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UKRAINE MEDIA PROJECT (U-Media) ANNUAL REPORT October 1, 2013 – September 30, 2014 USAID Cooperative Agreement No. AID-121-A-11-00002 WAYNE SHARPE CHIEF OF PARTY Josh Machleder, Vice President, Europe, Eurasia, and Asia Programs Internews Network www.internews.org 1640 Rhode Island Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 Phone: +1 202 833-5740, Fax: +1 202 833-5745 E-mail: [email protected] SUBMITTED: SEPTEMBER 30, 2014 Page 1 Ukraine Media Project USAID Cooperative Agreement No. AID-121-A-11-00002 Annual Report October 1, 2013 – September 30, 2014 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acronyms ................................................................................................................................................ 3 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 4 Approach to Implementation ................................................................................................................ 7 Media Environment ............................................................................................................................. 11 The Information War 13 Attacks on the Press 14 Key Activities and Results in Response to the Latest Challenges ................................................... 19 The EuroMaidan Protests 19 The Russian Annexation of Crimea 23 The Separatist Conflict in the East of Ukraine 24 East-West talks about Elections and EU integration 29 Key Activities and Results by Objective ............................................................................................ 34 Objective 1: Support and Promote Freedom of Speech and Media Independence 34 Objective 2: Increase Variety of News Sources and Improve News Quality 35 Objective 3: Improve the Enabling Environment for Media and Freedom of Speech 36 Objective 4: Improve Organizational capacity of Ukrainian Media CSOs 40 Media Research .................................................................................................................................... 43 Communication & Coordination ........................................................................................................ 45 Challenges ............................................................................................................................................. 50 Other Activities .................................................................................................................................... 52 Attachment 1: List of Sub-Grants ...................................................................................................... 56 Attachment 3: Volyn Press Club’s Gender Alphabet for Ukrainian Media………………59 Page 2 Ukraine Media Project USAID Cooperative Agreement No. AID-121-A-11-00002 Annual Report October 1, 2013 – September 30, 2014 Acronyms Acronyms AUP NGO Academy of Ukrainian Press (www.aup.com.ua) CSO Civil Society Organization CUA United Action Center UA CURE Center for Ukrainian Reform Education (www.cure.org.ua) DG Democracy and Governance EC European Commission EU European Union GoU Government of Ukraine IAB Independent Association of Broadcasters (http://www.nam.org.ua/) IMI NGO Institute of Mass Information (http://imi.org.ua/) IMTUU Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine (http://nmpu.org.ua/) IPC NGO Information Press Center (http://www.ipc.crimea.ua/) IR Investigative Reporting IUA NGO Internews Ukraine (http://www.internews.ua) IWP Institute for World Policy (http://iwp.org.ua) LCD Local Capacity Development LPC NGO Lviv Press Club (http://pressclub.lviv.ua/) MLI NGO Media Law Institute (http://www.medialaw.kiev.ua/) PACT Implementer of UNITER program (www.pactworld.org) PMEP Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Plan RPDI NGO Regional Press Development Institute (http://www.irrp.org.ua/) SF “Suspilnist” (Society) Foundation TK NGO Telekritika (www.telekritika.ua) UAPP Ukrainian Association of Press Publishers (http://www.uapp.org/) U-Media Ukraine Media Project (previously the Strengthening Independent Media in Ukraine program) (www.umedia.kiev.ua) USAID US Agency for International Development Page 3 Ukraine Media Project USAID Cooperative Agreement No. AID-121-A-11-00002 Annual Report October 1, 2013 – September 30, 2014 Introduction Internews is pleased to submit the Ukraine Media Project (U-Media) annual report for October 1, 2013 to September 30, 2014. The Ukraine Media Project was awarded by USAID to Internews in August 2011 and launched on October 1, 2011. The Ukraine Media project follows the eight-year USAID media support program, Strengthening Independent Media in Ukraine, also known as U-Media and implemented by Internews. U-Media is implemented according to the following program objectives: 1. Support and Promote Freedom of Speech and Media Independence; 2. Increase the Variety of News Sources and Improve News Quality; 3. Improve the Enabling Environment for Media and Freedom of Speech; and 4. Improve Organizational Capacity of Ukrainian Media CSOs. Internews would like to highlight key accomplishments for the reporting period: The Suspilnist Foundation, in tandem with First National channel, organized a series of “Debates are important because televised presidential candidate debates in the they train candidates to be lead-up to the May 25 presidential elections. accountable before they are elected. Debates are the point Suspilnist negotiated cooperation with several where the accountability starts.” media NGOs (Internews Ukraine, Center UA, Mustafa Nayem, journalist and Hromadske.TV, and the Media Law Institute) to founder of Hromadske.TV produce a nationally broadcast debate with an additional interactive component via its online network of university groups throughout Ukraine. From May 9 to May 23, this group broadcast seven debates featuring three candidates each to a national audience on the state TV network, with a peak single night audience of 1.5 million viewers. When Ukrainian TV companies in the eastern part of the country started experiencing threats in April because of the escalating conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Internews performed physical security audits at five regional broadcasters at the request of the Independent Association of Broadcasters (IAB) in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, and Odesa. Internews’ Director of Operational Security conducted the audits; he addressed lapses in newsroom safety and provided recommendations for necessary improvements. One station, UNION in Donetsk, was overrun by separatist forces soon after; there were no casualties in the attack, but the UNION journalists were forced to either leave the station or broadcast the propaganda of the Donetsk Peoples’ Republic (DNR). After these assessments, IAB assisted the regional broadcasters to apply to the Emergency Assistance program of Freedom House, a fund designed to support physical security improvements for media at risk. In the summer of 2014, the Independent Association of Broadcasters (IAB) launched a program to find new employment for the scores of media professionals who were forced to leave eastern Ukraine and Crimea due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the escalation of Page 4 Ukraine Media Project USAID Cooperative Agreement No. AID-121-A-11-00002 Annual Report October 1, 2013 – September 30, 2014 the military conflict in the east. A section of the IAB website (http://nam.org.ua/main/media- vakansiyi20/) lists announcements of job offers from both national and regional media companies targeted at internally displaced journalists. On March 27, 2014, the Ukrainian parliament approved \draft law #0947, “On Amendments to the Laws of Ukraine due to the Adoption of the Law on Information (new edition) and the Law on Access to Public Information.” The Media Law Institute and Telekritika, both U-Media partners, along with the Stop Censorship! Movement, pushed for these amendments since the Law on Access to Public Information was first passed in 2011. The bill provides amendments to four codes and 53 laws of Ukraine; the amendments increase citizens’ access to information over a wide range of government activity, including state and local budgets, salaries of civil servants, and municipal construction plans. The bill also introduces fines for officials who instigate the “unwarranted attribution of information as confidential, failure to respond to information requests, unlawful refusal and failure to provide information, untimely or incomplete provision of information, and provision of false information.” The law was signed by then President Oleksandr Turchynov and went into effect on April 17, 2014. In response to the increase in physical attacks on journalists and more frequent hacker attacks on news websites, Internews conducted two two-day physical and digital security trainings in late March and early April for 89 journalists from various regions. The journalists learned how to avoid and escape dangerous situations while covering civil unrest while also learning the basics of safe online and mobile communication. In a post- training survey, 96% of participants said they would use at least some of the digital security tools they learned about in their daily work. Within days, several participants wrote to say they had already put some of the physical security techniques into practice, a testament both to the instability currently gripping Ukraine and the importance of this kind of training for Ukrainian journalists. In order to respond to the need to bolster
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