Enthusiasm And Co-operation: The Start Of The Vichy Government 65

Chapter 3 Enthusiasm and Co-operation: The Start of the Vichy Government

When Hitler turned his ruthless war machine against Western Europe on 10 May 1940, Marseille was at a comfortable distance from the military action. A German bombing targeting the installations of the port was followed three weeks later on 21 June by an indiscriminate Italian attack vehemently denounced for its cowardice. This Italian ‘stab in the back’ left in its wake 143 bodies, including 7 Gardiens de la Paix, with the worst of the damage occurring around the central Police station, known locally as ‘l’Evêché’ because it was housed in an eighteenth-century mansion which used to be the Bishop’s resi- dence.1 But compared with many of the conurbations of the North and East, the city came out of the campaign relatively unscathed. Police reports depicted the local population as indifferent to the defeat and more interested to know when the night-clubs would re-open. This was a little unfair. Many Marseillais were genuinely concerned by national events particu- larly since these were intricately interwoven with the fate of those fellow city- dwellers (and relations or work-mates) not yet returned from the front. Even in the Police d’Etat, where mobilisation had been relatively slight, 152 local Police officers were still absent in October 1940 for reasons related to the war. 127 (including 108 Gardiens de la Paix) were being held as Prisoners of War, whilst 20 were missing or injured. It was later confirmed that 9 had died during the military campaign.2 In Marseille, as in the rest of the country, the relief at the announcement of the armistice was underpinned by a profound sense of dis- belief at the speed and the scale of the rout. The local population was particu- larly relieved when it learnt that the armistice secured an unoccupied zone in which Lyon and Marseille would compete for the position of France’s largest ‘free’ city. The new regime deliberately chose to avoid locating itself in either. Over the next four years it was from the spa town of Vichy that France would officially be governed. ‘Vichy’ was directed first by the First World War hero Philippe Pétain, coupled with the scheming parliamentarian Pierre Laval. Then after

1 A. Sauvageot, Marseille dans la tourmente, Paris, 1949, p 78; André Ducasse, “Chronique du Vieux Port en Guerre, 1939-45”, Arts et Livres de Provence, n° 31 (special edition), 1957, p 84. 2 AD BDR M6 12070, Police d’Etat de Marseille, Secrétariat particulier du Commissariat Central, 15 October 1940.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004265233_005 66 Chapter 3 the end of 1940 power would pass to Pétain and the opportunistic naval admi- ral François Darlan. Finally Laval would return in April 1942 when Pétain was relegated to a largely symbolic role. The parliamentary democracy of the Third Republic had given way to the unregulated authoritarianism of the ‘Etat Français’.3 How then did law enforcement officers respond to this new regime? Few voices of dissent were raised in the Police when the Vichy regime first came to power. Vichy was not only considered as legitimate but, even amongst formerly Republican Policemen, many actually welcomed its arrival in power. If this position would seem an unlikely descendent of the political stance adopted by the Marseille Police at the end of the 1930s several explanations must be invoked. These explanations revolve around the silencing of mecha- nisms previously used by Policemen for political expression, the hopes raised by the new government and some overlapping of culture between the Police and its new rulers. Influences which might have helped push Police officers into opposition to such a regime were immediately silenced. The links with the local socialist party which many Police officers had chosen to maintain either through an attachment to their programme or in most cases through clientelism were undermined by a number of considerations. The retirement of the socialist Henri Tasso, who had been the patron of local Police trade unions, deprived them of a natural ally. The socialist party itself was forced underground. The banning of all trade unions in 1940 and the seizure of their funds between July 1941 and August 1942 eliminated structures which had been influential in terms of political orientation. The apolitical stance officially endorsed in Vichy dis- course corresponded both to that current in the Police which had been singing the virtues of apoliticism as well as to that of many who had performed their professional duties with obvious political preferences, who were now pushed into a position of mea-culpa by the military defeat. The free masons, who had been very active in Police circles, were outlawed.4 The head of the Vichy regime Marshal Philippe Pétain held considerable public prestige, not least amongst former soldiers of which the Police counted a large number within its ranks. As military leaders go he was seen as particu- larly attentive to the welfare of his troops. It was hoped that now he had been given a civilian role he would prove equally attentive to the welfare of his citi-

3 H.R. Kedward, Occupied France, Resistance and Collaboration, Oxford, 1985, pp 1-2; William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic, London, 1970, pp 1-13; Alistair Horne, To lose a battle: France 1940, Harmondsworth, 1970, pp 643-644 & pp 646-648. 4 The funds of 7 Police associations, most of whom had their headquarters in Marseille bars, were ceased by arrêté préfectoral between July 1941 and August 1942, AD BDR M14 2167.