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DATE ADMITTED., ~....., ..... ~.. NAMEOF WITNIESfl.~......
HelmutStrizek The main RPF argumentsare - The RPFis a "liberationmovement" to overcome LindaMelvern is right,but... the’Iotalitarian" Habyarimana regime. - Anybody-namely France-who opposed the RPF ShortAnalysis of takingpower in Kigali is blamedfor anti-Tutsi racism. A PeopleBetrayed - Oppositionto the Arusha Agreements of August 4, 1993,is characterized as support for the planning of Therole of theWest in Rwanda’s genocide. genocideBy LindaMelvern (2001)1 Despitethe fact that he wasmurdered, Habyari- manais regardedas thespiritual father of theTutsi Summary genocide. Melvernpoints out that in 1994the interna- - "Hutuextremists" had killed Habyarimana because tionalcommunity failed in itsobligation tointervene finallyhe wasnot ready to executehis own plans. againsta genocidethat could have been prevented. - Themilitary offensive immediately after the crash of thePresidential airplane onApril 6,1994, was launched The internationalcommunity acted against to stopthe genocide. theclear advice of GeneralDallaire, the Com mander of the UN PeacekeepingForcein Rwanda (UNAMIR) Thegenocidejustified theRPF in notapply- whohad repeatedly stated that the ongoing genocide ing the provisionsof theArusha Agreements, in couldbe stoppedif he hadappropriate orders and claimingthe absolute political leadership in Kigali support.Both were refused. andin postponingdemocratic elections ad calendas graecas. On thebasis of irrefutabledocuments, Mel- verndescribes that these denials were the result of In thelight of Melvern’sfindings, this argu- deliberatepolicies forced on theUN Security Council mentadopted in linewith most of thewestern inqui- mainlyby theClinton Administration andGreat Bri- ries,is in dangerof beingconsidered partisan. tain- underthe influence of LadyChalker 2 - with Especiallythetheory of thegenocide plann- the agreementof Belgium. ingby Habyarimanaturns out to serveas an alibito Melvernproves that the argument put for- veilthe fact that the international community by the wardlater that these countries were not aware of de factoretreat of theblue helmets unleashed ’lhe thegenocidal character of the mass killings against hu manbeasr’. Its existence and danger was known theTutsi population isnot justified. to everybodyand an nouncedby Dallaireand respon- siblehuman rights organizations. Countriessuch as Nigeriaand the Czech Republichadclearlywarnedagainsttheconsequen- An analysisof the"evidence" putforward to cesof theUN SecurityCouncil decision of Apri121, provethe existence of "genocideorganizations" by 1994,to reducethe peacekeeping force to a symbolic Melvernand others suggests- having been mostly numberof 270soldiers. This decision allowed the communicatedanonymously - the needto be very ongoinggenocide to spread cautious.Itcannot be ruledout that "traps" were set in anticipationof the later necessity to apportion It is,however, difficult to understandwhy blame. LindaMelvern doesn’t try to contrasther findings to theusual explanation of what had occurred in the Ailinformation available nowadays contra- GreatLakes Region. She adopts most of theargu- dictsthe "Hutu extremisr’ theory also used by Mel- mentsmade by the RwandanPatriotic Front to vernconcerning the air crash on April6, 1994. justifyits political action to re-conquer power in Ki- Buteven if Melvernshould have been more gali,Iost by theirpredecessors as a resultot a cautiousin acceptingthe usual explanations, her democraticreferendum on September25, 1961. main messageis welldocumented: The Rwandan
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peoplehas been betrayed; the Tutsi by nothaving LindaMelvern also deserves thanks for having paid beenprotected and the Rwandannation as a whole homageto PhilippeGaillard, the representative of by the factthat a preventablegenocide could be theRed Cross, who relentlessly tried to savepeople executed,tarnishing the Rwandan future. evenin the mosthopeless circumstances. - Ailfurther research needed to shedlight on but... theCentral African tragedy with its millions of dead in Rwanda,Burundi and Congoshould start from Despiteail the positive elements of LindaMelvern’s thatpoint. publicationit should be stressedthat she could havescrutinized more closety the backgroundto herfindings. When she blamesthe BritishAmbas- sadorfor what he wassaying in thesecret meetings Introduction of theU N SecurityCouncil she rarely undertakes an in-depthanalysis of hisdeclarations. She seems A remarkablebook... reluctantto wonder if politicalobjectives may have guidedthe governments that insisted on refusing LindaMelvern 3 publishedin 2000a remarkable eventhe mostreasonable and modestdemands of book:A peoplebetrayed. The roleof theWest in GeneralDallaire. Rwanda’sgenocide.(Melvern 2000) It is remarkable becauseit addsvaluable details to theknowledge Herfindings call for further examination ofthe usual so farpublished on wh at wasdiscussed and decided explanationsfor the Rwandan catastrophe starting on Rwandain the secretsessions of the United on October1,1990, Linda Melvern could have tried Nation’sSecurity Council during the summerof to answerfour main questions: 1994.Linda Melvern doesn’t reveal how she got this "hot"information. 4 Melvernconfirms many aspects - Did the situationof the Tutsiemigrants of thememoirs of BoutrosBoutros-Ghali published mainlyin Ugandajustify a military attack against a in 1999.(Boutros-Ghali 1999) She points out clearly sovereignstate with ail its consequences? thatthe members of theSecurity Council were very wellinformed-at leasP about the ongoing genocide - Is thereany evidence that Hutu extremists perpetratedagainst the Tutsipopulation within couldhave killed two Presidents and a majorpart of Rwanda.But the West - againstthe recommen- the Rwandanarmy’s leadership? dationsof Nigeriafor example - wasnot ready to - Doesn’tthe "planning theory" of genocide stopit althoughitwould have been possible to doso. serveas a pretextfor non-intervention andbehaving GeneralRoméo Dallaire, the commanderof the - to usethe word of SamanthaPower- li ke "bystan- bluehelmets in Kigali,had from the very beginning ders"? (POWER 2001) e,.pi,i~~izudii~i~ipu~~ibiiiiy. - Why did the Anglophoneworld favor the RPF victory? In 2000the Organizationof African Unity (OAU) alsocame to the same conclusion.On July 10, The presentpaper analyses Linda Melvern’s argu- 2000,it publishedits voluminous report elaborated mentsrelating to theRwandan tragedy and confronts by a seven-memberInternational Panel of Eminent themwith the available facts and findings on a "hid- Persons(IPEP) under the direction of SirKetumile denagenda" concerning the Central African cri-sis, Masire(former President of Botswana)6 withthe triggeredby the crash of thepresidential aircraft in title:Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. What the Kigalion April6, 1994at 8.30p.m. Worldcould have done. (Masire 2000) Melvern points outin richdetail her main hypothesis:The Rwandan Tutsiwere betrayed. The facts are indisputable. Therewas no lackof informationand the genocide Was the RPF invasion of Rwanda was preventable.Those who couldhave prevented justifled? it inventeda whole series of prelextsnot do so. Thebook gives the best description published so far On October1, 1990,a groupof soldierscoming of how the CanadianGeneral Dallairewas fromUganda attacked Rwanda. They were part of discouragedfrom laking action in favorof the theRwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the armed wing threatenedpopulations. He had to sufferail sorts of of the RwandanPatriotic Front (RPF). Insiders humiliationsin the mosl horrible situations. knewthat the descendantsof the Tutsi oligarchy that had left Rwandabetween1959 and 1964
