THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION APRIL 6, 2020

VOLUME XVIII, ISSUE 7

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Brian Perkins Kyle Orton Rafid Jaboori Dario Cristiani

BRIEFS Coronavirus and The Leadership and Geopolitics and the Continued Conflict Future of Kata’ib Greater Maghreb Secu- Push Into Hezbollah rity Complex in a Time Greater Chaos of Financial Distress

ATTACKS DEMONSTRATE IS-CAP EVO- LUTION IN MOZAMBIQUE control of Mocimboa da Praia, the capital of Cabo Del- gado province, before attacking Quissanga, which is Brian M. Perkins more than a hundred miles south. Unlike previous at- tacks, the fighters seemingly attempted to limit civilian Northern Mozambique has witnessed a significant esca- casualties while attacking state institutions, looting lation of operations by Islamic State Central Africa Prov- banks and stores, and reportedly redistributing provi- ince (IS-CAP) in recent weeks, with the group claiming sions to civilians (Daily Maverick, March 26). Rather than two substantial attacks over a span of just three days. small cells armed with old rifles or machetes, the attacks The attacks, which took place in Mocimboa da Praia and were conducted by upwards of 40 fighters dressed in Quissanga between March 23-25, demonstrated a no- camo and equipped with automatic weapons and RPGs, table, concerning tactical evolution as well as improved a notable departure from most attacks over the past capabilities at a moment of particular vulnerability (Club several years. of Mozambique, March 26). IS-CAP released a series of photographs as well as a rare The majority of attacks claimed by IS-CAP since its es- video message claiming responsibility for the attacks, tablishment in Mozambique, as well as those previously with the speaker brandishing an Islamic State (IS) flag attributed to Ansar al-Sunna, have primarily consisted of and calling on fighters to come join them to establish hit-and-run style attacks conducted by small cells, often Sharia rule in Mozambique (Club of Mozambique, March with rudimentary weapons. Past attacks have also either 26). Previously rare, claims of responsibility have grown explicitly targeted civilians or demonstrated little regard more common and IS has increased coverage of activi- for collateral damage with an increasing trend toward ties in Mozambique (Twitter.com/emorier, March 26). attacks on security forces. While the exact level of IS involvement in the overall The attacks in Mocimboa da Praia and Quissanga, how- violence that has plagued northern Mozambique is still ever, were more sustained operations targeting entire unclear, these recent attacks are evidence that the dedi- cities. IS-CAP fighters overran security forces and seized cated IS-CAP core has grown, both in size and capabili-

1 ty. IS-CAP has evolved from its nascent phase of ques- ’S LATEST CEASEFIRE CALLS UNLIKELY TO tionable claims of responsibility to overt displays of its STOP HOUTHI OFFENSIVES involvement. At the same time, its fighters have seem- ingly improved their coordination as well as their access Brian M. Perkins to more sophisticated weaponry than what had been used in the earlier days of the conflict. Similarly, the announced that it invited the Houthis to group has seemingly moved on to a growth phase in Riyadh for direct talks following days of tit-for-tat attacks which it is leveraging its improved capabilities to launch that broke the March 25 UN-brokered ceasefire as more sustained operations that allow it to target and COVID-19 threatens to wreak havoc on war-torn Yemen. loot state institutions, while beginning a hearts and While Yemen has yet to officially confirm a COVID-19 minds campaign in an attempt to gain further local trac- case, it is likely only a matter of time and the virus’s tion. The video claim of responsibility also demonstrates spread will have dire human consequences and notable the group’s efforts to draw in regional and global ji- implications for the situation on the ground as it creates hadists. Looking forward, these attacks demonstrate the both opportunities and dangerous pitfalls. weakness of the state and set a precedent that it is no longer the remote roadways and townships that are in Saudi Arabia and the Houthis had been engaging in in- danger, but also key cities where those who have been formal talks prior to the latest ceasefire. The recent esca- displaced by violence in rural areas have relocated. The lation of violence that broke that ceasefire involved group may yet prove to be strong enough to hold terri- Houthi drone and ballistic missile attacks on Riyadh and tory for prolonged periods of time, but its ability to en- Jeddah, followed by Saudi Arabia conducting airstrikes ter a key location such as Mocimboa da Praia by sea and on Sanaa. Though the previous talks had not yielded land and control it for hours before successfully with- any concrete results, there was a reduction in cross-bor- drawing is a worrying trend of the group’s operational der attacks that were a demonstration of Saudi Arabia’s growth. efforts to draw back from Yemen, even at a time when the Houthis were still making significant gains. The likely Brian M. Perkins is the Editor of Monitor. impending COVID-19 outbreak spurred renewed efforts to jumpstart a ceasefire but has also created fodder for the Houthi propaganda machine and an opportunity for them to seek maximum concessions if they were to eventually pursue a ceasefire.

