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100819 Minot Task Force 21 and Geostrategic Analysis Triad Nuclear 100819 Minot Task Force 21 and Geostrategic Analysis Triad Nuclear Modernization Conference with Former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph, Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy MR. TOM RAFFERTY: Good afternoon. My name is Tom Rafferty and I’m with Task Force 21. I live in Minot, North Dakota, but in my formative years I did live on the Minot Air Force Base. My dad was in missile maintenance. I lived there until about the second grade. It has been fun reminiscing and making connections with some people at my table. Colonel Morgan was there when I was there, but I was probably about this tall or so. Anyway, North Dakotans like making connections. Our next speaker has a great connection to North Dakota, as in he’s from North Dakota. I’m going to introduce Ambassador Bob Joseph. He is a former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. He attended the U.S. Naval Academy, and has had a long and distinguished career in national security affairs, especially in nuclear deterrence, arms control and nonproliferation. He is from Williston, North Dakota. Please welcome Ambassador Bob Joseph. (Applause). MR. ROBERT JOSEPH: Good afternoon. I was back in Williston two weeks ago and the sun was shining and it was shirt sleeve weather. I see that things have changed a little bit, but coming from North Dakota I’m very much used to those types of changes. Thank you for the kind introduction. I’ve had the great fortune of working with both Roger and John over the course of the last 30 years. I know that I always learn when I listen to them. They are both clear examples of professionals who have contributed a great deal to the security of our country. Thank you both for that. Peter has asked that I provide you with a comprehensive overview of arms control, which is a rather daunting task given that I’ve been allotted 30 minutes; 20 minutes for a talk and 10 minutes for Q&A. Despite the shortness of time, I will try to deliver what Peter has asked for. I believe it’s useful to start with a very basic question about the role of arms control in national security. Here, many observers and practitioners begin with the question which is most often framed as an assertion as to whether arms control is good or bad for U.S. interests. To me, this is not the right starting point. This is not the right question, as it suggests that arms control is or should be treated as an end in itself. Rather, arms control is a tool. It is a tool that, along with other tools such as economic sanctions, intelligence and military force, should be employed as a broader strategy for promoting U.S. security. The starting point should not be how can we advance the goal of arms control, but how can we use arms control in combination with other tools, to advance U.S. security interests. And like other tools, we can use arms control skillfully, or we can use it poorly. And if done poorly, arms control can become, and has in the past often become, a problem masquerading as a solution. Here I would point out that at the time U.S. administrations, Republican and Democrat alike, have approached arms control as an end, rather than as a means to an end. Arms control, no matter how much we may hope, cannot substitute for strategy. When we’ve allowed it to do so, as with the Bush 43 attempt to negotiate with North Korea, or with the Obama JCPOA with Iran, the results have been uniformly detrimental to our national interests. So, if we start with the proposition that arms control is a tool to advance our national interests, the questions, I believe, become more analytically objective, and answers become more useful in determining and assessing policy choices. One initial question is, when is arms control consistent with our security objectives? You often hear that we need to talk to and we need to negotiate with all of our adversaries. As a general rule, that may be accurate, but there are exceptions. When Neville Chamberlain negotiated with Hitler in Munich and returned to London with a piece of paper that he claimed would provide peace in his time, he was not only fundamentally wrong, the agreement led to the opposite of the peace that he sought, contributing to a war that would claim over 60 million lives. After Munich Hitler brought his generals together to assure them that an attack on Poland would not be met with force. He told them that he had watched Chamberlain and the others around the arms control negotiating table, and that they were nothing but, in Hitler’s words, little worms. While we can never know for sure, many historians believe that if Hitler had been threatened with credible force, he may likely have backed down. A second question is, if an accord is reached, are the terms in our security interests? This evaluation has components that are specific to the agreement, such as the effectiveness of the verification provisions, and components that are at times far broader with respect to how the terms of the agreement get with the geostrategic environment and with our overall security interests. Looking back, I would argue that we’ve had a very mixed record in terms of arms control agreements. Just a few examples, and to begin with the positive, I thought START II was a sound treaty that achieved meaningful outcomes, for example, by banning Soviet or Russian heavy and MIRVed ICBMs. Perhaps because it did contribute to U.S. security in this way, Russia never implemented it. I also thought the 1987 INF Treaty was a net gain for U.S. security, though for me it was very difficult to watch the Pershing IIs leave Europe. But with regard to the INF Treaty, I think it’s important to acknowledge the logic of the decision to withdraw 32 years later. Russian violations, followed by years and years of failed diplomatic efforts by both the Obama and the Trump administrations to bring Russia back into compliance, left withdrawal as the only viable option. It simply makes no sense to maintain an agreement that bans two countries from an important military capability if only one side abides by the terms, while the other side cheats, all the while China, North Korea and Iran are developing formidable arsenals of intermediate‐range ballistic missiles. The failure to impose costs on Russia for its ongoing violations of the INF Treaty would also undercut prospects for future arms control by establishing that there are no consequences for breaching even the central provisions of agreements. Moreover, the security situation in Europe and Asia has changed considerably with the Russian deployments of modern INF capabilities, and China’s large‐scale buildup of dual capable mobile missiles. As the National Defense Strategy suggests, the U.S. deterrent in both regions has deteriorated significantly over the past decade. In the absence of countervailing U.S. military capabilities, the prospects for deterrence failure and the likelihood that adversaries will test our resolve by using these capabilities to coerce U.S. allies, increase dramatically. While most of the needed capabilities are likely to be conventional rather than nuclear, these deployments would also have been precluded by remaining in the treaty. One clear arms control outcome that served U.S. interest, if I don’t say so myself, was the 2003 agreement with Colonel Qaddafi. In March of 2004 we brought back to the United States hundreds of metric tons of Libya’s nuclear weapons program, as well as its longer range Scud missiles. In doing so we established the Libya model, a new model different from that of Iraq, that if a country was willing to give up its program it would receive relief from economic and political sanctions. A second Libya model would emerge eight years later under a different administration when Qaddafi ended up dead following U.S. and NATO intervention. I think it’s highly ironic that while the Obama administration placed arms control and nonproliferation at the top of its priorities, its decision to intervene in Libya on humanitarian grounds undercut the prospects for other proliferators to abandon their WMD and missile programs, as we see today with North Korea, which often cites the Libya outcome. We know that there was little thought, if any, given to a day after plan in Libya in 2011 as the country degenerated rapidly into a failed state. And it is equally unlikely, in my view, that any thought was given to the negative nonproliferation message being sent. Time does not allow me to give my assessment of the long list of Cold War era agreements that failed to meet U.S. objectives, and at times actually undermined our security, beginning with the 1971 ABM Treaty. So, I will limit my comments to two agreements that are of current interest, beginning with New START. John, you are right, we do disagree on this. Beginning with New START, in 2010 I testified against ratification, highlighting the treaties shortcomings and predicting, now proven accurate, that U.S. forces would go down and Russian forces would build up under the agreement. This was consistent with long standing Soviet, now Russian, tactics that use arms control to limit U.S. nuclear forces in a manner intended to gain unilateral advantage. I also emphasized the failure of the treaty to limit theater nuclear forces based on the fiction that nuclear attacks employing weapons with ranges less than 5,500 kilometers would somehow not be strategic.
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