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controlledthe RPF¯ Most of theirancestors fled to cendantsof theTutsi aristocracy in Uganda became Ugandaand Burundi.In 1963they tried, after a - firstin oppositionto Obote, then as alliesof Idi seriesof failedattempts, to regain power by force¯ Aminand later on of YoweriMuseveni - part of the Theyfailed again and mass killings took place in internalproblems of thatcountry. Rwandaagainst the Tutsi population¯ A mass exodus of Tutsifrom Rwanda followed in thebeginning of Theeconomic crisis in thewhole region in thelate 1964. eightiesaggravated the regional tensions¯ The Tutsi problemin Ugandabecame acute again. Yoweri The term genocidewas used- for instanceb~ Museveni,their protector in thishistorical phase, BertrandRussell - for the first time in theRegion. becameinterested in helping his allies during his Beforethat political murder was commonbut the armedconquest of Ugandain 1986- organizedin numberof victimslimited. A long lasting conflict the above-mentionedRwandan Patriotic Front-to tookroots. "gohome" and take power in Kigali.Melvern is right whenwriting: "While the Rwandan officer corps was Thedifferences between the population groups of an assetfor Museveni,the Rwandansthemselves Tutsiand Hutuin Rwandaand Burundidated from werea problem.There were increasing complaints beforethe colonial era but became virulent during amongUgandan officers that they were discrimi- ! thedecolonization process when the question came natedagainst in favorof Rwandansin the army¯" up of whetherthe pre-colonial monarchies in both (p¯28) countriesshould be reestablishedas independent states. TheRPF had succeeded in presentingitself to the restof the world as a non-ethnic liberation movement. Whereasthe pre-colonialTutsi-dominated order Afterthe death of FredRwigyema, the first president couldbe maintainedin Burundi, in Rwandathe inde- of the RPFand a IongtimeUgandan deputy minister pendentstate came under the controlof the Hutu of Defenseunder Museveni, during the first days of partyPARMEHUTU following the abolitionof the the¯ nvas¯on the HutuAlexJs Kanyarengwe 8 became monarchyin September25, 1961by a referendum the new RPF-President.He was a formerColonel monitoredby theUnited Nations¯ underHabyarimana andwent into exile after a failed putschin 1980¯His nomination was a veryclever Theinflux of Rwandanrefugees after the establish- moveby thenew RPFmilitary leader Paul Kagamé, mentof the Hutu-dominatedRepublic in Rwanda whowas actually the leading figure of theRPF. aggravatedthe up-to-then less virulent Hutu-Tutsi problemin Burundi¯In 1966the Burundian army led The RPF Iobby- very muchsupported by Roger bv anti-HutuTulsi extremists took power in a coup Winter,at thatlime Direclor of theUS Committee d’étatand in 1972the first ethnocide was organized for Refugeesand since2002 Deputy Administrator by theBurundian slate against the Hutu elite in Bu- of USAID-succeededin presenting it to theoutside rundi.In summer 1972 between100,000 and worldas an non-ethnicliberation movement. Even ) 300,000Hutu were executed¯ The international SethSendashonga, a Hutu opposed to Habyarimana communityhad ail thenecessary information but andliving in exilein Kenya joined the RPF, convinced didnot intervene to protectlhe threatened popu- thatthe non-ethnic and democratic rhetoric of the lations,avoiding the conflict with one western power RPF9 was honest. protectingits"cronies". TheBurundian Tutsi-conlroll- ed armyis stillin power! A precedentfull of conse- LindaMelvern reasons along this line. She doesn’t quenceswas set. Since 1972 the Hutu-Tutsi conflict reallyask if theRPF was right to mounta military becamethe main political rationale in the region of attackon theregime oi GeneralHabyarimana. For theGreat Lakes in CentralAfrica. her - and thiscan be consideredas themost im- portantweakness of herbook - thehistorical right In 1973,with the consent of theinternational com- of theRPFto overthrowthe"dictatorship"of Habya- munity,General Habyarimana took power in Rwanda rimanaby ail meansis undisputed."Among non- and repressedthe alreadyongoing "revenge for communislcountries Rwanda was probablythe Burundi"by RwandanHutu against the Tutsipopu- mostcontrolled state in theworld." (p. 25) lation.The cyclical killings came to a stopin bolh countriesuntilthe end of theeighties. Bulthe regio- Beforelhe beginning ofthe civil war in October1990 nalrefugee problem could not be solved.The des- thischaracterization of the situation is al least
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exaggerated.Someone who livedin the country nothingin theyears prior to theinvasion to help from1980 to 1983and whodealt with the co-ope- resolvethe festering problem of Rwanda’srefugees; rationprojects of theFRG in Rwandaand Burundi it hadbeen of marginalconcern until it assumedcivil between1987 and 1989- as the authordid - can warproportions. As a result,~he OAU felt it lacked testifythat before October 1990 the situation in themoral authority to condemnthe RPF invasion, Rwandadid not correspond tothat description. U ntil althoughat thesame time it quiteappreciated the thebeginning of thecivil war Habyarimana can be outragethat the invasion caused the Habyarimana accusedof humanrights abuses against his Hutu government."(Masire-Report11.16)Thetruth behind politicalopponents but not against Tutsi. thatunconvincing argument is rathersimple. Atthe timeof theRPF invasionYoweri Museveni was the If Melvernwants to justifythe military overthrow of actingPresident of OAUand could therefore prevent the establishedorder in Rwandashe cannotbut thecondemnation of his RPF-friends for aggression. characterizethe Habyarimanaregime in themost horrificcolors. For this reason she doesn’t even dis- Anothertact should never be forgotten.At the time cussthe question of whetherit wasjustified to supp- of theinvasion negotiations concerning thepossibility ly weaponsto theRPF. Therefore she doesn’t exa- of emigrantsreturning to Rwandawere under way. mine where theseweapons came from. Conse- Duringhis visitto Rwandalate in the summerof t quentlythose who helpedthe Rwandanstate to 1990the Pope had also urged Habyarimana to find fightagainst a military invasion are considered tobe a solutionto thatquestion. So, an aggressionin or- onthe wrong side of historyfrom the very begin ning. der to solvethe refugee problem can by no means havebeen justified at thatmoment. France,following the declared "La Baule policy" of June1990, helped Rwanda against the invasion Thequestion whether the war was justified is very andis nowadaysgenerally blamed for that involve- importantsince it wasobvious to everybodythat an ment.However, in 1990France acted in fullaccor- invasionmust bring back the "ethnic devir’ to the dancewith the United States and the whole western region.The RPF played "with tire" and wasquite world- exceptGreat Britain. awareof the inherent risks. Actually, only days after theinvasion on October1,1990, the first ethnic cla- HermanCohen, at thatrime Deputy Secretary of shestook place. During the war lasting from October Statefor Africa,had conceivedfor Secretaryof 1990to theArusha Agreements of August4, 1993, StateJames Baker, in closecontact with France, theanti-Tutsi propaganda became part of dailylire thepolicy of "smoothdemocratization" to replace andthe number of politicalmurders and politically the"cronies" of thecold war. Habyarimana, after motivatedmassacres increased, but thephenome-
havinav evoked to Mitterrandthe danaers of that nonof masskillings was limited during Habyarima- policy,finally complied. Sodid Mobutu after a visitof na’slifetime. JamesBaker to Kinshasain Apri11990.France and the USA guaranteedto someextent a peaceful Mass murderstarted with the downingof the ) transformationto democracy and promisedhelp Rwandanpresidential aircraft onApril 6, 1994,kill- againstmovements which could be temptedto take ingnot only Habyarimana and his Burundian collea- powerby force.This applied to Rwandaand to Zaire gue CyprienNtaryamira but at thesame time the aswell. In both countries the democratization started mostimportant leaders of the RwandanArmy. in autumn1990 with full French-American support. Onlyin 1993/1994did the ClintonAdministration TheRwandan state organization was almost annihi- changethat policy unilaterally andwithout informing lated.A politicalvacuum was created making pos- or discussingit with France. siblethe massacres turning eventually -not being preventedbut evenencouraged by the Security Objectively,theattack of October 1,1990, by theRPF Councildecision of April21, 1994 - intogenocide was an aggression.The MASIRE-Reportdiscussed againstthe Tutsi population. the questionand acceptedthe very questionable argumentationof the OUA. "The situation, however, was immediatelycomplicated by two facts. First, Who shot down the airplane? despiteclear guidelines set down in the1969OAU ConventionGoverning the SpeciticAspects of Nowadaysthere is broadagreement that the geno- RefugeeProblems in Africa,the OAU had done cidewould not have taken place
378 H.Strizek,Linda Melvern Ruanda/IAF4/2002
