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Mediterránea 12/11 Mediterránea 12/11 Giulio Ferracuti: Islam: elezioni e democrazia Angela Dolcetti: Letteratura poliziesca in Catalogna. Alicia Giménez-Bartlett e Pablo Tusset Laura Facchinetti: María Zambrano, filósofa del sentir Mediterránea Mediterránea Rassegna di Studi Interculturali a cura di Gianni Ferracuti Università di Trieste Dipartimento di filosofia, lingue e letterature Centro di Studi Mediterranei Tutti i diritti riservati www.ilbolerodiravel.org settembre 2011 ISSN: 2036-8313 (per l'edizione digitale) . Giulio Ferracuti: Islam: elezioni e democrazia .................................... 5 Angela Dolcetti: Letteratura poliziesca in Catalogna. Alicia Giménez-Bartlett e Pablo Tusset ..................................... 65 Laura Facchinetti: María Zambrano, filósofa del sentir ............... 117 eadadadf giulio ferracuti Islam: elezioni e democrazia Secondo il noto schema proposto da Samuel P. Huntington, nel 1974 il mondo avrebbe assistito allo sviluppo di una nuova ondata di democratizzazione, la terza precisamente, grazie alla quale la democra- zia avrebbe smesso di essere un fenomeno prettamente occidentale acquisendo viceversa un carattere globale. A partire da questo anno e proseguendo fino al 1990, almeno trenta sono i paesi che hanno ope- rato una transizione democratica portando così il mondo a contare il più alto numero in assoluto di Stati democratici, cinquantotto, quasi il doppio di quanti se ne sarebbero potuti dichiarare tali al termine della seconda ondata di riflusso1. Le ondate di riflusso seguono quelle di democratizzazione e portano a una diminuzione del numero di paesi democratici: chi aveva intrapreso la strada del cambiamento torna, per così dire, sui suoi passi riportando il sistema politico ad un livello non democratico variabile, e spesso difficilmente classificabile. Questo avviene perché la democrazia è un sistema complesso, tanto nella sua attuazione pratica quanto nella sua astrazione teorica, e sono molte le variabili che possono intervenire per contribuire ad ostacolarla. Nel suo articolo Huntington ne cita alcune, quali ad esempio la debole inte- riorizzazione dei valori democratici da parte del popolo come dell'élite, le battute d'arresto dell'economia 1 Samuel P. Huntington, Democracy's third wave, “Journal of Democracy”, 2.2, 1991, 12-34, 12. 6 giulio ferracuti che possono intensificare i conflitti sociali e possono aumentare la popolarità di risoluzioni forti e decise che possono essere imposte solamente da un governo autoritario, la polarizzazione sociale e politica op- pure ancora gli scarsi risultati, o peggio i fallimenti, conseguiti da un sistema democratico nel tentativo di operare efficacemente, che potrebbero minare la sua legittimità. Quel che è certo, è che la transizione dalla democrazia ad un sistema autoritario, escludendo i casi in cui si ha un intervento di attori stranieri, è quasi sempre stata prodotta dalle personalità che durante la fase democratica erano riuscite a prendere il potere o erano vicine ad esso2. Con una o forse due eccezioni, scrive sempre Huntington, i sistemi demo- cratici non sono mai stati rovesciati con l'appoggio popolare espresso tramite voto o tramite un'insurrezio- ne. Che quella che oggi osserviamo sia la nascita di un movimento che prelude ad una nuova ondata di democratizzazione, la prima a coinvolgere in modo massiccio il mondo arabo tanto da avere origine pro- prio al suo interno, è certamente possibile. Ma si tratta di una valutazione che va decisamente rimandata, da fornire a posteriori guardando all'esito del processo; sbilanciarsi in modo netto ora sarebbe ingenuo quanto imprudente. Se una democrazia appena nata non è affatto immune dal rischio di ricadere in quella che viene chiamata ondata di riflusso, è evidente che la fase immediatamente precedente alla sua instau- razione è, a maggior ragione, altamente complessa, con un numero elevato di variabili in gioco, che pos- sono evolvere in modo rapido, rendendo la situazione delicata e sempre in procinto di degenerare, pren- dendo una piega inaspettata. Non basta certo una sollevazione popolare, motivata con il favore verso la democrazia, per assicurare che questa troverà lo spazio che merita. Ammesso che questo accada, come gran parte del mondo si augura guardando alla situazione con apprensione, serviranno molti anni prima di poter dare una valutazione obiettiva sul successo o il fallimento del movimento che vediamo all'opera. Al momento attuale non siamo ancora in grado neppure di indicare con certezza la strada che i singoli paesi prenderanno (strada che può benissimo variare caso per caso, come dimostra la differenza delle situa- zioni in Libia, in Egitto e in Tunisia), o di individuare le istituzioni vecchie e nuove che emergeranno in essi: l'esercito, i partiti politici, vecchi esponenti dei