100819 Minot Task Force 21 and Geostrategic Analysis Triad Nuclear Modernization Conference with Former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph, Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy

MR. TOM RAFFERTY: Good afternoon. My name is Tom Rafferty and I’m with Task Force 21. I live in Minot, North Dakota, but in my formative years I did live on the Minot Air Force Base. My dad was in missile maintenance. I lived there until about the second grade. It has been fun reminiscing and making connections with some people at my table. Colonel Morgan was there when I was there, but I was probably about this tall or so. Anyway, North Dakotans like making connections. Our next speaker has a great connection to North Dakota, as in he’s from North Dakota. I’m going to introduce Ambassador Bob Joseph. He is a former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. He attended the U.S. Naval Academy, and has had a long and distinguished career in national security affairs, especially in nuclear deterrence, arms control and nonproliferation. He is from Williston, North Dakota. Please welcome Ambassador Bob Joseph. (Applause). MR. ROBERT JOSEPH: Good afternoon. I was back in Williston two weeks ago and the sun was shining and it was shirt sleeve weather. I see that things have changed a little bit, but coming from North Dakota I’m very much used to those types of changes. Thank you for the kind introduction. I’ve had the great fortune of working with both Roger and John over the course of the last 30 years. I know that I always learn when I listen to them. They are both clear examples of professionals who have contributed a great deal to the security of our country. Thank you both for that. Peter has asked that I provide you with a comprehensive overview of arms control, which is a rather daunting task given that I’ve been allotted 30 minutes; 20 minutes for a talk and 10 minutes for Q&A. Despite the shortness of time, I will try to deliver what Peter has asked for. I believe it’s useful to start with a very basic question about the role of arms control in national security. Here, many observers and practitioners begin with the question which is most often framed as an assertion as to whether arms control is good or bad for U.S. interests. To me, this is not the right starting point. This is not the right question, as it suggests that arms control is or should be treated as an end in itself. Rather, arms control is a tool. It is a tool that, along with other tools such as economic sanctions, intelligence and military force, should be employed as a broader strategy for promoting U.S. security. The starting point should not be how can we advance the goal of arms control, but how can we use arms control in combination with other tools, to advance U.S. security interests. And like other tools, we can use arms control skillfully, or we can use it poorly. And if done poorly, arms control can become, and has in the past often become, a problem masquerading as a solution. Here I would point out that at the time U.S. administrations, Republican and Democrat alike, have approached arms control as an end, rather than as a means to an end. Arms control, no matter how much we may hope, cannot substitute for strategy. When we’ve allowed it to do so, as with the Bush 43 attempt to negotiate with North Korea, or with the Obama JCPOA with Iran, the results have been uniformly detrimental to our national interests. So, if we start with the proposition that arms control is a tool to advance our national interests, the questions, I believe, become more analytically objective, and answers become more useful in determining and assessing policy choices. One initial question is, when is arms control consistent with our security objectives? You often hear that we need to talk to and we need to negotiate with all of our adversaries. As a general rule, that may be accurate, but there are exceptions. When Neville Chamberlain negotiated with Hitler in Munich and returned to London with a piece of paper that he claimed would provide peace in his time, he was not only fundamentally wrong, the agreement led to the opposite of the peace that he sought, contributing to a war that would claim over 60 million lives. After Munich Hitler brought his generals together to assure them that an attack on Poland would not be met with force. He told them that he had watched Chamberlain and the others around the arms control negotiating table, and that they were nothing but, in Hitler’s words, little worms. While we can never know for sure, many historians believe that if Hitler had been threatened with credible force, he may likely have backed down. A second question is, if an accord is reached, are the terms in our security interests? This evaluation has components that are specific to the agreement, such as the effectiveness of the verification provisions, and components that are at times far broader with respect to how the terms of the agreement get with the geostrategic environment and with our overall security interests. Looking back, I would argue that we’ve had a very mixed record in terms of arms control agreements. Just a few examples, and to begin with the positive, I thought START II was a sound treaty that achieved meaningful outcomes, for example, by banning Soviet or Russian heavy and MIRVed ICBMs. Perhaps because it did contribute to U.S. security in this way, Russia never implemented it. I also thought the 1987 INF Treaty was a net gain for U.S. security, though for me it was very difficult to watch the Pershing IIs leave Europe. But with regard to the INF Treaty, I think it’s important to acknowledge the logic of the decision to withdraw 32 years later. Russian violations, followed by years and years of failed diplomatic efforts by both the Obama and the Trump administrations to bring Russia back into compliance, left withdrawal as the only viable option. It simply makes no sense to maintain an agreement that bans two countries from an important military capability if only one side abides by the terms, while the