- if the Presidentialairplane had not beenshot importantopposition had grownup againstthe down, agreementswith the RPF.So Habyarimanawas in - if theRPF had not resumed military action only a veryuncomfortable situation when he cameto hourslater and Arushato signthe agreements that would reduce his-alreadyreduced-presidential prerogatives in - if theinternational community would have acted in a veryfar-reaching manner. On theother side the an appropriatemanner to protectthe threatened RPF Presidentwas consideredby most of the Tutsipopulation. Rwandansas thefrontman for themilitary leader PaulKagamé. There was widespreadmistrust of Melvern’sbook offersmuch evidence on how in hisobjectives. Washe reallyready to acceptpower- secretsessions the UN SecurityCouncil managed sharing?Would he reallyaccept the results of de- to preventany help to thethreatened Tutsi. It con- mocraticelections foreseen in theAgreements af- firmsin a verydetailed manner the findings of the tera transitionalperiod? There were considerable Masire-Report,whichwas first to ascertainthat the doubts. genocidecould have been prevented. In September 2001Samantha Power added several details about On the otherhand the RPF and mostof thehuman howthe decision for inactivity wastaken within the rightsNGOs who had strongly criticized Habyarima- ClintonAdministration. (Power 2001 ) Theformer UN- na’smaneuvers during the democratization between SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-G hali des-cribes 1991and 1994 and after the conclusion of a cease- in detailthe differences withthe Clinton Administra- tirewith the RPF in March1993 wondered if Habyari- tionand especially with the new US-Ambassador to manaand his entouragewould really be readyto theUN, MadeleineAlbright, on theRwandan case, acceptthe provisions of the agreements. They felt whichcontributed to the early end of her UN career. thatthe President, still considered to be in full controlof Rwandanpolitics, must be behindail the Thedanger for the Tutsi population was increased anti-Tutsipropaganda stemming from Radio-Televi- by themilitary campaign of theRPF and its refusal siondes Mille Collines, created just before the sig- to reacha cease-firewith the RwandanArmy in ningof the ArushaAgreements. orderto protectthe threatened population. UnfortunatelyMadeleine Albright had to negotiate Thefacts on thesetwo conditions allowing the ge- themandate for the United Nations Assistance Mis- nocideto happenare known. What really happened sionfor Rwanda(UNAMIR), foreseen in the Arusha onApril 6, 1994 is not yet revealed. Ailparties invol- Agreements,al a momentwhen the UnitedStates vedkeep their knowledge secret. Nevertheless some was firmlyopposed to new involvementsfo UN-led individualshave testified. But those who are in a peace-keepingmissions after having seen on their positiontoconfirm these testimonies still refuse to televisionscreens the dead 18 Americansoldiers in do so.Written in 1999/2000Melvern’s formulation Somaliaon October3, 1993.The decision to estab- appliesalso to thesituation in 2002: "At this point lishUNAMIR two dayslater, on October3,1993, eventsconspired to removehim [Habyarimana] from wastaken at an unfortunatemoment. The Clinton thescene and to this day there is stillno adequate Administrationthatin March1993 had almost enthu- explanationfor what happened next." (p.114) siasticallyaccepted the transfe r of theAmerican led operationin Somaliato a multinationalforce under The politlcalcontexf directUN commandwas deeplydisappointed and MadeleineAlbright came fo hernew job in NewYork changedits policy. Consequently theU.S. tried to in spring1993. The negotiations aiming at a power- reducethe UNAMIRmandate from the beginning. sharingagreement between the RwandanState Whenthe blue helmets arrived in Kigaliin December andthe RPF were under way and came to a conclu- 1993the political situation had profoundly deterio- sionon August4, 1993.The RwandanPresident rated.On October21,1993, the Tutsi-dominated ar- Habyarimanaand the RPF PresidentKanyarengwe my hadkilled the recently elected Burundian Presi- signedthe ArushaAgreements. Both men werenot dentMelchior Ndadaye. From now on therewas thereal players of thegame. A multi-partygovern- strongopposition in large parts of theHutu po-pula- mentheaded at thatmoment by AgatheUwilingiyi- tionto theapplication of the Arusha Agreements. manalimited Habyarimana’s power. She had been Fierceanti-Tutsi feelings were cultivated amongst nominatedafter a crisiswithin the coalition party theBurundian Hutu refugees fleeing the civil war MDRonly on July17, 1993. Within the country an thatbroke out in Burundiafter the Ndadaye murder.
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And alsoin a secondrefugee community living in truthabout the event is notrevealed. Approaching miserableconditions around Kigali hatred of "the Kigaliairport, two rockets were launched at the Tutsi"was common:About one millionHutu had PresidentialFalcon Mystère on April6, 1994at fledto the southwhen the RPF had conquereda 20.30local time. The airplanecame down in the largepart of thenorthern regions in Rwandain compoundof PresidentHabyarimana’s private February1993. The RPF-RadioMuhabura started residence. in 1991to diffuseanti-Habyarimana propaganda and broadcasteven the deathsentences imposed Ailpassengers aboard died: ¯ . 10 by theRPF agamst Hutu°politiclans . In an unavoi- - PresidentHabyarimana of Rwanda dabledialectic Muhabura provoked the creation of - PresidentCyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi the anti-RPFRadio-Tél~vision desMille Collines - TheBurundian Ministers Bernard Ciza and Cyri- (RTLM)in summer1993. aqueSimbizi It mustbe stressedagain and againthat these - MajorGeneral Déogratias Nsabimana, Army Chief eventshad createdan anti-Tutsimood in large ofStaff partsof thepopulation. Ethnic hatred did not have JuvénalRenzaho, Habyarimana’s Political Counse- to be organized.It was present everywhere. Every- Ior, formerRwandan Ambassador to Germany bodyknew that. Even a CIAdesk-level analysis for 11 - ColonelElie Sagatwa, Personal Counselor of Ha- the StateDepartment which was mentionedin byarimanaand his brother in law differentpublications andnot denied by theagency - MajorThadée Bagaragaza, Commander of the pointedout in January1994 that when the war re- RwandanPresidential Guard sumedin Rwandamass killings would happen and - Dr. EmmanuelAkingeneye, Habyarimana’s Perso- halfa millionlives could be Iost. nalPhysician It mustalso be stressed;at that moment the French - ThreeFrench crew members (Héraud, Minaberry troopswho had twice saved the Habyarimana regime and Perinne) in October1990 and in February1993 had left Rwanda in December1993 for good.The new cohabitation A glanceat thepassenger list gives rise to strong governmentin Francewas aboutto imposeon Pre- doubtsabout the hypothesis of the responsibility of sidentMitterrand a reduction of France’smilitary "extremistHutu". Even il Habyarimana’sHutu ene- commitment in Africa.So eventhe Ndadaye assassi- mieshad had an interestin gettingrid of himafter nationin October1993 could not postpone the reso- havingagreed to implementthe Arusha Agreements lutionto withdrawfrom the Rwandan theater. Habya- why shouldthey kill the newlyelected Burundian rirn~nawas alone.He hadafter a longperiod of PresidentNtaryamira, who could have been a valu- hesitationtogiveintopressuresto applytheArusha ableally in fightingagainst the RPF? Why should Agreementsagainst the tierce opposition in his theyhave killed one of the criticsof the Arusha country.Being aware that it wouldbe riskyto go to Agreementslike the Chie!of StaffNsabimana? Dar-es-Salaamandaccept the full application of the Why shouldthey have killed Colonel Elie Sagatwa agreementshe had askedhis friendMobutu to (a brotherof Habyarimana’swife Agathe), who comewith him in the presidentialplane. Mobutu normallyconsidered as one of theinner-family op- acceptedbut did not show up afterhaving received ponentsto Habyarimanawith considerable pres- some12 hints from the CIA via Brussels hOt to do so. tigewithin the Army? Why should they have killed His lifewas saved,the other passengers on the MajorBagaragaza, the commanderof the Presi- flightfrom Dar-es-Salaam to Kigali perished. dentialGuard that should play a crucialrole in fightingthe RPF? What do we know? Thedowning of theRwandan presidential aircraft is In !actail of them were strongly opposed to theRPF normallydescribed as a "mystery".The related inci- takingpower in Kigali. dentis infact mysterious. Butin politicalterms the 13 biggestmystery is thefact that up fo nownobody Andfurthermore, a political and military vacuum hasbeen interested in examining this mystery more couldhave been in theinterest of extremistgroups. closely.Ail the work that has been done to explain Butis it conceivablethat they did not show up after the genocidehappening during the summer1994 their success?Nobody asked to take power mustbe consideredas preliminaryas long as the immediatelyafter the creation of thatpower vacuum;
38O H.Strizek,Linda Melvem Ruanda/IAF4/2002
