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German Idealism, Analytic Philosophy, and Realism Patrick J Duquesne University Duquesne Scholarship Collection Electronic Theses and Dissertations Fall 2011 German Idealism, Analytic Philosophy, and Realism Patrick J. Reider Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd Recommended Citation Reider, P. (2011). German Idealism, Analytic Philosophy, and Realism (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1092 This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact [email protected]. GERMAN IDEALISM, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, AND REALISM A Dissertation Submitted to McAnulty Graduate School of Liberal Arts Duquesne University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for The degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Patrick J. Reider December 2011 Copyright by Patrick J. Reider 2011 GERMAN IDEALISM, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, AND REALISM By Patrick J. Reider November 4. 2011 ________________________________ _______________________________ Dr. Rockmore Dr. Swindal Distinguished Professor of Philosophy Dean. McAnulty College and Graduate (Committee Chair) School of Liberal Arts Professor of Philosophy (Committee Member) _______________________________ Dr. Nuzzo The City University of New York Professor of Philosophy (Committee Member) _______________________________ _______________________________ Dr. Swindal Dr. Polanksy Dean. McAnulty College and Graduate Chair. Philosophy School of Liberal Arts Professor of Philosophy Professor of Philosophy iii ABSTRACT GERMAN IDEALISM, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, AND REALISM By Patrick J. Reider December 2011 Dissertation Supervised by Dr. Rockmore ―Can one know mind-independent reality?‖ There are two fundamental positions concerning this question: either 1) mind-independent existence causes us to know mind-independent existence, or 2) all knowledge is a construct of the human mind, and therefore mind-independent existence is unknowable. This question holds enormous significance as it establishes the source of truth as being either mind-independent or mind-dependent. It thereby sets the stage for the type of epistemic claims that can be properly defended. Of all the myriad formulations of idealism, Analytic Philosophers have consistently singled out German Idealism to either reject or misappropriate for its own ends. The most significant and provocative occurrences of this trend can be found in the iv writings of Moore, Russell, Strawson, Sellars, McDowell and Brandom. One objective of this text is to explicate the manner in which these Analytic Philosophers either reject or borrow from German Idealism. A second objective of this text is to answer the following question: ―what does it mean for Analytic Philosophy when its leading members, such as McDowell and Brandom, continue in the Sellarsian tradition of couching traditional Analytic concerns within the framework of German Idealism?‖ Will it be found, in the final pages of the Analytic tradition, that its original rejection of German Idealism was only a hiccup that restored the Anglo/American traditions back to 18th century German thought? More bluntly still, will we find that only in becoming idealists can Analytic Philosophers have a future? My analysis of Analytic Philosophy‘s relationship to German Idealism, as it concerns our ability to know mind-independent existence, culminates in two related claims. First, Kant and Hegel hold superior epistemic views to Moore, Russell, Strawson, Sellars, McDowell and Brandom, in that Kant and Hegel can demonstrate their objects of knowledge, while the above noted Analytic thinkers cannot. Second, Sellars, McDowell and Brandom have maneuvered themselves into a corner by borrowing (directly and indirectly) from Kant and Hegel: in order to make their core conceptual, linguistic, and epistemic claims internally consistent, they must proceed to a version of German Idealism and deny their respective versions of realism. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would like to first thank Dr. Rockmore for all of his insights. All the best portions of this text took shape under his guidance, and all of its inadequacies would have been multiplied without his supervision. I also would like to recognize Dr. Swindal, the previous department Chair of Philosophy and acting Dean of McAnulty College of Liberal Arts, who swiftly addressed all my concerns as a graduate student. Additionally, he has provided me with numerous comments on my dissertation that will be invaluable as I continue working on it as a manuscript for future publication. Third, I would like to acknowledge Dr. Nuzzo, who currently is teaching at City University of New York, for her tremendous generosity in agreeing to work with me. Her keen understanding of Kant helped me to avoid several oversights that otherwise would have weakened my claims. Moreover, I understand that all my readers are exceptionally busy. I am grateful to all of them for donating their time, which as Seneca notes, is of the greatest value, for it is one‘s life. And finally, from a personal and financial side, I would like to thank my wife Jodie, who made it possible for me to finish my Graduate degrees. Again, my gratitude to all of you. