Socialism Meets Neoliberalism in Pro-North Korean Schools in Japan

Social Identities Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture

ISSN: 1350-4630 (Print) 1363-0296 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/csid20

Cultural politics of transgressive living: socialism meets neoliberalism in pro-North Korean schools in Japan

Kyung Hee Ha

To cite this article: Kyung Hee Ha (2018) Cultural politics of transgressive living: socialism meets neoliberalism in pro-North Korean schools in Japan, Social Identities, 24:2, 189-205, DOI: 10.1080/13504630.2017.1327140 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2017.1327140

Published online: 25 May 2017.

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=csid20 SOCIAL IDENTITIES, 2018 VOL. 24, NO. 2, 189–205 https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2017.1327140

Cultural politics of transgressive living: socialism meets neoliberalism in pro-North Korean schools in Japan Kyung Hee Ha Graduate School of Humanities, Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY More than two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and Received 30 November 2016 dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991), North Korea stands in Accepted 18 April 2017 isolation from not only Western liberal societies, but also former KEYWORDS Eastern bloc with its nuclear weapons programs under ‘military Pro-North Korean schools; first’ policy, or Sŏngun. In spite of the condemnation of North ‘ ’ sanctions; neoliberalism; Korea as an axis of evil and the subsequent sanctions against Hallyu; transgression; Zainichi North Korea and its associates, socialist ideas and practices as well as ‘allegiance’ to a ‘rogue state’ appear to be well alive in pro- North Korean schools Japan. Based on ethnographic observation and interview data, this essay explores the politics and poetics of dissent. Members of the pro-North Korean schools disrupt the politics of respectability that only allows two ways to become legible subjects in contemporary Japanese society – either as victims of North Korea’s dictatorship or as someone who disavows it. Instead, they strive to gain agency beyond these two readily available positions vis-à-vis North Korea. In doing so, however, their political and cultural responses are not always in the most progressive forms or purely nationalistic, but entail nuances and flexibilities by actively engaging with neoliberal capitalist logic and South Korean popular culture. By examining their day-to-day politics of living, this essay sheds light on how people negotiate the socialist legacies in growing neoliberalism, as well as their contradictory strategies and competing discourses to navigate, defy and challenge the material, discursive and affective consequences of being associated with North Korea today.

Stepping into a pro-North Korean school September in Kyoto is still quite hot and humid. On 23 September 2012, the annual athletic meeting at Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School (hereafter ‘Kyoto Korean School’) was held on fields puddled with rain from the previous day. Kyoto Korean School is one of some one hundred K-12 schools operated by Chongryun, the pro- North Korea organization in Japan.1 As soon as I passed the school gate, I was greeted by a number of vendors run by mothers of the schoolchildren, selling all kinds of Korean foods and drinks. Under the decoration of North Korean national flags, students were proudly marching just like the North Korean soldiers that are frequently shown on

Figure 1. Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School’s athletic meeting. Source: Koppon-ori (2013). Note: Koppon-ori is a popular nickname for a civic support group based in Kyoto and Shiga prefectures, Chōsen Gakkō to Minzoku Kyōiku no Hatten wo mezasu kai/ Keiji. television.2 The highlight of the day involved all the students holding up a gigantic North Korean national flag (Figure 1).3 Toward the end of the day, I started to hear the familiar sound of Psy’s Gangnam Style, which was becoming extremely popular in South Korea, the United States and other parts of the world in the summer of 2012. While the original music video reached one billion views on YouTube within the first month, a record high of all music videos on YouTube, it remained largely unknown in Japan except among some K-pop fans (Time,15 October 2012). As soon as I heard the melody, a group of high school students appeared to perform the famous ‘horse dance’ in front of several hundreds of audience members perfectly mimicking Psy in his music video (Figure 2). This was happening all in front of my eyes: South Korean popular dance music performed by the students at the allegedly pro-North Korean school in Japan. Although I had expected that at least some of the students would be committed K-pop fans because of the rise of the Hallyu, or the global spread of South Korean popular culture, little had I imagined that their appreciation of

Figure 2. High school students dancing to Psy’s Gangnam Style. SOCIAL IDENTITIES 191

K-pop would appear in public events at a pro-North Korean school, let alone at the annual athletic meeting, the biggest and most well-attended event of all. More than two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991), North Korea stands in isolation from not only Western liberal societies but also former Eastern bloc with its nuclear weapons programs under ‘military first’ policy, or Sŏngun. In spite of the condemnation of North Korea as an ‘axis of evil’ and the subsequent sanctions against North Korea and its associates, socialist ideas and practices as well as ‘allegiance’ to a ‘rogue state’ appear to be well alive in pro-North Korean schools in Japan. In this essay, I ask: How do the pro-North Korean schools in Japan strive to survive amidst escalating anti-North Korean sentiments? What kind of strategies do they employ in their politics and poetics of dissent? How do they negotiate North Korean style socialist ideas and practices with the rise of South Korean popular culture while phys- ically situated in Japan that is increasingly driven by neoliberal capitalism? I argue that examining pro-North Korean schools will enable us to bear witness to the life that con- tinues after the rupture of postsocialist turn. Based on ethnographic observation and interview data, I explore the ‘politics of living’ (Feldman, 2012, p. 157) rather than simply documenting the damages and pains of the socially dead.4 I am not so interested in documenting incidents and events of victimiza- tion, or engaging in what Tuck (2009) calls ‘damage-centered’ research that focuses on the ‘pain and brokenness’ of the marginalized communities (p. 409). Instead of representing the communities as damaged and hopeless, I intend to show how members of pro- North Korean schools have struggled to make sense of the world they live in, create lives and respond to their desires despite the stigma associated with them. As editors Neda Atanasoski and Kalindi Vora contend, postsocialism is a global condition engender- ing diverse responses in local communities. This article examines one of many such ‘afterlives’ in which people employ various personal and collective approaches to cope with a new modernity brought by the ‘end of the cold war’. Members of the pro-North Korean schools disrupt the politics of respectability that only allows two ways to become legible subjects in contemporary Japanese society – either as the victims of North Korea’s dictatorship or as someone who disavows it. They strive to become political agents beyond these two readily available positions vis-à-vis North Korea. In doing so, however, their political and cultural responses are not always in the most progressive forms or purely nationalistic, but entail nuances and flexibilities by actively engaging with neoliberal capitalist logic and South Korean popular culture. By examining their day-to-day politics of living, I hope to shed lights on how people negotiate the socialist legacies in growing neoliberalism, as well as their contradictory strategies and competing discourses to navigate, defy and challenge the material, discursive and affective consequences of being associated with North Korea today.

