on the value of these forward de- debate, as it has done until now, it could find itself in an uncomfortable spot: A ployments, it may soon find itself in a delicate decision to remove the U.S. weapons from , , and the Neth- position on the question of how to continue the erlands would likely leave Turkey and policy effectively. as the only NATO members with foreign nuclear weapons on their soil.1 Such a situation would put pressure on Turkey to reverse its long-standing policy of hosting U.S. nuclear weapons With other NATO countries such as drawal of U.S. weapons from Europe, on its territory—even more so if the

10 Luxembourg and Norway supporting Turkish decision-makers might conclude U.S. nuclear weapons are removed from

20 them, Belgium, Germany, and the Neth- that two fundamental principles of the Italy as well. Turkey’s calculus must erlands have indicated a desire to reassess alliance, namely solidarity and burden include an additional element because the case for continued deployment of sharing, have been seriously weakened. it has Middle Eastern neighbors that U.S. nuclear weapons on their territories. Those principles have been the basis are a source of concern to some allies ODAY June ODAY

T Should these countries advocate with- for Turkey’s agreement, since the early but with whom Turkey is developing

Mustafa Kibaroglu teaches courses on arms control and disarmament in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. He has held fellowships at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Center for Nonprolif-

ARMS CONTROL eration Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 8 increasingly close diplomatic ties after a the challenges and threats that the allied nuclear strategy of the alliance, Secretary- long period of animosity that extended countries are facing now and are likely to General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has said beyond the end of Cold rivalry. confront in the future. that, “in a world where nuclear weapons The most sensible course for Turkey is The Strategic Concept has therefore exist, NATO needs a credible, effective to support the efforts of other host na- been under revision since the alliance and safely managed deterrent.”4 tions to create a consensus within the summit convened in Strasbourg/Kehl, That statement suggests that nuclear alliance that would lead to a withdrawal on April 3-4, 2009. At the summit meet- weapons are likely to retain their central of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. ing, NATO heads of state and govern- role in NATO’s forthcoming Strategic That step would help Ankara to con- ment tasked the secretary-general with Concept. That would satisfy Turkey’s ex- tinue cultivating relationships with its assembling and leading a broad-based pectations; Ankara is looking for the con- non-European neighbors and could be group of qualified experts who would tinuation of extended deterrence, which achieved without undermining extended lay the groundwork for the new Strategic has traditionally relied on U.S. nuclear nuclear deterrence. Concept with the active involvement of weapons deployed in Europe. ARCTIC OCEAN NATO’s highest decision-making body, Nevertheless, the positions of the Euro- NATO’s New Strategic Concept the North Atlantic Council.2 The report, pean allies are not fully compatible with Since 1999, when NATO last revised its “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic that of Turkey. Some western European Strategic Concept, the world has under- Engagement,” was released May 17. allies have expressed strong reserva- gone dramatic changes and witnessed The details of the new Strategic Con- tions about the presence of U.S. nuclear tragic events, such as the September 11 cept are not yet final, but the Experts weapons on their territories, while some terrorist attacks on the , Group report and media accounts of the central and eastern European allies still followed by others in Bali, Istanbul, ongoing deliberations give an idea of support the deployment of these weapons Madrid, London, and Amman. Since the general principles that are likely to in Europe as a visible sign of U.S. security the September 11 attacks, NATO, while govern the new document. For instance, guarantees for Europe. maintaining its identity as a collective during their April 22-23 meeting in The foreign ministers of Belgium, security organization, has accelerated Tallinn, Estonia, NATO foreign minis- Germany, Luxembourg, the Nether- the pace at which it is transforming ters discussed ways to modernize the lands, and Norway stated in a February itself from one focused on defending a organization and held talks on the new 26 letter to Rasmussen that they “wel- particular geographical area against a Strategic Concept. In those discussions, come the initiative taken by President well-known enemy to one that would be they shared the view that “the new Obama to strive toward substantial capable of dealing with emerging threats concept must reaffirm NATO’s essential reductions in strategic armaments, and such as international terrorism, which and enduring foundations: the politi- to move towards reducing the role of may manifest itself in different forms cal bond between Europe and North nuclear weapons and seek and se- and almost anywhere in the world. America, and the commitment to defend curity in a world without nuclear weap- This process of transformation within each other against attack,” according to ons.”5 The letter emphasized that there NATO has called into question the rel- a NATO press release.3 should be discussions in NATO as to evance of the 1999 Strategic Concept to More specifically, concerning the what the allies “can do to move closer

