The Rwandan Genocide: The True Motivations for Mass Killings MOISE JEAN What were you doing during the spring of 1994? Were you watching the solar eclipse, following the breaking news of the low speed OJ Simpson Bronco chase, or even better using Yahoo search for the first time? While the world was focused on these events, Rwanda was facing a systematic eradication of a people. During the period of April to June 1994, Hutu extremist massacred hundreds of thousands of Tutsi and their Hutu sympathizers. Many Americans and others in the international community maintained the sentiment that the violence was just part of the never ending Rwandan civil war or a continuation of a “tribal conflict” which was viewed as commonplace in Africa. However, collateral damage of a civil war cannot account for the death of 800,000 civilians in three months. This massacre was premeditated genocide. Regardless of who in the international community was watching or not willing to help stop the genocide, what was the motivating force that would lead to extreme measures such as mass killings? Many scholars believe the long lasting ethnic conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi was the seed to the development of the genocide. In this paper I will investigate the true motivation of the 1994 Rwandan genocide as more than just social divide and ethnic hatred between the Hutu and the Tutsi; but due to the seeds of the economic recession and the civil war, which allowed the Northern Hutu elites to use their manipulating power over the masses and inciting ethnic division in order to maintain political power. Historiography: Other Schools of Thought on the Genocide Rwanda is a small landlocked nation in the Great Lakes region in the heart of Africa. It is approximately 10,000 square miles with a temperate climate, and vast topography.i The population of Rwanda is made up of three ethnic groups. One percent of the population are Twa (from pigmy hunters), fourteen percent are Tutsi (from Ethiopian pastoralist), and eighty five percent are Hutu (from Bantu farmers). ii What is the motivating force of Rwanda’s history? What caused violence between these groups? Some may argue that stress catalyzes human history. Stressors create an environment that makes reactions an essential occurrence. The lack of something, the need for something, or the fear of something, causes humans to respond and attempt to implement a change to tha t i Susan E. Cook, Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transactions Publishers, 2006). ii Kingsley C. Moghalu, Rwanda's Genocide: The Politics of Global Justice. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). situation. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, what motivating force had such a stronghold on people that ethnic cleansing was the answer? Did stressors of ethic differences, politics, or economics motivate it? Some historians argue that the motivating seeds for this three month massacre began hundreds of years prior. Others believe the seeds developed due to political and economic stressors during a ten year period. In this section I will investigate these contrasting scholarly views and evaluate my historical perspective to the motivation of genocide. Many scholars have taken on the daunting task of explaining ethnic violence. Older schools of thought emphasize the "ancient hatreds" argument, which relies on the idea that centuries old differences motivate current hatred. However, this argument is not valid due to the likelihood of changes in ethnicity and identity over time. Similarly, the theory of “conflictual modernization,” provides an incomplete argument, which argues that ethnic cleansing is influenced by one innovating group’s belief that a less innovative group will retard societa l innovation as a whole. But this theory does not explain why modernization leads to violent ethnic conflicts in some times and places in history more than others.iii Currently, there are two important contrasting points of views in reference to ethnic violence: the symbolist political theory developed by Political Science scholar Stuart Kaufman, and the rational choice theory pioneered by sociologist George Homans. The Symbolist Political Theory The symbolist political theory is based on a social-psychological view, which asserts the critical importance of intangible concerns such a group’s emotional state when characterizing motivation behind ethnic violence. iv Advocates of this theory believe that extreme acts of ethnic violence such as genocide are caused by “group myths that justify hostility, fears of group extinction, and a symbolic politics of chauvinist mobilization. The hostile myths produce emotion-laden symbols that make mass hostility easy for chauvinist elites to provoke and make extremist policies popular.”v Symbolists reject the assertion that ethnicity is merely a social construct that elites use to maintain control of masses and that on an individual basis ethnicity is of minor importance. In contrast, symbolists support the idea of "myth-symbol complex" that identifies elements of shared culture and what interpretation of history binds the group and distinguishes it from others. Myths have deep roots in history and culture tha t cannot be easily ignored.vi Furthermore, this model suggests that emotions, not rational calculations, motivate people to act. Elites equipped with long lasting myths can manipulate the emotions of the people and encourage action. Along with the preexisting myths and ethnic contrasts, symbolic politics leads to ethnic war or genocide through a process involving three dynamics—mass hostility, chauvinist political mobilization, and a security dilemma. Symbolists argue that this environment existed in Rwanda and is the motivation of its genocide. iii Stuart J. Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence,” International Security 30.4 (2006) 45-86. iv Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice?” 46. v Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice?” 47. vi Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice?” 50. Contrary to the symbolist theory, the rational choice model emphasizes elite’s self interests and security dilemma as the primary motivators for ethnic violence. The desire to maintain power and the threat of losing power in an environment of political and economic instability leads to social deviance and fractionalization. Rational choice advocates propose an elite-predation model, which assumes that masses do not want violence, but elites do. Leaders who fear losing power: [may] gamble for resurrection by resorting to predation—provoking ethnic conflict to try to change the agenda toward issues that favor their remaining in power. The public notices the violence, so even if they are unsure about which side provoked it, they can rationally increase their concern that the opposing group might be dangerous. The public may therefore rationally support policies leading to war or even genocide, calculating that the costs of violence are lower than the costs of facing threatened violence unprepared.vii Moreover rationalists believe the fact that regardless of what elite official encourages violence all people are rational beings and each individual is responsible for their own actions. The main proponent for the symbolic political theory is Stuart J. Kaufman, author of “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence”. In this article Kaufman contrasts his model with the rational choice model in the case studies of the Sudanese conflict over the past thirty years and the Rwandan genocide of 1994. According to Kaufman, “Rwanda's genocide must have been motivated by an exceptionally hostile, eliminationist Hutu mythology aimed against the Tutsi … extreme mass hostility against Tutsi, and chauvinist mobilization based on manipulating ethnic symbols—all resulting in a predation-driven security dilemma.”viii Plainly, Rwanda had a preexisting ethnic divide in an unstable region, which made citizens highly dependant on the government and left it open for governmental elitist manipulation. The importance of myths and their effect on relations between groups is vital to the symbolist argument. The creation myth of the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa has many variations, but the same outcome on the hierarchy of the Rwandan society. Kaufman believes, “The Story of the Origins” [below] is the foundation of Hutu hostility toward Tutsi. …there was Kigwa, who fell from heaven and had three sons: Gatwa, Gahutu, and Gatutsi. When he decided to choose his successor, he entrusted each of the three sons a pot of milk to watch over during the night. At daybreak, Gatwa had drunk the milk; Gahutu had fallen asleep and in the carelessness of the sleep, had spilt the milk; and only Gatutsi had kept watch throughout the night, and only his milk pot was safe. So it was clear to Kigwa that Gatutsi should be the successor and by that fact should be exempt of any menial tasks. Gahutu was to be his servant. The utter unreliability of Gatwa was to make him only a clown in society. As a result, Gatutsi received cattle and command whereas Gahutu would acquire cattle only through the services to Gatutsi, and Gatwa was condemned to hunger and gluttony and would not acquire cattle.ix vii Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? 50. viii Kaufman “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? 70. ix Aimable Twagilimana, The Debris of Ham: Ethnicity, Regionalism, and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003). Myths such as “The Story of the Origins” were common knowledge in Rwanda and used to justify the Tutsi minority rule, over the Hutu majority and the marginal Twa. These myths were supported by the European colonizers and extended to fit the Eurocentric idea of superiority. The Belgian colonizers viewed the Hutu as ignorant, vile, slaves by nature, with no ambition. Hutu features were ugly and indicative of the inferior Negro. A 1925 colonial report describes Hutu as, “generally short and thick-set with a big head, a jovial expression, a wide nose, and enormous lips.”x As for the Twa, they were described as being the most primitive of the three groups.