Moral rupture and disavowal of the evil Scholars have argued that socialism was about moral economy as much as it was about political economy (Hann, 2002; Kwon, 2010). The ‘defeat’ of the Eastern bloc symbolized with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the passing of Kim Il-sung, the founding father of North Korea in 1994, followed by the succession of his son, Kim Jong-il made many diasporic Koreans skeptical of their homeland politics. With the 2002 revelation of 192 K.H. HA the abduction of Japanese civilians between 1977 and 1982 by North Korean secret agents at the September 17th summit in Pyongyang,5 even the most loyal members of the pro- North Korean community lost faith in the country’s moral integrity. Confused and angry, Koreans in Japan, postcolonial exiles and their descendants, popularly known as ‘Zainichi Koreans’,6 condemned North Korea for its ‘senseless and unforgivable’ acts (Mainichi Shimbun, 18 September 2002).7 Meanwhile, this 9/17 admission immediately made Zaini- chi Koreans targets of racist hate crimes and state sanctions, particularly pro-North Korean schools and their associates because of their visibility and connection with North Korea. For example, the number of verbal and physical assaults targeting Korean school students multiplied immediately after the 9/17 summit.8 Younger students and female students were more likely to be targeted on their way to and from schools.9 On a state- level, in 2010, Japanese government excluded Korean high schools from the newly implemented ‘Act on Free Tuition Fee at Public High Schools and High School Enrollment Support Fund’ (hereafter, ‘free tuition program’) as part of the sanctions against North Korea.10 Despite the numerous recommendations made by the Bar Associations and civic groups in Japan, as well as the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Japanese government has yet to overturn the exclusion policy, appealing to the unresolved abduction issue, ongoing nuclear threats and the schools’ close relationship with North Korea.11 Following the national government’s sanctions against Korean schools, some prefectural and municipal governments have terminated the already-small subsidies to the schools. These cases of assaults and economic sanctions have brought a critical crisis to the school operation in recent years. In pro-North Korean schools, the portraits of Kim Il-sung, the founding father of North Korea and his successor, Kim Jong-il are displayed in the teachers’ rooms and most classrooms in (Figure 3).12 Teachers and students explain that it is not a sign of their allegiance to the North Korean state, but simply to honor the financial, material and emotional support that the leaders have given to the schools since 1957. However, displaying the portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, along with teaching North Korea’s Chuch’e ideology (North Korea’s ‘self-reliance’ principle) in classes and taking a high school senior trip to North Korea, are often considered as a testament to Korean schools’‘abnormality’ and its ‘brainwashing’ nature. Not only Japanese conservatives but also many Zainichi Koreans

Figure 3. The portraits displayed right above the blackboard in each classroom. SOCIAL IDENTITIES 193 criticize North Korea’s military and moral threats. Distancing themselves from bodies and spaces associated with North Korea has become crucial and unavoidable for Koreans to win respectable identity in the society where anything and anyone associated with North Korea is stigmatized.