Istanbul ATLANTIC Ankara Turkey

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A U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter jet prepares to land at in November 2001.

to this overall political objective.”6 which was negotiated prior to the admit- ish F-100, F-104, and F-4 “Phantom” Some central and eastern European tance of the Czech Republic, , aircraft at air bases in Eskisehir, Malatya allies of NATO attach great importance to and Poland to NATO, the alliance declared (Erhac), Ankara (Akinci/Murted), and the continuation of the extended nuclear it had “no intention, no plan and no Balikesir.12 All such weapons, whether on deterrence strategy of the alliance and reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the U.S. or Turkish aircraft, have been under the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear territory of new members, nor any need to the custody of the U.S. Air Force. weapons, which they consider to provide change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear pos- Turkey still hosts these U.S. tactical credible assurances against the potential ture or nuclear policy.”10 Hence, it would nuclear weapons on its territory, albeit threat that they perceive from .7 be fair to assume that if nuclear weapons in much smaller numbers.13 They are There is unanimous support for includ- are withdrawn from Belgium, Germany, limited to one location, the Incirlik ing tactical nuclear weapons in the next and the , there are no new base near Adana on the eastern Medi- round of nuclear arms control, and there candidates to take them. terranean coast of Turkey.14 All other are also views suggesting concomitant Should this be the case, Turkey might nuclear weapons have been withdrawn withdrawal of all Russian and U.S. tactical have to revise its stance vis-à-vis the U.S. from the bases mentioned above.15 nuclear weapons from Europe.8 nuclear weapons on its soil.11 Moreover, the no lon- However, even the central and eastern ger has any operational link with the

10 European countries that favor the con- U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey remaining tactical nuclear weapons 16

20 tinuation of nuclear sharing do not want Turkey has hosted U.S. nuclear weapons deployed at Incirlik. F-104s have not to commit themselves to any obligation since intermediate-range Jupiter mis- been in service since 1994. F-4s are still to host U.S. nuclear weapons on their ter- siles were deployed there in 1961 as a in service after modernization of some ritories.9 This was, in fact, an agreed-on result of decisions made at the alliance’s 54 of them by Israeli Aerospace Indus- ODAY June ODAY

T principle within the alliance at the time 1957 Paris summit. Those missiles were tries in 1997. Yet, only the F-16 “Fight- of their admission so as not to provoke withdrawn in 1963 in the aftermath of ing Falcons” of the Turkish air force Russia, which was adamantly opposing the Cuban missile crisis. Since then, no participate in NATO`s nuclear strike ex- the eastward expansion of the alliance nuclear missiles have been stationed in ercises known as “Steadfast Noon,” dur- throughout the 1990s and beyond. Turkey. The only nuclear weapons that ing which crews are trained in loading,

ARMS CONTROL According to the terms of agreement of have been deployed are the bombs that unloading, and employing B61 tactical the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, would be delivered by U.S. F-16s or Turk- nuclear weapons.17 The Turkish aircraft 10 in these exercises serve as a non-nuclear be diluted. To live up to their commit- still face a dilemma in its foreign and se- air defense escort rather than a nuclear ment to solidarity, which was reaffirmed curity policies if it sees the hosting of U.S. strike force.18 in Tallinn, the five countries that cur- nuclear weapons as the only way for it to There were two main reasons for Tur- rently host these weapons should con- fulfill its burden-sharing obligations. key to host U.S. nuclear weapons. First tinue to do so for the foreseeable future, Ankara’s continuing support for the and foremost has been the deterrent the official said.20 presence of the U.S. weapons on Turkish

Ankara’s continuing support for the presence of the U.S. weapons on Turkish territory could be justified only if there were a threat from the capabilities of Turkey’s neighbors…and if the Western allies shared that threat assessment.

