The Leader, the Victory, and the Nation: Public Celebrations in Soviet under Stalin (Kiev, 1943-1953) Author(s): Serhy Yekelchyk Source: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Bd. 54, H. 1, Themenschwerpunkt: Gespaltene Geschichtskulturen? Zweiter Weltkrieg und kollektive Erinnerungskulturen in der Ukraine (2006), pp. 3-19 Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41051580 . Accessed: 25/05/2014 06:02

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This content downloaded from 208.67.143.49 on Sun, 25 May 2014 06:02:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ABHANDLUNGEN

Serhy Yekelchyk,Victoria/

The Leader, theVictory, and theNation: Public Celebrationsin SovietUkraine under Stalin (Kiev, 1943-1953)*

Soviet troopsentered Kiev in the earlymorning hours of 6 November 1943. The residents were waiting forthe firstSoviet soldiers whom they welcomed, in the words of one early report,with tears in theireyes, but also with "cigarettes,home-made tobacco blend, wine, home-madeliqueur, and patties."1This descriptionreads more naturallythan a more formal contemporaryreport about the Kievans "expressingtheir profound gratitude to the Leader, Comrade Stalin,for his wise guidance of the Red Armyin the liberationof Kiev,"2 but I am not suggestingthat the latterinformation was false. In fact,these could be two different - descriptionsof the same event one emphasizingthe spontaneityof popular sentimentand anothernarrating the liberationin properpolitical language. But even if both partyofficials were being completelytruthful, Kievans themselveswere accustomed to expressing even genuine sentimentin language appropriateto the moment,or as StephenKotkin would say, "speaking Bolshevik."3 In any case, with Nazi collaborators,Ukrainian nationalists,and otherswho had reason to expect repressionhaving gone west, the majorityof the remaining populationwas favorablydisposed towardthe Soviet power. The descriptionsof these firstencounters between the populace and the Soviet authori- ties, however, reveal bureaucrats' concern over the appropriatecelebration of the city's liberation.When political officersand partyorganizers recorded (or invented)the details of the people's welcome and expressionsof gratitudeto Stalin,they framed the various events of theirchaotic firsthours in Kiev into a coherentnarrative of a "popular celebration." In subsequent years, the Ukrainian authoritiesapplied enormous effortstoward organizing various holiday celebrationsin theircapital, but the events of November 1943 encapsulated the difficultiesof theirendeavor. Old revolutionaryholidays were intertwinedwith libera- tion dates, occasions specificto Ukraine conflictedwith ail-Union festivals,and spontaneity had to be replaced by orderliness. Under Stalin,the state saw public celebrationsas importantpolitical ritualsallowing the citizenryto demonstrateits supportfor the Soviet cause. The affirmationof allegiance in- creasinglytook the formof thankingStalin forhis "gift"of freedom,prosperity, and happi-

* Earlierversions of thispaper were presented at theinternational conference on "DividedHistorical Cultures?The Impactof WorldWar II on the Shapingof NationalSymbols and CollectiveMemory Culturesin East CentralEurope" (30 May-1 June2003, Lviv University)and at theworkshop on "Citi- zenship,Nationality, and theState in Russianand SovietHistory" (Harvard University, 26-28 March 2004). I wouldlike to thankthe organizers and participantsof theseconferences for their helpful com- ments,and MartaD. Olynykfor her assistance with the stylistic editing of thispaper. My researchon politicalrituals in postwarUkraine has beensupported by a grantfrom the Social Sciencesand Humani- tiesResearch Council of Canada 1 Derzhavnyiarkhiv Kyivskoi oblasti (hereafter DAKO), fond1, opys 3, sprava5, ark.28. "Ibidemark. 53. 3 See StephenKotkin Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization.Berkeley 1995.

Jahrbücherfür Geschichte Osteuropas 54 (2006) H. 1 O FranzSteiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart/Germany