other side cheats, all the while China, North Korea and Iran are developing formidable arsenals of intermediate‐range ballistic missiles. The failure to impose costs on Russia for its ongoing violations of the INF Treaty would also undercut prospects for future arms control by establishing that there are no consequences for breaching even the central provisions of agreements. Moreover, the security situation in Europe and Asia has changed considerably with the Russian deployments of modern INF capabilities, and China’s large‐scale buildup of dual capable mobile missiles. As the National Defense Strategy suggests, the U.S. deterrent in both regions has deteriorated significantly over the past decade. In the absence of countervailing U.S. military capabilities, the prospects for deterrence failure and the likelihood that adversaries will test our resolve by using these capabilities to coerce U.S. allies, increase dramatically. While most of the needed capabilities are likely to be conventional rather than nuclear, these deployments would also have been precluded by remaining in the treaty. One clear arms control outcome that served U.S. interest, if I don’t say so myself, was the 2003 agreement with Colonel Qaddafi. In March of 2004 we brought back to the United States hundreds of metric tons of Libya’s nuclear weapons program, as well as its longer range Scud missiles. In doing so we established the Libya model, a new model different from that of Iraq, that if a country was willing to give up its program it would receive relief from economic and political sanctions. A second Libya model would emerge eight years later under a different administration when Qaddafi ended up dead following U.S. and NATO intervention. I think it’s highly ironic that while the Obama administration placed arms control and nonproliferation at the top of its priorities, its decision to intervene in Libya on humanitarian grounds undercut the prospects for other proliferators to abandon their WMD and missile programs, as we see today with North Korea, which often cites the Libya outcome. We know that there was little thought, if any, given to a day after plan in Libya in 2011 as the country degenerated rapidly into a failed state. And it is equally unlikely, in my view, that any thought was given to the negative nonproliferation message being sent. Time does not allow me to give my assessment of the long list of Cold War era agreements that failed to meet U.S. objectives, and at times actually undermined our security, beginning with the 1971 ABM Treaty. So, I will limit my comments to two agreements that are of current interest, beginning with New START. John, you are right, we do disagree on this. Beginning with New START, in 2010 I testified against ratification, highlighting the treaties shortcomings and predicting, now proven accurate, that U.S. forces would go down and Russian forces would build up under the agreement. This was consistent with long standing Soviet, now Russian, tactics that use arms control to limit U.S. nuclear forces in a manner intended to gain unilateral advantage. I also emphasized the failure of the treaty to limit theater nuclear forces based on the fiction that nuclear attacks employing weapons with ranges less than 5,500 kilometers would somehow not be strategic. For those who cared about agreements actually reducing the number of nuclear weapon on each side, I pointed out in my testimony that the new bomber counting rule contained in the fine print of New START made the 1,550 limit on deployed strategic warheads meaningless, as it allowed the deployment of more strategic warheads than were permitted under the previous Treaty of Moscow. While these flaws were likely fully understood by the U.S. negotiators, the view of the Obama administration, reflected in its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, was that preventing nuclear proliferation was the overriding priority, which the administration asserted would be advanced by leading through example and taking steps toward a nuclear‐free world, including measures that amounted to unilateral disarmament, despite the fact that there has never been any empirical evidence to support this proposition. It is, in my view, a textbook case of fashioning a dangerous illusion from an ideologically driven view of the goodness of arms control. The JCPOA is another textbook case, but in this case it was the triumph of hope over experience, a phrase used by Samuel Johnson to describe second marriages, but an equally apt characterization of the Iran nuclear deal. The flaws were both fundamental and apparent, as evidenced by the unwillingness of the Obama administration to subject the agreement to the constitutional purview of the Senate, where it surely would have failed. As with New START, I testified against the JCPOA. I pointed out the flawed verification provisions, the failure to limit ballistic missiles, the regional instability that would result from providing billions of dollars to a regime that bankrolls terrorists and aggressively pursues an agenda of regional instability, as we see in Syria, in Yemen, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But enough of past arms control, let me conclude with a view to the future. Public discussion today is focused on the question of whether to extend New START, the only remaining agreement limiting the size of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. Under its terms, New START will expire in February of 2021 unless both parties agree to an extension of up to five years. Advocates argue that there is an urgent need to endorse extension. The principal argument is that if New START expires the entire fabric of the Cold War arms control structure will unravel and ignite a nuclear arms race. The question of extending New START, however, is much more complex and I believe must be assessed in light of the substantial changes in the geostrategic environment since the treaty was negotiated. Looking forward, any new negotiations with Russia must consider the realities of today’s security