THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION APRIL 6, 2020 VOLUME XVIII, ISSUE 7 p.1 p.3 p.5 p.7 Brian Perkins Kyle Orton Rafid Jaboori Dario Cristiani BRIEFS Coronavirus and The Leadership and Geopolitics and the Continued Conflict Future of Kata’ib Greater Maghreb Secu- Push Syria Into Hezbollah rity Complex in a Time Greater Chaos of Financial Distress ATTACKS DEMONSTRATE IS-CAP EVO- LUTION IN MOZAMBIQUE control of Mocimboa da Praia, the capital of Cabo Del- gado province, before attacking Quissanga, which is Brian M. Perkins more than a hundred miles south. Unlike previous at- tacks, the fighters seemingly attempted to limit civilian Northern Mozambique has witnessed a significant esca- casualties while attacking state institutions, looting lation of operations by Islamic State Central Africa Prov- banks and stores, and reportedly redistributing provi- ince (IS-CAP) in recent weeks, with the group claiming sions to civilians (Daily Maverick, March 26). Rather than two substantial attacks over a span of just three days. small cells armed with old rifles or machetes, the attacks The attacks, which took place in Mocimboa da Praia and were conducted by upwards of 40 fighters dressed in Quissanga between March 23-25, demonstrated a no- camo and equipped with automatic weapons and RPGs, table, concerning tactical evolution as well as improved a notable departure from most attacks over the past capabilities at a moment of particular vulnerability (Club several years. of Mozambique, March 26). IS-CAP released a series of photographs as well as a rare The majority of attacks claimed by IS-CAP since its es- video message claiming responsibility for the attacks, tablishment in Mozambique, as well as those previously with the speaker brandishing an Islamic State (IS) flag attributed to Ansar al-Sunna, have primarily consisted of and calling on fighters to come join them to establish hit-and-run style attacks conducted by small cells, often Sharia rule in Mozambique (Club of Mozambique, March with rudimentary weapons. Past attacks have also either 26). Previously rare, claims of responsibility have grown explicitly targeted civilians or demonstrated little regard more common and IS has increased coverage of activi- for collateral damage with an increasing trend toward ties in Mozambique (Twitter.com/emorier, March 26). attacks on security forces. While the exact level of IS involvement in the overall The attacks in Mocimboa da Praia and Quissanga, how- violence that has plagued northern Mozambique is still ever, were more sustained operations targeting entire unclear, these recent attacks are evidence that the dedi- cities. IS-CAP fighters overran security forces and seized cated IS-CAP core has grown, both in size and capabili- 1 ty. IS-CAP has evolved from its nascent phase of ques- YEMEN’S LATEST CEASEFIRE CALLS UNLIKELY TO tionable claims of responsibility to overt displays of its STOP HOUTHI OFFENSIVES involvement. At the same time, its fighters have seem- ingly improved their coordination as well as their access Brian M. Perkins to more sophisticated weaponry than what had been used in the earlier days of the conflict. Similarly, the Saudi Arabia announced that it invited the Houthis to group has seemingly moved on to a growth phase in Riyadh for direct talks following days of tit-for-tat attacks which it is leveraging its improved capabilities to launch that broke the March 25 UN-brokered ceasefire as more sustained operations that allow it to target and COVID-19 threatens to wreak havoc on war-torn Yemen. loot state institutions, while beginning a hearts and While Yemen has yet to officially confirm a COVID-19 minds campaign in an attempt to gain further local trac- case, it is likely only a matter of time and the virus’s tion. The video claim of responsibility also demonstrates spread will have dire human consequences and notable the group’s efforts to draw in regional and global ji- implications for the situation on the ground as it creates hadists. Looking forward, these attacks demonstrate the both opportunities and dangerous pitfalls. weakness of the state and set a precedent that it is no longer the remote roadways and townships that are in Saudi Arabia and the Houthis had been engaging in in- danger, but also key cities where those who have been formal talks prior to the latest ceasefire. The recent esca- displaced by violence in rural areas have relocated. The lation of violence that broke that ceasefire involved group may yet prove to be strong enough to hold terri- Houthi drone and ballistic missile attacks on Riyadh and tory for prolonged periods of time, but its ability to en- Jeddah, followed by Saudi Arabia conducting airstrikes ter a key location such as Mocimboa da Praia by sea and on Sanaa. Though the previous talks had not yielded land and control it for hours before successfully with- any concrete results, there was a