Understanding India's Representation of North–South Climate Politics

Understanding India’s Representation of North–South Climate Politics Shangrila Joshi Understanding India’s Representation of North–South Climate Politics • Shangrila Joshi*

International negotiations to mitigate climate change in the so-called post- Kyoto era have been caught in a North–South impasse.1 One key issue has been the refusal of the US to accept mandatory caps on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions until emerging emitters such as India and China do so as well. The Fif- teenth Conference of Parties (COP-15) to the United Nations Framework Con- vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen was an important milestone in climate negotiations. These three countries came together at that meeting to draft a compromise agreement—albeit a weak one—and made vol- untary commitments to reducing greenhouse gas intensity based on 2005 emission levels. Yet legally binding mandatory caps on emissions for these countries remain contentious. This paper engages with contentious debates over mitigation responsibility within the UNFCCC, by focusing on India’s position in these debates. India is increasingly becoming one of the key players in climate negotiations due to its growing economy, rising emissions proªle, and clout in Third World politics and North–South bargaining.2 I base my analysis on twenty-two qualitative interviews conducted in Delhi during a six-week period between November 2008 and January 2009, participant observation during COP-15 in December 2009, and review of government and NGO documents, editorials, and public statements. I used the snow- ball sampling method for selecting interviewees, including ofªcials from the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF), as well as two inºuential NGOs in Indian climate discourse and policy, the Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), and the Center for Science and Environment (CSE). These interviewees included delegates to UNFCCC negotiations and members of the Prime Minis- ter’s Council on Climate Change (PMCCC). The aim was to understand how the Indian intelligentsia thinks about

* The author would like to thank Shaul Cohen, Alexander Murphy, James Pletcher, and three anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on earlier drafts, and Aarti Gupta for copyediting the ªnal draft. 1. Roberts and Parks 2007. 2. Atteridge 2010; Jakobsen 1998; Rajan 1997; Vihma 2011.

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international climate negotiations and deliberations. Interviewees shared their perceptions of the Indian government’s stance on climate negotiations. Their collective responses revealed a strong inºuence of North–South imaginaries in shaping their agreement with the government’s position. This is important in- sofar as the relevance of the North–South binary in global climate politics has been questioned by some critical scholars3 even as others continue to engage with it.4 In the following section, I brieºy describe debates over the North–South framing of global inequality, particularly in the context of global environmental politics.

The North–South Question The term Global South is synonymous with categories such as developing countries or the Third World.5 The North–South terminology gained prominence in the context of proposals for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) during the early 1970s.6 Scholars have problematized the North–South framing of global inequality for several reasons. These include heterogeneities within each category, as well as decreasing gaps between North and South,7 the state- centrism and “Third Worldism” inherent in a North–South framing of global inequality,8 preference for class-based analyses of global inequality,9 and the perceived decline in the legitimacy of the Third World coalition in global politics after the end of the Cold War.10 Toal has argued that “a critical geopolitics is one that refuses the spatial topography of First World and Third World, North and South, state and state.”11 Despite its critics, the North–South geopolitical imagination continues to be regarded as a useful construct, particularly in the domain of environment and development.12 Proponents argue that a North–South framing is a re- minder of the linkages between geopolitics and development,13 and of abiding core–periphery dynamics and imperialism reminiscent of past colonial rela- tionships.14 Contemporary scholars continue to refer to global inequities along

3. E.g., Barnett 2007; Sowers 2007. 4. Najam 2004; Roberts and Parks 2007. 5. Jones 1983; Williams 2005. 6. Bhagwati 1977; Cox 1979; Doty 1996; Jha 1982. 7. Eckl and Weber 2007; McFarlane 2006; Payne 2004; Slater 1997; Therein 1999; Toal 1994. 8. Berger 2004; Dodds 2001; Simon and Dodds 1998; Toal 1994. 9. Barnett 2007; Conca 2001; Newell 2005. 10. Berger 2004; Slater 1997; Therien 1999; Williams 2005. 11. Toal 1994, 231. 12. Simon and Dodds 1998; Slater 1997. 13. Simon and Dodds 1998. 14. Potter 2001; Power 2006; Slater 2004; Slater 2006.