Just one day after the nominal ceasefire agreement, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi gave a televised speech on the group’s al-Masirah television channel to once again urge Riyadh to release Hamas prisoners de- tained in Saudi Arabia in exchange for the release of Saudi prisoners in Houthi custody (YouTube, March 26). In doing so, the Houthis were leveraging heightened media attention as a means to expose Saudi Arabia and turn regional public opinion against the Kingdom. On April 1, Mohammed al-Houthi, a prominent Houthi leader, reiterated calls for a COVID-19-related ceasefire while noting the importance of the three references— the Gulf Initiative, outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, and applicable UN Resolutions—and call- ing for a 12-country arbitration process, which further muddies the water for timely results (Middle East Moni- tor, April 2).

Despite the group’s public calls to pursue a ceasefire in the face of a potential COVID-19 outbreak, the Houthis

2 are well aware that they are negotiating from a position of power as they continue to push deeper into al-Jawf Coronavirus and Continued and the oil-rich governorate of Marib. Over the past Conflict Push Syria Into week, both the Houthis and Saudi Arabia have contin- ued military operations, including a reported Houthi at- Greater Chaos tack on an oil pumping station in Marib and the shelling of a prison in Taiz. While the Houthis are likely to pursue Kyle Orton this desperately needed, piecemeal ceasefire and dia- logue with Saudi Arabia, the group will almost certainly The first quarter of 2020 saw a serious escalation of continue its offensive in Marib while trying to leverage combat in Syria, albeit without much alteration in the the looming health crisis to its advantage. Starting a political trends, and the arrival of the novel coronavirus ceasefire while on the verge of taking Marib would be to (COVID-19) has exacerbated a fraught situation. the Houthis’ detriment, as doing so could allow forces aligned to the internationally-recognized Yemeni Presi- Under the Astana process, which began in late 2016, dent to consolidate their posi- , Russia, and Iran were supposed to act as guaran- tions. Given the Houthis’ past strategies and its current tors to freeze hostilities in Syria. Instead, Bashar al-As- trajectory, an outbreak or international pressure would sad’s regime, backed by Russia and Iran, picked off each likely need to meet a critical mass before the group of the de-escalation zones seriatim. In September 2018, abandons its attempts to seize the key governorate of a renewed ceasefire commitment was worked out in Marib and genuinely pursues a fulsome ceasefire. Sochi, based on the new realities on-the-ground, to halt the pro-Assad coalition’s attack on the final insurgent- Brian M. Perkins is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor. held pocket, Idlib, in northwest Syria (The National, Sep- tember 19, 2018).

In mid-December 2019, the pro-Assad coalition at- tacked Idlib again. Within two months, 900,000 people had been displaced (United Nations, February 18). De- spite the “observation posts” that Turkey has through- out Idlib, it seemed Ankara had no will to defend the province, even as 21 soldiers were killed by the pro-As- sad coalition (The New Arab, February 10). [1] Then, on February 27, 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in an airstrike (Rudaw, February 29). This could not be ig- nored. Within hours, Turkey used drones to clear the skies over Idlib and attacked Assad’s troops and the Shi’a militias controlled by the Iranian Islamic Revolu- tionary Guards Corps (IRGC), including Lebanese Hezbollah. Turkey escalated the aerial campaign even further after midnight on February 29/March 1, when the deadline Ankara set for a regime withdrawal south to the “Sochi Line” expired.

Dubbed Spring Shield (Bahar Kalkani), Turkey’s opera- tion inflicted an average of 50 confirmable fatalities on the Assad/Iranian forces per day until a new Turkey-Rus- sia ceasefire was worked out on March 5 (Twitter.com/ GregoryPWaters, March 7). The terms of the ceasefire did not reflect the leverage Turkey had built by demon- strating the essential hollowness of the pro-Assad coali- tion (Daily Sabah, March 13).

