Kant's Rechtsstaat and Its Reception in Japan

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Kant's Rechtsstaat and Its Reception in Japan KANT’S RECHTSSTAAT AND ITS RECEPTION IN JAPAN Professor Yasuo Hasebe Law School, Waseda University, Japan I. The Crooked Timber of Humanity Isaiah Berlin often referred to Kant’s aphorism, where he said, ‘Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made’1. This aphorism appears in Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’2. Here, Kant describes the following general tendency of humanity in the course of its historical development. Human beings are, by nature, equipped with the unsocial sociability, the ‘tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up’3. To solve problems that emerge from this tendency, it is necessary to construct a civil society that ensures the greatest freedom for each citizen equally: the civil society that specifies with coercive laws the limits of each citizen’s freedom so that it can co-exist with the same freedom of others. Human beings are obliged to enter this state of restriction, which establishes a just and civil condition4. However, the most intricate point in this project is that it requires a legislator, who is also a human being. ‘Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made’. Therefore, the task of solving problems is actually impossible. Establishing a perfectly just society is an unrealisable ideal, which humanity should strive to get closer to, eternally5. The problematique that Kant sketches here is the same as the connecting point between a coercive legal system and morality that each citizen embraces within her conscience, which he describes in The Metaphysics of Morals6. Kant describes the transition from the state of nature to the legal condition where what is mine or yours is legally demarcated and secured. The principles over what is mine or 1 Kant, Political Writings 44 [8: 21]. ‘8: 21’ signifies ‘volume 8, page 21’ of Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences. 2 Kant, Political Writings 45-46 [8: 22]. 3 Kant, Political Writings 46-47 [8: 24]. The translation is not precisely the same as that by Reiss. 4 In Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy (Mary Gregor ed, Cambridge University Press 1996) 450-56 [6:306- 313] (sometimes, I do not follow Gregor’s translation precisely). The cardinal importance of these paragraphs in understanding Kant’s legal theory is stressed by Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge University Press 1999) 42 ff. and Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford University Press 1999) 207 ff. 5 Kant, ‘The Metaphysics of Morals’ in his Practical Philosophy (n 6) 451-52 [6: 307]. 6 Kant, ‘The Metaphysics of Morals’ in his Practical Philosophy (n 6) 455-56 [6: 312]. 292 ASIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS yours are already intended to be valid in the state of nature, where common coercive legal rules do not yet apply. People’s rights there are merely private rights. On the other hand, in the legal condition, the distributive justice on what is mine or yours is assured by common objective rules. When you cannot avoid living side by side with all others, you ought to leave the state of nature and proceed with them into a rightful condition, that is, a condition of distributive justice. –The ground of this postulate can be explicated analytically from the concept of right in external relations, in contrast with violence (violentia). No one is bound to refrain from encroaching on what another possesses if the other gives him no equal assurance that he will observe the same restraint towards him. No one, therefore, need not wait until he has learned by bitter experience of the other’s contrary disposition; for what should bind him to wait till he has suffered a loss before he becomes prudent, when he can quite well perceive within himself the inclination of human beings generally to lord it over as their master (not to respect the superiority of the rights of others when they feel superior to them in strength or cunning)?1 Having read thus far, one may think that Kant advocates the establishment of the legal condition on the grounds that human beings are by their nature not sufficiently rational or moral, and are inclined to fight each other regarding what is mine or yours. However, the reason why human beings should enter the legal condition is stronger than that2: It is not experience from which we learn of the maxim of violence in human beings and of their malevolent tendency to attack one another before external legislation endowed with power appears, thus it is not some deed that makes coercion through public law necessary. On the contrary, however well-disposed and law-abiding human beings might be, it still lies a priori in the rational idea of such a condition (one that is not rightful) that before a public lawful condition is established individual human beings, peoples and states can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has its own right to do what seems right and good to it and not to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this. So, unless it wants to renounce any concepts of right, the first thing it has to resolve upon is the principle that it must leave the state of nature, in which each follows its own judgment, unite itself with all others (with which it cannot avoid interacting), subject itself to a public lawful external coercion, and so enter into a condition in which what is to be recognised as belonging to it is determined by law and it allotted to it by adequate power (not its own but an