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a North–South divide.15 Many do so implicitly even as they criticize these binaries,16 a phenomenon termed the “paradox of categories.”17 I suggest that the Global South and North need to be understood as ºuid and dynamic categories, rather than being static and ªxed. In light of the heterogeneity of the South, some scholars ªnd it useful to see the Third World not as a monolith that represents a structurally determined political solidarity, but rather as a political entity that ºuctuates between acting in unity and maintain- ing plurality according to the geopolitical context.18 In the context of the ongo- ing dominance of industrialized states in the global political economy,19 the Southern construction allows countries with lesser inºuence to wield increased inºuence in global negotiations.20 Other scholars refer to these categories as imaginaries. They refer to the Global South as an “imagined community of the powerless and vulnerable,”21 in most cases victimized by a colonial and imperial past.22 Despite claims of South-North graduation, scholars caution that such graduation is often partial—usually economic23—and that self-identiªcation with the South arises from “a sense of shared vulnerability and a shared distrust of the prevailing world order rather than a common ordeal of poverty.”24 That such self- identiªcation is little more than ideological posturing by Third World elites is a claim that has yet to be veriªed.25 It is helpful to think of categories not as static “pre-given things-in-the- world” but rather as complex and dynamic entities that political actors continually renegotiate, rearticulate and reproduce amidst power struggles.26 The Global South is one such category, as evident in climate politics. Individuals engaged in policy negotiations and discourses substantiate or deny the North–South binary among countries. Placing such agency on individuals helps us see these categories not as givens, but rather as socially constructed and hence continually rene- gotiated and reproduced. Since the process of categorization is so inherently political,27 it is important to examine how and why these categories are contested by some and defended by others. Yet little if any research exists that examines the role of individuals in reproducing such imaginaries.28 Past research has pro-

15. E.g., Athanasiou 2010; Kapoor 2008; Najam 2004; O’Brien and Leichenko 2003; Potter 2006; Slater 2006. 16. Williams 2005. 17. Jones 2009, 176. 18. Broad and Landi 1996; Williams 2005. 19. Obrien and Leichenko 2003; Therien 1999. 20. Hansen 1980; Williams 2005. 21. Williams 2005, 53. 22. Anand 2004. 23. Hansen 1980. 24. Najam 2004, 128. 25. Roberts and Parks 2007; Williams 2005. 26. Jones 2009, 180. 27. Ibid. 28. Dodds 2001; Williams 2005.

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vided insight into the reproduction of the Third World through the institution- alization of norms in climate negotiations.29 I go beyond this here by also exam- ining how and why the Indian intelligentsia reproduces these binary identities in the context of climate politics.

North–South Environmental Politics The increasing salience of global environmental concerns, and the role of some developing countries in alleviating them, has signiªcantly altered North–South diplomacy, with the South reportedly gaining bargaining power in global environmental politics.30 While some scholars have argued for the continued relevance of the Third World category for global environmental politics from a structuralist perspective,31 of greater relevance for this paper is the discursive construction of the North–South divide. The latter is a key feature of contemporary global environmental negotiations, which in turn has created the space necessary for the reproduction of these spatial imaginaries.32 In global environmental politics, the Group of 77 (G77) plus China is a negotiating entity representing a common developing country position, although occasionally individual countries or subgroups do diverge from this common position.33 The G77 plus China represents, for some, a “new regionalism” that seeks not only to inºuence the North’s environmental and political agenda but also that “the North confront its responsibilities to the wider world.”34 The G77 and China typically represent a distinct set of interests from the North. These include a call to link global environmental concerns with development needs; require ªnancial and technological assistance from the North for environmental programs; capacity building; a longer period for implemen- tation of new regulations,35 and “the question of responsibility for environmental degradation.”36 The UN has institutionalized such concerns and promoted the North–South dichotomy in various global agreements,37 including the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment,38 the 1992 Conference on Environ- ment and Development,39 the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that De- plete the Ozone Layer,40 and most recently, the United Nations Framework Con- vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its successor, the Kyoto Protocol. The UNFCCC, for example, has articulated several principles to guide the

29. Williams 2005. 30. Anand 2004; DeSombre 2002; Dodds 1998; Rajan 1997; Therien 1999; Williams 1993. 31. Miller 2005. 32. Williams 2005. 33. Vihma 2010; Williams 2005. 34. Dodds 1998, 729. 35. Najam 2002; Williams 2005. 36. Dodds 1998, 728. 37. Williams 2005. 38. Conca 2001. 39. DeSombre 2002, 10. 40. Rajan 1997.

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attainment of its overarching objective of GHG stabilization. These allude to, inter alia, concepts of equity, sustainable economic development for developing country parties, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. The text of the convention explicitly notes that “the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs.”41 The Kyoto Protocol, negotiated under the UNFCCC, introduced binding emission reduction targets for Annex I countries, a category of 42 industrialized countries that includes the US, Australia, Japan, Canada, and western European countries.42 Two elements of a North–South dichotomy are clear in this text, ªrst, a clear demarcation between the responsibilities of developed and developing countries, and second, the prioritization of economic growth for the latter. Such articulation of differentiation of responsibilities and capabilities is compatible with the North–South framing championed by scholars who speak of contraction and convergence,43 ecological debt,44 eco-equity45 or ecologically unequal exchange, and climate injustice46 based on disparities at the level of states.