3 Turkey essentially allowed the pro-Assad coalition to ers’ Party (PKK) (see Terrorism Monitor, June 14, 2019). keep the gains from its December-February offensive, The pressure exerted by the United States on the PKK to covering the south of the “Greater Idlib” pocket up to create a more inclusive, sustainable governance struc- the M4 Highway that runs east-west from city to ture in the Arab-majority areas of Syria it had captured the coast, including the crucial town of Saraqeb, where from Islamic State (IS) was not going well (AlJazeera, the M4 crosses with the M5 (running north-south from October 12, 2019). After Trump ordered the pull-out in Aleppo to Damascus), which the Assad/Iran system also December 2018, even this minimal pressure on the PKK got to keep. The pro-Assad coalition is thus within easy evaporated. striking distance of Idlib city when this ceasefire in- evitably breaks down, and if the provincial capital is lost Omar Abu Layla, the executive director of Deir Ezzor it might well unravel Turkey’s position in northern Syria 24, a local reporting outlet, described the situation in altogether. eastern Syria as a “time bomb”, and that was before the coronavirus. The virus is “a horrific danger, especially The options for Idlib, under nominal Turkish protection, with the presence of the Iranians in the western Eu- but dominated by the al-Qaeda derivative, Hay’at Tahrir phrates regions”, who are believed to have introduced it al-Sham (HTS), are few and ugly. HTS could evolve into a into the area, “and the indifference of the Assad Hamas-like entity that the international community de regime”. “Indifference” might be to understate the is- facto deals with (Ahval, December 8, 2018). Turkey’s sue: the Assad regime sees political advantages in the continued build-up suggests it will exert ever-increasing spread of the virus into Rojava. [2] control in the remaining areas of northern Idlib, but it probably cannot displace HTS entirely (Twitter.com/ Mazen Hassoun, a journalist from , describes a OmerOzkizilcik, March 27). similar situation in his home area, emphasising that apart from the malevolent games played by the regime Spring Shield has ended the pro-Assad coalition’s hopes and the PKK’s missteps— while the PKK has initiated a of retaking all of Idlib at this moment, but it will try public information campaign and taken economic steps, again. Perhaps the precedent of this operation means its overnight curfew is not effective as a social distancing Turkey will hold its ground, but even if Turkey is in measure since people do not go out at that time any- northern Syria for the long-term this is likely to co-exist way—there is a simple lack of resources, from testing with the consolidation of the Assad regime in the rest of kits to ventilators. There are no testing kits, and maybe Syria, including the east, since U.S. President Donald three-dozen ventilators in Rojava. Hassoun says that to Trump remains determined to leave. the best of his knowledge, the United States has not sent additional equipment. [3] This is partly an unin- For now, it is HTS controlling the response to the coron- tended consequence of the PKK playing down the scale avirus in Idlib, banning large gatherings—not that it had of the crisis to avoid affecting the situation with coalition previously allowed them—and closing schools, though troops, fearing that they would begin isolating them- stopping short of preventing Friday prayers (Twitter.- selves or that Trump would pull them out altogether and com/Elizrael, March 30). As in Afrin and northern Alep- leave the PKK vulnerable (Twitter.com/Mzahem_Alsa- po, the adjacent zones actually controlled by Turkey, in loum, April 1). Idlib there are civil society groups like the “White Hel- mets” that try to deliver services, but there is a serious IS has capitalized on the coronavirus crisis, staging two lack of medical resources and a vast population of inter- prison riots in late March in Rojava that led to a number nally displaced people (IDPs) packed into a small, often of escapes (Rudaw, March 31). Prison breaks were one insanitary, territory. Idlib is additionally debilitated be- of the key factors in IS’ previous revival. cause of Assad’s and Russia’s deliberate destruction of a majority of the hospitals and killing hundreds of medical The IRGC, which plays a decisive command role in the professionals (TRT, March 23). Assad system, was likely the vector in bringing the coro- navirus to the west of Syria too, and passing it on to Security in the northeast “Rojava” zone that the United both the regime forces and the Russians (Kavkaz Centre, States oversees has been deteriorating, largely for polit- March 5). [4] The regime’s obfuscation makes reliable ical reasons. The United States is embedded with the information difficult to obtain, and the World Health Or- “” (SDF), the politico-legal ganization (WHO) has proven to be as compromised in cover used by the terrorist-designated Work- Syria as it has in China.