This content downloaded from 208.67.143.49 on Sun, 25 May 2014 06:02:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 4 SerhyYekelchyk ness.4 Althoughideologues carefullystaged such mass celebrations,they wished to believe thatat rallies and people were expressingtheir objective political identities.Cultural historians,however, have viewed public ceremoniesas symbolicrepresentations of the ideal social order.5In the field of Russian history,Karen Pétronehas writtenabout prewar Soviet festivalsas representationsof ideal Soviet society, complete with its social, national, and gender hierarchies.6Building upon Petrone's interpretation,in this paper I will attemptto expand on this analysis of Stalinist festivalsby analyzing them as political and cultural practices establishingindividuals' symbolicrelationship to the state. Since political rituals - did not express stable identities nor were state policies fixed - symbolic interactionsin public space remained fluid. Hence the unending concern of authoritiesover the proper organizationof celebrations. Officialholidays and commemorationsinstitutionalize a nation's collective memoryinto a series of cyclical rituals.In the wake of a greatwar and major territorialchanges, the So- viet Ukrainiancalendar of holidays was undergoingmajor changes to take into account the new political and ideological realities.It assimilatedwith greatdifficulty new holidays that had been created duringthe war and the celebrationsspecific to the Ukrainianrepublic. In the long run,the authoritiesdowngraded war-related festivals, while absorbing some holi- days specific to Ukraine into the Soviet canon. This evolution reflectedlarger ideological processes duringHigh Stalinism,just as the critiqueof "spontaneity"during festive events mirroredcontemporary efforts to restorestrict ideological control.In the end, though,the partyapparatus was able to ensure attendance,rather than a desired symbolic interaction duringparades and meetings.Increased food deliveries duringthe holidays served as the state's implicitrecognition that the citizenrydid not celebrateSoviet holidays merelyout of innerconviction. Yet, Stalinistideologues remainedunperturbed by the interferenceof ma- terialstimuli in the symbolic interactionbetween the authoritiesand the people. During the last years of Stalin's regime, the Bolshevik revolutionarydream of transformingpeople's identitiesossified intoa systemof politicalrituals, mere participationin which markedone's belongingto the Soviet politicalworld.

Celebratingthe Liberation

Upon theirarrival, the Soviet authoritiesimmediately showed greatconcern forthe sym- bolic reclaimingof Kiev. Even beforeremoving Nazi posters and streetname plates, party officials attemptedto organize festive meetings to mark the anniversaryof the October Revolution,which were to symbolizethe restorationof Soviet political life. The date of the liberationwas not accidental,as the militarywanted to hand over Kiev to Stalin as a kind of Revolution Day present.Yet, celebratingthe anniversaryin the city itselfproved difficult. On 7 November the authoritiesin Petrovsky(Podil) districtmanaged to gatherin a movie theateraround 1,000 people, or "almost everyone"they could find.7Other districtsmissed

4 On theStalinist "moral economy" of gratitude,see JeffreyBrooks ThankYou, ComradeStalin! SovietPublic Culture from Revolution to Cold War.Princeton 2000. See notablyMary Ryan The AmericanParade: Representations of the Nineteenth-Century Social Order,in: Lynn Hunt (ed.) TheNew CulturalHistory. Berkeley 1989, pp. 131-153. Karen Pétrone Life Has Become More Joyous,Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin. Bloomington2000. DAKO 1/3/23,ark. 91. Justbefore the 'sfinal attack, the German military administration orderedall civiliansto leavethe city, but many did not oblige and went into hiding in the city. Those who