The Spatial Politics of Climate Change Conºicts within G77 and China resulting from differences in levels of development, GHG emissions and extent of vulnerability47 have led some to claim that “(t)he geopolitics of the UNFCCC cannot be explained merely as a matter of the differences between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’.”48 COP-15, for example, saw the emergence of subgroups such as BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China). Some have argued as a result that the raison d’être for the G77 and China has ceased to exist and that climate politics are now characterized by an “‘elephant in the room’—an awkward balance between the political expediencies of alli- ance and the prevalence of multiple voices of self-interest within G77 in the climate debate.”49 Yet reasons for continued solidarity across the Global South still exist. As noted by various scholars, these include, for example, the “unanimity within the G77 on the inadequacy of Northern action on climate change,”50 “the collective

41. UNFCCC 1992, 1, 4. 42. Kyoto Protocol 1998, 9. 43. Agrawal et al. 1999, 2001; Meyer 2004. 44. Martinez-Alier 2002; Srinivasan et al. 2008. 45. Athanasiou 2010. 46. Roberts and Parks 2007. 47. Barnett 2007; Rajan 1997. 48. Barnett 2007, 1367. 49. Vihma 2010, 3. 50. Ibid, 8.

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sense of an “unjust world order”51 as well as “a logic of mutual dependency”52 between the emerging superpower China and the rest of the G77. Others claim that despite internal differences over short-term interests, the G77 and China are united by long-term interests. One key interest is to highlight the historical responsibility of the North for much of the cumulative GHGs in the global at- mospheric commons,53 and to consequently demand that Annex I countries take the lead in accepting aggressive emission reduction targets, while respect- ing the South’s right to development.54 While developing country negotiators seem to accept the inevitability of future commitments for their countries,55 they have consistently resisted dis- cussing mandatory emission targets at negotiations.56 This resistance arises from the conviction that the problem has been caused by the economic growth process of the “early industrializers.”57 Some think that such a reactive approach stems from an intense distrust of the North’s agenda in the negotiations,58 and the latter’s failure to meet past commitments and obligations.59 It is more difªcult to pin down a distinct Northern position in climate negotiations, although increasingly Annex I countries seem committed to including the larger developing countries in a framework of mitigation commitments. US participation is ªrmly predicated on the meaningful participation of the major developing countries, particularly India and China. This has been a key reason for the US reluctance to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,60 also reºecting an increasing insecurity about its status as a global hegemon.61 This position also implicitly questions the validity of a North–South dichotomy in climate negotiations. These negotiations have been characterized in recent years by Annex I countries introducing proposals for differentiation that circumvent the lan- guage of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and by refusing to extend the tenure of the Kyoto Protocol. A number of scholars have dismissed the North–South politics of climate change due in part to the state-centric spatial imaginaries inherent in such cate- gorizations of GHG emissions and impacts of climate change.62 The argument is that the North–South politics of climate change is constrained by a “territorial trap”63 that serves to privilege states as “climate hegemons”—even as their regu-

51. Ibid, 8, 9. 52. Ibid, 2. 53. DeSombre 2002. 54. Barnett 2007; Williams 2005. 55. Agarwal et al. 1999; Bello 2007; Najam et al. 2003. 56. Najam et al. 2003. 57. Williams 2005, 61. 58. Najam et al. 2003; Rajan 1997; Roberts and Parks 2009. 59. DeSombre 2002. 60. Byrd and Hagel 1998. 61. Roberts 2011. 62. Barnett 2007; Newell 2005. 63. Agnew 1994.

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latory power is declining64—while diverting attention away from other important loci of action at smaller scales.65 Other scholars have likewise critiqued the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the UNFCCC for priv- ileging the international scale in assessing vulnerability, responsibility, and capability while ignoring variations within countries.66 The recognition that attributing emissions to corporations/individuals leads to more accurate assessments of responsibility,67 and that differences in aggregated emissions are more pronounced when categorized by wealth rather than states,68 has led scholars to conclude that the spatial politics of climate change are far more complex than simplistic state-centered geopolitical analyses suggest. Yet inter-state disparities should not be entirely dismissed, as climate change creates winners and losers at multiple levels, and the issue of ªnancial compensation renders the choice of scale politically contentious.69 While critical scholars are understandably concerned about sociopolitical and ecological vulnerabilities to climate change at individual and community scales, they need to be wary of falling into the trap of assuming that attending to these more inti- mate scales is necessarily more effective.70 Focusing exclusively on smaller scales of action may lead to a trend akin to the individualization of environmental responsibility71 at the risk of ignoring structural constraints on effective climate mitigation at larger scales. Scholars have therefore argued that the role of the state in mitigating and adapting to climate change cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.72 Negotiations under the UNFCCC occur between representatives of states as Parties to the Convention.73 Consequently, for the purposes of this article, although I agree that the impacts of climate change will be felt differently within states, I undertake a state-centric examination of climate negotiations because pervasive differences exist at this scale, and because only states can negotiate and making binding commitments under the UNFCCC.