value of these weapons against the threat Deterrence Against Whom? territory could be justified only if there posed by the nuclear and conventional Because of the view that NATO’s deter- were a threat from the military capabili- weapons capabilities of its enormous rent will be more credible with the pres- ties of Turkey’s neighbors, the two most neighbor, the , during the ence of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear significant of which would be Iran and . Similarly, after the Cold War, weapons in the allied territories in Eu- Syria, and if the Western allies shared that these weapons were believed by Turk- rope, Turkish diplomats believe that the threat assessment. There can be no other ish military commanders to constitute a burden of hosting these weapons should meaningful scenario that would justify credible deterrent against rival neighbors continue to be shared collectively Turkey’s policy of retaining U.S. nuclear in the Middle East, such as Iran, Iraq, and among five allies, as has been the case weapons on its territory as well as leaving Syria, which used to have unconvention- over the last several decades. the door open for the deployment of U.S. al weapons capabilities as well as delivery Even if all of Turkey’s allies accept this missile defenses in Turkey in the future. vehicles such as ballistic missiles.19 proposal and act accordingly, Turkey will Recent trends, however, appear to be A second reason for Turkey to host U.S. nuclear weapons has been the burden- sharing principle within the alliance. Turkey has strongly subscribed to this principle since it joined NATO in 1952. In fact, Turkey had already displayed un- equivocally its willingness to share the burden of defending the interests of the Western alliance by committing a signifi- cant number of troops to the Korean War in 1950, even before NATO membership was in sight. Yet, if Turkey is likely to be left as the only country, or one of only two countries, where U.S. nuclear weapons ARMS CONTROL TODAY June will still be deployed after a possible withdrawal of these weapons from other allies and no other NATO country will be willing to assume the burden of hosting nuclear weapons, Turkey may very well insist that the weapons be sent back to the United States. From Turkey’s current

standpoint, this would not be the desired NATO outcome of the current deliberations 20 within the alliance. At an April 22 press conference in Tallinn, Estonia, NATO Secretary-General 10 According to a Turkish official, the Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that “in a world where nuclear weapons exist, NATO principle of burden sharing should not needs a credible, effective and safely managed deterrent.” 11 with the participation of experts, scholars, officials, and other concerned citizens. There is a common belief in Turkey that the U.S. weapons constitute a credible deterrent against threats such as Iran’s nuclear program and the possible further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region in response to Tehran’s program. Others contend that if Turkey sends the weapons back to the United States and Iran subsequently develops nuclear weap- ons, Turkey will have to develop its own such weapons. These observers argue that even though they are against the deploy- ment of U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkish soil in principle, the weapons’ presence in the country will keep Turkey away from such adventurous policies.23 Similar AFP/Getty Images AFP/Getty views have also been expressed by foreign experts and analysts who are concerned about Turkey’s possible reactions to the developments in Iran’s nuclear capabilities in case U.S. nuclear weapons are with- Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu speaks during a press conference in drawn from Turkish territory.24 Istanbul May 18, a day after signing an agreement in Tehran with his Brazilian and Iranian counterparts on Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium. The negative effects of the weapons deployments on Turkish-Iranian relations need to be assessed as well. Some Iranian moving from such a threat assessment by the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A key part security analysts even argue that the Turkey. Over the last few years, Turkey has of this regional involvement is mediation deployment of the weapons on Turkish experienced an unprecedented rapproche- efforts between Israel and Syria. Another territory makes Turkey a “nuclear-weapon ment with its Middle Eastern neighbors. element is a willingness to take on a simi- state.”25 There is, therefore, the possibility Last year, Turkey held joint ministerial lar role in Iran’s dispute with the inter- that the presence of the weapons could cabinet meetings with Iraq in October and national community over the nature and actually spur Iranian nuclear weapons Syria in December. Until recently, Turkey scope of Tehran’s nuclear program, which efforts. This issue may well be exploited had treated both countries as foes rather is generally considered by Turkey’s NATO by the Iranian leadership to justify the than friends. These meetings have pro- allies to have the potential for weaponiza- country’s continuing investments in more duced a significant number of protocols, tion and thus further proliferation in the ambitious nuclear capabilities. memoranda of understanding, and other region. Top Turkish political and military documents on a wide array of issue areas officials have suggested on various occa- Conclusion including the thorniest subjects, such as sions that the most promising way out A key question for NATO’s new Strategic ways and means of dealing with terrorism of the conflict in the longer term would Concept is whether burden sharing will effectively and using the region’s scarce be the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free continue to be construed as it has had for water resources more equitably. zone in the Middle East. Against that many decades, as suggested by Turkey, or Moreover, these high-level meetings background, the continued insistence of whether it will be altered in response to the resulted in the lifting of the visa require- the Turkish security elite on hosting U.S. combined negative stance of some western ment for Turkish citizens traveling to Syria nuclear weapons has drawn criticism from European allies regarding the forward de- and vice versa. That action has paved the Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors.21 ployment of U.S. nuclear weapons.