Rescue mission: saving the innocent Once a communist ‘evil empire’ of the cold war, North Korea was now named as a terrorist ‘axis of evil’ of the war on terror by President Bush. In his state of union address, Bush accused North Korea of its nuclear weapons program and showed great concerns over human rights violation that is believed to be widespread. Indeed, postsocialist modernity assumes western liberalism’s capability and responsibility for protecting the human rights of those ‘trapped’ in dictatorial regimes. The ‘rescue mission’ is further facilitated with North Korean Human Rights Law that was enacted in the United States (2004) and Japan (2006). While North Korea is constructed as a merciless rogue state, North Korean refugees and Japanese abductees have become living proofs of human rights violation who are waiting to be ‘rescued’. In a similar vein, while pro-North Korean schools are considered as backward and cult-like in Japan, the ‘innocent’ students quickly became objects of rescue. For example, when the-then Osaka governor Hashimoto Tōru decided to discon- tinue the prefectural education subsidies to the Korean schools claiming they are connected to the ‘illegal’ and ‘gangster-like’ regime of North Korea, he simultaneously showed concerns for students’ wellbeing.13 Disturbed by the fact the students are educated in an ‘abnormal’ institution, Hashimoto even proposed to transfer them to Japanese schools because he felt ethically responsible to ‘rescue’ and educate them in ‘normal’ institutions. As North Korea is increasingly portrayed as alienated from freedom and democracy in the time of war on terror, the schools are seen as incapable of providing the students with democratic and peaceful education. It is in this context that Hashimoto asserts his and Japanese society’s moral superiority over the pro-North Korean schools using the rhetoric of educational and human rights of the ‘innocent’ students. It is important to note that the pro-North Korean schools are seen as ‘abnormal’ not only in relation to Japanese society, but also to their South Korean counterparts. Mindan,14 a pro-South Korean organization in Japan, which also runs K-12 schools in Japan,15 has also shown strong concern about the ‘innocent’ students being educated in the ‘abnormal’ institutions. Mindan (2012) encouraged the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) to actively intervene with the pro-North Korean schools’ operations and educational contents in order for students’ rights to education to be ‘rightly protected’.16 In contrast to Hashimoto and Mindan that force reforms onto the pro-North Korean schools, Japanese liberals and newspaper editorials that are ‘supportive’ of these schools also started to use a moralizing language. A Mainichi Shimbun editorial tells the schools to ‘voluntarily take this moment as a good opportunity’ to self-reflect and become an ‘open-minded’ school that can be accepted in a multicultural society (6 November 2010). An Asahi Shimbun editorial (8 March 2010) calls for separating the ‘North Korea’s abnormal regime’ from the ‘Korean school students’ while a Tokyo Shimbun editorial (3 February 2011) sympathizes with the students who are ‘born and raised, and will continue to live in Japan’ and have nothing to do with the ‘savage acts’ 194 K.H. HA that North Korea has committed against world peace. Highlighting the ‘innocence’ of the students and the ‘abnormality’ of the schools, the liberals – as protectors and correctors – justify the interventions of Japanese state and public with school operation and public affairs. Despite the ever-growing financial crisis and doubt in morality, the pro-North Korean schools have persevered and have run an autonomous educational system rooted in deco- lonizing theory and praxis for more than seventy years. Today, Chongryun operates 1 university, 10 high schools, 33 middle schools and 55 elementary schools,17 serving approximately 8500 students or less than 10% of all school-aged children of Korean descent (Song, 2012, p. 144). The pro-North Korean schools are run by second- and third-generation Korean teachers and serve the third-, fourth- and fifth-generation Korean students whose nationalities vary from South Korean and Japanese to virtually stateless ‘Chōsen-seki’.18 All subjects except Japanese are taught in Korean, and the textbooks and other educational materials used are written and edited by the teachers and published by Chongryun’s own publishing company, Hagu Sobang. Although the statistics on student enrollment transition before and after 9/17 were never disclosed, interviews that I conducted with teachers and community members confirmed that there was a drop in the number of student enrollment, which led some campuses to close down. Many have transferred to Japanese schools and even South Korean schools.

Research site: the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School In order to examine more nuanced responses to the post-9/17 that are neither simply disavowing the schools and North Korea nor accepting the innocent victim roles, I conducted a total of 15-month fieldwork at the Kyoto Korean School between 2012 and 2014. Since its foundation in 1953, a total of 5316 have graduated from the Kyoto Korean School. In the academic year 2013–2014, 210 students were enrolled in the school, comprising 16.6% of all school-aged Koreans in Kyoto and Shiga prefectures.19 The majority of the students are fourth generation Koreans with Chōsen-seki,or‘nationality of (unified) Korea’ (47.1%), and South Korean nationality (50.9%); only 1.9% held Japanese nationality.20 That same year, 25 teachers (17 males and 8 females), mostly third-generation Koreans, were working at the school. While the majority were graduates of Korea University in Tokyo, also operated by the pro-North Korea organization, Chongryun, two had graduated from Japanese universities and two had completed a master’s degree in Japan and the United Kingdom. About half of them (12) were in their 30s, five were in their 20s and eight were in their 40s or older. Amidst the escalating financial and moral crisis, the school has made various efforts in order to increase student enrollment. They include providing a free school bus service and offering free seminars and consultations for students. These extra services put tremendous burden on the teachers that is often translated as ‘dedication’. This in fact is a larger trend in Japanese society where more schools are being privatized and teachers being out- sourced to provide ‘fast education’ devoted to increasing standardized test scores. Univer- sities and K-12 schools are put into severe competitions in which they are obliged to present various added values to attract consumers (students and parents). Under neoliberal academic industrial complex, quantifiable skills, knowledge and experiences are highly valued as a sign of individual efforts rather than structural or collective. In SOCIAL IDENTITIES 195 responding to such trend, pro-North Korean schools too encourage their students to adopt meritocracy and attain presentable skills and knowledge that would eventually lead them to prestigious universities and companies in Japan. One of the most significant ways in which neoliberalism is reflected in the Kyoto Korean School is the ‘Mirae Seminar’ (‘future seminar’ in Korean). Since its launch in May 2013 under the initiative of the Korean Youth Commerce Community (KYC) of Kyoto,21 the Seminar has quickly become a significant added value of the school. Func- tioning as a de facto cramming school for the students who prepare for Japanese college entrance exams, the Seminar covers subjects such as English, Math, Physics, Math and Essay Writing, but does not include Korean school specific subjects such as Korean history and Korean literature. On the one hand, Mirae Seminar is extremely popular among the parents who cannot afford to send their children to private cramming schools. The parents also appreciate that all the volunteer teachers are Koreans currently enrolled in or have graduated from prestigious Japanese universities, serving as role models for their children. On the other hand, it has posed a fundamental ques- tion as to why Korean schools exist in the first place. Some faculty members feel ambivalent and have difficult time finding a balance between the current trend in pur- suing success on Japanese terms and the school’s founding mission rooted in anti- imperial epistemology with a strong focus on socialist ideology and practices. Therefore, when KYC introduced Mirae Seminar, some teachers were more cautious of further Japa- nization of their school and education than its positive potentials. As Japanese neoliberal value system is permeating and changing the nature of the school and its future prospects, teachers are made to feel alienated because their experience and knowledge are becoming increasingly irrelevant and unfit for neoliberal academic industrial complex.