India’s Role in the North–South Politics of Climate Negotiations India has played a key role in the North–South politics of climate negotiations. The Indian government was instrumental in developing a common position for the South as the representative for G77 and China during the 1992 UN Confer- ence on Environment and Development that produced landmark documents

64. Conca 2001. 65. Barnett 2007, 1372; Haas 2008. 66. Liverman 2009; O’Brien and Leichenko 2003, 99. 67. Barnett 2007. 68. Baer et al. 2009; Leichenko and O’Brien 2008. 69. O’Brien and Leichenko 2003. 70. Brown and Purcell 2005. 71. Maniates 2001. 72. Biermann and Dingwerth 2004. 73. DeSombre 2002.

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such as Agenda 21 and the UNFCCC.74 In climate negotiations, Indian negotiators have been instrumental in establishing the CBDR principle and in inserting statements in negotiating texts that attribute historic responsibility for emissions of GHGs to developed countries.75 Indian positions in a range of global environmental negotiations have been remarkably consistent in emphasizing issues of state sovereignty, and need for enhancing North–South economic equity and power in international affairs.76 The Indian position is typically compatible with Third World/Southern interests, and it is not surprising to see India referred to as a leading member of this coalition.77 India’s championing of the North–South frame of reference is particularly intriguing given that its place in the Global South is increasingly questioned.78 Currently classiªed as a non-Annex I country under the Kyoto Protocol and therefore exempt from mandatory commitments to reduce GHGs, India has recently come under substantial pressure to accept ambitious GHG reduction plans. Indian ofªcials and negotiators have consistently resisted these pressures. A 2009 study of domestic climate politics in India called the country’s characterization as a major emitter unfair, given the development challenges it faces. It categorized Indian sentiment around climate debates into three group- ings: growth-ªrst stonewallers, progressive realists and progressive internation- alists,79 revealing a fair amount of divergence and discord within the domestic discourse on climate policy. Such divisions appear to persist given recent events where the MOEF and the Planning Commission diverged on their approach to determining the nation’s climate policy.80 Yet in terms of the representation of India’s national position in international climate negotiations, there has been a consistent position spearheaded by the MOEF and the PMCCC. Another study of India’s participation in international climate negotiations has noted that India has moved away from its traditional defensive neo- colonial rhetoric to a more proactive internationalist approach in climate negotiations since 2007.81 The author attributes this in part to the fact that the climate discourse is expanding beyond a handful of inºuential agencies, namely MOEF, CSE and TERI; as well as the formation of the PMCCC and the appoint- ment of Jairam Ramesh as MOEF minister,82 although India’s Prime Minister soon replaced Ramesh owing in part to his approach to environmental policy.83 My interviews with key Indian negotiators and ofªcials from MOEF, TERI,

74. Jakobsen 1998. 75. Ibid. 76. Rajan 1997. 77. Ibid. 78. E.g., Khor 2007; Sowers 2007. 79. Dubash 2009. 80. Nitin Sethi, “Environment ministry writes to plan panel, asks it to rework climate change chap- ter.” The Times of India, August 24, 2012. 81. Vihma 2011. 82. Jakobsen 1998; Rajan 1997. 83. Priscilla Jebaraj, “The Jairam brand of governance moves from Environment to Rural Develop- ment.” The Hindu, July 13, 2011.

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CSE, and other Indian institutions revealed a strong conviction that India should be exempt from emission targets. Even the few respondents who felt that the gravity of the impending climate crisis might necessitate that all countries undertake mitigation measures were hesitant to agree to absolute emission targets for India in light of development concerns. Consequently India seems un- willing to budge from its basic original positions, as its participation in current climate negotiations and national-level debates continue to reveal. The following sections reveal the extent to which India’s position in contemporary negotiations to mitigate climate change are inºuenced by the strong- hold of North–South imaginaries, notwithstanding academic critiques of this framing or observations of the country’s growing economic might. To summa- rize, the North–South imaginaries are perpetuated in two ways: one, by insisting that despite its growing economic prowess, India still clearly belongs in the Global South; and two, by upholding the legitimacy of the distinction between North and South institutionalized as Annex I/non-Annex I in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.

