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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES CSC 28 / CCEM 28 EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS THE BATTLE OF CHATEAUGUAY, AN IMPORTANT FRENCH CANADIAN VICTORY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA By/par LCol PJA Bilodeau This paper was written by a student attending La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire the Canadian Forces College in fulfillment of du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au contains facts and opinions which the author cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and correct for que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas policy or the opinion of any agency, including nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un the Government of Canada and the Canadian organisme quelconque, y compris le Department of National Defence. This paper gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la may not be released, quoted or copied except Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de with the express permission of the Canadian diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude Department of National Defence. sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale. Introduction 1. In June 1812, the United States (U.S.) declared war on Great Britain following several years of trade disputes and animosity with its former colonial authority. The ongoing war in Europe between Britain and France (1793-1815) had devastated the U.S. economy. Naval blockades prevented American merchant ships from delivering their cargoes to European ports. The Royal Navy’s practice of stopping U.S. vessels, in search of British sailors deserting for better wages, was also considered a lawless act. At home, American settlers were also blaming the British for selling firearms to the Indians in their fight against a U.S. expansion westward. In defense of their rights, the U.S. Government argued that a war against British North America would restore their honour and force Britain to change its unpopular policies. It was also their belief that capturing Canada’s fertile lands and defenceless territories would be simply a matter of marching across the border against a distracted enemy. The dominance of the Royal Navy at sea and its blockade of the American East Coast forced the U.S. to seek victory on land.1 Since the New England states had declared their neutrality in the conflict, any invasion of Canada would have to take place in the central region. A month later, in July 1812, American forces, although not yet ready for war, were ordered by Congress to invade Canada, and a three-year-long conflict began between the two neighbours. In the early 1800s, the two Canadas lacked the population, the military power, and the national resources to defend itself against a much stronger U.S. opponent. With Great Britain also at war in Europe against Napoleon, the British army in North America was left on its own, faced with the insurmountable task of defending a long border stretching from Montreal to Detroit. 1 Bowler, Arthur, The War of 1812, (Toronto & Montreal: Holt Rinehart and Winston of Canada) 15. 1/27 2. The Commander-in-Chief of British forces in North America, Lieutenant-General (LGen) George Prevost, saw no benefit in provoking the Americans. Prevost instead opted for a strategy of passive defense that would preserve the colony until reinforcements arrived from England.2 British officials were also concerned about the loyalty of the French Canadians and recent American loyalist emigrants that might welcome the U.S. invasion and take up arms against the colonial regime. In a display of patriotism and sometimes heroism, English and French Canadians rallied behind British troops in repelling the American offensive and preserving their independence. From the outset, Major-General (MGen) Isaac Brock directed a successful campaign in Upper Canada by containing infiltrations and conducting several counter-attacks across the border, often disobeying the higher guidance from LGen Prevost. Meanwhile in Lower Canada, French Canadians responded to the call by quickly mobilizing militia units including a volunteer regiment called “Les Voltigeurs Canadiens”, a unit that would shortly see action in the American campaign of 1813 to capture Montreal. 3. In Fall 1813, the U.S. strategy focused on the border along the Saint-Lawrence River with two large armies totalling 12,000 men planning to meet near Montreal to capture the city and cut the lines of communication into the heart of the British colony. The overpowering U.S. invaders were, however, opposed by a well-trained and highly motivated Canadian militia that was prepared to fight hard for the defence of their country. The first encounter occurred on 26 October 1813 along the Chateauguay River, where 1,200 Canadian soldiers stopped one of two U.S. armies advancing towards Montreal, a division of 4,000 men commanded by MGen Hampton. In just a few hours, a 2 Turner, Wesley, B., British Generals in the War of 1812, (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999) 30. 2/27 small group of 300 Canadian militiamen under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel (LCol) de Salaberry defeated a vanguard of approximately 2,000 U.S. troops. The victory at Chateauguay allowed the Canadians time to regroup and concentrate their efforts against the second American force advancing northeast along the Saint-Lawrence River. The next confrontation at Crysler’s Farm on 11 November 1813 also resulted in another stunning victory for the Canadian militia. These two important victories in Fall 1813 forced the southern invaders back across the frontier for the winter and saved Canada from an American invasion for at least another year. 4. While smaller in scale than other events of the War of 1812, the battle fought on the banks of the Chateauguay River in October 1813 was a defining moment in Canadian history. In particular, two-thirds of the 300 men under LCol de Salaberry’s command that day were French-speaking Canadians from Lower Canada (now Quebec). What motivated this small group of patriots to rise above all expectations and win such an uneven match-up? What caused the American defeat despite their overwhelming numerical superiority on the battlefield? This paper demonstrates that the leadership of the Canadian Commander LCol de Salaberry, the degree of the defensive preparations along the river, the loyalty of French Canadian troops, and a lack of determination from the American invaders were the key factors that contributed to the decisive victory at Chateauguay. A small but well-led military force, mostly composed of French Canadian militia well positioned behind a strong wooden barrier, held off a vastly superior but reluctant American opponent, thereby confirming their allegiance to Canada and ensuring a continued British presence in North America. 3/27 The Battle of Chateauguay – 26 October 1813 5. The U.S. campaign in 1813 initially got off to a good start with victories at Fort York (Toronto), Fort George and Queenstown, but these British setbacks were quickly reversed. Realizing that their strategy for conquest of the Canadas was not achieving any great success on the Niagara front, the Americans planned a new campaign to capture the town of Montreal and cut the British supply line between Lower and Upper Canada. Montreal was identified as the strategic centre of gravity, its loss making the British positions untenable in North America. The expedition against Montreal in Fall 1813 involved a simultaneous two-pronged assault by two American forces: one column of 8,000 troops located at Sacketts Harbour on Lake Ontario under the command of MGen Wilkinson to move down the Saint Lawrence, and a second column of 4,000 troops assembled at Plattsburg under the command of MGen Hampton to move up the Champlain valley.3 Neither force had sufficient strength to capture Montreal, so they hoped to rendezvous near the objective, concentrate their force, and launch a coordinated attack in late September. The use of two separate forces was intended to distract the attention of the defenders as to the final objective of the campaign. This deception was partially achieved as the British Commander-in-Chief, LGen George Prevost, moved additional troops to Kingston in expectation of an attack on his garrison fort located just across from Sacketts Harbour on Lake Ontario. Unfortunately for the Americans, their force commander MGen Wilkinson became ill and the execution of the campaign plan had to wait a few weeks for his recovery.4 3 Suthren, Victor, The War of 1812, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999) 173.