Regional Patterns of Voter Turnout in Russian Elections, 19931996

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Regional Patterns of Voter Turnout in Russian Elections, 19931996 TITLE: REGIONAL PATTERNS OF VOTER TURNOUT IN RUSSIAN ELECTIONS, 1993-1996 AUTHORS: RALPH S. CLEM and PETER R. CRAUMER florida international University THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR EURASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH TITLE VIII PROGRAM 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 LEGAL NOTICE The Government of the District of Columbia has certified an amendment of the Articles of Incorporation of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research changing the name of the Corporation to THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR EURASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH, effective on June 9, 1997. Grants, contracts and all other legal engagements of and with the Corporation made under its former name are unaffected and remain in force unless/until modified in writing by the parties thereto. PROJECT INFORMATION:1 CONTRACTOR: Florida International University PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Ralph Clem COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 81 1 -06 DATE: February 3, 1998 COPYRIGHT INFORMATION Individual researchers retain the copyright on their work products derived from research funded by contract with the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research. However, the Council and the United States Government have the right to duplicate and disseminate, in written and electronic form, this Report submitted to the Council under this Contract, as follows: Such dissemination may be made by the Council solely (a) for its own internal use, and (b) to the United States Government (1) for its own internal use: (2) for further dissemination to domestic, international and foreign governments, entities and individuals to serve official United States Government purposes; and (3) for dissemination in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act or other law or policy of the United States Government granting the public rights of access to documents held by the United States Government. Neither the Council, nor the United States Government, nor any recipient of this Report by reason of such dissemination, may use this Report for commercial sale. 1 The work leading to this report was supported in pan by contract funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, made available by the U. S. Department of State under Title VIII (the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended). The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author (s). CONTENTS Summary i Introduction 1 National Differences in Voter Turnout 1 The Problem of Spatial Variations in Voter Turnout 2 Trends in Russian Voter Turnout 4 Regional Patterns of Voter Turnout 6 Correlates of Voter Turnout 8 Effective Number of Parties and Voter Turnout 9 Social Structure and Voter Turnout 10 Age 10 Education 10 Occupations 10 Urban-Rural Residence 11 Voter Turnout and Economic Conditions 11 Conclusions 12 Tables 14 Figures 16 Endnotes 23 SUMMARY2 The totality of the Russian political process since 1989 suggests that an electoral geography of that country has emerged, with some regions identified as supportive of the economic liberalization policies of the government, and other regions clearly opposed to reform. These regional patterns of political affinity have been remarkably stable from the first electoral event in post-Soviet Russia, the national referendum on the efficacy of the Yeltsin government in April, 1993, right through the elections to the new Duma and simultaneous constitutional plebiscite in December 1993, the elections to the second Duma in December. 1995, and the presidential elections in June-July, 1996. Support for Yeltsin and the reform parties has been strongest in the North and Northwest, the city and oblast of Moscow, the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East, whereas areas along the western and southern margins of the country have tended to vote for nationalist parties or parties of the left. The emergence of regional power bases for different political points of view is to be expected in a country as large and diverse as Russia, and to some extent this regionalization of politics might be viewed as normal. Voter turnout in the four national electoral events in Russia since early 1993 has also varied over both time and space, often dramatically. National turnout levels experienced a significant decline between the April, 1993 referendum (64.5%) and the December, 1993 parliamentary election and constitutional plebiscite (54.8%), but then recovered (to 64.8%) for the December, 1995 Duma vote and rose again (to 68.9%) for the presidential race of July, 1996. These macro changes are understandable in light of the external political and social turmoil that preceded or accompanied each event. Thus, the rancorous exchanges between President Yeltsin and the Congress of People's Deputies through 1992 and into 1993 no doubt alienated many voters from the political process; even so, about two-thirds of those eligible voted in the April 25, 1993 referendum, and in only one of the 87 units of Russia