nobodywent directly to theradio station to declare Sincethe documentationestablished by Filip thata coupd’état had taken place. Many publications Reyntjens(Reyntjens 1995) in 1995there is common havesince been written trying to provethe extremist knowledgeof an internationalbackground. The com- theory.However it didnot work. After eight years no plexconsequences of that crash which seriousevidence has been brought up in favorof it. Thattheory can be excludedfrom further conside- - causedthe breakdownof the Rwandanstate ration.Even Colonel Théoneste Bagosora - often organization, consideredas the headof the Hutuextremists - - deprivedthe Rwandan army of itsleadership and whois indicted atthe International Criminal Tribu nal - neutralizedBurundi as an opponentto the RPF forRwanda (ICTR) in Arushafor having participated suggestthe existence of an internationallyguided inthe organization of mass killings after the assassi- "invisiblehand". nationof thetwo Presidents has not been accused of beinginvolved in thedowning of thePresidential Thefact that Mobutu was eventuallywarned not to plane. boardthe Rwandanplane especially underlines thatsupposition. Such complicated organization On thecontrary, most convincing indicators are canrarely been handled by a liberationmovement availableto underlinethe theory making the RPF alone. ! andtheir allies accountable forthe assassinations of April6, 1994.It doesnot seem tobe pure chance Moreoverthese speculations are nourished by the thatthe RPF launched its well-prepared assault to refusalto includethis starting point of thegenocide takepower in Rwandaimmediately after the an- in theinquiries ofthe International Arusha Court. It nouncementof thedeath of thepassengers in the cannotbe maintainedthat a Courtwhose expenses Presidentialplane. 1~ Theaccusation of theRPF’s amountin the meantimeto more thanUS-$ 600 involvementin the assassination of Habyarimana is million2° hasno rightto inquireinto this crucial summarizedin a most comprehensiveway in a element.21 bookrecently published in Franceby CharlesOnana withthe collaboration of Déogratias Musha-yidï. Andthere is anotherastonishing fact related for the (Onanaand Mushayidi2001) firsttime by LindaMelvern: "In a strangecoincidence of timing,an Americanmilitary officer, Colonel Theyexplain whythe RPFdid nothing to preventthe Charles,Chuck’Vuckovic, was already in Kigaliand masskillings starting after the plane crash and had hadan evacuationplan. Vuckovic had turned up at no objectionswhen it turnedinto genocide two therive-star H6tel des Mille Collines some six hours weekslater by neutralizingtheblue helmets under beforethe presidential plane was shot down." (p. theirCommander Dallaire through the UN Security 140) Actuallythe Americansalreadv began Io Councildecision on Apri121,1994.Themost sensa- evacuatetheir nationals on the morning of April7, tionaltestimony fo confirmthe assumption that the 1994. RPFwas not interested in stopping the killings of the Tutsiliving in Rwandawas given by DeusKagiraneza When will the US investigate? on March1, 2002at a hearingorganized by the Duringhis short visit to Kigalion March25, 1998, BelgiumSenate. He said:"lt was a politicalcalcula- PresidentClinton asked how il couldhappen, that tionthat led to thesacrifice - history may judge the "therewere people like me sittingin offices,day CentralCommittee of the RPF whosemember I afterday after day, who did not fully appreciate the was’’6 - of 800.000persons. depthand the speedwith which you werebeing engulfedby thisunimaginable terror. "He never Theseand someother testimonies of formerRPF- gavean answerto thatquestion and hisadmini- . 17 . members(Chnstophe ¯ Haklzabera , Jean-Pierre strationdid ail il couldto prevenlan investigation . . Mugabe,18 Michael. Houngan . reporhng19 of infor- whichwas already suggested by AlanKuperman in mantsto theICTR in Arusha)indicate that in-depth The WashingtonPost of December29, 1998."lhe investigationsmust be undertakento obtainan U.S.Congress should follow the lead of itsBelgian "adequateexplanation" of what happened on April counterpartsby launching a full-scale investigation, 6, 1994and afterwards. startingwith ail relevant classified documents."
The mostcomplicated question is a possibleUS Ailavailable information indicates that this will be a involvementin organizing the downing of theplane. painfulproceeding. So one cntlque., 22 of Melvern’s
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bookin theU.S. stressed: "Melvern’s implicit equa- Butthe RPF also refused any appropriate action to tionof theFrench and U.S. roles, for instance, isn’t helpthe threatened Tutsi. Why did Kagamé threaten so muchu nfairas unhelpful.The French govemme nt to considerthe Belgian soldiers as enemies,if they wasactively complicit in theviolence; the Clinton did notwithdraw after the evacuation of Belgian Administration,after Somalia and alreadyunder nationalsin mid-Apri11994?23 Apparentlythe RPF pressurefrom isolationist Republicans in Congress, didnot try to neutralizeRobert Kajuga who acted as wassimply unwilling to wastepolitical capital on leaderof thesemilitias. The RPF succeeded in as- furtherAfrican misadventures." Despite the know- sassinatingseveral of hisenemies. Shouldn’t it ledgeof thelater American commitment in the Con- havebeen possible to eliminate¯hJm? 24 If theRPF go warand the support to theRPF to getrid of the andhis allies can be heldresponsible forthe plane refugeesin EasternZaire nobody seems to be crash,its co-responsibility forthe genocide would readyto believethat an Americanpart could have be evident. beenplayed in theplane crash on April6, 1994. Sincethe responsibility of the RPF for the downing Theprocess of takinga closer look at the involvement ofthe presidential aircraft can not yet fully be proven of theClinton Administration waslaunched by the and many contestthe theoryof a spontaneous BushAdministration when SamanthaPower could outbreakof hatredafter the assassination of the two usedeclassified documents to writeher already Presidents,thetheory of a centrallyplanned geno- mentionedarticle "Bystanders to genocide".But cidethat is alsoadopted by Melvem,must be con- September11,2001 interrupted this process in the sidered.Two versions exist: one group maintains interestofnational solidarity. thatHabyarimana himself was at thecenter of ge- nocidalplanning; others presume that "Hutu ex- Nevertheless,sooner or laterthe US Administrationtremists"overruled Habyarimana and killed him so must shareits knowledgeof what happenedon as to be ina positionto exterminatetheTutsi. April6, 1994and why the evacuation ofits nationals couldstart immediately after the plane crash and The Habyarimanaversion whythe US Embassywas already closed on April7, AlisonDes Forges(Des Forges 1999) and others 1994. havedescribed the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsipopulation in a comprehensiveway. Incon- testablefacts are unfortunately mixed up withcon- Planned genocide? testableconjectures about the historical backgrou nd. Melvemadopts these speculations. Shebelieves that Theresponsibility forthe mass killings that dege- Habyarimanawas personallyinvolved in genocidal neratedinto genocide after the spectacular decision planning.Isthere any evidence orat leastlikelihood? of theUN SecurityCouncil of Apri121,1994 to with- drawthe UN peacekeepingforce and not to intervene Nobodyhas beenable to produceevidence that he to helpthe threatened population rests with those wasinvolved in theplanning of genocide.Ail "evi- thousandsof killerswho executed the massacres. dence"put forward up to nowis doubtful.The aile- Comparedto otherprecedents we are confronted garionsagainst him personally are based on con- by a genocidesui generis. It wasexecuted without jectureand hearsay.The Masire-Reportis very realweapons in a statevacuum by massesdriven cautiousbut unfortunately gives in tothe temptation by hatred.Objectively they did what the RPF expec- to speculate."Sofaras is known, there is nodocument, tedthem to do.The Hutu elite who could have ex- no minutesof a meeting,nor any other evidence that plainedthisdialectictotheHutupopulationasawhole pinpointsa precise moment when certain individuals andconvince them to stopthese actions didn’t exist decidedon a masterplan to wipeout the Tutsi. Aswe anymore.The"human beast" was unleashed and no- havealready seen, both physical and rhetorical bodymade efforts to containit. The "interim go- violenceagainst the Tutsi as a peopleindeed began vernment"didn’t try. It wasin tactmore of a phantom immediatelyafter October 1, 1990,and continued to thana government.The Army had been decapitated escalateuntil the genocide aclually started in April by the plane crash and the headless"Garde 1994.Withoutquestion thiscampaign was organized Présidentielle"became part of that"human beast". andpromoted, and at somestage in thisperiod these The InternationalCommunity succeeded in pre- anti-Tutsiactivities turned into a strategyforgenocide. ventingfights against the "lnterahamwe" militias. Butthat exact point has never been established. Theblue helmets did not tire a singleshot at them. (Masire-Report,7.2.)