10 way to an opening of the borders between Some of these neighbors, such as Iran This situation could lead to a divisive

20 the two countries; the borders had stayed and Syria, criticize Turkey’s policy of and unnecessary controversy between closed for decades due to the presence retaining nuclear weapons because they Turkey and its long-standing allies in the of large numbers of heavy land mines see the weapons as being directed against West. By insisting that the weapons remain on both sides. The mines will soon be them.22 Others in the Arab world, such as on European territory, Turkey would not ODAY June ODAY

T cleaned up with a view to opening huge Egypt, portray these weapons as a symbol only alienate some of its Western allies that land areas to agriculture. of Western imperialism. truly want to move the weapons out of In addition to improvements in bilat- Turkey therefore will have to seriously their territories, but also create tension in eral relations with its immediate neigh- reconsider its policy on U.S. nuclear weap- its relations with its neighbors and newly bors, Turkey has become more involved in ons. For this to happen, a debate should emerging partners in the Middle East.

ARMS CONTROL wider Middle Eastern political affairs than take place in the country in various plat- On May 17, Turkey signed a joint decla- it ever has been since the establishment of forms, in closed as well as open forums, ration with Brazil and Iran, providing for 12 the safe storage of Iran’s 1,200 kilograms nuclear-weapon states. Of the NATO sonal communication with author, Ankara, of low-enriched uranium fuel in Turkey in non-nuclear-weapon states, only five, as February 15, 2010. return for the delivery by , Russia, mentioned above, are known to host U.S. 14. Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons the United States, and the International nuclear weapons. The remaining 20 mem- in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Atomic Energy Agency of 120 kilograms bers have no nuclear weapons on their Force Levels, and War Planning,” p.9. of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Re- territories. Yet, these members enjoy the 15. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Isn’t It Time to Say Fare- actor.26 This “nuclear fuel swap” is poten- credible nuclear deterrent of NATO, which well to US Nukes in Turkey?” European Security, tially a breakthrough in the long-standing remains the most powerful military orga- Vol. 14, No. 4 (December 2005), pp. 443-457. deadlock in Iran’s relations with the West nization in the world. Hence, the simple 16. Retired Turkish air force commander, per- over Tehran’s nuclear program. There is outcome of this analysis is that, for NATO sonal communication with author, Ankara, Feb- no question that the degree of trust that members to feel confident against the ruary 15, 2010. Turkey has built with Iran, especially over threats posed to their national security, 17. Hans M. Kristensen, e-mail communication the last several years with the coming to they do not have to deploy U.S. nuclear with author, April 22, 2010 28 power of the Justice and Development weapons on their territory. Turkey need 18. Retired Turkish air force commander, e-mail Party in Turkey, had a significant impact not be an exception to this rule. ACT communication with author, April 23, 2010.

