University of Michigan Law School University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository Articles Faculty Scholarship 2002 Default Rules in Sales and the Myth of Contracting Out James J. White University of Michigan Law School,
[email protected] Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/381 Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Computer Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons Recommended Citation White, James J. "Default Rules in Sales and the Myth of Contracting Out." Loyola L. Rev. 48, no. 1 (2002): 53-85. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. DEFAULT RULES IN SALES AND THE MYTH OF CONTRACTING OUT James J. White* I. INTRODUCTION In his celebrated article The Problem of Social Cost,1 Ronald Coase argued that rules of law alterable by agreement were not inherently inefficient because parties could and would negotiate to an efficient result. Coase explicitly qualified his principle with the corollary that the costs of negotiating might keep parties from reaching efficient outcomes. 2 Where this is so, the existing law that governs the transaction - now sometimes called the "default rule" - prevails despite its inefficiencies. In the modern sale of goods, Coase's corollary has overtaken the principle. Few contracts for the sale of goods are fully negotiated either in person or by electronic or other remote communication.