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An astonishingcontradiction regarding the perso- victoryof the RPF.France was no longerin a nalityof Habyarimanahas to be mentioned.Most of positionto preventit. But they knew also that mass thosewho were writing about the Rwandan genocide killingsof the Tutsipopulation would be the describeHabyarimana as a moreor lessdiabolical consequence.In this respect it is u nderstandableto person.Even Alison Des Forges quotes without fur- tryto attributethe responsibility to a person who therexplanation pure speculations that Habyarima- cannotdeny it anymore.Since it wasnot Iogical to na, althoughhe had beenwarned the RPF attack assumethat Habyarimana would make plans based couldtake place, did nothing to preventit, because on his own deathan auxiliaryversion has been "hewanted the invasion" in order to launchan anti- invented. Tutsicampaign. (Des Forges, 1999, p. 49)On the otherhand the authors of theMasire-Report blame The "Hutu extremistversion" him for not havingacted in a wisemanner with Accordingto thistheory Habyarimana was killed by respectto the invaders."The October 1990 RPF "Hutuextremists" because in the endhe wasnot invasionof Rwandaand theGovernment’s response readyto executehis own plans. constituteda giant step on theroad to genocide. Habyarimanaat that moment had a choice.Contrary The"Hutu extremist theory" assumes that Habyari- to RPF expectations,few Rwandansof any manahimself was no longerin controlof hiscountry. backgroundwelcomed these unknown "Ugandan" Wasthat the case? We don’tknow exactly. It is, soldiers.A united front among ail Rwandans against however,strange that ail those who adhere to the outsideinvaders would have been possible, but an planningtheory maintain that Habyarimana and his opportunisticand threatenedHabyarimana familywhere in fullcontrol of Rwandanpolicy. governmentchose the oppositecourse. With great deliberation,itawakened the sleeping dogs of eth nic Supposedthat Habyarimana was unawareof the division.The Tutsi were portrayed as alien invaders. plannedgenocide is thereany evidencethat a Anyquestion of classor regionaldivisions between conspiracyby Hutuextremists against Habyarimana Hutu was tobe submergedin a common front was under way? No "hard evidence"has been againstthe intruders. Ail Tutsi were denounced as founduntil now. The passenger list and themost fifthcolumnists, secret supporters of the RPF. Anti- convincingfindings of Onanaand Mushayidi (Onana Tutsipropaganda, largely muted for the previous 17 andMushayidi 2001 ) suggestthe contrary. years,was unleashedanew." (Masire-Report, ExecutiveSummary, 17) Whenresuming the waron April7, 1994,the RPF knewas wellas anybodyelse that an enormous Thisappreciation is very theoretical. Even if the potentialfor aggression- as already detailed above RwandanPresident had wantedto behavein the - existed.The soeculationmav be allowed:Those ¯ 25 recommended way, his prevailing political weakness withinthe CIA who in a reportof January1994 pre- aireran agitatedsummer tollowing the La Baule dictedhalf a millionvictims if the civil war should speechof FrenchPresident Mitterrand in June resumewere not those who were in favorof a policy ) 1990would not have allowed him to do so. totakethatrisk. Whydidtheyannouncethedanger? Was somebodyplaying with that risk? In any case,the RPF consideredHabyarimana as theincarnation of evil and could nol have expected Theinformation by Mobutu’s last security cou nsellor that the Rwandanregime would not awakenthe (N’Gbanda1999) may be repeated:Mobutu was "sleepingdog". But during Habyarimana’s lifetime wamedby a secretagent in a phonecall coming the"dog" could only bark and was prevented from fromBrussels not to boardthe Rwandan airplane. becominga beastof prey.Would Habyarimana (Habyarimanahad expressedsome fear for his alreadyhave implored Boutros-Ghali in January personalsecurity and asked him during a visitto 1994not to withdrawthe bluehelmets in any Gbadolitesome days beforethe Dar-es-Salaam circumstances?If he had plannedgenocide he meetingto do so beingconvinced that the presence wouldhave had, on thecontrary, an interest in their of thisAmerican ally would give him some security). departure. In thedays after the RPF seized power in Kigalithe Thosewho planned the air crash knew that airer the wholeTutsi community followed the theory that the departureof Frenchtroops in late 1993 the Habyarimanaregime had plannedthe genocide. eliminationofHabyarimana could lead fo the military Thismore or lessofficial version was laid down in a
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bookedited in Londonin 1994by RakiyaOmaar, critics29oftheArusha Protocols were taking part in Directorof AfricanRights 26. (Omaar1994) Only a conspiracy.If they wanted to delivera message to somemonths later, in 1995,Gérard Prunier who is Habyarimanathey had otherpossibilities to let a sortof a French"dissident" toMitterrand wasable Habyarimanaknow their position than anonymous to publishhis book in Englishtransmitting thesame letters. message.(Prunier 1995)¯ AlisonDes Forgesconsiders the letter authentic Nowadaysthe Tutsiopposition to Kagamé,living becauseits content is similarto thefamous phrase partlyin Brusselsand partly in the U.S., seems tobe of LéonMugesera "He who wishesfor peacepre- convinced,as DeusKagiraneza has testified March paresfor war." Her appreciation could be right,but 1,2002,at theBelgium Senate that the Tutsi popu- it maynot be. The RPF knew the position of Mugesera lationwhich had not left the country with the nobility andcould easily have used it for itspropaganda in theperiod form 1959 to 1964was "sacrificed" by purposes.The RPF wasin anycase interested in theRPF in theinterest ofits military victory and the accusingthe opponents to theArusha Protocols to establishmentof its undisputed rule in Rwanda. provokeethnic hatred.
Melvern- taki ng fromalready known sou rces- pre- The anonymousletter of December3, 1993 sentsthree pieces of evidencefor both versions of "In eadyDecember 1993, peacekeepers received theplanning theory an anonymousletter from Rwandan army moderates wamingthat President Juvenal Habyarimana had - the anonymousAMASUSU-letter of January 1993; conceiveda’Machiavellian Plan’for political assas- - theletter written by anonymousofficers to Dallaire sinationsand ethnicmassacres across the coun- on December3, 1993; try."3°The letter is confirmedby many sources since - the"Jean-Pierre-information" transmitted to New copieshad been sent to the diplomaticmissions. Yorkby GeneralDallaire on January11,1994¯ Nobodycan prove that it waswritten by the"mode- rates"referred to. Normally the army is presented It is worthwhileto havea closerlook on these asthe stronghold ofthe "Hutu extremists ».Is it likely documents. thatail of a suddendovish officers got the upper hand who accuseHabyarimana to be a hawk? The anonymousAMASUSU-letter AlisonDes Forges writes: ’oEhe congruence of inte- It seemsmore likely that the authors could be found restbetween hard-line soldiers and anti-Tutsi mili- in RPF circlesthan in the RwandanArmy. tantsreappeared in January 1993 just after the third of theArusha protocols was signed. On January20, The"Jean-Pierre Informations" of Jan. 10, 1994 a groupof soldierscalling themselves Amasusu Melvern’sdescription of how "Jean-Pierre" passed sentan aggressiveopen letter to Habyarimana.(...) his informationto UNAMIRis worthquoting in CommandantM=ke ¯ was27’ a pseudonym,of course, extenso: butit seemslikely that he is eitherCol. Théoneste "InJanuary Dallaire was told the Interahamwe was Bagosoraor someoneworking closely with him". receivingmilitary training. Then on 10 Januarysome- (DesForges, 1999, p. 104/5)"Commandant Mike" oneelse came forward, this time from the heart of warns,"the RPF had better clear out of thecountry theHutu Power network, who agreedto meetMar- beforeit is toolate." He asksHabyarimana:"How do chai31 onlyat night,and alone. Marchal met the man youexpect to stopus fromdelivering an exemplary by candlelight.They both laid their pistols on the lessonto traitorsinside the country? After ail, we table.The man’scodename was Jean-Pierreand havealready identified the most virulent of them he hadbeen introduced to the intelligence network andwill strike them like lighting." by a seniorpolitician 32.Jean-Pierre had a most extraordinarystory to tell.He wasa formermember Des Forgesdares to make the riskyequation of thepresident’s security guard, who had worked Amasusu= Bagosora. Is shein a positionto produce as a chauffeur,and was now a seniortrainer in the any"hard" evidence"? It is unlikely.Linda Melvern Interahamwe.Hissalary came from the ruling party goes even further:"Bagosora,Nsengiyumwa 28 and MRNDD.He toldMarchal that 1,700 Interahamwe othersset aboutcreating a secretHutu Power had been trainedin Rwandanarmy camps and societywithin the army called Amasusu" (p.63.) thesemen werenow scatteredin groupsof forty Shegives no evidenceto provethat the well-known throughoutthe city. (...) Up untilnow Jean-Pierre
