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Short Analysis of a People Betrayed Ruanda DATE ADMITTED., ~....., ..... ~.. NAMEOF WITNIESfl.~........... HelmutStrizek The main RPF argumentsare - The RPFis a "liberationmovement" to overcome LindaMelvern is right,but... the’Iotalitarian" Habyarimana regime. - Anybody-namely France-who opposed the RPF ShortAnalysis of takingpower in Kigali is blamedfor anti-Tutsi racism. A PeopleBetrayed - Oppositionto the Arusha Agreements of August 4, 1993,is characterized as support for the planning of Therole of theWest in Rwanda’s genocide. genocideBy LindaMelvern (2001)1 Despitethe fact that he wasmurdered, Habyari- manais regardedas thespiritual father of theTutsi Summary genocide. Melvernpoints out that in 1994the interna- - "Hutuextremists" had killed Habyarimana because tionalcommunity failed in itsobligation tointervene finallyhe wasnot ready to executehis own plans. againsta genocidethat could have been prevented. - Themilitary offensive immediately after the crash of thePresidential airplane onApril 6,1994, was launched The internationalcommunity acted against to stopthe genocide. theclear advice of GeneralDallaire, the Com mander of the UN PeacekeepingForcein Rwanda (UNAMIR) Thegenocidejustified theRPF in notapply- whohad repeatedly stated that the ongoing genocide ing the provisionsof theArusha Agreements, in couldbe stoppedif he hadappropriate orders and claimingthe absolute political leadership in Kigali support.Both were refused. andin postponingdemocratic elections ad calendas graecas. On thebasis of irrefutabledocuments, Mel- verndescribes that these denials were the result of In thelight of Melvern’sfindings, this argu- deliberatepolicies forced on theUN Security Council mentadopted in linewith most of thewestern inqui- mainlyby theClinton Administration andGreat Bri- ries,is in dangerof beingconsidered partisan. tain- underthe influence of LadyChalker 2 - with Especiallythetheory of thegenocide plann- the agreementof Belgium. ingby Habyarimanaturns out to serveas an alibito Melvernproves that the argument put for- veilthe fact that the international community by the wardlater that these countries were not aware of de factoretreat of theblue helmets unleashed ’lhe thegenocidal character of the mass killings against hu manbeasr’. Its existence and danger was known theTutsi population isnot justified. to everybodyand an nouncedby Dallaireand respon- siblehuman rights organizations. Countriessuch as Nigeriaand the Czech Republichadclearlywarnedagainsttheconsequen- An analysisof the"evidence" putforward to cesof theUN SecurityCouncil decision of Apri121, provethe existence of "genocideorganizations" by 1994,to reducethe peacekeeping force to a symbolic Melvernand others suggests- having been mostly numberof 270soldiers. This decision allowed the communicatedanonymously - the needto be very ongoinggenocide to spread cautious.Itcannot be ruledout that "traps" were set in anticipationof the later necessity to apportion It is,however, difficult to understandwhy blame. LindaMelvern doesn’t try to contrasther findings to theusual explanation of what had occurred in the Ailinformation available nowadays contra- GreatLakes Region. She adopts most of theargu- dictsthe "Hutu extremisr’ theory also used by Mel- mentsmade by the RwandanPatriotic Front to vernconcerning the air crash on April6, 1994. justifyits political action to re-conquer power in Ki- Buteven if Melvernshould have been more gali,Iost by theirpredecessors as a resultot a cautiousin acceptingthe usual explanations, her democraticreferendum on September25, 1961. main messageis welldocumented: The Rwandan 375 IAF4/2OO2/Ruanda H.Stritzek,LindaMelvern peoplehas been betrayed; the Tutsi by nothaving LindaMelvern also deserves thanks for having paid beenprotected and the Rwandannation as a whole homageto PhilippeGaillard, the representative of by the factthat a preventablegenocide could be theRed Cross, who relentlessly tried to savepeople executed,tarnishing the Rwandan future. evenin the mosthopeless circumstances. - Ailfurther research needed to shedlight on but... theCentral African tragedy with its millions of dead in Rwanda,Burundi and Congoshould start from Despiteail the positive elements of LindaMelvern’s thatpoint. publicationit should be stressedthat she could havescrutinized more closety the backgroundto herfindings. When she blamesthe BritishAmbas- sadorfor what he wassaying in thesecret meetings Introduction of theU N SecurityCouncil she rarely undertakes an in-depthanalysis of hisdeclarations. She seems A remarkablebook... reluctantto wonder if politicalobjectives may have guidedthe governments that insisted on refusing LindaMelvern 3 publishedin 2000a remarkable eventhe mostreasonable and modestdemands of book:A peoplebetrayed. The roleof theWest in GeneralDallaire. Rwanda’sgenocide.