Commodifying socialist values for Japanese dreams The Japanization trend seems to be further solidified in recent years with the new emerging narrative that makes direct connection between Korean school’s socialist collective values and Japanese success stories. While the Mirae Serminar intends to make the Korean school ‘as good as Japanese schools’ by addressing the needs of the students and parents that the teachers cannot provide with their limited capacity, the emerging trend emphasizes how Korean school education actually helps one to achieve Japanese dreams. In other words, the clichéd message, ‘We succeed despite Korean education’ is being replaced by a new one, ‘We succeed because of Korean education’ (both emphases mine). The national network of KYC created the 35-page full-color pamphlet named ‘Uri Hakkyo’ in 2013. The pamphlet is entirely written in Japanese and features 18 individuals who received education in pro-North Korean schools. They include a CEO of a nationally famous company, an award-winning fashion designer and a musical star in Japan’s best-known theater company. While all eighteen people lead a successful life in diverse ways, the message is consistent: ‘Korean education is beneficial to achieving Japanese dream.’ In order to make Korean school education attractive and to convince the readers that it is ‘worth’ all the money and labor, the KYC pamphlet makes conscious efforts in making connections between success stories of the Korean school graduates and the education they received at the schools. 196 K.H. HA

All the success stories featured in the pamphlet are accomplishments that are highly recognized in Japanese society, and each story precisely describes how receiving Korean school education contributed to their success. For example, Kim Mihwa, a young female business owner of the internationally well-known roll cake, ‘Dojima Roll’ makes a parallel between a strong sense of collectivity nurtured in Korean schools and the way she now manages her company. In both contexts, individual sense of responsibility and teamwork spirit are fundamental to success, she stresses (pp. 6–7). Another example is Hang Ahn Soon, a fashion designer, who believes her upbringing in pro-North Korean schools contributes to her unique perspective as a designer today (p. 10). After eighteen of these success stories of Japanese dreams, there is a long list of Japanese universities where graduates have been admitted in recent years (p. 15). Here, the end goal of Korean education seems to focus on how successful one can be in Japanese society. The following pages are devoted to convincing the readers that the skills, knowledge and experiences that students gain in pro-North Korean schools are useful in getting into the prestigious companies in Japan and beyond. In addition to the quantifiable skills, knowledge and experience under the rubric of meritocracy, the KYC pamphlet goes into discuss in detail how Korean schools also provide unquantifiable quality education, popularly referred as ‘ningen-ryoku’ or ‘human quality’. Sociologist Honda (2008) argues that this tendency of desiring ‘human quality’ is a symptom of ‘hyper meritocracy’ in which highly subjective, often intangible and unquantifiable aptitudes such as aspirations, communication skills and creativity are considered essential to success. The KYC pamphlet argues that the Korean schools’‘ethnic education’ based on socialist collectivity has always emphasized such human quality as aspirations, proactivity and communication skills, and therefore pro-North Korean schools can better equip students for Japanese job market (than Japanese or South Korean schools). As a conclusion, it makes a case that pro-North Korean schools are not only capable of, but also particularly good at nurturing competitive and competent students who will likely to succeed in Japan. In other words, the KYC pamphlet commodifies schools’ socialist values and practices, and presents them as desirable assets to survive and succeed in a neoliberal capitalist society that they live in. This is a radically different narrative that gives new meanings and roles to ethnic education. Instead of blindly following socialist ideals or fully disavowing them, this new trend offers a glimpse of more nuanced forms of survival, which pro-North Korean schools employ in responding to escalating neoliberal disciplining.

From space of terrorism to space of pleasure: pro-North Korean school meets the Hallyu Another dimension of recent shifts in pro-North Korean schools is the rise of the Hallyu phenomenon –the global spread of South Korean popular culture. The students, their parents and teachers redefine and reconstruct their relationship with the southern half of the homeland, actively utilizing the knowledge and skills acquired at the pro-North Korean institutions. Rather than simply discarding socialist values and practices, members of the schools transform themselves into active producers, mediators and consumers of the Hallyu with their linguistic and cultural knowledge as well as emotional and familial ties with their homeland(s). SOCIAL IDENTITIES 197