This content downloaded from 208.67.143.49 on Sun, 25 May 2014 06:02:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PublicCelebrations in SovietUkraine under Stalin (Kiev, 1943-1953) 5 theanniversary date. On 8 November,party organizers in Kirovsky(Pechersk) district suc- ceededin assemblingsome 600 remainingworkers for a meetingat the city's largest factory, thefamous Arsenal.8 Similar smaller meetings took place at thefew functioning enterprises, suchas theshoe factory,water pumping station, and drivingschool.9 No celebrations,how- ever,took place in Stalinskydistrict, where on 8 Novemberresidents were assembledin- steadfor the screening of a new Sovietfilm, The Battle at Orel,which was followedby a lectureon theinternational situation.10 Other districts simply did notreport on whetherthey hadheld festive meetings. The aim of thoseearly Revolution Day gatheringswas to markKiev's symbolicre- admittanceto theSoviet Union, but there remained the task of celebratingthe liberation of Kiev itself,the largest Soviet city to changehands during the war. The occasioncalled fora majorrally, but the population's slow returnto thecity prevented the authorities from or- ganizingsuch a massevent until late November. Finally, on 27 November1943, an open-air rallyto celebrateKiev's liberationtook place in ShevchenkoPark in the citycenter. An estimated40,000 peoplelistened to speechesby Ukrainianparty leader N. S. Khrushchev, commanderof theFirst Ukrainian Front Gen. N. F. Vatutin,Marshal G. K. Zhukov,Presi- dentof theUkrainian Academy of SciencesO. O. Bohomolets,and assortedwriters, physi- cians,and workers.Khrushchev established the tenorof the gatheringby beginninghis speechwith "our first word of love and gratitudeto theorganizer of victoryover the Ger- mans,to theorganizer of theRed Armyoffensive, which liberated our magnificentKiev. Gloryto ourgreat Stalin!" (Applause and shoutsof "hurrah"followed.) In a similarfashion otherspeakers thanked Stalin, the Red Army,and the great Russian people for their military prowess- or denouncedthe Nazis and theiralleged assistants, the Ukrainian nationalists. Significantly,most orators spoke on behalfof the Kievans and General Vatutin was theonly one to addressthe crowd directly. He expressedhis "heartfeltcongratulations on theocca- sionof the liberation from German slavery and the return to thehappy family of the peoples ofthe Union of SovietSocialist Republics, under the sun of Stalin'sConstitution."11 As if to confirmits principal function as a thankingritual, the rally ended with the adoption by ac- clamationof two addresses:the Kievans' letterof gratitudeto Stalinand a similarletter "fromthe Ukrainian people to the great Russian people." Followingthe first difficult winter in a ruinedcity, the restoration of Sovietpolitical life in Kiev proceededslowly during the springof 1944. On 19 March,before the snow had melted,another large open-air rally took place in thecity center to markthe complete lib- erationof Kiev oblast.This timethe proceedings were broadcast by Ukrainianradio. Ap- plauding,an estimated50,000 participants showed their "approval" of yetanother letter to Stalin,thanking him for the liberation and promising new achievements in battle and labor.12 But in thelong run, adopting by acclamationletters filled with gratitude proved inade- quate,as itbecame clear to theauthorities that the re-absorption ofUkraine was notgoing to leftwent to nearbyvillages and returned as soonas thefront line passed westward. Still, in thefirst days afterits liberation, Kiev remainedsparsely populated. This changed by late November, when the authori- tiesestimated that some 250,000 residents were inthe 8 living city. Ibidem1/3/9, ark. 10. 9 Tsentralnyiderzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy (hereafter TsDAHO), 1/70/72,ark. 1. 10 DAKO 1/3/5,ark. 56. 11 TsDAHO 1/70/95,ark. 79 (Khrushchev),89 (Vatutin);1/70/97, ark. 17 (40,000);Kyivska prenda (28 November1943) 1-3; (3 December 1; Pravda December 2. " pp. 1943)p. (3 1943)p. RadianskaUkraina (21 March1944), pp. 1-2; Kyivskapravda (21 March1944) p. 1; DAKO 1/3/72, ark.12; 5/2/606,ark. 56-63.

This content downloaded from 208.67.143.49 on Sun, 25 May 2014 06:02:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 6 SerhyYekelchyk be eitherfast or easy. In earlyspring 1944, as theRed Armyfirst began encountering na- tionalistguerilla resistance in WesternUkraine, and multipleeconomic and social crises plaguedEastern Ukraine, the republic's leadership engaged sixteen leading Ukrainian poets to composea lengthycollective poem, "An Epistle[Slovo] to GreatStalin from the Ukrain- ian People."The resultingliterary product opened with the address, "Our wise teacher,our faithfulfriend, /Our great father. These words are foryou." The poemexpressed boundless gratitudeto Stalinfor his wise guidancein generaland forthe liberation of Ukrainein par- ticular.It reachedan almostecstatic fervor toward the end, where the collective voice ofthe Ukrainianpeople thanked Stalin "for the sun that you lit"and made an oath"[t]o be loyal forever,just as we have been / To the friendshipof peoples and our authorities[vladi svoii'ru In an unprecedentedeffort to confirmthe citizens'allegiance to the Sovietpower, the Ukrainianleadership organized the collectionof signaturesunder this letter. Tlie signing ritualwas plannedas an intensiverepublic-wide campaign on 5-8 September1944, but logisticalproblems did notallow fora three-daylimit. In Kiev,the signing in mostdistricts did not startuntil 6 September,for the authoritiesneeded time to organizemeetings and prepare"discussions" of the letter.(In line withthe contemporaryreconstruction drive, meetingstypically ended with participants vowing to increaseproduction norms.) Kievans who missedthe meetingswould oftencome to the districtparty committees afterwards, askingfor their chance to sign- eitherthey felt excluded from an importantpublic event or wereafraid of beingdenounced as absentees.14But people could incorporate into this dem- onstrationof loyaltya displayof theirdeep personalfeelings about the war. Some docu- mentsmention that participants cried during the reading of the poem (which dwelt at length on thehuman cost of theNazi occupation)and duringthe discussionperiod, when some peoplerecounted stories about their personal sufferings.15 In villages in Kiev oblast,how- ever,there were cases of war widowsrefusing to sign- apparentlyfinding it difficultto reconciletheir private emotions with the required display of joyous gratitude,or perhaps even blamingthe Sovietstate for the loss of theirloved ones. In addition,some peasants refusedto signin thebelief that the Americans almost forced Stalin to disbandthe collective farms,but the Soviet leader was collectingthe peasants' signatures in orderto provethat the populationwanted them.16 The signingcampaign continued through the rest of Septemberand earlyOctober, when theauthorities finally wrapped it up in connectionwith the forthcoming celebration of the "completeliberation of the Ukrainianlands" (discussedbelow). By 11 October 1944, 9,316,973Ukrainian citizens, including 158,272 Kievans and 445,501 residentsof Kiev oblast,signed the letter that Khrushchev could finallyforward to Stalin.17Forcing the ma- jorityof the republic's adults to signthis eulogy, and moreoverdoing so in themidst of the difficultreconstruction period, seems eccentric. Yet thiscampaign revealed several impor-