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had supposedthat the Interahamwehad been murderwas unfortunately common. In thefirst days createdin orderto protectKigali form the RPF. But afterthe death of Habyarimana,people on thelists he saidthat since October he hadbeen ordered to were37 killed by thePresidential Guard and the RPF. registerTutsi in Kigali. Hewas certain that it was for theirextermination, forthe Interahamwewas now Theselists cannot nonetheless be taken as evidence beingtrained to kill up to 1,000people every twenty forgenocidal planning. The genocide after the retreat minutes."(p.92) of theblue helmets an Apri121,1994was executed mostotten by illiterate young people without lists. GeneralDallaire sent a confidentialcable to his headquartersin New Yorkon January14, 199433. Thiscable is normallytaken as irrefutableevidence Who wanted the Rwandan Patriotic Front of theplanning theory, although Dallaire has written: to win the war in Rwanda and take power "Forcecommander does have certain reservations also in the Congo? on thesuddenness of change of heartof theinfor- mantto comeclean with this information. Recce of SamanthaPower asks in herarticle: "Who were the armscache and detailed planning of raidto go on peoplein [theClinton Administration] whoruade the lateto morrow. Possibility ofa trap not fully excluded, life-and-deathdecisions that dictated U.S. policy? as thismay be a set-upagainst the very important Whydid they decide (or decide not to decide) politicalperson." theydid? Were any voices inside or outsidethe U.S. governmentdemanding that the UnitedStates do more?"Convincing answers still don’t exist. Regardingthe circumstancesof thistestimonv Dallaire’swarning that Jean-Pierre Turatsinze wasasked to playthe role of an agentprovocateur Analyzingthe events in CentralAfrica since 1990 a shouldbe takeninto serious consideration. Those majorpolitical change can be observedwhen the who may haveplanned that trap knewthat the ClintonAdministration tookoffice in January1993. mandateof UNAMIRexcluded the seizureof arms The formerUndersecretary of State for African cachesindicated by "Jean-Pierre’’35¯ Andin fact, AffairsHerman Cohen stated in Parisbefore the NewYork ordered no actionto be takenand Jean- InformationCommission of the FrenchNational PierreTuratsinze not to be broughtout of the Assemblythat the US hadno interestin supporting country.(He later on "disappeared"without leaving the RPFwhile he wasin office.When the Clinton anytrace!) Administrationcame in thingschanged slightly. In the beginningGeorge Moose, the successorof In January1994 the planning of theassassination of HermanCohen, followed his Iow-profilepolicy Habyarimanamust have been under way. The towardsCentral Africa. But his role diminished in an plannerswere aware that it couldbe usefulfo obviousway and Madeleine Albright came gradually forwarddocuments after that event "proving" that tothe forefront. Habyarimanawas the"Machiavellian" spirit whose existencewas already established in the"Amasusu" But even in 1990,when Herman Cohen believes letter. thatthe U.S.government had no interestin the victoryof theRPF, this organization already had The"Jean-Pierre" story was in anycase very suc- someimportant friends in the UnitedStates. The cessfulsince honest people like Alison Des Forges, 1988 WashingtonConference on the problemof theJ° formerSwedish Prime Minister Carlsson RwandanRefugees in Ugandacan be identifiedas (Carlsson1999) and others still consider the cable the startingpoint of the pro-RPFpolicy. Some to be themost convincing "evidence" of the planned monthslater the present President of Rwanda,Paul genocide.However it can hardlybe assessedas Kagamé,came to ForthLeawenworth (Kansas) for such.Following Dallaire’s warning historians should furthermilitary train ing. After the invasion ofRwanda be cautious. he was orderedback and startedhis ultimately successfulcampaign fo takepower in Rwanda.His KillingIists friendRoger Winter, the directorof the US Somepublications refer to "killing lists" to prove the Committeefor Refugees, was during ail thattime planningof thegenocide. Such lists existed and oneof hisAmerican "guardian angels". Winter can containedon theHutu as wellas on theTutsi side be consideredas a partof a "non-official"USforeign namesof politicalopponents to be killed.Political policyteam. The PrayerBreakfast movement was
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anotherpart of this"shadow-foreign-policy" estab- an anti-Khartoumcoalition formed by theso-called lishment.Rudolf Decker, the unofficial represen- "newgeneration of Africanleaders" from Asmara, tativeof thePrayer Breakfast in Germany,has re- viaAddis Ababa, Kampala, Kigali, Buju mbura finally vealedin a booklethow the later US Ambassadorto to Kinshasa. Kigali,David Rawson, managed together with him to be an integralpart of theArusha negotiations in Observers-Warren Christopher among them with 1992/1993.Fromthat moment on, the US involve- hispro-democracy speech in AddisAbaba on Octo- mentin Rwandanaffairs became unofficially official. ber10, 1996,-wondered very soon if thenew allies Rawsonpushed Habyarimana strongly to go to Dar- whodefied ail democratic options would be suitable. es-Salaamand wasthe firstto evacuateAmerican Themost astonishing of these western allies was nationalsfrom Rwanda and leftthe countryafter LaurentKabila who, despite his long anti-American Habyarimana’sdeath. Did he knowthattheAmerican past,came to be consideredas oneof these"new policyhad opted for a RPFvictory? leaders"and was flown to Kinshasain May1997 by American38. pilots AfterApril 6, 1994,it becameobvious that the Clin- tonAdministration endorsed that option. Had the In December1997 Madeleine Albright in conformity ClintonAdministration a strategy in thisrespect? To withthe extreme conservative wing of theAmerican answerthis question we shouldknow, once again, foreignpolicy establishment represented by Jesse if themost sophisticated attack on theairplane was Helms,publicly asked in Kampalathe SouthSudan organizedwith the helpof agencies- or at teast leaderJohn Garang to attackKhartoum. Probably partsof them- withconnections to the West. MadeleineAlbright was not very interested in estab- lishingan independentChristian South-Sudan State, Theunconditional support for the new military regime as werethe BreakfastPrayer Movement and Senator inKigali and the US support for its invasion of Congo JesseHelms. She was moredriven by theKhartoum togetherwith other"new African leaders" make clear question. thepro-RPF option. This political option is notjust an expressionof the "guilt complex" for not having Duringhis trip to Africain March1998 Clinton gave preventedthe genocide. hisblessing to thatstrategy but expressed some doubtswhen meeting Kabila. One day earlier in Ki- A Sudan Syndrome ? galihe hadmade a veryastonishing declaration. He It is notapure coincidence that in 1993/1994when acknowledgedthat in 1994people"sitting around in the Rwandancdsis became more acute the regime officesdid not fully appreciate the depth and the in Sudancame openly under rhetorical fire. Sudan speed"of the Rwandantragedy. Only some weeks wasclassified as a "roguestate". Following the de- laterthe coalition ofthe "new African leaders" implo- cisionnot to sendAmerican soldiers to Africaafter ded.War brokeout betweenEritrea and Ethiopia Somalia,the British ally Museveni was going to get and on August2, 1998Laurent Kabila refused to moreimportant. He was threatenedby Khartoum playthe role he wassupposed to play.In August andcooperated with the south-Sudan rebels under 1998-during the most threatened point of hispoli- JohnGarang. As a militaryleader Museveniwas not ticalcareer after having confessed his affair with veryinterested inthe democratization policy launch- MonicaLewinsky - he neverthelessordered the ed by Mitterrandand JamesBaker in 1990.He bombardmentof Khartoum. This event, with its de- offeredto serveas an allyagainst Khartoum and vastatingeffect on theArab world, marked the com- suggestedthat he be freedfrom the"democratization pletefailure of theattempt to bringdown the Khar- pressure".At thesame rime- as alreadymentioned toumregime by force.The record was horrible. "Af- - he askedfor support to "relieve"him of hisTutsi rica’sFirst World War", as MadeleineAlbright friendsand helpthem to returnfo Rwanda. describedit in a sessionof theUN SecurityCouncil on January24, 2000, came into being. The democra- Thenew anti-Khartoum policy and its consequences ticmovement that also sprang up in CentralAfrica werenot compatiblewith Mitterrand’s pro-Arab afterthe fall of theBerlin wall was destroyed. policy.The dialoguewith Mitterrand’s France WarrenChristopher’s warning against military concerningCentral Africa was phased out. regimeshas proved to be correct.