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………..iv Acknowledgement……………………………………………………………………….vi Introduction………………………………………………………………………………xi Chapter One: Early Analytic Philosophy, its Hyper-Realism, and its Rejection of Idealism……………………………………………………………………………………1 1.1. Introduction to Chapter One and its Function in the Rest of the Text………..1 1.2. Moore‘s Views on Perception, His Rejection of Idealism, and His Poor Scholarship………………………………………………………………………...3 1.3. Russell‘s Relationship to Moore……………………………………………20 1.4. Synthesis, Judgment, and Their Relationship to Perception…...………...…29 1.5. Russell and the Ascendance of Scientific Realism…………………………36 1.6. A Critique of Data, Fact, and Judgment in Russell‘s Scientific View of Perception………………………………………………………………………..38 Chapter Two: Kant‘s ‗Empirical Realism,‘ His ‗Refutation of Idealism,‘ and Strawson‘s ‗Corrected View‘…………………………………………………………………...……48 2.1. Introduction to Chapter Two………………………………………………...48 2.2. A Brief Introduction to Kant‘s Idealism…………………………………….50 2.3. Why Sensation Cannot Yield Experience……………………………...……56 2.4. Time, Space, and the Appearing World Constructs………..…...…..………61 2.5. Backhanded Arguments in Support of Kant‘s Ideality of Time and Space....77 2.6. The ‗Thing-in-Itself‘………………………………………………………...87 vii 2.7. The Thing-in-Itself, Correspondence, and Kant‘s Refutation of Idealism...101 2.8. Correspondence and ‗Objective Validity‘ in ―Remark III‖ of the ―First Part of the Main Transcendental Problem‖………………………………………….106 2.9. Clarification of Relevant Kantian Terms and ―Remark II‖ and ―III‖ as an Abbreviated Counterpart to ―The fourth paralogism‖………………………….111 2.10. Kant‘s Argument for Outer Existence and His Rejection of Descartes‘ Model of the Self…………………………………………………..…………...118 2.11. The ―Refutation of Idealism‖ and Persistence……………………………129 2.12. Strawson‘s Scientific Realism is His Anti-Kantianism……………....…..134 Chapter Three: Hegel and Sellars: Knowledge, Mediation, and the ‗Given‘……...…...146 3.1. Part One: Introduction to Chapter Three………………………………….146 3.2. Hegel‘s Dialectic as a Non-Presumptive Approach to Philosophy……......149 3.3. Hegel‘s Term ‗Spirit‘ as Found in the ―Preface‖ and How it Distinguishes Him from Previous Thinkers……………………………………………...……151 3.4. Hegel‘s ―Introduction‖: How ‗Spirit,‘ ‗Absolute,‘ and ‗Science‘ Relate to Hegel‘s Conception of Knowledge………………………………………….....157 3.5. Why Hegel‘s Phenomenology Invokes Epistemology……………………170 3.6. Part Two: A Transition into the Linguistic Turn…………………………..180 3.7. The Comparisons Being Made and the Epistemic Problems that Arise from Them……………………………………………………………………………182 3.8. Locke‘s Historical Influence, the Meaning of the Given, and its Epistemological Implication……………...…………………………………….185 3.9. Hegel‘s ―Sense-Certainty‖ as a Rejection of the Given…………………...188 viii 3.10. Hegel‘s and Sellars‘ Rejection of the Given via Their Views on Perception………………………………………………………………………203 3.11. Two Accounts of Consciousness Without Self-Recognition: ―Lordship and Bondage‖ and ―The Logic of Private Episodes‖………………………………..224 Chapter Four: Why Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom Cannot Validate Humanity‘s Access to Objects of Knowledge, While Kant and Hegel Can…………………………235 4.1. Introduction to Chapter Four………………………………………………235 4.2. Sellars, Kant, and Sensation……………………………………...………..237 4.3. The Role of Sensation and Science in ―Picturing‖………………..……….242 4.4. Sellars‘ View on Sensation and Its Role in Inner Sense: Sellars‘ Rejection of Kant‘s Claim that Time and Space are Ideal……………………….…………..250 4.5. Can Sellars Overcome Hegel‘s Dialectic?....................................................258 4.6. An Account of McDowell‘s Epistemic Revision of the Kantian-Hegelian- Sellarsian Tradition……………………………………………………………..275 4.7. A Critique of McDowell‘s Epistemic Revision of the Kantian-Hegelian- Sellarsian Tradition……………………………………………………………..280 4.8. An Account of Brandom‘s Epistemic Revision of the Kantian-Hegelian- Sellarsian Tradition……………………………………………………………..293 4.9. A Critique of Brandom‘s Epistemic Revision of the Kantian-Hegelian- Sellarsian Tradition……………………………………………………………..304 4.10. Concluding Remarks: Why We Should Consider German Idealism
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