setting. These include the facts that, first, with our loss of technical policy and operational competence in nuclear weapon, which is only now beginning to be recovered, Russia has likely now succeeded in its determined drive to achieve superiority in nuclear forces at both the theater and the strategic levels. Moscow has for years invested heavily in nuclear modernization, developing and deploying new road and rail mobile and heavy ICBMs, new submarine platforms and ballistic missiles, and an array of novel weapons from longer range underwater drones with megaton yields, to air and ground‐launched cruise missiles based on new technologies, to a family of hypersonic weapons. Russia’s position is that many of these weapons are not covered under New START, demonstrating either yet another fundamental flaw of the treaty or the intention of Moscow to cheat on yet another arms control agreement, or both. Second, Russia has moved to a doctrine that emphasizes the centrality of nuclear weapons at all levels of conflict, including nuclear threats in peacetime to intimidate the U.S. and our allies, and the use of theater nuclear weapons to prevail in conventional conflicts. Third, while Russia today has active production lines for a wide range of platforms and new warheads, the United States is only slowly moving forward to modernize the nuclear triad with uncertain funding and political impediments. Those who fear an arms race absent New START ignore the race that began more than a decade ago when Russia began aggressively modernizing its nuclear forces, even with New START in place, while the U.S. stood still. Given that Russia today is a clear threat to the United States and to our allies, and given the detrimental changes in the nuclear balance, any future arms control negotiations must include all nuclear weapon types. The Senate’s ratification of New START made clear that any future agreement with Russia must take into account the huge disparity in theater nuclear capabilities. As Russia has expanded its nuclear forces at all ranges, making the distinction between strategic and so‐called non‐strategic increasingly meaningless, this Senate imposed condition has become even more important. This is especially the case, I believe, for assuring U.S. allies and deterring Russia in Europe where Russia holds a 10 to one advantage in theater systems. China’s nuclear forces must also be included in future negotiations. Like Russia, with whom it has greatly expanded its military and strategic relationship overall, China has been modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal for the past decade. It has developed and deployed new mobile ICBMs and SLBMS, and may be building a new heavy bomber. Beijing can no longer credibly make the case that its forces are so small and intended only for a secure retaliatory deterrent that they need not be included in arms control negotiations. China, as President Xi has made public, has embarked upon becoming a world power. Beijing is challenging the United States throughout the Asia‐Pacific, and nuclear weapons are central to its plans, as revealed I believe in last week’s military parade in Beijing. Arms control disciples have long treated arms control agreements as ends in themselves, and once negotiated, as sacrosanct. This pattern is apparent in their urgent call for the extension of New START without any changes. Seeking to limit all Russian nuclear forces and to include China is seen by these advocates as non‐negotiable; for some, as a nefarious attempt by arms control critics, such as yours truly, to sabotage the prospects for any future agreement. But, we can no longer base our positions on disarmament ideology or on misplaced nostalgia for the familiar ways of the Cold War. Arms control can contribute to our national security, but only if it reflects the current security environments. We need a pragmatic approach that, as I mentioned, considers arms control as one of a number of tools which in combination support a broader strategy that includes developing the new nuclear and missile defense capabilities that are prescribed by the recent DOD posture reviews. Only in this way can arms control serve our national interests. Let me have one more moment and provide one footnote on John’s argument that support for New START will or can strengthen support for the modernization of our triad. I remember that this was the argument that was made in 2010, and Senator Kyl did get the agreement of many Democratic senators to support modernization funding in exchange for the ratification of New START. I think it was about a day after ratification occurred that a number of Democratic senators decided that it’s a new environment, it’s a new budget environment, and we no longer have to hold to our commitment of supporting modernization. Let me say today, if we were to extend New START for five years in exchange for support from Democratic senators in terms of funding for modernization, I think it probably would take about a day before they discovered that it was a new budget environment and that agreement would no longer hold. I will leave it there, and I’d be happy to take your comments and your questions. Thank you. (Applause). MR. : Do you see parallels between, whether in Asia or Europe, the pre‐World War II environment? Is our deterrent capability and approach still capable of preventing World War III. MR. JOSEPH: I think a strong deterrent will certainly add to our ability to reduce the odds of the failure of deterrence. If we have credible forces, if we have the right policies and the right doctrine, I think that will go a long way to deter either China or Russia from pushing us too far. I think they’re both determined to push us, Russia in Europe, China and Russia in the Pacific. It’s always difficult to anticipate what will be the spark of a conflict. But I think the best posture is clearly to be prepared for that conflict and to ensure that we take the steps that we can to strengthen deterrence, such as through modernization, such as through the deployment of a