external power); that is, it ought above all else to enter a civil condition. This is the fundamental reason why people should leave the state of nature where each one behaves as he thinks right and good and enter the legal condition. In the state of nature, as what is mine or yours is imprecise and insecure, the inclination of human beings to attack one another tends to bring about violent conflicts. However, the problem is not limited there. Even if each one sincerely seeks out the rightful principles and tries to realise good, as people’s judgements differ and conflict 1 Thomas Nagel suggests that Kant ‘clearly’ assumes that the ‘universalizability’ that the categorical imperative requires ‘will yield the same results for everyone’, although Nagel himself is sceptical about whether the categorial imperative can produce unanimously acceptable moral principles. See his Equality and Partiality (Oxford University Press 1991) 48. 2 Kant, ‘Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals’ in his Practical Philosophy (n 6) 58 [4: 403]. KANT’S RECHTSSTAAT AND ITS RECEPTION IN JAPAN 293 with one another, people’s safe social lives will never be secured. This is why everyone should live under a common legal system which is enforced by the state. II. The Categorical Imperative The idea that people’s moral judgements sincerely made conflict with each other may seem inconsistent with Kant’s view on morality. Did Kant not think that in accordance with the categorical imperative, human beings can always deliver one right answer to any moral question?1 He asserts that ‘common human reason, with this compass [i.e. the categorical imperative] in hand, knows very well how to distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil’2. Is it not the case that because of that, theorists who argue that there are higher moral values that ordinary political calculations cannot override are called ‘Kantians’?3 However, Kant did not think this way. Kant formulated the categorical imperative in several ways. One of the most well-known formulations is as follows4: ‘I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law’. ‘A rule that the agent himself makes his principle on subjective ground is called his maxim’5. Different agents may make different maxims. The categorical imperative, which requires everyone to act upon a maxim ‘that can also hold as a universal law’, excludes maxims that cannot hold as universal laws as agents’ guiding principles. It is its only task. Kant raises several examples: (1) A maxim: ‘from self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life when its longer duration threatens more troubles than it promises agreeableness’ cannot become a universal law, because ‘a nature whose law it would be to destroy life itself by means of the same feeling whose destination is to impel towards the furtherance of life would contradict itself’; (2) a maxim: ‘when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen’ cannot become a universal law, because the universality of a law that everyone, when he believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not keeping it would make the promise and the end one might have in it itself impossible, since not one would believe what was promised him’; (3) a maxim that a person with a talent that by means of some cultivation could make him a human being useful for all sorts of purpose can neglect his natural gifts and be concerned with devoting his life merely to idleness cannot become a universal law because as a rational person he necessarily wills that all the capacities in him be developed; (4) a person who thinks that while others have to contend with great hardships, each should be allowed to be as happy as heaven wills or as he can make himself cannot will that such a principle is to become a universal law, because he himself may in time face great hardships and need others’ help6.
Recommended publications
  • Theocracy Vs Constitutionalism in Japan Constitutional Amendment and the Return of Pre-War Shinto Nationalism
    The RSIS Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author(s), and do not represent the official position of RSIS. This publication may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior written permission obtained from RSIS and due credit given to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email [email protected] for further editorial queries. NO. 310 THEOCRACY VS CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPAN CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND THE RETURN OF PRE-WAR SHINTO NATIONALISM NAOKO KUMADA S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES SINGAPORE 2 MAY 2018 About the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was officially inaugurated on 1 January 2007. Prior to this, it was known as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), which was established 10 years earlier, on 30 July 1996, by Dr Tony Tan Keng Yam, then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence. Dr Tony Tan later became the elected seventh President of the Republic of Singapore. Like its predecessor, RSIS was established as an autonomous entity within Nanyang Technological University (NTU). RSIS’ mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will: Provide a rigorous professional graduate education with a strong practical emphasis Conduct policy-relevant research in defence, national security, international relations, strategic studies and diplomacy Foster a global network of like-minded professional schools Graduate Programmes RSIS offers a challenging graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners.