Self-Identiªcation with the Global South All my respondents unºinchingly referred to India as a developing country, often comparing India to the US or the Global North. Questions about calls for differentiation and India’s portrayal as an emerging economy were typically met with disbelief bordering on indignation: “It is absolutely ridiculous that countries of this position should take on commitments as countries like Japan. This is protectionism disguised as climate change concern.”84 Countries with higher GDP such as Singapore, South Korea, and the Maldives were summoned in efforts to demonstrate the heterogeneity of the Global South, and the implausi- bility of singling out India and China as emerging economies. Some suggested that India and China get picked on because of their size and population, despite their relatively lower per capita emissions. Respondents often cited statistics on low-income levels and lack of access to energy sources to justify India’s categorization as a developing country. De- spite its image as an emerging power: “the ground realities say developed and developing countries are different. And when I say developing country I still consider India and China [a] developing country.”85 The argument was that In- dia’s limited resources have to be prioritized for more pressing ecological secu- rity and development needs and not for climate mitigation.86 Interviewees noted that India’s Human Development Index ranking is 119th of 169 countries, with 41.6 percent of the Indian population living under the income poverty line of US$1.25 a day in the period 2000–2008.87 India’s portrayal as an

84. Author’s interview with Secretary, MOEF, Delhi, December 30, 2008. 85. Author’s interview with Dr. Pradipto Ghosh, Distinguished Fellow, TERI, Member, PMCCC, Ne- gotiator, Delhi, December 22, 2008. 86. Author’s interview with Deputy Secretary, MOEF, Delhi, January 6, 2009. 87. 2010 UNDP Human Development Report.

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emerging economy was thus perceived to be misleading and falsely constructed: “Anyone who says that there is no North and South, is basically reading too much of international press, which basically show that India and China are going to overtake the western world.”88 In addition, although these countries’ current and projected future emissions are substantial, respondents argued that their historical emissions were meager. Respondents also viewed motives behind proposals for differentiation with intense suspicion, as a delaying tactic for Northern action and a divide- and-conquer strategy. According to one negotiator: “We feel that the Annex I parties are not pursuing an honest environmental agenda. We believe that they are pursuing an economic agenda, and a strategic agenda, in the guise of an environmental agenda.”89 Respondents saw the US and Japan as Parties most keen to blur the developed/developing distinctions by highlighting China and India as major emitters. They perceived their push for differentiation to be motivated by economic motives, as emission targets for these emerging economies would force their industries to adopt American and Japanese patent-protected technol- ogies. They also saw differentiation as a way to diffuse the threat from emerging economies as it was easier to “separate them and deal with them separately.”90

North–South Inequities in the Global Economy My interviews also revealed a strong perception that developing countries were marginalized in global economic and environmental affairs. Many saw climate change as an opportunity to challenge the status quo of the prevailing world order: “Climate is a classic case of equalization in the world—economic equalization, which I don’t think Northern countries are willing to reconcile.”91 Respon- dents noted that the rising GDPs of some developing countries were insufªcient to obliterate their subservient relationship vis-à-vis the North, as Northern corporations still owned most of the polluting industries therein92 and imported most of the products and services that countries such as India produced.93 Since these countries were still in a relatively weak position in the global economy, they were entitled to differential treatment in international negotiations, to avoid exacerbating current levels of global inequality.94 In addition to differences in development between the Global North and South, respondents saw the South as more vulnerable to climate change. A key climate negotiator argued that development was important not only to alleviate

88. Author’s interview with Chandra Bhushan, Associate Director, CSE, Delhi, December 23, 2008. 89. Author’s interview with Dr. Pradipto Ghosh, Delhi, December 22, 2008. 90. Author’s interview with Prabhat Upadhyay, Research Associate, TERI, Delhi, December 22, 2008. 91. Author’s interview with Chandra Bhushan, CSE, Delhi, December 23, 2008. 92. Author’s interview with environmental reporter, Delhi, December 31, 2008. 93. Author’s interview with Shirish Sinha, Head, Climate Change and Energy Programme, WWF- India, Delhi, December 19, 2008. 94. Author’s interview with Dr. Kamal Mitra Chenoy, JNU Professor/environmental activist, Delhi, December 30, 2008.

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poverty but also to enhance the state’s capacity and capability for adaptation to climate change. He argued that for a developing country such as India, adaptation should be a higher priority than mitigation.95 When asked about the growing income and vulnerability gaps within India, many were defensive: “How countries address their problems is the sover- eign right of a country. That has got nothing to do with negotiations.”96 My respondents were convinced that there could be no comparison between the poor in India and the poor in the US, or between the numbers of rich in the two countries and the emissions thereof.97 One respondent alluded to the hypocrisy of emphasizing disparities within India, when disparities between countries didn’t receive similar attention.98 In response to the argument that Indian elites were hiding behind the poor,99 several interviewees retorted that Annex I countries were instead hiding behind the emerging economies. Heterogeneity in country emissions, vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities within the South thus took a back seat in the broader context of a sense of marginalization and difference vis-à-vis the North. Some respondents pointed out that government of- ªcials in Delhi were representing Indian citizens, including those most vulnerable to climate change, and thus were answerable to them. If the government accepted a binding emission reduction commitment at this time, “it [would] be thrown out the next day.”100 The point was that although India may have income inequalities and those representing India at international negotiations may be the country’s elite, they still represented the needs and interests of the country’s poor that constitute the majority of the population.