Especiallyafter MadeleineAIbright became Manyfacts indicate that the Bush jr. Administration SecretaryofState in 1997she tried hard fo establish aftertaking office on January20, 2001 was ready to
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takeup a newstance in CentralAfrican affairs. in February1993 for the secondtime and the WhenKagamé and Kabilajr.were-only some days governmentin Paris became aware that the interna- afterLaurent Kabila’s death -"ordered" to take part tionalmood was rather anti-French because of ot- in theNational Prayer Breakfast in theUSAthe new hermuch criticized military involvement in Africa, Secretaryof StateColin Powetl told them that the Francewas- again in accordancewith the American U S didnot favor any more the ongoing secession of policyrather keen to leavethe Rwandan theater theCongo Kivu Provinces and that Rwandan troops whena quicklynegotiated power-sharing agreement mustpull out of theCongo in exchangefor security wasreached in Arusha.France actually withdrew, guaranteesagainst invasion by formerRwandan butwas rather astonished when the US optedin fa- Armyunits. September 11,2001, slowed down Ame- vorof theRPF after the foreseeable implementation ricanpressure. But finally both had to signsuch an problemsof the ArushaAgreement. When Mitter- agreementin Pretoriaon July30, 2002, brokered by randwas about to preventsuch a victoryand wan- theSouth African government with US support.If tedto optfor an interventionto stop the genocide, theseagreements were applied, peace could corne hisPrime Minister Balladur strongly opposed such backto CentralAfrica. a course.France started her now almost completed militaryretreat from Sub-Saharan Africa. Buildingup new democraticstructures will be a J difficulttask. Reaching that goal is alsoin theUS Butfora very complicated setof reasons international interestto contribute to the truthful analysis of what publicopinion - theabove mentioned book by Gé- happenedbetween 1990 and 1998 in the Great rardPrunier andthewritings of Jean-Pierre Chrétien Lake’sRegion in CentralAfrica. - stillholdsFrance to be mostlyresponsible forthe Rwandangenocide. Some also maintain that the The role of France CatholicChurch, in alliancewith France, was a res- As it waspointed out before, France was in complete ponsibleforce behind the genocide. Non-partisan harmonywith the US governmentregarding the researchwill come to theconclusion that neither democratizationpolicy to be appliedin Africaafter deservesto be consideredas the "main culprit" in theend of thecold war. And despite minor rivalries theCentral African catastrophe. Responsibility must overthe growing American influence in the traditional be sharedby many. "francophone"countries the U.S. agreed with the Frenchcommitment in favorof Habyarimanafollo- wingthe invasion of October1, 1990.The former Germancolonies Ruanda and Urundi (later govemed Conclusion by Belgiumunder the mandateof the Leagueof TheGreat Lake’s Region in Africawas in a spaceof Nationsand UN-trusteeship)only came under 30 yearsthe theater of fourgenocides or genocidal Frenchinfluence in the earlyseventies. France mass-killings. supportedthe Tutsi dominated army in Burundiand livedon goodterms with the Hutu-regime in Rwanda. Burundi1972 In 1990both partners were told by theUnited States In1972 in Burundithe Hutu Intelligentsia waskilled thattheir regimes had to seekmore legitimacy mainlyby theBurundian Army. The killingswere amongthe population.In the beginningFrance organizedby the State and no officialinvestigation wonderedif it shouldfollow such a policy.Only after has been undertakenso far. René Lemarchand a periodof hesitationwas Mitterrand ready to go spokerecently of the"conspiracy of silence" con- alongwith the Americans to saygood-bye to the cerningthis genocide". (Lemarchand 2002) France "cronies"of theCold War. Habyarimana maintained hasever since supported the Tutsi-dominatedBu- someobjections and compliedafter he received rundianArmy which was responsible. The historian militaryguarantees against groups that could try to Jean-PierreChrétien, who mademost of hispro- overcomethe established order by force. fessionalcareer in Bujumbura,contributed much to the "democracy-sceptical"position of lhe French In Burundithe democratization succeeded in the leftwhich was never interested in scrutinizing people summerof 1993withdemocratic presidential elec- beingheld responsible for the events that occurred tions,but France continued its cooperation with the in Burundiin 1972and still being in power. Tutsi-dominatedarmy. An oftenasserted French altinityfor "the Hutu" never existed. And when Rwanda1994 in areasheld by theIntedm Governrnent Frenchtroops hadto save the Habyarimanaregime Themassacres of the Tutsipopulation in 1994are
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officiallyrecognized as genocide.Most knowledge 1994,the available facts already allow a typeof is availableonthis crime since it happened publicly. processbased on "circumstantialevidence". On Ail seriousresearchers agree that it couldhave thatbasis it canbe ruledout that "Hutu extremists" beenprevented, but two members ofthe UN Security shotdown the plane.A lotof credibletestimony Councilblocked any action. There is disagreement pointsin anotherdirection. Butthe full truth of how withinthe research communitywhether thegenocide thecrash was organized cannot yet be established. was centrallyplanned before and duringits Historiansand other researchers have a lotof work execution.Some maintain that it wasplanned by to do. EspeciallyAmerican researchers should organsof the RwandanState long beforethe encouragethe US Governmentand/or Congress to assassinationof the Presidentsof Rwandaand undertakeserious investigations. Itcou Id be painful, Burundion April6, 1994.Others are convinced that but it is necessaryin the interestof themoral it wasa genocidesui generisthat happened in a leadershiprole that the United States has to play in vacuumof Statepower after that event.This Post-Cold-Warworld politics. [email protected] hypothesistakes it thatthe Interim Government establishedon April 9, 1994,that had to fleethree timesbefore arriving finally in exile mid-July 1994, Bibliography wasnot in a positionto organizeanything. It was Boutros-Ghali,B.(1999). Unvanquished: a U.S.-U.N. saga. mass-killingsby the masseswith rudimentary New York,Random House. armaments.In this characterization it was genocide Carlsson,I.(1999). Report of theIndependent Inquiry into beyondState-p!anning. It was a crimeagainst theActions of theUnited Nations during the 1994 humanitynonetheless and can hardlybe excused Genocidein Rwanda.New York,United Nations as "normalwar proceedings". Organization. DesForges, A. (1999).Leave None to Tellthe Sto-ry. Rwanda1994 in RPF-controlledare, as Genocidein Rwanda.New York et al.,Human Rights Thekillings of Hutuin theByumba Province didn’t Watch. occurofficially. The RwandanRPF-State denies Halberstam,D. (2002). War in a rimeof peace.Bush, thatmass-killings were undertakenby the RPF Clintonand the Generals. London, Bloomsbury Pub- whileconquering the country. None of thewestern lishing.(Asvaluable background information forthe Clinton era.) secretservices has declassified itsknowledge. The zonewas declared secret during the civil war. The Lemarchand,R. (2002). Le génocidede 1972au Burundi: Les° silences del’Histoire." DIALOGUE, BruxeUes 34(N GersonyReport gave detailedhints, but was 228):3-24. classifiedby the UN. 39 Howeverexperts like Filip Masire,K., Ed. (2000). Rwanda: the preventable genocide. Reyntjenshave asked on severaloccasions to Reportbythe International Panelof E mi-nent Personalities undertakeinvestigations. te !m:est!g~_te!he!99A Gen~i_rl~_ inRwan_rla ~n~ thp SurroundingEvents. Addis Ababa, Organization ofAfrican FormerZalre 1996/1997 Unity/IPEP. Thekillings of theRwandan refugees in EasternEx- Melvern,L. (2000).A people betrayed. The role of the ) Zaireorganized by AFDLand the RPFArmy between Westin Rwanda’sgenocide. London New York,Zed November1994 and April 1995 are not yet officially Books(Distributed inthe USA exclusively bySt. Martin’s recognizedas genocide.Only semi-official Press).ISBN: 1- 85649-830-1.272p. investigationshave been undertaken so far.But N’Gbanda,H.N.K.A. (1999). Ainsi sonne le glaslLes derniersjours du MaréchalMobutu. Paris, Edi-tions sinceail necessary information is available, an in- Gideppe(58, rue de Lisbonne, 75008 Paris). depthassessment would be easy. Omaar,R., Ed. (1994). Rwanda. Death, Despair and Defiance.London, African Rights. A fullassessment of that period of Africanhistory is Onana,C. andD. Mushayidi(2001). Les Secrets notyet possible. On theone hand too many of the GënocideRwandais. Enquètes sur les myslères d’un peopleinvolved are still in powerand on theother président.Paris, Editions MINSI. handin some countries it is stillconsidered tobe in Power,S. (2001).Bystanders 1ogenocide. Whythe United the"national interest" not fo revealwhat has been StatesLet the Rwandan Tragedy Happen. Atlantic Monthly donein thename of thosenations. 288(2/2001(September)): 84-108. Prunier,G.(1995). The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994. History We are stillin a phaseof askingquestions and of a Genocide.London, Hurst and Company. reflectingon somehypotheses. In the case of the Reyntjens,F. (1995). Rwanda: trois jours qui ont fait downingof the Presidentialairplane on April6, basculerl’histoire. Paris, L’Harmattan.