Bodies and spaces associated with North Korea are racialized as ‘(potential) terrorists’, constituting ‘bad Koreans’ while those associated with South Korea are generally cele- brated as ‘good Koreans’. Although the two groups of Koreans, North and South, are imagined to be inherently different, in reality, students and teachers at the Korean schools flawlessly transgress the boundaries on a daily basis. In fact, the transgression has become one of the most empowering ways to bring life to the space that is deemed socially dead. As we saw in the beginning of this article, pro-North Korean school students do enjoy the Hallyu, proving the dominant understanding that there lies intense hostility between the two countries, peoples and cultures to be overly simplifying. For example, during recess and lunchtime, students would gather and watch YouTube videos of South Korean TV shows and K-pop music on their smartphones (which they are not supposed to use at the school). With their linguistic and cultural fluency, the students appreciate the humor and appeal of these videos without the need for translation. Minutes before watching South Korean TV shows on their break, they would have learned in their history class about the Korean War as a war in which North Korea fought to liberate the South from American imperialism – a completely different perspective from that of Japan, South Korea or the United States.22 North Korean-centered academic texts and South Korean-centered cultural texts seem to coexist in these students’ lives without much internal conflict. Some students spend most of their monthly stipends on the K-pop CDs, other merchandise, and a concert ticket to see their favorite singers when they perform in Japan. Other students and their family members take regular trips to South Korea to shop, eat and enjoy K-pop culture and the latest fashions. Some even ‘study abroad’ in South Korea to pursue specialized subjects in undergraduate and graduate programs, as well as to brush up their Korean language skills in language institutes. From the students’ perspective, K-pop does not only provide pleasure and enjoyment, but also shows how the education they receive at pro-North Korean schools which are considered as ‘evil’ and ‘abnormal’ could possibly be useful and respectable when it is connected to K-pop. Although it is still considered a taboo for the teachers to openly enjoy the Hallyu, they also transgress the North-South/socialist-capitalist boundary just as much as the students. As teachers of the pro-North Korean schools, they are officially prohibited to visit South Korea by the schools. They are not even supposed to refer to South Korea as ‘Hankuk’ (which implies that it is a liberated, sovereign state), but as ‘Nam-Chosŏn’–an occupied territory that exists south of North Korea. While physical transgression is strictly restricted, the teachers travel to the world of the Hallyu through music, movies and TV dramas. Among the two-dozen teachers at the Kyoto Korean School, I became particularly close with Hyung-soo,23 a male teacher in his 40s. As the main breadwinner of the household, he supports his parents and sibling with the already-small salary that often gets delayed. To relieve the stress from a demanding job and family, Hyung-soo makes a daily escape to South Korean dramas. At least two or three times per week, he stops by the nearest rental DVD shop from his apartment on his way home and rents dozens of DVDs of South Korean dramas of all genres. While eating a late dinner, he watches the drama and forgets about his present reality. One day Hyung-soo let me listen to the K-pop music on his iPhone that he listens during his on-hour commute. He would also enthusiastically tell me about the new Korean words and sayings that he learned from watching the dramas. Hungered for alternative Korean texts to what he is used to hearing in the Korean school context, which 198 K.H. HA is heavily influenced by the North Korean-style speech and values, he quickly became pas- sionate about the Hallyu. In addition to providing pleasure with which Hyung-soo sustains his rather difficult life, the Hallyu also empowers him who is routinely deprived of means to participate in a capitalist consumption culture. Hyung-soo is now able to exercise his agency and knowledge in Korean language and culture, and becomes an exceptionally qualified Hallyu fan, but one who is nonetheless forbidden to make visits to South Korea. In fact, the members of the pro-North Korean schools do not simply meet the Hallyu, but the two parties are intricately connected to each other on a more fundamental level. They have played a significant role as producers and mediators of the Hallyu in Japan, utilizing their ethnic resources – cultural and linguistic knowledge and ties with the southern half of the homeland. One such person is Lee Bong-u, a Zainichi Korean movie producer and graduate of the Kyoto Korean School. Known as ‘the mastermind behind the Hallyu boom’ (kanryū bumū no shikakenin), Lee introduced mega-hit films such as Shiri (1999) and JSA (2000) to the Japanese audience, which became the forerunner of the Hallyu today. Additionally, during my ethnographic observation, I met several individuals who were very deeply involved with the Hallyu industry as interpreters, translators and coordinators. For example, Mihye regularly escorts South Korean musicians, actors and actresses and provides interpretation services when they visit Japan. Similarly, Riyoung undertakes a part-time job of creating Japanese subtitles for South Korean TV shows in addition to teaching Korean language at a Japanese school. In other words, members of the pro-North Korean schools are not only enthusiastic consumers of the Hallyu, but its very producers and mediators. Mihye, Riyoung and others were also able to turn their linguistic and cultural knowledge and skills into a means to building their careers and earning money.

Navigating limitations, celebrating life The Hallyu has provided an opportunity to sustain lives on both material and emotional levels in the midst of anti-North Korea sentiments and the series of sanctions. These practices unsettle and disrupt the imposed dichotomy of a friendly and hip South Korea and a monstrous and evil North Korea. However, the school still remains officially connected to Chongryun, the pro-North Korean organization, and dominated by North Korean culture and socialist values. For this reason, some students express doubts about what they learn in classes, complain and demand changes while a small number of students, on rare occasions, decide not to fully participate in certain activities and events including a senior trip to North Korea. However, most students manage to find creative ways to incorporate school’s North Korean characteristics into their quotidian life and create something entertaining instead of completely disavowing ‘abnormal’ and ‘dangerous’ North Korea- ness as encouraged by both conservatives and liberals. Their counter-imagination and practices, involving multiple transgressions, remain carefully unrecognizable and illegible to the outside world, maintaining the distinct culture and autonomy of the school. According to Chongryun, the purpose of Korean school education is to cultivate ‘authentic Koreans’ [shin no Chōsenjin] who ‘contribute to the development of their homeland and people, as well as [the] Zainichi Korean community’.24 Under this mission, the students are never allowed to be just students. They have strictly expected roles as activists and future leaders working for their community. In many occasions, however, the students SOCIAL IDENTITIES 199 manage to create something innovative and fun that meets both the school’s official mission and their own desire and pleasure. In other words, they do not passively fulfill expected tasks; they use creativity and humor to showcase what it means to be ‘authentic Koreans’ in their own style. This practice is ambiguous in some cases and quite evident in others, depending on how fluent one is in deciphering the visual and audio contents and contexts through which these students perform their Koreanness. Their performative act is alternative rather than oppositional, to borrow Raymond William’s distinction, which can also be described as ‘disidentification’. According to Muñoz (1999), disidentification is not about counter-hegemonic or anti-assimilation, but about ‘recycling and rethinking encoded meanings … and using the codes as raw material for representing the disem- powered’ (p. 31). One such example in which students engage in ‘disidentification’ and ‘recycle and rethink encoded meanings’ without completely disavowing the school’s official mission is seen at the annual cultural festival, held in November. At the cultural festival, each class organizes a food vendor of their choice such as crepes and rice cakes. Each vendor booth is decorated in a unique way, and one of them stood out. The vendor had a big signboard in the center that reads, ‘Club Chuch’e’. ‘Club’ refers a Japanese- style bar called ‘host club’ usually located in a red-light district where male hosts serve and entertain female customers, and ‘Chuch’e’ or ‘self-reliance’ is an official political ideology of North Korea developed by the founding father Kim Il-sung. Accurately reproducing the atmosphere of the host club, there were photos of ‘hosts’ with their professional names that await customers. Juxtaposing the word Chuch’e, which is often sensationalized as ‘dangerous’ and ‘absurd’ in Japanese society, with a term that represents Japan’s night- life entertainment industry creates an interesting dissonance that only those with knowledge of both cultures would find amusing. The juxtaposition of these two terms and worlds would probably be considered disgraceful and disrespectful to North Koreans and the country’s leaders. However, with their ability to convert a supposedly sensational and ideological element of North Korea into something that can be played with, the students assert their ownership of what they have learned at the school and what they know from the media and the streets. This resonates with what sociologist Han (2005) calls the ‘sensibility of the Korean schools’ which allows students to transform the otherwise dog- matic principles and regulations into something that can be entertaining without intend- ing to be disrespectful. ‘Club Chuch’e’ creates an intimate space of shared linguistic and cultural knowledge among students, parents and community members while carefully remaining illegible to the eyes of outsiders who are unable to decipher the beauty of the dissonance. Another example where students demonstrate their creativity coupled with the ‘sensibility of the Korean schools’ is seen in their band performance at the cultural festival. Led by two student MC’s, the high school students sing and dance to various musical instruments. The songs they sang varied from Zainichi Korean songs such as Uri lul bosira [Look at us] and a South Korean rock band, Yoon Do-hyun Band’s 1178, a song about the division and unification of the Korean Peninsula. The band members needed to gain permission from their teacher when they proposed to perform a South Korean song, which can be ‘inappropriate’ in a pro-North Korean school. The students who performed songs from the South, North and Zainichi Korean community are the ones who have received the education after the 2003 major curriculum reform. 200 K.H. HA