(Melvern 2000) It is remarkable becauseit addsvaluable details to theknowledge Herfindings call for further examination ofthe usual so farpublished on wh at wasdiscussed and decided explanationsfor the Rwandan catastrophe starting on Rwandain the secretsessions of the United on October1,1990, Linda Melvern could have tried Nation’sSecurity Council during the summerof to answerfour main questions: 1994.Linda Melvern doesn’t reveal how she got this "hot"information. 4 Melvernconfirms many aspects - Did the situationof the Tutsiemigrants of thememoirs of BoutrosBoutros-Ghali published mainlyin Ugandajustify a military attack against a in 1999.(Boutros-Ghali 1999) She points out clearly sovereignstate with ail its consequences? thatthe members of theSecurity Council were very wellinformed-at leasP about the ongoing genocide - Is thereany evidence that Hutu extremists perpetratedagainst the Tutsipopulation within couldhave killed two Presidents and a majorpart of Rwanda.But the West - againstthe recommen- the Rwandanarmy’s leadership? dationsof Nigeriafor example - wasnot ready to - Doesn’tthe "planning theory" of genocide stopit althoughitwould have been possible to doso. serveas a pretextfor non-intervention andbehaving GeneralRoméo Dallaire, the commanderof the - to usethe word of SamanthaPower- li ke "bystan- bluehelmets in Kigali,had from the very beginning ders"? (POWER 2001) e,.pi,i~~izudii~i~ipu~~ibiiiiy. - Why did the Anglophoneworld favor the RPF victory? In 2000the Organizationof African Unity (OAU) alsocame to the same conclusion.On July 10, The presentpaper analyses Linda Melvern’s argu- 2000,it publishedits voluminous report elaborated mentsrelating to theRwandan tragedy and confronts by a seven-memberInternational Panel of Eminent themwith the available facts and findings on a "hid- Persons(IPEP) under the direction of SirKetumile denagenda" concerning the Central African cri-sis, Masire(former President of Botswana)6 withthe triggeredby the crash of thepresidential aircraft in title:Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. What the Kigalion April6, 1994at 8.30p.m. Worldcould have done. (Masire 2000) Melvern points outin richdetail her main hypothesis:The Rwandan Tutsiwere betrayed. The facts are indisputable. Therewas no lackof informationand the genocide Was the RPF invasion of Rwanda was preventable.Those who couldhave prevented justifled? it inventeda whole series of prelextsnot do so. Thebook gives the best description published so far On October1, 1990,a groupof soldierscoming of how the CanadianGeneral Dallairewas fromUganda attacked Rwanda. They were part of discouragedfrom laking action in favorof the theRwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the armed wing threatenedpopulations. He had to sufferail sorts of of the RwandanPatriotic Front (RPF). Insiders humiliationsin the mosl horrible situations. knewthat the descendantsof the Tutsi oligarchy that had left Rwandabetween1959 and 1964 376 H.Strizek,Linda Melvern Ruanda/IAF4/2002 controlledthe RPF¯ Most of theirancestors fled to cendantsof theTutsi aristocracy in Uganda became Ugandaand Burundi.In 1963they tried, after a - firstin oppositionto Obote, then as alliesof Idi seriesof failedattempts, to regain power by force¯ Aminand later on of YoweriMuseveni - part of the Theyfailed again and mass killings took place in internalproblems of thatcountry. Rwandaagainst the Tutsi population¯ A mass exodus of Tutsifrom Rwanda followed in thebeginning of Theeconomic crisis in thewhole region in thelate 1964. eightiesaggravated the regional tensions¯ The Tutsi problemin Ugandabecame acute again. Yoweri The term genocidewas used- for instanceb~ Museveni,their protector in thishistorical phase, BertrandRussell - for the first time in theRegion. becameinterested in helping his allies during his Beforethat political murder was commonbut the armedconquest of Ugandain 1986- organizedin numberof victimslimited. A long lasting conflict the above-mentionedRwandan Patriotic Front-to tookroots. "gohome" and take power in Kigali.Melvern is right whenwriting: "While the Rwandan officer corps was Thedifferences between the population groups of an assetfor Museveni,the Rwandansthemselves Tutsiand Hutuin Rwandaand Burundidated from werea problem.There were increasing complaints beforethe colonial era but became virulent during amongUgandan officers that they were discrimi- ! thedecolonization process when the question came natedagainst in favorof Rwandansin the army¯" up of whetherthe pre-colonial monarchies in both (p¯28) countriesshould be reestablishedas independent states. TheRPF had succeeded in presentingitself to the restof the world as a non-ethnic liberation movement. Whereasthe pre-colonialTutsi-dominated order Afterthe death of FredRwigyema, the first president couldbe maintainedin
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