low yield SLCM capability. I think I agree with John, the latest NPR has it right. MR. : Any insights on the capabilities the Russians have in Kaliningrad? MR. JOSEPH: The Russians are rather opaque when it comes to Kaliningrad, even though they do acknowledge at times that there are nuclear weapons. My sense is that there are likely – I don’t know, I haven’t seen the intelligence so I’m speculating – there are likely Iskandr missiles there. They seem to foresee using the Iskandr in a whole lot of different contexts, but it could be well beyond that, well beyond that. I think the Russians are now signaling that they very well may be deploying theater systems into Crimea, breaking yet again another political barrier that at least some in Europe had tried to establish. MR. : I’ve got two questions. In your mind and in your experience, do you ever foresee us having – what would drive us to have a treaty with China on nuclear arms control? China doesn’t want – they’re very non‐transparent in terms of what they have. Recently there was a buzz about having a trifecta treaty to bring China in, but let’s just look at China solo. I’d also like to hear your thoughts on North Korea and how things are going. MR. JOSEPH: Speaking of fantasy and arms control. (Laughter). I don’t envision the Chinese moving forward and agreeing to negotiate a treaty in the nuclear field, just because of the past behavior and given also their relatively lower level of capabilities and forces. That said, I think that there are any number of circumstances in which there is no arms control solution, there is no arms control agreement to be had. I don’t know if there’s an agreement to be had with the Russians. But as I look at New START and the fundamental flaws of that agreement, and moving forward under those provisions under those conditions into the current and expected security environment, just because it’s an arms control agreement doesn’t mean we ought to extend it. Just because it’s the only arms control treaty left in terms of U.S.‐Russian nuclear forces, it doesn’t mean that we should extend it. So, I’m not optimistic on negotiating an agreement, because I think that right now we need to use other tools to strengthen deterrence. But if there is a possibility for arms control, we should explore it and we should take it if it’s in our interest. The key issue is if it’s in our interest. Often there is this dynamic that you get into a negotiation – especially with U.S. negotiators – and we begin by viewing the situation as one of compromise. We need to compromise to get an agreement. Let me tell you, the Russians don’t think that way. The Chinese don’t think that way. The North Koreans certainly don’t think that way. But there is this sort of trend or characteristic of American negotiation that leads us to develop fall back positions and fallback, fallback positions. Over time, in the process of negotiation, the agreement becomes the end in itself, and we’ve seen this over and over again. That’s something that I think we need to guard against because we don’t have that luxury anymore. I truly believe Russia has gained nuclear superiority over the United States. We’ve been sleeping since the end of the Cold War. I mentioned in my talk, the competence, the technical competence, why can’t we build pits anymore? Johnny Foster talks about the loss of technical competence at the laboratories, operational competence. Admiral, you know better than I all of the problems that have developed. You will remember, speaking of North Dakota, flying from Minot to Barksdale, some (LFINS ?) that we thought were inert and they turned out to be armed. That could never have happened. I remember the day I heard that. It was actually with Ash Carter and we were conducting a review of DITRA. We were pulled aside by one of the DITRA leaders and we were told about this. We just looked at each other. This couldn’t have happened. It couldn’t have happened in our time. But we’ve lost that operational competence, and I think there are many other examples of that. And, I think we’ve lost policy competence. We’re only now starting to rethink about what we really require for deterrence. For 20 years we’ve had this notion that nuclear weapons were for some sort of existential threat if we’re attacked. Well, that sort of led to a whole lot of problems, particularly within the services, I would argue; perhaps with the nuclear Navy being an exception. As for North Korea, what do you say? They keep moving forward with their nuclear program. They keep building nuclear weapons. They are testing short‐ and medium‐range missiles. We keep saying that they’re going to give up their weapons. Well, they’re not going to give up their weapons. I would bet the house on that one. MR. : I think you mentioned three technologies the Russians have developed. I think one of them was hypersonics, the other was underwater drones, and other capabilities they have. From an arms control perspective, how should that change the way we look at any type of arms control agreement? MR. JOSEPH: It is a strong statement, I think, in terms of what they’re doing. It’s a strong statement about how they approach nuclear weapons and how they approach arms control. I mean, who in the United States would ever have thought about developing an underwater drone with – what is it they claim – a 100 megaton warhead on it? It’s kind of like assigning SS‐18 warheads that follow the initial destruction of the United States with warheads filled with biological agents. I mean, who would have thought of that? The Russians think differently about nuclear weapons, and about other weapons of mass destruction. I think the message is that we need to be clear eyed in how we approach this. We need to be pragmatic. We can’t approach arms control as some ideologically‐driven good, as some search for peace in our time. If we do that, we’re going to pay. We’re going to pay a high price for that. And the likely price is that deterrence will fail when we need it most. I’ll leave it there. Thank you. Thank you, all. (Applause).