Following the spirit of the 2000 North Korea summit and joint declaration on peaceful reunification, the new curriculum was designed to be ‘more ethnic’ (than ‘political’)so that pro-North Korean schools would attract more Zainichi Koreans regardless of their ideology or belief. Accordingly, the new curriculum abolished overly political subjects such as ‘Modern Korean Revolutionary History’ (Hyŏngdae ChosŏnHyŏkmyŏng Ryŏksa) in which students would learn about great achievements of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Now the focus is placed on Korean language and culture. Having received much more relaxed version of Korean school education, younger students’ identity and perception toward homeland(s) is much different from what it used to be decades ago. For example, while historically, and still in the official language of Chon- gryun today, the term, ‘uri nara’ (literally ‘our country’) only indicates the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, students today use the term to refer to the entire peninsula including the southern half. Moreover, because of the Hallyu, the students grew up being surrounded by South Korean music and culture. Some even make frequent visits to South Korea on their vacation, while sending care packages to their relatives in the North. In other words, these students are gesturing toward an alternative subjec- tivity on both conceptual and material levels in the sense that their cultural and material capitals allow them to deal with the 38 parallel in a more flexible way. The students embody and practice a new Zainichi being that was not readily available to their parents’ and teachers’ generation who received education in the height of the cold war. Following the South Korean song, there was a medley of uri norae, or North Korean songs, which high school seniors had learned during their two-week trip to North Korea in the past summer, a culmination of their 12-year education. One of the songs they performed was, Torp’ahara Ch’oech’ŏmtanŭl [Breakthrough the Cutting Edge], popularly known as ‘CNC song’. Composed by Pochonbo Electronic Ensemble in 2009, the song is about the newly invented revolutionary machine called ‘CNC’ (computer numerical control) that is supposed to represent North Korea as a ‘strong country with science and technology’. Three students sing the song with their original CNC dance. Here are the translated lyrics of the song:25

Breakthrough the Cutting Edge Whatever we set our minds to, made according to a program Pride of the machine industry in the Sŏngun era, Our style CNC technology CNC – Chuch’e industry’s power! CNC – an example of self-reliance! Following the General’s leading path Breakthrough the cutting edge Arirang! Arirang! The people’s pride is high Let’s build a strong country with science and technology Happiness rolls over us like a wave ‘The Sŏngun’ in the song indicates North Korea’s ‘military ﬁrst’ policy where military is prioritized over everything else in state affairs. First appeared in 1995, Sŏngun ideology determines how resources are distributed, and controls people’s economic and political life. The CNC was invented under such circumstances and exempliﬁes North Korea’s industrial power and self-reliance. This breakthrough was made possible thanks to the General (Kim Jong-il), and happiness will come as we build a strong country, so the song ends. SOCIAL IDENTITIES 201

Another song, Boran Tŭsi [Proudly], sings about how the General (Kim Jong-il) makes the people feel proud by building a strong socialist country that others are jealous of. It was apparent that the performers did not sing these songs because they wanted to praise North Korea and thank the General. The audience did not seem to pay particular attention to the lyrics or think deeply about the song either other than catching some sig- naling keywords, such as Sŏngun, the General and socialism that often appear in North Korean ‘propaganda’ songs. Not taking things in a literal sense or dismissing their meanings, at least partially, enables the students to balance who they are, Japan-born Koreans who receive North Korean-style education while actively consuming South Korean popular culture. In the pro-Korean schools, the students cannot avoid learning various subjects and issues from the North Korean perspective, which still dominates what the Chongryun means by being/becoming ‘authentic Koreans’. They learn geography, history, political structure and culture of North Korea, the country they call chokuk [homeland]. The students are well aware of how this sort of knowledge and information is not only irrelevant but also seen as dangerous and scandalous in Japanese society that sees innocent students being indoctrinated by the world’s most evil country. However, no student at the pro-North Korean school openly refuses to learn or engage in what is covered and expected in classrooms and extracurricular activities. Instead, they manage to incorporate such ‘abnormality’ into their ‘normal’ quotidian life through taming, modifying and nullify- ing some of the contents and contexts. American studies scholar Imada (2012)’s scholar- ship on Hawaiian hula dancers sheds light on how one can interpret such practice. She contends that hula performers during the American colonial expansion did not always demonstrate explicit opposition to colonial institutions, but rather responded to coloniza- tion with what she calls ‘counter-colonial desires’ that were neither clearly oppositional nor accommodating. These students too do not show explicit discontent or skepticism toward ‘irrelevant’ and ‘scandalous’ elements of North Korea that they are exposed to through school education. Instead, not taking things too seriously, but being playful with the contents without completely (or directly) disrespecting North Korea and its great leaders, these repertoires of knowledge become integrated into the students’ lives without much hesitation and conﬂict, and can even become a source of pleasure in their mundane school life that is constantly being threated by the Japanese state and society. These nuanced counter-imagination and practices that were in large part muted before the 1990s flourished in recent years. Some of these survival strategies are meant to remain unrecognizable and illegible to the outside world while others are precisely intended for potential allies. Navigating the afterlives of the post-cold war, members of the pro-North Korean schools have strived to gain political and cultural agency by adapting to new values and meanings, and to explore what it means to be Korean in Japan today that is neither about a complete disavowal of the schools or playing the innocent victim roles. Crafting creative and often contradictory ways to cope with the present, the students, teachers and parents insist on not only surviving but also thriving and continuing to dream.