4 In early March, WHO dismissed news of coronavirus spread in Syria as “misinformation,” relying on Assad’s The Leadership and Future of notoriously mendacious health ministry. WHO has insist- Kata’ib Hezbollah ed on sending all aid to Damascus, essentially ensuring that Idlib and Rojava do not receive the help they need Rafid Jaboori (WHO, March 5; Al-Jumhuriya, March 26). Damascus finally admitted its first COVID-19 case on March 22 On February 26, the U.S. State Department designated (Anadolu, March 22). There are now ten confirmed infec- Ahmed al-Hamidawi, the new secretary general of the tions and one death, which the United Nations says is Iraqi Shia militia, Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), as a specially the “tip of the iceberg” (Anadolu, March 30). designated global terrorist (State.gov, February 26). The The Assad regime has instituted a travel ban—between designation came amid ongoing tension between the cities and across borders—and a 6PM to 6AM curfew, United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias. which has the same limitations as the one in Rojava Among the numerous militias supported by Tehran, KH (SANA, March 24; Al-Modon, March 23). Also, like in is particularly unique. The militia is one of the most well- Rojava, resources are a problem for the regime. There armed and organized of these groups, with an active are 325 intensive care unit (ICU) beds with ventilators in media arm, but an intentionally opaque leadership and Syria, able to cope with about 6,500 COVID-19 cases chain of command. The United States’ recent strategy (LSE, March 19). has focused more heavily on targeting KH than any oth- er Shia militia. With the economy in free fall long before the virus hit and now essentially paused, the mass-demobilization of Recent Tensions reservists announced on March 29 raises serious ques- tions about the capacity of the Assad regime, always On December 28, a rocket attack on the K1 military short of manpower, to maintain order (The New Arab, base near Kirkuk in northern killed a U.S. contractor January 11; Youm7, March 29). Perhaps the increasingly- and wounded several U.S. soldiers. The United States overt restoration of Assad’s relations with the United quickly launched retaliatory strikes that targeted KH Arab Emirates will fill some of the gaps in the Assad sys- bases and killed dozens of its members (Arabi21, De- tem (Twitter.com/Presidency_Sy, March 27). But, de- cember 29). pending on how far the virus has spread during the pe- riod of denialism, it might be a moot point. Hundreds of KH and other militias members attacked the U.S. embassy in Baghdad in protest. Although most, Kyle Orton is an independent researcher focused on the if not all, of the attackers were Iraqis, the United States Syrian war. He tweets @KyleWOrton. administration blamed Iran directly for the attack based on the degree of influence the country has on KH and Notes other Shia militias (Aljazeera, December 31, 2019). [1] The pro-Assad coalition killed eight Turkish soldiers The highest point in the confrontation between the on 2 February; five on the 10th; two on the 20th; one on United States and Iran came just days later when the the 22nd; two on the 25th; and three in the morning of U.S. military killed Iranian Major General Qasem 27 February before the mass-casualty attack in the Soleimani and Jamal Ja’afar al-Ibrahim (a.k.a. Abu Mah- evening. di al-Muhandis), the founder of KH, outside Baghdad [2] Author interview, March 30, 2020 International Airport on January 3 (Al-Quds al-Araby, January 3). [3] Author interview, March 30, 2020 The Insurgency Years [4] Sam Dagher, Assad or We Burn the Country: How One Family’s Lust for Power Destroyed Syria (2019), pp. KH first became widely known in 2007 as an active Shia 323-324. insurgent group that targeted U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq. The group has not officially stated when exactly it was founded. Iranian strategy in post-invasion Iraq