    [Show full text]
  • Rising the Enemy. Stalin, Truman and Surrender of Japan. T. Hasegawa .Pdf
    RACING THE ENEMY RACING THE ENEMY stalin, truman, and the surrender of japan tsuyoshi hasegawa the belknap press of harvard university press Cambridge, Massachusetts • London, England 2005 Copyright © 2005 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, 1941– Racing the enemy : Stalin, Truman, and the surrender of Japan / Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-674-01693-9 (alk. paper) 1. World War, 1939–1945—Armistices. 2. World War, 1939–1945—Japan. 3. World War, 1939–1945—Soviet Union. 4. World War, 1939–1945— United States. 5. World politics—1933–1945. I. Title. D813.J3H37 2005 940.53′2452—dc22 2004059786 In memory of Boris Nikolaevich Slavinsky, my friend and colleague, who did not see the fruit of our collaboration Contents Maps viii Note on Transliteration and Spelling ix Introduction: Race to the Finish 1 1. Triangular Relations and the Pacific War 7 2. Stalin, Truman, and Hirohito Face New Challenges 45 3. Decisions for War and Peace 89 4. Potsdam: The Turning Point 130 5. The Atomic Bombs and Soviet Entry into the War 177 6. Japan Accepts Unconditional Surrender 215 7. August Storm: The Soviet-Japanese War and the United States 252 Conclusion: Assessing the Roads Not Taken 290 Abbreviations 307 Notes 309 Acknowledgments 363 Index 367 Illustrations follow pages 132 and 204 Maps 1 Japan at War, 1945 9 2 August Storm 196 3 Central Tokyo 246 4 Soviets’ Kuril Operation 257 5 Battle of Shimushu 261 Note on Transliteration and Spelling For Russian words, I have used the Library of Congress translitera- tion system except for well-known terms such as Yalta and Mikoyan when they appear in the text; in the citations, I retain Ialtinskaia konferentsiia and Mikoian.
    [Show full text]
  • Indigenization of Constitutionalism in the Japanese Experience, the Christopher A
    Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Volume 28 | Issue 1 1996 Indigenization of Constitutionalism in the Japanese Experience, The Christopher A. Ford Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Christopher A. Ford, Indigenization of Constitutionalism in the Japanese Experience, The, 28 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 3 (1996) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol28/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. ARTICLES THE INDIGENIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE ChristopherA. Ford* SINCE ITS OPENING TO THE WORLD in the middle decades of the 19th century, Japan has distinguished itself by its receptivity to foreign legal ideas, adopting from European models not only the very concept of a written constitution but also an elaborate system of cabinet governance, an extensive regime of codified general law, and (more recently) a scheme of constitutional rights and judicial review modeled on the United States Constitution and American judicial precedents. This essay seeks to explore Japan's process of legal adoption and adaptation, with particular emphasis upon how the American-inspired scheme of court-policed constitutional liberties has grown and developed in the soil of its new home. Japan's adoption of foreign legal models - and especially of foreign approaches to constitutional jurisprudence - has displayed characteristic patterns of alteration and adaptation.
    [Show full text]
  • The Art of Constitutional Legitimation: a Genealogy of Modern Japanese
    Title Page The Art of Constitutional Legitimation: A Genealogy of Modern Japanese Political Thought by Tomonori Teraoka Bachelor of Law (LL.B.), Tohoku University, 2010 Master of International Affairs, The Pennsylvania State University, 2013 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2020 Committee Page UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Tomonori Teraoka It was defended on August 14, 2020 and approved by David L. Marshall, Associate Professor, Department of Communication Paul Elliott Johnson, Associate Professor, Department of Communication Dissertation Directors: Olga Kuchinskaya, Associate Professor, Department of Communication and Ricky Law, Associate Professor, Department of History (Carnegie Mellon University) ii Copyright © by Tomonori Teraoka 2020 iii The Art of Constitutional Legitimation: A Genealogy of Modern Japanese Political Thought Tomonori Teraoka, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2020 This dissertation examines rhetorical and historical issues of the two Japanese constitutions, the Meiji constitution (1889 − 1946) and the postwar constitution (1946 −). It examines a rhetorical issue of how persuasive narratives ground a constitution. It also examines a historical issue of modern Japan, that is to say, the re-emerging issue of whether or not, how, and how much Japan needed to domesticate foreign paradigms, a core of which was a modern constitution. The dissertation’s analysis of the two issues shows how the scholarly discourse in modern Japan (1868-) responded to the re-emerging issue of political/constitutional legitimacy across both the Meiji constitution and the postwar constitution.