Notes 1. The official name of the organization is ‘Chae Ilbon Chosŏnin Ch’ongryŏnhaphoe’ (재일본조선인총련합회) in Korean or ‘Zai-Nihon Chōsenjin Sōrengokai’ (在日本朝鮮人総聯合会) in Japanese. 202 K.H. HA

2. The military march in North Korea resembles that of other totalitarian regimes, and the soldiers do not move their heads, lock elbows in 90°, and lock their knees when they march. 3. Many other schools hold a ttongil-ki or unification flag that has the Korean Peninsula drawn in light blue without the 38th parallel demarcation. 4. Anthropologist Ilana Feldman in her study of Palestinian Refugees urges us to see not just the ‘politics of life but the politics of living’ (p. 157) as a way to imagine viable, meaning social life which refugees manage to make. 5. On 17 September 2002, the late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il held a historic summit with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro in Pyongyang where Kim admitted to the abduction of thirteen Japanese civilians by North Korean agents. 6. Because Japanese nationality law employs jus sanguinis, or the principle of blood, one is not automatically given Japanese nationality by having been born in Japan. Today, there are 491,711 Koreans who are registered as ‘aliens’ in the Alien Registration System (0.5% of the total Japanese population). Of those, 344,744 hold special permanent residency according to the Ministry of Justice (2015). 7. In the face of the shocking revelation of September 17 and immediate backlash to the Korean communities, Kim Sijong, a first-generation Zainichi Korean poet, was in great grief and harshly criticized North Korea (Mainichi Shimbun, 2002, September 18). 8. In the absence of the ‘official’ record, a group of young Japanese attorneys conducted surveys and questionnaires with 2710 students at 21 Korean elementary, junior high and high schools in Tokyo, Saitama and Kanagawa prefectures in January, four months after the September 17th revelation. The report, Zainichi Korian no Kodomotachi ni taisuru Iyagarase Jittai Chōsa Hōkokushū was published in June 2003 by the group of young Japanese attorneys. According to the report, the number of harassment incidents and threats Korean schools and students received between 1998 and 2000 were relatively small with the average of 28.27 incidents per year (10 per year at minimum and 53 per year at maximum). In 2001, there were 101 incidents reported, and for about two weeks immediately prior to the Pyongyang summit, the number drastically rose to 157. In the post-9/17 period, the number multiplied and continued to stay high in the next several months. 9. In average, female students are almost twice as likely as to be targeted while older female students were four to five times more likely to be targeted than their male counterparts. One- third of junior high school students and one-fourth of high school students have experienced some form of violence. 10. ‘The Act on Free Tuition Fee at Public High Schools and High School Enrollment Support Fund’ was passed on March 31 and enacted on 1 April 2010 by the-then ruling Democratic Party of Japan, ‘to ease family educational expenses and to contribute to equal opportunity in upper secondary education.’ This Act in effect makes public high school education free, and provides approximately 120,000 yen (approximately 1200 dollars) per year, equivalent to the public school tuition, to those who attend private schools. Among the non-Japanese schools that were initially excluded from the free tuition program, forty were eventually recognized as eli- gible by the special committee of experts established by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science & Technology (MEXT). These included South Korean, Chinese, French, and German schools. When the Liberal Democratic Party regained political power as the ruling party in 2012, the new Abe regime quickly amended the act in February 2013 to officially exclude the Chongryun Korean schools. Moreover, Shimomura Hakubun, the Minister of MEXT, assured that Korean schools would not be included unless Japan and North Korea establish diplomatic relations, or if Korean schools attain the so-called ‘ichijō-kō,’ or ‘clause- 1 school’ status, which would put them under direct control of MEXT. As of August 2015, four Prime Ministers and six MEXT Ministers later, some 2000 students in Korean high schools remain excluded from the free tuition program. Four of the ten Korean high schools have sued the government, and the court cases are ongoing. 11. In 2010 and 2014, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination released a report concerning Japanese government’s exclusion of Korean schools from the free tuition program. SOCIAL IDENTITIES 203

