volume. Much of it is a restatement of what the translation says, with little added deptn or breadth. On the other hand, von Loewe is too often silent on topics that need elucida- tion. For example, many slaves were classified as immovable property (IV: 0, V[8]7), a distinction that is relatively rare and should have been discussed. Von Loewe interpolates (VI: [12]11) that a debtor whose estate cannot. satisfy his obligations "[is left at the mercy of the creditor]." Does that mean that the creditor could seize a landholder and enslave him? The Lithuanian form of subinfeudation (III: 15) passes without comment, as does the -apparent fact that a man could have four or more marriages, in spite of church law (IV:14). "Punishment by fire" is specified for some crimes (for example, forgery, 1:5). Did that mean that the felon was branded, burned on the skin some place, or placed on a pyre and burned alive? Where did the practice come from? Was it ever effected? The Statute required the ruler to pledge to expand his domain (III:2), a remark- able built-in dynamic for expansion that should be viewed in light of the size Lithuania had attained by 1529, in general a subject deserving of a lengthy essay. Would it not have been worthy of a comment that West Russian judges could use their own judgment in the absence of clear precedent (VI: [26]25), completely unlike Muscovite officials? The Glossary (largely adapted from the 1960 Minsk edition) is useful, but incomplete (where is, for example, samosud?). The Bibliogarphy is a good beginning guide for some- one else interested in the subject. There can be no question that Mr. von Loewe labored mightily on this project, and certainly its inadequacies are at least as much attributable to those whose help is ac- knowledged in the Preface. It is sad that the group did not leave a more satisfactory monument, and that the Brill series editors were not more helpful both to their author and their press.

Richard Hellie University of Chicago

R. G. Skrynnikov. Boris Godunov. Moscow: Izdatel'sto Nauka, 1978. 192 pp. 70 kopecks.

Professor R. G. Skrynnikov received a well-deserved first prize from his institution, Leningrad State University, for his three interrelated scholarly books, Nachalo oprich- niny, Oprichnyi terror, and Rossiia posle oprichniny, which broke new ground and have become indispensible for those who work in sixteenth-century Russian history. He was asked to contribute to a "scientific-popular" series of paperbacks (something we could well do with here) that enjoys wide circulation and appreciation in the Soviet Union. He obliged with Ivan Groznyi and the present volume. Both tell their stories in a straightfor- ward accessible manner which belies the profound research that went into them. Boris Godunov is divided into thirteen chapters which follow their protagonist's ca- reer. Disposing of legends that Boris was of Tatar origin and illiterate, Skrynnikov points out that the comparative obscurity of the Godunov family presaged its rise: it was pre- cisely such people Ivan the Terrible desired to recruit for his service in order to counter- balance the power of the great boiars he mistrusted. The Godunov family was thus an ex- clusive product of the Oprichnina milieu, and one of the very few that successfully sur- vived the vicissitudes of that institution. Skrynnikov emphasizes that pedigree, in its man- ifestation of precedence (mestnichestvo), remained of supreme importance in assignment of office since, contrary to many opinions, the Oprichnina had not eradicated the influ- ence of the great boiar families; thus Boris, very much a novus homo, was fortunate that his sister Irina had married Tsar Fedor, thereby enabling him to secure ascendancy over the weak-minded ruler. Skrynnikov brings out the importance of rumor during Boris' entire administration, and this consideration leads him to assign considerable significance to the Uglich affair of 1591. Tsarevich Dmitrii killed himself in an epileptic fit. Boris had nothing to do with it, and in fact found it disadvantageous to his interests because it led to the circulation of hostile rumors concerning his imperial ambitions at an awkward juncture. Skrynnikov believes that Boris' position as regent satisfied him; it was not until approximately 1595 that he seriously thought of becoming tsar and began to feud with old associates in prep- aration for the struggle that was bound to ensue when the childless Fedor died. One chapter focuses on social developments, especially the growth of serfdom. Ivan the Terrible wrought great havoc among the lower strata of the population, but he never abrogated the time-honored right of peasant removal known as St. George's Day. By the statute he issued in Fedor's name in 1597 Boris must bear responsibility for its final re- vocation. Skrynnikov does not, however, belong to the juridical school; he envisages a gradual process, which began as an attempt to recoup the losses the fisc had sustained during Ivan's reign, until Boris, determined to become tsar, recognized that enserfment would win him gentry support. But he reaped the whirlwind. The expansion of serfdom inflamed the people; and, as a later chapter demonstrates, his efforts to extend the sys- tem to the Cossacks of the Periphery ignited a powder keg. Skrynnikov has an original section on the culminating event of Boris' career-his adroit manouevres successfully to put together the coalition of forces overcoming the great boiars (and the entrenched prejudices of the time) which formally elected him tsar in 1598. One is struck by the paradox that Boris had to devote so much of his proven skill and ability to achieving what others of far lesser capacity had assumed by virtue of the accident of their birth. Even after his coronation Boris knew he had to compromise with the great boiar families, and did so by restoring their contemporary representatives to positions their houses had not held since 1564. Boris should not, as he often has been, be compared with Ivan. His was no capricious reign of terror; his repressions were motivated by specific political considerations and di- rected against particular individuals, whom, in most cases, he merely demoted or ban- ished. His concerted attack on the Romanov family might seem to be an exception, but a logical explanation exists. It is often forgotten that Boris' health was chronically poor, and he became so ill in 1600 that persistent rumors concerning his imminent demise found credence. His moves against the Romanov family were thus dictated by his desire to protect his new unstable dynasty from those who theoretically held a stronger claim to the throne. Other leading boiars helped him because they had old scores of their own to settle. Boris desired to reconstruct many areas of Muscovite life. He had a passion for build- ing and did much to beautify Moscow. He was fully aware of the importance of ties with the West and, anticipating Peter the Great by more than a century, was the first ruler to send young Russians abroad for study. He planned, but could not realize, a system of lower schools and even thought of a university. Boris, whose opponents even testified to his capacities and qualities, was an unlucky man. No sooner had he managed to consolidate his position than natural disaster over- whelmed Russia. A protracted cold spell destroyed the harvests, and famine stalked the land. Boris did what he could to alleviate suffering, but failed to secure the cooperation he needed. Much has been made of the statutes of 1601-02, which seemed to reinstate the rights of St. George's Day; but, as Skrynnikov indicates, it is easy to exaggerate their significance, for their provisions were restrictive. The estates of the mighty in central Rus- sia were exempted, as Boris could not afford to alienate his most influential subjects. He was not the champion of the middle service gentry, as he has sometimes been portrayed. Skrynnikov devotes a detailed chapter to Grigorii Otrep'ev, whom he unequivocally terms the first False Dmitrii. No nonentity, Otrep'ev was a person of remarkable attain- ments, as well as a consummate opportunist and adventurer. On Skrynnikov's showing, Otrep'ev's own contributions to Boris' and Russia's catastrophe were minimal. From the