    [Show full text]
  • An Earlier Experience of Lay Involvement in Court Decisions in Japan – the Jury 1928–1943
    An earlier experience of lay involvement in court decisions in Japan – The Jury 1928–1943 WATSON, Andrew <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9500-2249> Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at: http://shura.shu.ac.uk/14301/ This document is the author deposited version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it. Published version WATSON, Andrew (2016). An earlier experience of lay involvement in court decisions in Japan – The Jury 1928–1943. Journal of Japanese Law, 21 (42), 153-178. Copyright and re-use policy See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive http://shura.shu.ac.uk An Earlier Experience of Lay Involvement in Court Decisions in Japan – The Jury 1928–1943 Andrew R. J. Watson∗ I. Introduction II. The Reception of Western Laws and Consideration of Juries III. The Jury I V. Explanations for the Failure of Juries V. Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers VI. Reduction in Promotion to the Public VII. Cultural Features VIII. Historical Explanations IX. The Post-War Years I. INTRODUCTION Lay judge, or “saiban-in”,1 courts try serious cases in Japan.2 Sitting together, profes- sional judges and lay judges decide guilt and sentence. Resembling Anglo-American jurors, and unlike lay judges elsewhere, saiban-in are selected at random and sit in only one case. Dissimilar to mixed tribunals in some countries, where they cannot, or do not in practice, Japanese lay judges question witnesses directly, giving them a more active role in fact finding than jurors. Before their inception, in May, 2009, ordinary citizens’ participation in the criminal justice system was very limited.3 A criminal jury system did exist from 1928 to 1943.
    [Show full text]
  • Beyond Words: the "Kokutai" and Its Background
    ORIENTATS-2006 ISSN 1696-4403 Josefa Valderrama López Beyond words: the "kokutai" and its background Josefa Valderrama López (University of Tokyo, Japan) Abstract / Resum / Resumen The author provides a short study about what the word kokutai, its background meaning and the possibilities of its translation and interpretation, considering the essential elements such as culture, language and religion. L'autora elabora un petit estudi sobre què vol dir la paraula kokutai, i les possibilitats de la seva traducció i interpretació, tenint en compte elements esencials com ara la cultura, la llengua i la religió. La autora elabora un pequeño estudio sobre qué quiere decir la palabra kokutai, y las posibilidades de su traducción e interpretación, teniendo en cuenta elementos esenciales como la cultura, la lengua y la religión. Key Words / Paraules clau / Palabras clave Kokutai, Tennou, Constitutional Law, translation, culture, symbol, myth, language, religion, identity, Family Estate. Kokutai, Tennou, Dret Constitucional, traducció, cultura, simbol, mite, llenguatge, religió, identitat, Estat Familia. Kokutai, Tennou, Derecho Constitucional, traducción, cultura, símbolo, mito, lenguaje, religión, identidad, Estado Familia. The comparison of two different legal constitutional systems seems to be very promising for modern research in order to understand different types of law systems, as well as of your own 125 “juridical world”. However, the comparableness between two legal systems might appear limited, as they are product of different societies founded on different historic development giving a different cultural background, entailing different ways of think. Though intercultural exchange due to shared interests has taken place throughout history, specific cultural characteristics which are unique in a society and are expected to be essential for the understanding of mechanisms established in this society, thus, they might remain.
    [Show full text]
  • Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan Setsuo Miyazawa UC Hastings College of the Law, [email protected]
    University of California, Hastings College of the Law UC Hastings Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship 2000 Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan Setsuo Miyazawa UC Hastings College of the Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Legal Education Commons Recommended Citation Setsuo Miyazawa, Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan, 1 Asian-Pac. L & Pol'y J. 1 (2000). Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1219 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan Setsuo Miyazawa Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal http: //www. hawaii. edu/aplpj Copyright ©2000 APLPJ Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 1 Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan Setsuo Miyazawa 1 with 2 Hiroshi Otsuka A Paper Prepared for the Conference on NEW CHALLENGE FOR THE RULE OF LAW, LAWYERS, INTERNATIONALIZATION, AND 3 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL RULES Acknowledgment: At Kobe University Faculty of Law, Ken'ichi Yoneda, then a lecturer, Keiichi Ageishi, then a doctoral student, and Masashi Kanno, then a master's student, helped the authors in data collection. In Cambridge, Hans Van Der Sande, a JD student at Harvard Law School, edited most of the text and Table 1, and Roy Freed, Esq., edited the conclusion.