Perceptions of the US or Annex I in Deªning India’s Identity Most respondents defended India’s identity as a developing country by pointing out how different it was from developed countries: “When I say India is a developing country, I say that people have still not got the very basic things which are taken for granted in developed countries—education, right to health, shelter, basic necessities like food.”101 He added that developed countries are much more ªnancially capable of attending to the needs of their poorest citizens. Even if India’s economy were booming in certain areas, it could not compare with the developed world in technological prowess or economic status, especially in per capita terms.102 Moreover, despite such comparisons, some wanted to emphasize that India wasn’t aspiring to be like the US. Invoking Gandhi, they empha-

95. Author’s interview with Dr. Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, Distinguished Fellow, TERI, Negotia- tor, Delhi, January 2, 2009. 96. Author’s interview with MOEF Deputy Secretary, Delhi, January 6, 2009. 97. Author’s interview with Dr. Kamal Chenoy, Delhi, December 30, 2008. 98. Author’s interview with environmental reporter, Delhi, December 31, 2008. 99. Ananthapadmanabhan 2007. 100. Author’s interview with Dr. Kamal Chenoy, Delhi, December 30, 2008. 101. Author’s interview with Prabhat Upadhyaya, TERI, Delhi, December 22, 2008. 102. Author’s interview with Greenpeace India representative, Delhi, December 26, 2008.

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sized the difference between luxury emissions and subsistence emissions, under which category India’s emissions would fall. One interviewee compared India and the US in terms of human equality (or lack thereof):

You either have a concept of every citizen is equal, or they’re not. Or there is some amount of difference that you agree. Then you need to admit to that, that an average US citizen is at a different level than an average Indian citizen.. . . But, the entire convention is based on the fact that every citizen is equal. Everyone’s right should be protected by each and every government, internationally and nationally.103 Most interviewees also brought up unfulªlled Annex I commitments in meeting agreed-upon targets and in delivering the promised ªnancial and technological support. A strong perception of the Annex I inability or unwillingness to fulªll its historical responsibilities enshrined in previous agreements contrib- uted to a strong conviction about the continued validity of the Global South categorization. The fact that the most powerful economy and biggest culprit, the US, was dragging its feet in taking on ambitious emissions targets, suggested that for developing countries, including India, this was not a feasible goal. If Annex I countries had made a genuine effort to meet their obligations, the pressure on India to accept more mitigation responsibilities would have been more credible: “I think India is sitting pretty right now because it has a very easy thing to throw back at their face saying, you know, but you had the ªrst phase of Kyoto to prove yourselves. Now if you haven’t done so much, how do you expect anyone else to do anything?”104 India’s position is therefore consid- ered safe because of Annex I inaction. Yet many also pointed out that, unlike the US, India was taking responsibility according to its capabilities, as evidenced by domestic investments in alternative energy projects. Irrespective of other states’ inaction, most interviewed argued that India should undertake mitigation actions voluntarily, but that it should not commit to mandatory targets unless all players did, and unless it received technological and ªnancial support.

Deference to the UNFCCC’s Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities A reinforcement of India’s identity as a developing country is accompanied by a keen interest in upholding the UNFCCC as an almost sacred text. Because this text was the outcome of intense negotiations, respondents viewed efforts to challenge or question it with suspicion and frustration. One negotiator emphat- ically defended the convention thus: “In negotiations, what matters is the mandate. The mandate has made this categorical distinction of Annex I and non- Annex I. In international negotiations we can’t say whatever we like, we have to

103. Author’s interview with environmental reporter, Delhi, December 31, 2008. 104. Ibid.

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go by the mandate.”105 Another vehemently defended the UN’s binary categories thus:

(sounding irked) Why the differentiation ªrst of all? You see, there are two categories of countries: Annex I and non-Annex I, which in the convention itself, we had agreed in 1992 that there are only two groups. Those who are listed as countries in Annex I, and those who are not listed. Either you are a developed country or you are a developing country. There is no need to create any further categories of countries. And the UN system does not recog- nize it.106

One respondent argued that there was not enough time to discuss a new arrangement based on differential levels of development: “It took 15 years to work this one out, I don’t think we can wait for another new convention to work out a new basis.”107 Most importantly, a negotiator clariªed that the differential responsibilities arose from a historically contingent context rather than level of development of countries: “The Annex I/non-Annex I distinction has noth-

ing to do with developed/developing, but with levels of CO2 emissions in the 1990s.”108 Respondents frequently brought up the CBDR principle enshrined in the UNFCCC, which acknowledges the right of developing countries to increase their share of emissions. Similarly, the Kyoto Protocol and Bali Action Plan (BAP) received tremendous support among interviewees. The Kyoto Protocol has legally binding targets for Annex I countries, and the BAP has secured a commitment from these countries to ªnancially and technologically support nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) adopted voluntarily by non- Annex I countries. Efforts to deviate from these earlier agreements were tanta- mount, many argued, to “going back on their word, which is completely inap- propriate in international relations.”109 Most respondents acknowledged that India should pursue domestic mitigation actions as per NAMA, but were insis- tent that these should be outside the purview of international monitoring, reporting and veriªcation (MRV), unless accompanied by ªnancial and technological transfers. The compromise to permit MRV and set aside national sovereignty concerns in the context of funded projects was already a break from In- dia’s traditional stance.110 Developments in Cancun in 2010 when Jairam Ramesh supported international MRV in the absence of ªnancial support were perceived as a transgression from this stance.111 The negotiators interviewed were adamant that talk about commitments from non-Annex I countries at the COP-15 was misplaced and emphasized that