5 aimed to empower its Iraqi allies, namely the Shia par- On March 11, two U.S. and one British soldier were ties, and help them dominate the government while at killed in another rocket attack on Camp Taji, north of the same time maximizing the losses and cost of the Baghdad (Rudaw, March 1) Although the United States U.S. and coalition military occupation. In 2007, that blamed KH, the group did not claim responsibility for strategy faced two particular problems. First, Moqtada the attack. Instead, they declared that they supported it al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, which dominated the Shia insur- and called for those who launched it to be proud and gency after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, declared a series claim responsibility. Shortly after, a new unknown group of ceasefires and al-Sadr sponsored a political wing that called Usbat al-Thaereen (The League of the Revolu- joined the parliament and government. Second, the tionaries) claimed responsibility for the attack (Al- Sunni insurgency witnessed the dramatic emergence of Akhbar, March 16). the Sahwa (Awakening) groups that shifted sides and fought against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) alongside U.S. Although KH declared that it opposes the United States forces. Under those circumstances, KH emerged as an and the coalition military presence in Iraq, it never insurgent group almost at the same time another Iran- claimed responsibility for the recent attacks. The forma- ian-supported Shia militia group, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (The tion of a new group that is not part of the government league of the Righteous-AAH). In 2009, KH and its or PMU became a necessity for the Shia militias move- founder al-Muhandis were issued terrorist designations ment. The Shia militias do not want to further embarrass (Treasury.gov, July 2, 2009). the Iraqi Shia-led government, which is under immense U.S. pressure to reign in the armed groups. Most of the The two groups enjoyed significantly more support from leaders of the Shia militias and the locations of their Iran than the Mahdi Army received and were referred to camps and branches have become known in recent as ‘Special Groups’ in U.S. military literature. AAH was years. A shadowy new group, however, will not be under clearly a splinter group of the Mahdi Army and its lead- the same scrutiny or threat from U.S. reprisals. ers were former aides of al-Sadr’s. KH also attracted members of the Mahdi Army, but its leadership included Future of KH members with stronger ties to Tehran. Some lived in Iran and were members of the Iran-based armed opposition Reports have surfaced that the United States is consider- to the Saddam Hussein government before the 2003 ing plans to completely destroy KH in the wake of the invasion. [1] Taji attack (Al Arabiya, March 28). KH, however, is just one of several Iranian-backed Shia militias that have ac- Leadership quired significant political and military power in Iraq, especially after the defeat of IS. Many of those militias In response to the collapse of large units of the Iraqi promote the same anti-American sentiment as KH and army and police in the face of the swift advance of the have declared policies that aim to expel the United Sunni jihadist Islamic State (IS), Shia militias mobilized States from Iraq through both violent and nonviolent and deployed its fighters to the frontlines. means. As such, confronting this threat requires a more comprehensive U.S. strategy. While most of the Shia militias publicized their activities and promoted their leaders as war heroes, KH continued KH was one of the Shia groups that played a key role in to keep its structure and leadership secret. While the repressing the anti-corruption protests that have en- group’s founder al-Muhandis came into prominence gulfed Iraq since October. The group, however, pursued from operating an underground organization, KH never a misleading discourse. Like all Iranian-backed militias, officially announced that al-Muhandis was its leader. He KH was against the protests and accused the protesters was known to have always aspired to a larger role in of being sponsored by the United States, Israel, and Iraq. He was revered by all of the Shia militias as an in- anti-Iran Gulf countries. The group never accepted re- fluential commander and became the deputy leader of sponsibility for killing protesters (almaalomah, October the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU)—the official um- 29). brella group that gave the Shia militias a government mandate to operate. There have been accusations against many of KH’s lead- ers of orchestrating the crackdown that killed hundreds

6 of protesters. Yet, the group alleged that it also supports the protesters’ cause and their calls for reform. Pro- Geopolitics and the Greater testers have condemned KH and the United States has Maghreb Security Complex in sanctioned the group’s leaders. The whole protest movement, however, seems to have lost momentum and a Time of Financial Distress failed to bring any genuine reform to the political sys- tem. KH appears to have emerged stronger from that Dario Cristiani crisis and U.S. sanctions are unlikely to weaken its lead- ers who operate secretly between Iraq and Iran. Introduction

