Aid and Conditionality
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Aid and conditionality The role of the bilateral donor: A case study of Norwegian–Tanzanian aid relationship July 1999 Hilde Selbervik A Report submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Chr. Michelsen Institute The Ministry does not accept any responsibility for the information in this report nor the views expressed, which are solely those of CMI TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . 5 ABBREVIATIONS . 9 1. INTRODUCTION . 11 1.1 THEME AND RESEARCH PROBLEM . 11 1.2 DEFINITIONS AND DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY . 12 1.3 METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES . 14 1.4 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY . 14 2. A CHANGE IN NORWEGIAN AID POLICY? . 15 2.1 FROM DONORSHIP TO OWNERSHIP, CONDITIONALITY TO PARTNERSHIP? . 15 2.2 NORWEGIAN POLICY ON CONDITIONALITY . 17 3. THE TANZANIAN CONTEXT . 20 3.1 THE NYERERE ERA . 20 3.2 MAIN TRENDS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM . 21 3.3 MAIN TRENDS IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM . 23 3.4 ODA TO TANZANIA . 26 Goals for Norwegian aid to Tanzania . 29 4. CONDITIONALITY, A REVERSED MICRO-MACRO PARADOX AND THE SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA . 30 4.1 INTRODUCTION . 30 4.2 IN SEARCH OF AN APPROPRIATE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK . 30 The small state in international politics . 31 4.3 THE SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA . 32 The donors’ conditionality policy towards Tanzania – an illustration of a reversed micro–macro paradox? . 34 5. DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY . 35 5.1 INTRODUCTION . 35 5.2 FROM ALL-WEATHER FRIENDS TO FAIR-WEATHER FRIENDS ONLY? . 35 5.3 THE CG MEETING PROCESS . 36 Getting tougher . 39 Honeymoon or grace period? . 44 5.4 THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATION PROCESS . 47 6. CONCLUSION . 51 6.1 TYING TOGETHER THE DISCUSSION . 51 A special Nordic–Tanzanian relationship? . 55 LITERATURE . 58 Primary Sources – Official/Published . 60 Archival material . 61 Speeches & Lectures . 63 Interviewees . 63 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 Executive summary This study gives a presentation of the role of Norway – the same time, aid in general has come under increas- from a conditionality perspective – in the aid negotia- ing attack and scrutiny. tion processes within different forums, mainly the CG meetings and the bilateral annual country consulta- The ‘political correct’ slogans currently are ‘partner- tions between Norway and Tanzania in order to inves- ship’ and ‘ownership’. From being a word of honour tigate the role of Norway, and in more general terms within large parts of the donor community, in the late what has been the role of the bilateral donor in this 1990s conditionality has become more of a swear regard. The report also analyses how Norway has word within the same donor circles. Paradoxically the applied its conditionality policy towards Tanzania, and donors are still practising conditionality, but with no how this has changed over time. Moreover, how the clear conception of how to apply it. Norwegian policy can be explained is explored. This study supports the main criticism of conditional- For Tanzania the 1980s and the 1990s has been a ity: the donors’ lack of credibility when pursuing a period of economic and political reform. In many of conditionality policy and the lack of ownership at the the reform processes both the bilateral and the multi- recipient end, which is indispensable for achieving lateral donors have been heavily involved. The donors sustainable results. have imposed many reforms, and the main instrument to accomplish these aims has been conditionality in If aid is to be used as a mid-wife for reform, condition- different forms. ality seems needed, but the conditions have to be fol- lowed up and to be worked out in real partnership with Norwegian and Nordic policy towards Tanzania has the recipient. There ought to be fewer conditions, and gone through notable changes from the mid-1980s to they should be redefined with stipulated deadlines and date. In view of the cordial Nordic–Tanzanian relation- benchmarks. ship, it might seem like a paradox, therefore, that it was towards Tanzania that Norway for the first time Norway has since the mid-1980s applied so-called actively supported economic conditionality. The impo- cross-conditionality towards Tanzania, which means sition of macro-economic conditions meant a signifi- that Norwegian bilateral aid has been conditional on cant departure from previous Norwegian aid policy. In Tanzania reaching agreements with the IMF and the the 1980s and 1990s there has been a gradual change World Bank. But applying cross-conditionality does and adjustment to what may be termed as an ‘interna- not necessarily involve tangible or strict sanctions if tional conditionality’ regime, which represents a fun- the conditions are not met. Threats have often been damental change from previous principles. expressed vaguely and equivocally. The novelty in the 1980s and the 1990s was the change Since the mid-1980s Norway has given full backing to of attitude towards interference and more explicitly the the economic reform programmes initiated by the recipient country’s national policy in the context of Bretton Wood institutions. The Word Bank is the lead- aid, concerning national economic policy, good gov- ing “think tank” on aid questions and sets much of the ernance, democratisation and human rights. aid agenda. Both bilateral donors and recipients seem increasingly oriented towards the Bank on aid issues in The policy on how aid can be used as a tool for politi- general and more specifically in the context of condi- cal reform and human rights promotion and how to tionality. The role of the bilateral donor has been react in extreme cases is roughly outlined. The main weakened in recent years, but at the same time the pol- instrument to achieve these goals has been positive icies of the Bank and Norway have converged. Norwe- measures. Sanctions should only be applied as a last gian policy has moved closer to that of the World resort. Aid as an instrument for economic reforms is Bank, and vice versa. even less clearly treated in official policy documents. No explicit strategy is elaborated. It has also often been argued that Norway and the Nor- dic bloc contributed significantly to integrating soft In the 1980s and 1990s conditionality has been the sector issues in the structural adjustment programmes. most important aid policy instrument to accomplish It is difficult, however, to find documentary evidence reforms, and has been described as the most character- to support this claim. Nevertheless, among the inform- istic feature of aid in this period. In recent years the ants there seemed to be a general perception that the use of conditionality as a tool has been questioned. At Nordic countries – particularly through their repre- 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY sentatives in Washington DC –successfully influenced tions. The motivation for disbursing aid is not entirely the Bank in a softer direction. altruistic, not even for Norway. Many would probably claim that other motives have been on the increase. In The group discipline among the donors in the context addition, a donor like Norway is also faced with the of the CG meetings seems strong. If one donor raises so-called disbursement imperative, due to a rigid an issue, most of the other donors follow suit. Inform- national budgeting system, and the need to get rid of ants have stated that if unpopular issues are raised, the money by the end of the year. The recipient is donors fear isolation. There is a lot of competition and aware of this. This only reinforces the general argu- positioning among the donors. Since the CG meetings ment that the donor will have one dominant strategy: are closed and more confidential than for example the disbursement. country negotiation processes, positioning vis-à-vis other countries is judged as more important than reac- But there are limits to the Samaritan’s willingness to tions from the recipient country and the domestic pub- disburse aid irrespective of the recipient’s behaviour. lic. It is.