The General Board Andthe Design of the Fleet That Defeated the Japanese Navy Michael Pearlman
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Naval War College Review Volume 63 Article 18 Number 1 Winter 2010 Agents of Innovation: The General Board andthe Design of the Fleet That Defeated the Japanese Navy Michael Pearlman Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Pearlman, Michael (2010) "Agents of Innovation: The General Board andthe Design of the Fleet That Defeated the Japanese Navy," Naval War College Review: Vol. 63 : No. 1 , Article 18. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/18 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen 164 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW Pearlman: Agents of Innovation: The General Board andthe Design of the Flee strategy before presenting a thorough GeneralStaffCollege,inFortLeaven- examination of operations and tactical worth, Kansas, is far more subtle in this considerations for both land and mari- excellent book. He shows how the time forces involved in the campaign. Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 froze The outcome in Norway was never a battleship construction and yet made foregone conclusion. Germany’s tactical the U.S. Navy stronger by 1941. While prowess and brilliant leadership at the it is never easy to prove something so small-unit level are conveyed nicely, counterintuitive, Kuehn does it hands leaving the reader to actually wonder down. throughout the narrative whether the How did this happen? First, by freezing Germans can pull off such a bold and the building of battleships the treaty daring feat of arms. drove the Navy to invest more time, It is a tribute to Rhys-Jones’s authorita- money, and imagination into other tive approach to the subject matter and projects, particularly submarines and hisfinewritingstylethathehascreated aircraft carriers. These ships had greater such a useful study of the elements— potential than the battleship, which had the matching of strategy and policy, the just about reached its maximum tech- conduct of joint operations, and the nology by the end of World War I. In wisdom of opening a new theater— addition, by preventing the United while at the same time telling a riveting States from enhancing its base fortifica- story. tions west of Hawaii, the treaty drove Any student of grand strategy, as well as the Navy to design new vessels of much the casual reader, will find plenty of greater operational radius, build float- value in this well written historical nar- ing dry docks, and enhance its total rative. If there is a waiting list of books transport capabilities. By World War II, to be included into the curriculum at the U.S. Navy could do the seemingly the Naval War College, this book impossible: beat a peer competitor in should top the list. the western Pacific without permanent bases in the area of operations. JEFF SHAW Naval War College One wonders why the Japanese did not take advantage of the constraints im- posed by U.S. arms limitations. Kuehn offers a convincing explanation, by fo- cusing on the General Board of the U.S. Kuehn, John T. Agents of Innovation: The General Navy. Whereas the Royal Navy and the Board and the Design of the Fleet That Defeated the Imperial Japanese Navy were hierarchal Japanese Navy. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute and faction ridden, the U.S. General Press, 2008. 296pp. $32.95 Board was collegial, collaborative, and Skeptics of disarmament treaties, such remarkably open to new ideas from all as Richard Pearl, have long argued that branches of the service, virtually irre- these treaties make a nation weaker by spective of rank. Both the British and depriving it of the means of self-defense. the Japanese fell far behind in antisub- John Kuehn, former naval aviator and marine warfare. The Japanese stuck to presently professor of military history their Mahanian dogma of decisive naval at the U.S. Army Command and battle conducted by large battleships. Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010 1 NWCR_Winter2010_john.ps C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\5294_NWC_Review_Winter2010\NWCR_Winter2010_john.vp Tuesday, November 24, 2009 11:28:46 AM Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen BOOK REVIEWS 165 Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 1, Art. 18 The Americans, meanwhile, built a Warren Kozak captures the true essence more balanced fleet, able to starve Ja- of General Curtis LeMay. Like many panofsuppliesaswellasdefeatits great leaders, LeMay was a paradox, a forces on land, in the air, and beneath vivid contrast of unique strengths and the sea. debilitating weaknesses. He was inse- When Kuehn writes of being collegial cure, afraid of failure, always question- and collaborative, this reviewer thought ing his own decisions. LeMay hid his of a perpetuation of the status quo, insecurities beneath a stern and gruff since I was of the opinion that military demeanor that gave the impression of innovation is only the by-product of confidence and strength. The antithesis egotistic individuals who are unable get of the stereotypical dashing American along with their fellow officers. Billy flyboy, “LeMay was dark, brooding, and Mitchell, J. F. C. Fuller, George Patton, forbidding. He rarely smiled, he spoke and Pete Ellis readily come to mind. even less, and when he did, his words Kuehn points out yet another irony as came out in a snarl.” well—that the U.S. Navy of the 1920s Always seeking to learn as much as he thrived because of financial constraints. could, LeMay not only flew airplanes All naval officers with pulses and open but took time to service and repair eyes could see that they could no longer them alongside his maintenance crew. rely on their navy’s simply being bigger He made himself the best navigator in than its prospective opponents. Hence the U.S. Army Air Corps. For example, the institution entertained all serious he successfully located the USS Utah in ideas of reform, so that the rebels, so to a 120,000-square-mile area of the Pa- speak, became the norm. cific, and he found the Italian ocean Although this is an excellent book, it is liner SS Rex in a large Atlantic storm. not perfect. The discussion of flying- As the United States entered World deck cruisers (a model never put into War II LeMay commanded the 305th production) is too long. Chapter 8, Bomber Group, which began with only however, which compares innovation three aircraft to train thirty-five crews. or lack of it in the navies of Britain, Ja- He was a stern disciplinarian who pan, and Germany, is about the best demanded excellence. writing I have seen on military develop- LeMay was always able to cut to the ment in the interwar years. heart of the matter. He devised radically new tactics that improved bombing ac- MICHAEL PEARLMAN Lawrence, Kansas curacy and reduced aircraft losses. To U.S. Army Command and General Staff College build trust and confidence within his (Retired) crew, he led the missions himself. His success was noticed, and as Generals Hap Arnold’s and Ira Eaker’s “fireman” he was given the toughest challenges to overcome. Kozak, Warren. LeMay: The Life and Wars of Gen- Kozak goes on to describe LeMay’s de- eral Curtis LeMay. Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2009. 434pp. $27.95 velopment of Strategic Air Command (SAC), which supported his long-held https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/18 2 NWCR_Winter2010_john.ps C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\5294_NWC_Review_Winter2010\NWCR_Winter2010_john.vp Tuesday, November 24, 2009 11:28:47 AM.