The question of leadership is problematic for KH. After The first months of 2020 witnessed significant diplomat- all, it failed to live up to its inspiration/name and form an ic activity between the Gulf and the Maghreb. However, Iraqi Shia group as successful as the Lebanese Hezbol- the emerging global economic crisis caused by the lah. KH could neither publicly present a charismatic COVID-19 pandemic will likely affect some of these leader like Hassan Nasrallah, nor unify the other Iraqi diplomatic dynamics. In January 2020, the Berlin confer- Shia militias into one group that dominates the military ence on offered an occasion for many countries to and political field like Hezbollah did in . KH will target Maghrebi partners. Germany largely ignored local not be easily eliminated, even in a potential large-scale actors: , , and the Arab Maghreb U.S. military campaign. It would most likely survive, al- Union were not invited. Taieb Baccouche, the Secretary- beit in a different form, and use any losses to consoli- General of the Arab Maghreb Union openly criticized date its position as a major component of the PMU. The this European attitude, voicing the regional disappoint- militia’s position and status, however, will always depend ment for this approach (Affari Internazionali, March 5). on Iranian support for the group and its secretive lead- was invited only the day before the conference, ership. and the new President Kais Saied made an explicit ref- erence to this late invitation when rejecting the offer Rafid Jaboori is a journalist, writer and researcher. He is (Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 18). a former BBC World Service Reporter. He covered The Among Gulf countries, the UAE was the sole country Iraq War and its aftermath, the conflict in Syria, and sev- invited to the conference. This should not come as a eral other events. He is an expert in militant groups in surprise. The UAE is likely the most influential external the Middle East. actor in Libya these days and the only country with the ability to impose choices on Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Notes the warlord dominating eastern Libya (see Terrorism Monitor, February 7). [1] Author’s April 3 interview with an Iraqi source who preferred to remain anonymous. In the immediate aftermath of the conference, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Com- mander of the Armed Forces, Sheikh Mohamed bin Za- yed, flew to Morocco, where he owns a house, and met with the Moroccan King Mohammed VI (Twitter.com/for- san_uae, January 20). The picture of the meeting was widely shared online, but this did not change the com- plex nature of Emirati-Moroccan relations, which remain tense due to Rabat’s commitment to neutrality over the blockade. In March, Morocco recalled its ambas- sador and two consuls from the UAE. Notably, this deci- sion came after Fouad Ali El Himma, one of the most influential Moroccan politicians and a close senior advi- sor to King Mohammed VI, toured the Gulf in late Feb- ruary, excluding the UAE from his visit (Le1 Maroc, March 11).

7 Emirati regional diplomatic activism continued in the The UAE’s greater engagement with Mauritania is be- following weeks. In essence, the UAE Foreign Minister coming increasingly multidimensional and not only lim- Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan met his Algerian ited to political and security issues. The Emiratis an- counterpart, Sabri Boukadoum, Prime Minister Abdelaziz nounced the allocation of $2 billion towards investment Djerad, and President in Algiers and development projects. National media highlighted in late January, with Libya being at the forefront of the how this effort is particularly significant, as Mauritania’s talks ( Press Service, January 27, Ashar Al-Awsat, GDP is worth $5 billion. As such, the UAE plan would January 28). A few days later, the Mauritanian President represent no less than 40 percent of its entire economy also went to the UAE for an (The National {Abu Dhabi}, February 9). Cooperation is official state visit. also ongoing in areas like environmental and social is- sues (Mauritanian News Agency, February 19). In March, The UAE’s recent diplomatic activity was matched by a the UAE-led “Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim So- renewed activism from Qatar as well. At the end of Feb- cieties” organized the first consultative forum for schol- ruary, the emir of Qatar went to Tunisia, the regional ars from Sahel countries in Nouakchott under the pa- country in which Doha likely has the most significant tronage of the Mauritanian presidency (Emirates News leverage (AnsaMedInfo, February 25). The UAE has Agency, March 12). The two countries signed a memo- been trying to deepen its role in Tunisia for years, but randum regarding a mutual visa exemption (SaharaMe- these ambitions have often been frustrated. The Qatari dias, February 2). The UAE even helped Mauritania emir also went to Algeria and despite some ongoing evacuate its citizens stuck in China as the coronavirus problems—the most notable being the Ooredo issue— outbreak erupted. The two countries also coordinated a on more strategic and regional issues the countries response to deal with this crisis (Al-Mashhad Al-Araby, seemed to be on the same page (The Arab Weekly, Feb- March 4; Emirates News Agency, March 30). ruary 23, The Peninsula (Qatar), February 25) Over the past years, Mauritania’s regional importance This activism on both sides remains part of the broader has indeed increased, partially as a result of growing confrontation, despite some feeble attempts to start economic investments, especially in the oil sector (Africa settling issues regarding the 2017 blockade. This con- News, December 25, 2016). In the geostrategic context frontation goes beyond the mere diplomatic sphere, as of the Maghreb-Sahel region, Mauritania can hardly be it embraces a much more comprehensive set of ques- considered a crucial player, given its limited demo- tions: it is a confrontation between models of gover- graphic and economic size. However, its position as a nance, ideological approaches to the relationship be- country in between the Maghreb and the Sahel—areas tween power and religion, and how to develop their whose connections have been more and more important global presence in the coming years over the past few years—makes it an ideal target for diplomatic action by Abu Dhabi. A more substantial Mauritania as the UAE’s Key to the Region? presence there can be used as a tool of influence in The diversified problems that the UAE face vis-à-vis Mo- both regional blocs, but also vis-à-vis the other countries rocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are likely the main reasons of the Maghreb in which, for one reason or another, Abu explaining why, over the past few months, Abu Dhabi Dhabi struggles to exert influence. has become even keener in deepening relations with The current Mauritanian president was the primary polit- Mauritania. Relations between the two countries were ical architect behind the significant strengthening of re- already good. Under previous President Mohammad lations between Mauritania and Western actors, namely Ould Abdul Aziz, Mauritania took several positions that and NATO (The New Arab Weekly, November 4, were in line with Abu Dhabi's feelings—a harsh stance 2018, NATO, May 29, 2018). As the UAE is increasingly towards the Muslim Brotherhood; and severing diplo- close with France, as observable in the Libyan quagmire, matic ties with Qatar in the wake of the spat that led to deepening its ties with Mauritania can also serve as a the blockade in 2017 (GulfNews, September 24, 2018, means to become more involved in the Sahel. France Khaleej Times, June 7, Al-Araby, September 27, 2014). could seek greater support from the UAE as it tries to The situation did not change after the Mauritanian pow- step up its efforts in the region to make up for American er transition. disengagement from Africa and the increasing profile of globally connected local jihadist organizations in the