regimi caduti, movimenti islamisti. Questa premessa serve ad indicare che data la rapidità dei cambiamenti, accompagnati da forte incertezza, per il momento siamo ancora autorizzati, ed anzi costretti, ad utilizzare il vecchio schema delle tre ondate, un modello che per ora non può ancora essere né abbandonato né aggiornato. Due elementi strettamente collegati all'idea di democrazia sono il popolo e le élite, protagonisti di un continuo gioco dialettico tra governanti e governati, che ripetuto nel tempo ha contribuito all'evolversi dell'idea di democrazia e del sistema da esso rappresentato. La strada percorsa dai tempi dell'Atene di Pericle è evidentemente enorme, ed altrettanto grandi sono i cambiamenti occorsi nei termini, nelle pro- cedure, negli attori coinvolti, al punto che oggi per dare una definizione concreta, utile e condivisa del termine democrazia è necessario ricorrere ad un espediente: bisogna sgombrare il campo da tutto quanto non è condiviso. È necessario quindi giungere a una definizione minima che possa essere presa come base operativa per iniziare il lavoro. Viceversa, rimandando questo passaggio si rischierebbe di non trova- re neppure una base comune per poter dire dove è presente e dove invece è assente un sistema di tipo democratico. Per minima e funzionale che sia, una definizione esaustiva e universale di democrazia è impossibile da trovare; si tratta pur sempre della descrizione di un sistema complesso fatto anche di valori e percezioni in continuo mutamento. Tra le tante proposte, la definizione che ho scelto è quella procedurale di Schumpeter, secondo cui “il metodo democratico è lo strumento istituzionale per giungere a decisioni politiche, in base al quale singoli individui ottengono il potere di decidere attraverso una competizione che ha per oggetto il voto popolare”3. La definizione può sembrare fredda a tutti coloro che non si occupano della materia da un punto di vista accademico, ma è in realtà molto profonda e capace di dar conto del funzionamento e della qualità di una democrazia nel momento in cui si indagano i requisiti che devono essere soddisfatti perché le elezioni 2 Ibid., 18 3 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalismo, socialismo e democrazia, Edizioni di Comunità, Milano, 1955, 257. islam: elezioni e democrazia 7 siano effettivamente libere, competitive e decisive. Queste, infatti, non esauriscono di per sé il gioco de- mocratico, ma ne sono ugualmente una componente essenziale, ed un sistema in grado di organizzare delle elezioni realmente oneste è un sistema che si occupa al contempo di garantire quelle libertà che servono ai cittadini per strutturare le preferenze di voto (diritto di petizione, critiche, dimostrazioni) e per partecipare realmente alla vita democratica (diritti di associazione, espressione, stampa)4. Un elenco dei requisiti ritenuti fondamentali per la creazione di un regime pienamente democratico è stato proposto da Robert Dahl: Opportunità Garanzie istituzionali necessarie I. Formulare preferenze 1. Libertà di formare organizzazioni e di aderirvi 2. Libertà di espressione 3. Diritto di voto 4. Diritto dei dirigenti politici di competere per il sostegno 5. Fonti alternative di informazione II. Esprimere preferenze 1. Libertà di formare organizzazioni e di aderirvi 2. Libertà di espressione 3. Diritto di voto 5. Eleggibilità alle cariche pubbliche 5a. Diritto dei dirigenti politici di competere per il sostegno 6. Fonti alternative di informazioni 7. Elezioni libere ed eque III. Vedere le proprie preferenze valutate 1. Libertà di formare organizzazioni e di aderirvi in modo eguale nella condotta di governo 2. Libertà di espressione 3. Diritto di voto 4. Eleggibilità alle cariche pubbliche 5. Diritto dei dirigenti politici di competere per il sostegno 5a. Diritto dei dirigenti politici di competere per i voti 6. Fonti alternative di informazioni 7. Le istituzioni che producono politiche governative dipendono dai voti e da altre espressioni di preferenze Fonte: Gianfranco Pasquino, Nuovo corso di scienza politica, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2004, p. 3175. Questo schema può essere utilizzato per valutare i processi storici di democratizzazione e per classifi- care i sistemi politici, cercando di capire la strada che devono percorrere i regimi autoritari (egemonie chiuse) per diventare democrazie o, secondo il termine utilizzato da Dahl, poliarchie. Questa strada gene- ralmente passa per l'aumento congiunto di liberalizzazione, quale aumento dei diritti civili concessi, della competizione politica tollerata e dell'opportunità di contestazione, e dell'inclusività, l'allargamento delle attività di partecipazione ad una quota sempre maggiore dei cittadini. L'una senza l'altra non condurrebbe- ro comunque alla democrazia ma ad altre forme: oligarchia
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