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88309 Rwanda Omslag Assessment of the Impact and Influence of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Lessons from Rwanda – Lessons for Today Rwanda – Lessons for Today Lessons from Following the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated a comprehensive evaluation of the international response. The findings were highly critical of nearly all the international actors. Ten years after the genocide the Ministry commissioned this assessment of the impact and influence of the evaluation. It concludes that the evaluation con- tributed to increased accountability among humanitarian organizations and that it had important influences on several major donor policies. But, despite a greater willingness by the international community to intervene militarily and to undertake more robust peacekeeping missions, these remain the exception rather than the rule where mass killings of civilians threaten or are even underway. The evaluation’s main conclusion – that “Humanitarian Action cannot substitute for political action” – remains just as December 2004 valid today as 10 years ago. Lessons from Rwanda – Lessons for Today ISBN: 87-7667-141-0 Lessons from Rwanda – Lessons for Today Assessment of the Impact and Influence of Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda John Borton and John Eriksson December 2004 © Ministry of Foreign Affairs December 2004 Production: Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cover: Kiure F. Msangi Graphic production: Phoenix-Print A/S, Aarhus, Denmark ISBN (report): 87-7667-141-0 e-ISBN (report): 87-7667-142-9 ISSN: 1399-4972 This report can be obtained free of charge by contacting: Danish State Information Centre Phone + 45 7010 1881 http://danida.netboghandel.dk/ The report can also be downloaded through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ homepage www.um.dk or directly from the Evaluation Department’s homepage www.evaluation.dk Responsibility for the content and presentation of findings and recommendations rests with the authors. The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond to the views of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the recipient governments, or the implementing organisations. The report is printed on Multi Fine and the cover is printed on Invercote. Preface Preface Within a period of three months in 1994, an estimated five to eight hundred thousand people were killed as a result of civil war and genocide in Rwanda. Large numbers were physically and psychologically afflicted for life through maiming, rape and other trauma; over two million fled to neighbouring countries and maybe half as many became inter- nally displaced within Rwanda. This human suffering was and is incomprehensible. The agony and legacy of the violence create continuing suffering, economic loss and tension both inside Rwanda and in the Great Lakes Region. Recognizing both the magnitude of the Rwanda emergency and the implications of complex disasters for constricted aid budgets, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its development cooperation wing, Danida, proposed a Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. This initiative resulted in the launching of an unprecedented multinational, multi-donor evaluation effort, with the formation of a Steering Committee comprised of representa- tives from 19 OECD-member bilateral donor agencies, plus the European Union and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Secretariat of the OECD; nine multi- lateral agencies and UN units; the two components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC and IFRC); and five international NGO organizations. The main objective of the evaluation was to draw lessons from the Rwanda experience relevant for future complex emergencies as well as for current operations in Rwanda and the region, such as early warning and conflict management, the preparation for and pro- vision of emergency assistance, and the transition from relief to rehabilitation and devel- opment Published in March 1996, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience was a scathing critique of the way the "international com- munity", principally represented by the UN Security Council, had reacted – or rather had failed to react – to the warnings of, early signs of, and even to the full-blown geno- cide in Rwanda. The evaluation’s main conclusion was that humanitarian action cannot be a substitute for political action. Yet, since then, with notable exceptions such as East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone, the international community has responded to violence, mass killings and ethnic cleansing primarily by providing humanitarian assistance. In cases like the Democratic Republic of Congo, that assistance has been very limited indeed. The main lessons from the response to genocide in Rwanda were: 1. Unwillingness to acknowledge that genocide was happening prevented action to stop it. 2. In view of the scale of suffering, the humanitarian aid was impressive, but could have been better prepared, better coordinated and more cost effective. 3. Inadequate and slow support for reconstruction of the Rwandese society and govern- ment, including the justice system, have delayed a return to normalcy. Preface Commemorating the tenth anniversary of the genocide, ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action) and Danida commissioned two of the evaluation’s original authors, John Borton, leader of Study 3, and John Eriksson, leader of the Synthesis, to review the impact of the evaluation. This report constitutes that assessment. December 2004 Niels Dabelstein Former Chairman of the Steering Committee for Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Table of Contents Table of Contents Abbreviations and Acronyms 7 Executive Summary 11 1. Introduction: Purpose and Approach of the Assessment 21 2. A Summary of the Principal Developments in Rwanda, DRC and Burundi since Publication of the Joint Evaluation and of Seven Selected Cases of External Intervention 25 2.1 Introduction 25 2.2 Political, Economic and Social Developments in Rwanda 25 2.3 Principal Developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 33 2.4 Principal Developments in Burundi 36 2.5 Selected Other Examples of Conflict and International Intervention 38 3. A Preliminary Assessment of the Influence of the Joint Evaluation 45 4. Assessment of Developments in Genocide Prevention and Suppression 51 4.1 What the Joint Evaluation Recommended 51 4.2 Progress in Avoiding or Reducing the Instances of Conflict and Genocide 51 4.3 Developments in the Anticipation, Detection and Prevention of Violent Conflict and Genocide 56 4.4 Progress in Halting/Suppressing Conflict and Genocide 61 4.5 Progress in Fostering Policy Coherence 64 4.6 Using the Media in Support of Genocide Prevention and Suppression 65 4.7 Some Observations on the Recommendations and Developments in Relation to Prevention and Suppression since the Joint Evaluation 67 5. Assessment of Developments in Humanitarian Response 69 5.1 What the Joint Evaluation Recommended 69 5.2 Progress in Improving Policy Coherence and Coordination 69 5.3 Progress in the Management of Relief 75 5.4 Some Observations on the Recommendations and Developments in Relation to Humanitarian Response Since the Joint Evaluation 84 6. Assessment of Developments in Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Recovery 85 6.1 What the Joint Evaluation Recommended 85 6.2 Progress in Supporting Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Recovery 85 6.3 Some Observations on the Recommendations and Developments in Relation to Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Recovery Since the Joint Evaluation 98 7. Has the International Community Become More Willing to Prevent or Intervene Against Genocide or Mass Killings? 99 7.1 Eastern DRC: An Early and Ongoing Test in the Great Lakes Region 99 7.2 Darfur: A Current Litmus Test in the Sudan 100 5 Table of Contents 8. Findings and Conclusions: An Overall Assessment of the Impact and Influence of the Joint Evaluation 107 Bibliography 113 Annex 1 Advisory Group Members and Key Informants 123 Additional annexes to the Evaluation Report can be found on the attached CD-ROM or viewed on the website www.evaluation.dk Annex 2 Coverage of the Joint Evaluation in the Literature Annex 3 Summary Reviews of the Official Inquiries into the 1994 Rwandan Genocide conducted by the Belgian Senate, the French National Assembly, the UN and the OAU Annex 4 Principal Developments in Rwanda and Selected Other Countries Since Publication of the Joint Evaluation (Fuller version of Chapter 2 in the main text) Annex 5 Provisional Timeline of the Darfur Crisis 6 Abbreviations and Acronyms Abbreviations and Acronyms AIA Afghanistan Interim Administration ATAAfghanistan Transitional Administration AFDL Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire ALIR Armée pour la Liberation du Rwanda ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action AMIB Assistance Mission to Burundi AU African Union CAP Consolidated Appeals Process CDR Coalition pour la Défence de la République CEEAC Communauté Économique des États d’Afrique Centrale CHAP Consolidated Humanitarian Action Plan CNDD –FDD National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Force for the Defense of Democracy CPDC Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation DAC Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD) Danida Danish International Development Assistance DDRRR Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement Program DFID
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