105. Author’s interview with Dr. Pradipto Ghosh, Delhi, December 22, 2008. 106. Author’s interview with Dr. S. K. Sharma, Advisor, MOEF, Delhi, December 30, 2008. 107. Author’s interview with Shirish Sinha, WWF, Delhi, December 19, 2008. 108. Author’s interview with Dr. Pradipto Ghosh, Delhi, December 22, 2008. 109. Author’s interview with Chandra Bhushan, CSE, Delhi, December 23, 2008. 110. Author’s interview with environmental reporter, Delhi, December 31, 2008. 111. CSE press release, email received on December 9, 2010.

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the purpose of the negotiations in Copenhagen was to discuss Annex I commitments for the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol.11 2 However, the negotiations would take a different turn in Copenhagen: “The result was the now infamous Copenhagen Accord, which aims at changing the terms of the framework convention by removing the distinction between the developed and developing. Under this deal, the concept of historical emissions has to be set aside. All past records of pollution, of say the US, would be wiped clean.”11 3 Narain feared that acceptance of the Copenhagen Accord would obliterate the distinction between “countries that created the problem and so must take the ªrst step to cut emissions—create ecological space—and countries that still need that space to grow. All of us will be equal in the world of polluters. Since developing countries such as India are now growing in terms of emissions, the heat will be on them. The burden of a costly transition will shift to the developing world.”11 4 This concern reºects fears that the growing emphasis on current and future contributions to GHG emissions risks ignoring historical emissions. The Annex I/non-Annex I distinction institutionalized in the UNFCCC serves as a re- minder of this difference and continues to be seen as valid, particularly because Annex I countries have not met their obligations for reducing emissions and enabling ªnancial and technological transfers.

Historical Responsibility The science of climate change acknowledges the role of cumulative GHG emissions in contributing to global warming. Despite acknowledging India’s growing economy and resultant emissions proªle, most of my respondents shared a strong conviction that India had a much lower historical responsibility for contributing to climate change than Annex I countries:

As far as Southern negotiators are concerned, they very strongly believe that the problem has been created by the developed world. And historical emissions, they are very strong on this. From the Southern perspective it is very clear, in saying that, the problem has been created by you, you have not achieved even the modest target, given by Kyoto Protocol. Now you are ask- ing us to reduce. What right do you have, to ask us to reduce? So that is the Southern perspective. It’s a very clear politics.11 5

It was infuriating to many I spoke with that developed countries had not acknowledged the fact that they had created the problem. Even if they did accept this, they might feign ignorance: “They might say that we didn’t know that global warming is happening, which I ªnd completely fallacious. Simply because from 1950 onwards there was very clear scientiªc evidence that carbon di-

112. Author’s interview with MOEF ofªcial, Delhi, December 30, 2008. 113. Sunita Narain, “Politics of Climate Change.” The Tribune, July 12, 2010, 9. 114. Fortnightly News Bulletin, CSE, May 2010. 115. Author’s interview with Chandra Bhushan, CSE, Delhi, December 23, 2008.

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oxide levels are increasing. And when the UNFCCC process started from 1989 we had the platform. There was a very clear indication.”11 6 This lack of ownership of causality was evident in Yvo De Boer’s address at the ªnal plenary at COP-15, where he dismissed the notion of historical responsibility, encouraging Parties to instead focus on capabilities.11 7 This is probably by far the starkest distinction between a Northern and a Southern position on climate debates. While discourses about emerging economies are focused on the rising capabilities of certain developing countries, these countries are un- willing to let go of the importance of historical responsibility, and see the two as equally important aspects of a fair climate treaty. The conviction that Annex I countries have a historical responsibility to mitigate climate change therefore strongly inºuences the positions taken by Southern climate negotiators, as also revealed by my respondents.

