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A Note on Max Weber’s Unfinished Theory of Economy and Society 27 A Note on Max Weber’s Unfinished Theory of Economy and Society Dirk Baecker ety” which is mentioned twice in the title of Max Weber's Witten/Herdecke University, Germany book: in the society being called as such explicitly, and in [email protected] the innocuous word “and” separating and linking that society from, and with, the economy. I. Max Weber dealt with problems of economic sociology in almost all of his work. One of its most important parts, Max Weber's two most important contributions to eco- which is today rendered as sociology of religion, was origi- nomic sociology appeared only posthumously. Both contri- nally conceived of as studies into Wirtschaftsethik, eco- butions, the Fundamental Concepts of Economic Action, nomic ethics (Weber 1988a). Yet, it was only when Weber which appeared in Economy and Society (Weber 1990), gave his understanding of the economy – with regard to and his General Economic History (Weber 1991), featured both its general history and its fundamental concepts – its a definition of Wirtschaften, of economic action, which final shape that he came up with a definition of economic went almost unnoticed, even though Weber had given it a action, which certainly must have struck him when he good deal of attention in his comments in Economy and looked at it and began to deal with its consequences. Society. He had also started to rewrite his Herrschafts- Wirtschaften, or economic action, as Weber conceived, is soziologie, his political sociology, due to certain conse- to be defined as the “friedliche Ausübung von Ver- quences stemming from that definition. As far as I can see fügungsgewalt” (literally “peaceful exercise of the right of only Talcott Parsons discussed this definition of Wirtschaften disposal”, but note the use of the term Gewalt, violence, in his book on The Structure of Social Action, noting that in the German wording of the concept) in the context of Weber made it difficult for others to see its scope by taking precautions, or provisions, towards the future satisfaction it up in separate chapters on the economic and the politi- of future needs (Fürsorge für einen Begehr nach Nutzleis- cal sociology (Parsons 1968: 654-656). Wolfgang Schlu- tungen) (Weber 1990: 31; Weber 1991: 1). chter reexamines carefully the problematic division of Econ- omy and Society into two parts, a newer one (1918), as To do justice to the English audience we must add that the first part, and an older one (1914), as the second part, due to the very translation of the definition in all editions which is the way the book was divided by Marianne Weber of the book, they stood almost no chance of hitting upon after the death of her husband Max (Schluchter 1989; cf. the problem Weber had discovered when he gave his un- Mommsen 2005). Schluchter notes that it is the derstanding of economic action its final twist by condens- Wirtschaftssoziologie (economic sociology) which moti- ing it into his definition. Frank H. Knight skipped the Be- vates a new Herrschaftssoziologie (sociology of domina- griffliche Vorbemerkung (Conceptual Exposition) in his tion), which has to be formulated before any Rechts- 1927 translation of the General Economic History and soziologie (sociology of law) and Staatssoziologie (sociol- thereby left out Weber's definition of economic action as ogy of the state) make sense. Indeed, for Weber, no eco- well (Weber 1981). And Guenther Roth's and Claus Wit- nomic sociology should ignore the way any economic cal- tich's 1968 and 1978 edition of Economy and Society culus is dependent on the rules securing that present sacri- translated Weber's definition of economic action as “any fices are not only being taken but are also rewarded by the peaceful exercise of an actor's control over resources keeping of promises made to justify the sacrifice. That which is in its main impulse oriented towards economic means that a whole edifice of a present calculus of future ends” (Weber 1968: 63). This translation makes it impossi- rewards embedded within systems and institutions at- ble to see Weber's problem. There is no talk of any force tempting to guarantee both the present calculus and the being exerted, let alone of any violence. The notes as well future cashing-in emerges, which may be called the “soci- are translated in a way that makes it impossible to see that economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter Volume 8, Number 2 (March 2007) A Note on Max Weber’s Unfinished Theory of Economy and Society 28 it could be interesting to take a closer look at that “exer- Almost nobody seems to have taken notice of the inherent cise of an actor's control.” And the temporal aspect of the paradox of the definition and of the possible