    [Show full text]
  • Research Institute of Economic Science
    Working Paper Series No. 20-02 September 2020 Nationalist thought in pre-war Japan Atsushi Tsuneki Research Institute of Economic Science College of Economics, Nihon University Nationalist thought in pre-war Japan1 Atsushi Tsuneki (0000-0003-3486-5101) College of Economics, Nihon University 1-3-2 Kanda-Misakichō, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 101-0061, Japan Phone: 81-90-77577893 e-mail: [email protected] Biographical Note: Tsuneki, Atsushi, Professor of the College of Economics, Nihon University. Ph.D. in Economics at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada). Field: public economics, law and economics, development economics, history of political and social thought. Publications: Nationalism in Modern Japan. Osaka Economic Papers. 2018. 68. 1. 1-115; Some Observations on the Nation State (II)- Its Institutions and Ideas. The Annals of Legal Philosophy 2015. 2016.193-210. Word count: 8569 1 The author notes that this article partially draws on an essay published in Japanese (Tsuneki 2018). In this present article, I have extended the arguments, adding many new insights I developed after the first publication, and reorganized the basic structure of my presentation on Japanese nationalism to make it more accessible for English-speaking readers outside Japan. 1 Nationalist thought in pre-war Japan Abstract: This study aims to clarify the nature and effects of nationalist political thought in pre-war Japan (1800–1941). Despite a common belief that Japanese nationalism is unique and anti-modern in the sense that it is anti-liberal- democratic, feudal, hierarchical, and militaristic, which is sometimes called ‘Ultra-Nationalism’, through an analysis of specific texts, I argue that Japanese nationalism from 1800 to 1941 had a multilateral nature and its dominant aspect was neither feudal nor anti-modern.
    [Show full text]
  • The Jury 1928–1943 Andrew RJ Watson
    An Earlier Experience of Lay Involvement in Court Decisions in Japan – The Jury 1928–1943 Andrew R. J. Watson∗ I. Introduction II. The Reception of Western Laws and Consideration of Juries III. The Jury I V. Explanations for the Failure of Juries V. Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers VI. Reduction in Promotion to the Public VII. Cultural Features VIII. Historical Explanations IX. The Post-War Years I. INTRODUCTION Lay judge, or “saiban-in”,1 courts try serious cases in Japan.2 Sitting together, profes- sional judges and lay judges decide guilt and sentence. Resembling Anglo-American jurors, and unlike lay judges elsewhere, saiban-in are selected at random and sit in only one case. Dissimilar to mixed tribunals in some countries, where they cannot, or do not in practice, Japanese lay judges question witnesses directly, giving them a more active role in fact finding than jurors. Before their inception, in May, 2009, ordinary citizens’ participation in the criminal justice system was very limited.3 A criminal jury system did exist from 1928 to 1943. It ∗ Senior Lecturer, Department of Law & Criminology, Sheffield Hallam University. 1 “Lay judge” and “saiban-in” are used interchangeably henceforth. 2 They hear about 3 percent of criminal trials. The remainder are dealt with by a single profes- sional judge, or a panel of three professional judges. 3 It was restricted to the largely volunteer probation service and serving on Prosecutorial Re- view Commissions or Kensatsu Shinsa-kai. As a means of controlling the very wide discre- tion vested in prosecutors, decisions made by them not to charge suspects may be reviewed by Prosecution Review Commissions on the request of alleged victims of crimes or interest- ed parties or on their own initiative.
    [Show full text]
  • Racing the Enemy Roundtable, Frank on Hasegawa
    H-Diplo Roundtable- Racing the Enemy Roundtable , Frank on Hasegawa Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005) Roundtable Editor: Thomas Maddux , CSU Northridge Roundtable Participants: Michael D. Gordin, Gar Alperovitz, Richard Frank, Barton Bernstein, David Holloway Commentary by Richard Frank, Independent Scholar OVERVIEW The end of the Pacific War looms as one of the leading controversies in American history. For more than fifty years—an astonishing achievement--Robert Butow’s exemplary Japan’s Decision to Surrender reigned as the essential work on political decision making in Japan and the United States.[1] Other works supplemented Butow, but never entirely displaced him. Racing the Enemy now stands as an absolutely critical work on political dimensions of this passage and I believe it is the first work with a legitimate claim to have eclipsed Butow. Not only does Dr. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa profit from an enormous body of evidence shielded from Butow’s view, Hasegawa stretches the political canvas to include a Soviet Union in vivid hues. All of this is a sterling achievement that amply justifies this roundtable. At the core of Hasegawa’s presentation of Japanese decision making is his illumination of the attitudes of the key figures about the kokutai . This elusive concept represented the symbolic expression of both the political and the cultural essence of the emperor system. An attempt in the 1930’s to find a modern constitutional monarchy in the Meiji constitution was savagely rebuffed by the prevailing mythical vision that made the emperor a god reigning above the political system.