Understanding India’s Representation of the North–South Dichotomy in Climate Politics There are two aspects—one material and the other discursive—that are important to highlight about the Indian intelligentsia’s representation of the North– South dichotomy in climate politics. In the material realm, India faces a number of development challenges that contradict its portrayal as an emerging global power. These development challenges include widespread lack of access to energy and other basic services, as well as the need to enhance capabilities for climate adaptation. These priorities compete with demands increasingly placed on India to accept greater responsibilities to mitigate climate change through acceptance of a binding emission cap. In this context of mitigation commitments, Indian ofªcials have been consistently demanding that any mitigation measures they adopt should be volun- tary and aligned with their country’s capabilities. As India’s placement in the non-Annex I group supports the avoidance of a binding commitment to reduce emissions, it is not surprising that there is overwhelming domestic support for the categories of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and for these agreements. The categories Annex I and non-Annex I are historically contingent, and were determined according to the emission levels of states in the early 1990s when the UNFCCC was negotiated. Much has changed since then, and India is now increasingly portrayed as an emerging economy as well as the third largest emitter of total global emissions. These more recent developments have given scholars and negotiators—particularly those based in the US—reason to question whether India still ªts into the traditional understanding of a developing country. As Indian ofªcials anxiously struggle to argue that India is still a develop-

116. Ibid. 117. Author’s participant observation, COP-15, Copenhagen, December 18, 2009.

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ing country with immense poverty and energy needs to address, they are not entirely successful in addressing the contradictions posed by its growing economy and global prowess. Despite its low per capita GDP and low per capita emissions, India’s categorization as a developing country—as traditionally understood—has come under scrutiny, and justiªably so. Given challenges to the North–South categorization and the apparent cultural parallax11 8 between those who argue for and against it, it might serve India well to emphasize the less ºuid categories Annex I and non-Annex I in the forthcoming negotiations process, with the understanding that these categories are subject to change over time. While the validity of the structuralist categories North and South can be challenged, the discursive construction of these categories are equally (if not more) important and interesting in the climate negotiations. I have argued that India’s self-identiªcation as a developing country or with the imaginary of the Global South is a key feature of its climate politics. This self-identiªcation is enabled or motivated by a number of factors. One is a keen sense of marginalization in the global economic order and difference in levels of development vis-à-vis the North, as represented by the political, economic, and cultural hegemony of the US, although some scholars argue this is on the decline in the face of China’s ascendancy.11 9 The roots of a North–South global politics go back to the NIEO era. Although the proposal never came to fruition, the desire to subvert the North–South status quo has persisted. The prospect of a global ecological crisis that requires the cooperation of the Global South has enabled the resurgence of concerns over North–South inequities. Consequently, international distributive justice has been a key aspect of North–South environmental politics, reºected in the South’s claims to development and emphasis on holding the North accountable for contemporary environmental crises.120 India’s participation in the climate negotiations needs to be looked at in this historical context. Indian negotiators see the global climate negotiations as an opportunity to use their growing negotiating power to reduce such inequities. The use of the North–South imaginary is itself a signiªcant contributor to this enhanced negotiating advantage. The historical responsibility of Annex I countries for climate change—not yet addressed fully—is another strong contributor to the abiding imaginary of the Global South. The US, in particular, has been the greatest contributor to greenhouse gases in terms of both total cumulative emissions and per capita emissions. Indian contributions pale in comparison. The fact that Annex I countries have not stepped up to the plate and shown leadership in mitigation efforts renders it premature and therefore unfair for the rest (including India) to step up. These two factors coupled with perceived differences in vulnerability and adaptive capacity contribute to bolstering the imaginaries of a stark North–

118. Nabhan 1998, 266. 119. Roberts 2011. 120. Conca and Dabelko 2010.

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South divide in contributions to climate change, notwithstanding the reality of a growing global middle class.121 As some have indicated,122 Annex I acceptance of accountability for historical emissions will go far in enabling the currently disgruntled statespersons of the South to see beyond this imaginary and engage in a constructive process of identifying emissions targets based on evolving conditions. Following Doty (1996) and Jones (2009), I suggest in conclusion that the Global North and Global South are discursively reproduced and contested categories in global politics. From a structuralist standpoint, the validity of these categories has been long and fruitfully debated. Nevertheless, it is important to examine the politics of the representational practices that actors in climate negotiations engage in. By discursively reproducing the controversial North–South binary in global environmental politics, Indian actors are clearly engaging in a representational practice123 in efforts to highlight the historical responsibility of the North for the climate crisis. By doing so, they embody a key Southern interest and strategic essentialism124 of the function of the Global South125 in distin- guishing India’s position in climate politics from that of the Global North, exempliªed by the US. Lastly, India’s discursive representation of North–South climate politics suggests that scholars critical of the North–South framing cannot afford to simply dismiss it as an outdated binary in favor of class-centric analyses. Rather, there is an urgent need for an intersectional approach that analyses the linkages between state-centric and class-based examinations of global inequality in the context of climate politics. While critical scholars may desire sophisticated analyses that move beyond simplistic binaries and avoid the territorial trap of state- centrism, there is an immediate need to address emission targets for states, as they are the main entities participating in global climate negotiations.

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