388 H.Strizek,Linda Melvern Ruanda/IAF4/2002
Anmerkungen lo Ref.to the article "Jalons vers la tragédietotale" in: 1 Melvern,Linda, A pooplebetrayed. The role of theWest L’AGORA,July 1995. in Rwanda’sgenocide. London/New York, Zed Books, " Forexample, refer to DesForges, 1999, p. 159and Mel- 2000.272 p. (ISBN:1-85649-830-1 (cased); 1-85649-831 vern,2000, p. 91.According fo Melvernthe paper was x limp;in SouthAfrica 0 62026654 6 limp passedto UNAMIRbut "not until the genocide was over." 2 BaronessLinda Chalker was at thatt/me Britain’s minister 1= Thesefacts have been confirmed by Mobutu. for overseasdevelopment. She is the mostimportant 13 Noteven France who Iost 3 nationals,the crew being personalityamong those who, in thelate 80s, after his French. militaryvictory in Uganda’scivil war"integrated" theformer 14 Thefact is confirmedby thoseRPF members present in MarxistYoweri Museveni into the "western community". theevening of April6, 1994at theRPF-headquarters in 3 BiographicalNote: "Trained on localnewspapers before Mulindi,especially by Jean-PierreMugabe who gave his arrivingin FleetStreet where she worked on theEvening testimonyin exile published byThe International Strategic Newsand the Evening Standard. She then moved to the StudiesAssociation, April 24, 2000, Alexandria, Virginia, SundayT/mes working first in thenewsroom and then in USA. theInsight Team. Her first book, Techno-Bandits, (co- l s CharlesOnana is ajournalistfrom Cameroon, Déogratias authored),was published in 1984by HoughtonM/filin, Boston.In 1986she published The End of theStreet, an Mushayidiis a RwandanTutsi in exile. accountof RupertMurdoch’s secret plan to movehis titles 1« Morecomplete quotation in French:"11 est vrai, tout toa non-unionplant. In 1995she published a secret history d’abord,que le génocideest un crimeinnommable. Il est of theUnited Nations, The Uit/mate Crime. Who Betrayed vrai,ensuite, que la communautéinternationale n’apas pu theUN andWhy, Ail/son and Busby. Her account of tne intervenirentemps utile pour y mettrefin; il est vrai aussi genocidein Rwanda,A PeopleBetrayed, the Role of the que nousavons - j’étaismoi-même membre du bureau Westin Rwanda’sGenocide was published in September politique- interdit à celle-ci d’intervenir parce que nous 2000by Zed Books.She is an HonoraryFellow of the venionsde perdretoute la matièreutile, sur le planpoli- Universityof Wales,Aberystwyth, in the Department of tiqueen moinsde dix jours. En moinsde dixjours, on a vu InternationalPolitics."(From:http://www.reportin.q theworld. les rues se joncherde cadavres;le nombrede personnes or.q/clients/rtwhome.nsf/LKcontpcts/Linda+Melvern? tuéesdans ce lapsde tempsest évalué à 200.000.Ce opendocument) chiffreahurissant montre que le génocideétait consommé. 4 "InJanuary 1997 in NewYork an extraordinarydocument (...)Du coup, toute la matière utile, sur les plans politique washanded to journal/stLinda Melvern. A contemporary et économiquea été éliminée en moinsde dixjours. C’est accountof secretand informal meetings held by the doncun calculpoliticien qui a donnélieu au sacrifice- SecurityCouncil of theUnited Nations. It was155 pages l’histoirejugera, plus tard, le bureau politique, dontj’ai tait long.This was an unprecedentedleak of information.For partie- de 800.000personnes pour, finalement ne rien thefirst t/me in UN historyitwas possible to know what was gagner.(...) Si aprèsdix jours, l’ONU avait envoyé sur saidin secretCouncil meetings, andin thiscase during the placeun délugede forcesarmées, comme au Kosovo,on firstcrucial weeks of thegenocide in Rwanda.The auraitpu sauverne serait-ceque 500.000 personnes, ce documentdetailed ail of thesecret meetings of the Council quiest loin d’ètre négligeable." (Compte rendu de l’audition in Apriland May 1994." (Information of the Univers/iv of de M. DeusKagiraneza devant la Commissiond’enquête Wales,Aberystwyth, via www.~ber.ac.uklaberonline/uwo parlementaire
389 IAF4/2002/Ruanda H.Stritzek,Linda Melvern
familyin Kigali. Probably heplayed the role of an enemyof culerl’histoire. Paris, L’Harmattan. hispeople to be compensatedlater. Nevertheless it still »4 Thefull name was passed on by FilipReyntjens. remainsa mystery how he could do his horrible"job" untilthe »s On thefollowing day Luc Marchal sent a Senegalese end,not having been disturbed by UNAMIRor theRPF. 25Melvern characterizes if asa "desk-levelanalysis given peacekeeperto a buildingindicated by theinformant to theState Department" that was passed to UNAMIR"not belongingto thestate party MRNDD on theKimihurura bill nearthe Center of Kigali.Accordung to Melvern137 Ka- untilthe genocide was over". (p.91) lashnikovswere found (p.95).(Other sources give smaller 2«African Rights can be characterizedas a Iobby group for figures).Tofind some rifles in a Stateowned building is the RPF. actuallynota convincing evidence in a countryfull of arms 2~ Theletter was signed "Commandant Mike Tango." tornby civilwar. Melvern indicates for instance that the 2a Lieutenant-ColonelAnatole Nsengiyumwa was the chief RPFat thesame time "secretely reinforced the battalion in of armyintelligence (G2). Kigaliwith arms and ammunition, smuggled in fromthe z~ Melvernrefers to secretreports sent to thePresident northernheadquarters." (p.101) withwarnings against powersharing. (p.62) 3« TheCarlsson Report uses the,,Jean-Pierre-informations" zo Kuperman,Alan J. (Institutefor the Study of World as themain source to accuseUN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Politics),December 29,1998, The Washington Post. Annanfo be somewhatresponsible for the Rwandan 31 ColonelLuc Marchalwas the headof the Belgian Tutsi-genocide. »7 Cf.to Reyntjens,1995, p.62. contingentof UNAMIR. 3a In a TV reportrealized by theMunich based catholic »= The personwas FaustinTwagiramungu, the interim PrimeMinister mentioned in theArusha Agreements of organizationMISSIO, one of thesepilots testifies that tact. August4, 1993.When contacted by "Jean-Pierre"Twa- 39 For instanceNkiko Nsengimana, the Coordinator of giramungusent him to UNAMIR. CongresDemocratique Africain (CDA), mentioned thJs 3»Filip Reyntjens gothold of it and published itfirst in 1995. reportin a letterto KofiAnnan dated December 21,2000, Reyntjens,F. (1995). Rwanda: trois jours qui ont fait bas- andurged him fo declassifythis report.
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