on getting this result. 19. Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability Iran has so far adamantly refused all ENDNOTES was destroyed following the 1991 Persian Gulf other offers. Hence, the Iranian political War. Iran and Syria still have such weapons in and security elites who have been closely 1. Italy is believed to host U.S. nuclear weapons, their military arsenals. Hence, the Turkish secu- interacting with their Turkish counterparts but it is not clear whether it wants to get rid rity elite still consider extended nuclear deter- at every level over the past several months of them. For an account of U.S. nuclear weap- rence to be significant for Turkey’s security. ons deployed in Italy, see Hans M. Kristensen, and years prior to the fuel swap announce- 20. Turkish diplomat, personal communication “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review ment may raise their expectations in with author, Ankara, January 29, 2010. of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War turn. They may press for withdrawal from 21. Amr Mousa, personal communications with Planning,” Natural Resources Defense Council, author, Paris, February 1-4, 2010. Turkey of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, 2005, p. 9. which they fear may be used against them, 22 Mohmood Vaezi and Saghefi Ameri, per- 2. NATO, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept as a way for Turkey to prove its sincerity sonal communications with author, Tehran, – Why? How?,” May 2010, www..int/strate- December 2004. regarding its stance toward Iran and, more gic-concept. broadly, its commitment to creating a 23. These comments were made by Turkish secu- 3. NATO, “NATO Foreign Ministers Hold Talks nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. rity experts and analysts in response to a presen- on New Strategic Concept,” April 22, 2010. Turkey clearly has to tread carefully, but tation by Mustafa Kibaroglu entitled “US Nuclear 4. Ibid. the risks should not be overstated. Weapons in Turkey and the Evolution of NATO’s One concern might be the contingen- 5. Jean Asselborn et al. to Anders Fogh New Strategic Concept” at the Strategy Group Rasmussen, February 26, 2010. For the full text cies in which the security situation in Meeting of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute of the letter, see www.armscontrol.org/system/ in Ankara on March 31, 2010. Turkey’s neighborhood deteriorates, there- files/Letter%20to%20Secretary%20General% by necessitating the active presence of an 24. Various arms control experts, personal com- 20NATO.pdf. effective deterrent against the aggressor(s). munications with author, Washington, April 6. Ibid. 12-13, 2010. Yet, given the elaborate capabilities that exist within the alliance and the solidar- 7. Latvian ambassador, personal communication 25. Mohmood Vaezi and Saghefi Ameri, per- with author, Ankara, March 31, 2010. For a simi- ity principle so far effectively upheld by sonal communications with author, Tehran, lar approach from the region, see Lukasz Kulesa, December 2004. the allies, extending deterrence against “Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Central Turkey’s rivals should not be a problem. 26. Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Europe,” in Perspectives on Extended Deterrence, Affairs of Turkey, Iran and Brazil, May 17, 2010. Turkey would continue to be protected No.3/2010 (Fondation pour la Recherche Straté- 27. The credibility of NATO’s deterrent has been against potential aggressors by the nuclear gique, Paris, 2010). guarantees of its allies France, the United questioned by security analysts both inside and 8. Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski, “Next, the Tacti- outside of Turkey in various discussion plat- Kingdom, and the United States, the three cal Nukes,” The New York Times, February 1, 2010. forms, and some have expressed their concerns NATO nuclear-weapon states. Turkey’s reli- 9. Latvian ambassador, personal communication about whether NATO countries would really use ARMS CONTROL TODAY June ance on such a “credible” deterrent, which with author, Ankara, March 31, 2010. nuclear weapons against Iran to defend Turkey. will not be permanently stationed on 10. Kulesa, “Extended Deterrence and Assurance There can be no clear answer for such a question, Turkish territory, is less likely to be criti- in Central Europe.” which relates to a dilemma that is inherent in 27 cized by its Middle Eastern neighbors the concept of deterrence. 11. Retired Turkish ambassador, personal commu- and should not engender a burden-shar- nication with author, Ankara, March 31, 2010. 28. Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen ing controversy with its European allies. also suggested there are other means for main- 12. See Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey and Shared Re- One cannot argue that once U.S. nucle- taining alliance cohesion: “A more modest op- sponsibilities,” in “Shared Responsibilities for Nu- ar weapons that are stationed in Turkish tion would be for NATO to retain a nuclear task clear Disarmament: A Global Debate,” Occasional territory are sent back, the nuclear deter- without U.S. nuclear weapons being stationed

Paper, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 20 rent of the alliance extended to Turkey in Europe.” Daryl G. Kimball and Greg Thiel-

Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2010, pp. 24-27. 10 will be lost forever. mann, “Obama’s NPR: Transitional, Not Trans- 13. Retired Turkish air force commander, per- Currently, three NATO members are formational,” Arms Control Today, May 2010. 13