12. The total donation amount between 1957 and 2009 reached approximately 47 billion yen ($470 million) (Song, 2012, p. 162–163). The portraits were removed from classrooms in elementary and junior high schools in 2002 before the 9/17 abduction revelation, per North Korean state’s direction. Song speculates this direction as North Korea’s ‘consideration’ over Korean schools and their community members in Japan. According to Song, as the-late leader Kim Jong-il was going to admit to the abductions of Japanese civilians, North Korean state probably tried to take proactive measures for Korean schools that were likely to be targeted by post-revelation backlash (p. 159). 13. In justifying his decision to freeze education subsidies to the eleven Korean schools in the pre- fecture, Hashimoto called North Korea an ‘illegal state’, likening it to ‘the gangsters’ and suggested that Korean schools are equally ‘guilty’ of ‘deal[ing] with the gangsters’. (Asahi Shimbun, 2010, March 3). 14. Mindan’s official name is ‘Chaeilbon Daehan Minguk Mindan’ (재일본대한민국민단)or‘Zai- nippon Daikan Minkoku Mindan’ (在日本大韓民国民団). 15. Four Mindan-affiliated schools, Baekdu Hagwon, Kongo Gakuen, Kyoto Kokusai and Tokyo Korean School offer K-12 education to Korean residents in Japan. In addition, there are two fairly new Korean schools, Korea International School and Cheonggu Hagwon, that have no official affiliation with Chongryun or Mindan. 16. Prior to the proposal submitted to the MEXT on 13 February 2012, Mindan (2010) had submitted a similar proposal in September 2010, urging national and local governments to intervene in pro-North Korean schools. 17. Many elementary schools also operate affiliated kindergartens for students from age two to six. 18. ‘Chōsen-seki’ literally translates as ‘a nationality of (unified) Korea’ which essentially makes one stateless. When Korean colonial subjects were liberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, they were all grouped into a Chōsen-seki category. However, when Japan established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1965, Zainichi Koreans started to attain South Korean nationality for political reasons and out of convenience because with Chōsen-seki status, one is unable to obtain passport or excluded from various rights and privileges in Japan as Japanese state considers South Korea as the only legitimate state in the Korean Peninsula. Those who refuse to choose either North or South as their state hold onto Chōsen-seki status to this day. The number of Chōsen-seki holders in 2016 is 33,939, or less than 7% of some 500,000 Zainichi Koreans registered in Japanese Alien Registration (Ministry of Justice). 19. There were 109 junior high school students (59 males and 50 females) and 111 high school students (48 males and 53 females) enrolled in the 2013–2014 academic year. According to the ‘Foreign Resident Statistics’ (Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2013, there are a total of 1262 Koreans between age 13 and age 18 in Kyoto and Shiga prefectures, the school district of the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School. Of 210 students, 206 (98%) held either South Korean nationality or virtually stateless status of Chōsen-seki while only four held Japanese nationality. For the purpose of generating round percentage of those enrolled in the Kyoto Korean school among all school-aged Zainichi Korean children, I assume all of 210 are Koreans by nationality. The numbers of enrolled students in previous years were not disclosed by the school, however, ethnographic observation and interview data confirm that the number of student has been steadily declining in recent years. 20. The city of Kyoto’s resident registration reveals that there are 1806 Koreans who hold Chōsen- seki and 21,638 Koreans who hold South Korean nationality in December 2013. This means that those with Chōsen-seki comprise only 8% of all Korean residents in Kyoto city. While Chōsen-seki represents only 8% in the entire Kyoto city, close to half (47.1%) represents in the Kyoto Korean Junior High and High School, revealing the fact that Chōsen-seki Zainichi Koreans are disproportionately concentrated in and around the Korean school communities. This is not an exception for Kyoto, but other places. For instance, the Osaka University research project (2014) reveals that approximately 40% of all students at the Ikuno Korean Elementary School in Osaka hold Chōsen-seki. 204 K.H. HA

21. The Korean Youth Commerce Community (KYC) is called ‘Chae Ilbon Chosŏn Cheongnyeon Sangkonghoe’ (재일본조선청년상공회) in Korean and ‘Zainihon Chōsen Seinen Shōkōkai’ (在日本朝鮮青年商工会) in Japanese. KYC is a national network of young entrepreneurs, founded in 1995. Among 32 prefectural branches, KYC – Kyoto was founded in 1996 and has organized various fundraising events for pro-North Korean schools. See Korean Youth Commerce Community. Retrieved from http://kyc.gr.jp/ and Korean Youth Commerce Com- munity –Kyoto. Retrieved from http://www.kyc-kyoto.com/index.php. 22. In Korean schools, Korean War is called ‘Chokuk Haepang Chŏnchaeng,’ which literally translates as ‘Fatherland Liberation War.’ 23. The names of the interviewees that appear in the article are pseudonyms. 24. ‘Purpose of Ethnic Education,’ Chongryun’s official website, translation mine. Zainihon Chō- senjin Sōrengōkai, Minzoku Kyōiku. Retrieved from http://www.chongryon.com/j/edu/ index2.html. 25. Translation mine. The original lyrics in Korean version of the song read as follows: 돌파하라 최첨단을 무엇이나 마음만 먹으면 프로그람에 따라 만드는 선군시대 기계공업의자랑 우리식 CNC기술 CNC는 주체공업의위력 CNC는 자력갱생의 본때 장군님 가리키는 길따라 돌파하라 최첨단을 아 - 아리랑 아리랑 민족의자존심 높이 과학기술강국을 세우자 행복이 파도쳐온다

Acknowledgements I am indebted to Dr Kalindi Vora who encouraged me to write this article based on one of my dis- sertation chapters. I also would like to thank Dr Neda Atanasoski, Dr Yến Lê Espiritu, Dr Lisa Yoneyama, Dr Jin-kyung Lee, Dr John Lie, Haruki Eda, Misa Ryu and anonymous reviewers for Social Identities for their invaluable support and critical suggestions at various stages.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding This work was supported by the Joseph Naiman Graduate Fellowship in the Japanese Studies Program, University of California, San Diego and the research grant, the University of California Center for New Racial Studies.

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