consequences definition which is of utmost importance is completely left it has for Weber's economic and general sociology. Herbert out, because Roth and Wittich did not even try to translate Marcuse criticizes that Weber conceals the power aspects the idea of Fürsorge, that is of a precaution being taken or of the economy in his definition of it as a kind of rational of provisions being made. action (Marcuse 1965). Friedrich H. Tenbruck is too fasci- nated by Weber giving an account of the dissolution of the Parsons' translation of Weber's definition as “peaceful idea of God the creator to ask which role first this idea and exercise of power” (Parsons 1968: 654) is a better one. then its dissolution might play in the social establishment Weber indeed is dealing with questions of power, but not of economic action (Tenbruck 1975). Randall Collins ad- only of political power, as Parsons assumed, but more mires Weber's General Economic History for its “institu- fundamentally with questions of the exercise of violence tional” explanation of the economy in terms of entrepre- giving rise to the necessity of a certain political order. We- neurial organization of capital, rational technology, free ber indeed is looking at a paradox, namely at the paradox labour, unconstrained markets, a helpful bureaucratic of peaceful violence. Note, however, that Parsons avoids state, and the legal framing of bourgeois activity (all these the possible trap of rendering “Verfügungsgewalt” lexi- terms allegedly being directed against their Marxist inter- cally correct with “right of disposal,” which would reduce pretation) and does not note how Weber takes care to it to an exercise of legal rights, considered as an exoge- again and again explain the ends and the means of eco- nous factor. nomic action as the result from, and prerequisite for, the fight of man against man on the market (Collins 1980). Weber seems to have known what he was looking at, even Richard Swedberg proposes to go deeper into the notion if, given his rather objectivistic and positivistic understand- of “interest” to explore how Weber related economic ing of social sciences, he did not have the means to take it action and social structure, but even he, apart from right- seriously as a paradox. That he knew what he was looking fully drawing our attention to the distributive outcomes of at is demonstrated by the italics he used for the word “capitalism”, does not explain the quality of this relation friedliche (peaceful) and by the extensive discussion not of between the economic and the social (Swedberg 1998; cf. power but literally of violence in the notes he added to the Swedberg 2005; Nee/Swedberg 2005). definition. He took care to include the exercise of violence among the means of an action that is economically ori- ented, on the one hand, and to distinguish the “pragma” II. (a kind of instruction to useful action) of violence from the “spirit” of the economy, on the other hand (Weber 1990: Even if Weber lacked the means to deal with a paradox in 32). He adds that even when rights of disposal are to be a sound theoretical way, given that these means are only protected politically by the threat of the exercise of vio- nowadays developed due to an extensive research into the lence that does not turn the economy itself into some kind possible self-reference of social phenomena (Luhmann of violence (ibid.). And yet, he insists on the possibility to 1990, 1999), he certainly was on the right track when he use the means of violence when pursuing economic ends asked for empirically forceful distinctions to unfold the (Weber 1990: 31-32). In the next, the fourth note, one paradox inherent in the idea of a peaceful violence. Given might even see the great care Weber takes to distinguish that social action in general is dependent on the possibility his definition between a technical and a social understand- to give meaning to a certain behaviour, linking that behav- ing of the economy as another hint to pursue further the iour to a possible interpretation and thereby to another question of how that paradox of a peaceful violence is individual's action (Weber 1990: 1), what is needed to turn socially possible and fruitful (Weber: 32-33). The all impor- the violence into something peaceful is the interpretation tant question of economic action, or so Weber eventually that violence could not only be endured or accepted but settles to say, is to secure Verfügungsgewalt, rights of also welcomed as economically meaningful. But the ques- disposal, over all kinds of economic means, including ones tion arises, as to what is economically meaningful? We- own labour, which is if we consider slavery not at all self- ber's answer to this question, in accordance with both evident (Weber 1990: 34).

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