8 region, both al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS). Mauritania Dario Cristiani is a political risk consultant working on has also built up a reputation of being effective in cop- Mediterranean countries. He is currently an IAI/GMA ing with the jihadist threat. As it takes the leadership of Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, in Washington, the G5 Sahel, Nouakchott will become a major asset to DC. Previously, he was a Visiting Fellow at the In- UAE eyes. ternational Centre for Policing and Security at the Uni- versity of South Wales (UK). And prior to that, he was Conclusions: Diplomatic Depth in a Time of Profound the director of the Executive Training in “Global Risk Financial Distress Analysis and Crisis Management” and an adjunct pro- fessor in International Affairs & Conflict Studies at Vesal- This diplomatic activism will inevitably be affected by ius College (VUB) in Brussels. He received his PhD in the looming economic crisis set to burden the world Middle East & Mediterranean Studies from King’s Col- over the next several years. The impact of the ongoing lege, University of London, in 2015. The views ex- global coronavirus crisis is set to be quite significant pressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily since the foreign policies of both the UAE and Qatar are represent those of the German Marshall Fund. directly in service to their economic well-being. In addi- tion, for Gulf countries, the financial crisis will be even more significant given the ongoing price wars that are bringing the global demand for energy, already in freefall because of the coronavirus impact, to a total standstill. The economic crisis is also likely to shake the social fabric and economic foundations of Maghrebi countries, whose health systems are weak and socio- economic stability are already undermined by years of financial crisis. In Tunisia, a country whose democratic transition moved ahead despite years of economic trou- bles, people in historically marginalized areas of the capital, such as Mnihla, have already taken to the streets, and Algeria and Morocco are bracing to cope with the economic sequences of the pandemic (- cope, March 30; Courrier International, March 27; Yabi- ladi, April 3; Tuniscope, March 30).

At the same time, these issues create problems and po- tential for more engagement. Maghrebi countries will need money to support their economies. Gulf countries might need to reduce their external commitment, how- ever, depending on the extent of the impact, and the length, of the ongoing crisis. So far, in the theater in which the UAE is more active, Libya, economic hardship has not turned into lesser engagement, at least yet. Mauritania will remain at the forefront of UAE efforts to become more relevant in both the Maghreb and the Sahel. That said, the impact on the external projection of the Emirates might be significant. Paradoxically, the fact that Qatar had to adapt to the blockade since 2017 made it more resilient to sudden economic and logistic shocks. This aspect might also play a role in determining the efficiency of its external engagement in the coming months, as it needs less time to adapt to its foreign pro- jection to a more challenging domestic economic envi- ronment.

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