    [Show full text]
  • Constitutionalism in Japan
    – MBA 1/2008 – Prof. Teruji Suzuki Kozminski Academy, Warsaw Constitutionalism in Japan The Characteristics Despite of such a socio-political backgro- of the Meiji Constitution of 1889 und, Japan could not avoid introducing some The history of modern constitutional law constitutionalism prevailed among the We- in Japan was divided by the two constitutions; stern scholarship at the time. namely, the Meiji Constitution of 1889 and the Hirobumi Ito, chief drafting member, and Showa constitution of 1946. then prime minister, was himself visited to Germany and Austria to study constitutional The Meiji Constitution of 1889 was the first law and its political repercussions in Europe. written constitution in Asia, which was put As a result the constitution had received into effect on November 29, 1890, and was some of the scholarly influences on constitu- given to the people from above in the name tional thinking at the end of the 19th century, of “Tenno”, Emperor. Although needs of le- in particular that of the German school. gal reform was felt among the leaders from There were two distinctive views on the the beginning of the Restoration of 1868, Meiji Constitution; the one who understood drafting of constitution had been prolonged that the Constitution was a step for further by political considerations. There were two development of authentic constitutionalism in reasons why the leaders had finally decided to Japan and the other who treated the Consti- draft the constitution; first, the government tution as basis of strong authoritarian state of was confronted with political demands of the divine Emperor (Takayanagi 1963). the people for democratization, called “Jiyu- minkenundou”, which claimed to realize the Emperor is the English translation of “Ten- five principles declared at the beginning of the no” and the usage of emperor as connoted by Restoration and, second from external aspects, Tenno originates from the official English text the building of modern legal system, compa- of the Meiji Constitution.
    [Show full text]
  • MILITARISM in JAPAN WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION 40 M T
    THIRTY,FIVE CENTS YALE UNIVERSITY LffiRARY MILITARISM IN JAPAN WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION 40 M t. Vernon Street 8 West 40th Street Boston, Mass. New York, N.Y. Founded in I9IO HE World Peace Foundation is a non­ Board of Trustees T profit organization which was founded in 1910 by Edwin Ginn, the educational GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE, President publisher, for the purpose "of educating GEORGE W. ANDERSON the people of all nations to a full knowl­ FllANX AYDELOTTE edge of the waste and destructiveness of NEWTON D. BAKER war, its evil effects on present social condi­ HARVEY H. BUNDY tions and on the well-being of future gen­ LEONARD W. CRONKHITE erations, and to promote international STEPHEN P. DUGGAN justice and the brotherhood of man; and, HARRY A. GARFIELD generally by every practical means to pro­ MANLEY O. HUDSON mote peace and goodwill among all man­ kind." A. LAWRENCE LOWELL GEORGE A. PLIMPTON The Foundation operates upon the policy CHESTER H. ROWELL that the actual facts concerning interna­ tional relations and official international cooperation constitute the best possible ar­ • guments for lasting peace and improved General Staff international understanding. Its activities are, therefore, focused upon the task of mak­ RAYMOND THOMAS RICH, Director ing these facts available in clear and undis­ DENYS P. MYERS, Research torted form. FARRELL SYMONS, P1tblications ERNEST R. BRYAN, Distribution PUBLICATIONS MARIE J. CARROLL, Reference WORLD AFFAIRS BOOKS printed on fine book MARY J. MACDONALD, Treasurer paper and bound in cloth. Annual subscription $4.00. WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION books printed on fine book paper, bound in maroon cloth, fully in­ dexed.
    [Show full text]