which participated did turnout fall below 50 percent. The violent and abrupt end of the Congress of People's Deputies in October 1993 and the suddenness with which the new Duma would be elected that December certainly contributed further to voter absenteeism; it was clearly unrealistic to expect that new parties could form and mount campaigns on such short notice, or that candidates in the single-member district races would conduct meaningful, issue-oriented or ideologically-based races. What became clear was that parties with a structural base, notably the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), which had inherited a grass-roots organization from its Soviet-era predecessor, would do comparatively well. The higher turnout in the December, 1995 Duma election can be attributed to the generally more stable political situation in Russia and the longer lead time for parties to coalesce and to participate in the pre-election campaign. In the event, over 11 million more voters went to the polls in the 1995 election than in the 1993 Duma 2Edited and abridged by NCEEER Staff. election. Finally, the much-publicized and energetic campaign for the Russian presidency in June and July 1996 generated a record-high turnout for the post-Soviet period. A comparison of national turnout levels in the post-Soviet Russian elections and referenda with those both in the established and transitional democracies places Russia close to the bottom of the list. Including only the two most recent electoral events in Russia, with turnouts in the mid-to high- 60 percent range would, however, raise it to within a few percentage points of Japan, Spain. Ireland, and the 1997 British parliamentary election (71.3% turnout), and ahead of Hungary and Poland. It is difficult to explain Russian national turnout by reference to the factors discussed in the more general literature on voter participation because Russia's electoral system is a hybrid of the institutional types which are usually employed to explain cross-national differences. Thus, although half of the Russian Duma is elected through PR in a national district, which ordinarily increases voter turnout, the other half comes from single-member districts, which typically depresses turnout. Further, the five-percent threshold required to receive Duma seats through the party list (PR) vote probably discourages voting for minor parties and thereby reduces turnout. The proliferation of parties in the Russian Duma elections (13 in 1993 and 43 in 1995) would likewise be expected to lower voting participation rates overall, but turnout went up between the two Duma elections even though the latter featured considerably more parties. On the other hand, direct elections for a powerful executive, such as the 1996 presidential races, would be likely to have the effect observed: higher turnout owing to the salience of the event. Again, to what extent these institutional factors operate regionally is much more difficult to conceptualize, but clearly, given the spatial patterns discussed below, powerful influences are at work to shape the electoral landscape, not only in terms of party affiliation and attitudes, but also as regards voter turnout. Regional differences in voter turnout in Russia are linked both to institutional and socioeconomic factors. In the regions, affinity for parties with strong organizational or grass-roots structure (such as the KPRF) raises turnout. Age, occupation, education, and levels of urbanization also relate to the degree of electoral participation. Economic conditions in the regions have less effect on turnout, although variation in wages is important as a determinant of turnout across the country. Because the social structural and economic variables are not independent of one another, what emerges from this set of factors is a complex relationship which requires further study employing multivariate analysis. Meanwhile, we can say with some confidence that regions in which the population is characterized by relatively higher levels of urbanization, education, white collar employment, and wages and a younger age distribution will typically manifest lower voter participation. On the other hand, areas which are more rural and agricultural, with older and less- educated populations and lower wages will evince higher voter turnout. In this paper we have not attempted to adduce other, more idiosyncratic influences on voter participation, especially those relating to regional elites and/or local issues, although we recognize ii that in some cases these are very important. Thus, in some cases, especially in the non-Russian republics (e.g., Tatarstan and Bashkortostan), the local political leadership has effectively suppressed or, alternatively, maximized turnout, depending on the benefits accruing from doing either. Likewise, the national leadership has courted or scorned regional governors, some of whom (e.g., Eduard Rossel of Sverdlovsk Oblast) have been able to sway events within their constituencies. Finally, the presence on the ballot of highly popular politicians with specific regional bases ("favorite sons", such as Aman Tuleyev in Kemerovo Oblast or Aleksandr Lebed in Tula Oblast) no doubt increases turnout on given occasions.
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