reduction in cross-bor- drawing is a worrying trend of the group’s operational der attacks that were a demonstration of Saudi Arabia’s growth. efforts to draw back from Yemen, even at a time when the Houthis were still making significant gains. The likely Brian M. Perkins is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor. impending COVID-19 outbreak spurred renewed efforts to jumpstart a ceasefire but has also created fodder for the Houthi propaganda machine and an opportunity for them to seek maximum concessions if they were to eventually pursue a ceasefire. Just one day after the nominal ceasefire agreement, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi gave a televised speech on the group’s al-Masirah television channel to once again urge Riyadh to release Hamas prisoners de- tained in Saudi Arabia in exchange for the release of Saudi prisoners in Houthi custody (YouTube, March 26). In doing so, the Houthis were leveraging heightened media attention as a means to expose Saudi Arabia and turn regional public opinion against the Kingdom. On April 1, Mohammed al-Houthi, a prominent Houthi leader, reiterated calls for a COVID-19-related ceasefire while noting the importance of the three references— the Gulf Initiative, outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, and applicable UN Resolutions—and call- ing for a 12-country arbitration process, which further muddies the water for timely results (Middle East Moni- tor, April 2). Despite the group’s public calls to pursue a ceasefire in the face of a potential COVID-19 outbreak, the Houthis 2 are well aware that they are negotiating from a position of power as they continue to push deeper into al-Jawf Coronavirus and Continued and the oil-rich governorate of Marib. Over the past Conflict Push Syria Into week, both the Houthis and Saudi Arabia have contin- ued military operations, including a reported Houthi at- Greater Chaos tack on an oil pumping station in Marib and the shelling of a prison in Taiz. While the Houthis are likely to pursue Kyle Orton this desperately needed, piecemeal ceasefire and dia- logue with Saudi Arabia, the group will almost certainly The first quarter of 2020 saw a serious escalation of continue its offensive in Marib while trying to leverage combat in Syria, albeit without much alteration in the the looming health crisis to its advantage. Starting a political trends, and the arrival of the novel coronavirus ceasefire while on the verge of taking Marib would be to (COVID-19) has exacerbated a fraught situation. the Houthis’ detriment, as doing so could allow forces aligned to the internationally-recognized Yemeni Presi- Under the Astana process, which began in late 2016, dent Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi to consolidate their posi- Turkey, Russia, and Iran were supposed to act as guaran- tions. Given the Houthis’ past strategies and its current tors to freeze hostilities in Syria. Instead, Bashar al-As- trajectory, an outbreak or international pressure would sad’s regime, backed by Russia and Iran, picked off each likely need to meet a critical mass before the group of the de-escalation zones seriatim. In September 2018, abandons its attempts to seize the key governorate of a renewed ceasefire commitment was worked out in Marib and genuinely pursues a fulsome ceasefire. Sochi, based on the new realities on-the-ground, to halt the pro-Assad coalition’s attack on the final insurgent- Brian M. Perkins is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor. held pocket, Idlib, in northwest Syria (The National, Sep- tember 19, 2018). In mid-December 2019, the pro-Assad coalition at- tacked Idlib again. Within two months, 900,000 people had been displaced (United Nations, February 18). De- spite the “observation posts” that Turkey has through- out Idlib, it seemed Ankara had no will to defend the province, even as 21 soldiers were killed by the pro-As- sad coalition (The New Arab, February 10). [1] Then, on February 27, 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in an airstrike (Rudaw, February 29). This could not be ig- nored. Within hours, Turkey used drones to clear the skies over Idlib and attacked Assad’s troops and the Shi’a militias controlled by the Iranian Islamic Revolu- tionary Guards Corps (IRGC), including Lebanese Hezbollah. Turkey escalated the aerial campaign even further after midnight on February 29/March 1, when the deadline Ankara set for a regime withdrawal south to the “Sochi Line” expired. Dubbed Spring Shield (Bahar Kalkani), Turkey’s opera- tion inflicted an average of 50 confirmable fatalities on the Assad/Iranian forces per day until a new Turkey-Rus- sia ceasefire was worked out on March 5 (Twitter.com/ GregoryPWaters, March 7). The terms of the ceasefire did not reflect the leverage Turkey had built by demon- strating the essential hollowness of the pro-Assad coali- tion (Daily Sabah, March 13).