13 TsDAHO 1/70/881,ark. 3-5, 6; 1/23/720,arie 1-42; Kyivska pravda (15 December1944) pp. 1-2. M DAKO 1/3/78,ark. 5; 1/3/82,ark. 205. Note,however, that in theMinistry of theMeat and Dairy Industry,the signing was followedby a dinnerand dancing(ibidem 1/3/76, ark. 18). Insteadof a civic ritual,the event was stagedas moreof a holiday. duty13 DAKO 5/2/606,ark. 36-43. 16Ibidem ark. 132. 17 TsDAHO 1/70/881,ark. 1-2. Althoughthe state apparatus did itsbest to collectsignatures on such shortnotice, some Kiev oblastparty bosses felt that 150,000 signatures from the capital was notenough andthat this "low" number could embarrass them before higher-ups (DAKO 1/3/43,ark. 103).

This content downloaded from 208.67.143.49 on Sun, 25 May 2014 06:02:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PublicCelebrations inSoviet Ukraine under Stalin (Kiev, 1943-1953) 7 tantfeatures of the Stalinist regime that was beingrestored in Ukraine:the authorities' deep concernover popularallegiances, their belief in the effectivenessof large-scalepolitical rituals,and the complete conflation of Sovietpower with the Great Stalin. By the fall of 1944 the Ukrainianparty bosses no longerfavored open-air rallies, for popularallegiances could be Registered"at workand in residentialdistricts in theform of signaturesunder the letter to Stalin.On 14 Octoberthe republic celebrated what was termed the"complete liberation of the Ukrainian lands." (This conceptwas somewhatimprecise, as Ukraine'swestern borders were about to changeagain in 1945 and at themoment were the subjectof an internationaldispute.) Instead of a massrally, a moreformal festive gathering inthe Kiev operahouse - admissionby invitationonly - becamethe high point of thecele- brations.It was therethat Ukrainian functionaries staged the final,official reading of the letterto Stalin and the announcementabout the numberof signatories.The municipal authoritiesdecorated the streets lavishly with red banners and portraitsof partyleaders and generals,but there was no paradeor mass demonstration.18 Indeed,in 1944 therewas stillno customarymilitary or civiliandemonstration to mark1 May in Kiev (or Moscow). Some Kievans apparentlyremembered fondly these festivitiesas eventswhere they could either demonstrate their loyalty or expresstheir "So- viet"identity. When city workers began laying asphalt in sectionsof Khreshchatyk,Kiev's still-ruinedmain avenue, passers-by would ask whetherthis was beingdone in preparation fora demonstration.19Yet therewas no customaryparade and demonstrationeven in No- vember1944, although the "double holiday" of RevolutionDay and thefirst anniversary of thecity's liberation certainly warranted them. Butby thenthe republic's bureaucrats were planning a majorcelebration. As documents fromthe archives of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Central Committee show, discussions abouthow to greetveterans returning from the war began,on Khrushchev'sproposal, as earlyas 26 October1944. Ideas thatwere proposedranged from parades and triumphal archesto thecreation of new songs,and thediscussions soon focusedon thecelebration of the imminentSoviet victory.20 On 31 January1945 the same groupof ideologueshad al- readyplanned a conferenceon "VictoryDay."21 By Aprilthere were detailedplans for "spontaneous"public rallies after the arrival of thenews, to be followedthe next day by a paradeand demonstration.The local authoritiesbegan preparationsby decoratingstreets withbanners, slogans, and portraitsdesigned "to lasttwo to threeyears." The instructions also stressedthe need to use decorationsreflecting "the national motifs and elementsof Ukrainianfolk art," so as to presentthe victory as a Ukrainiannational holiday as well.The listof largeportraits that were installedin Kiev includedthat of the seventeenth-century Cossackleader Bohdan Khmelnytsky.22 The requirementthat the decorationsshould last two to threeyears reflected the ideo- logues' thinkingthat wouldbecome a permanentSoviet holiday. Suggestions for"making a traditionof Victory Day" can be foundin the minutes of a meetingheld on 27 March1945.23 Frustratingly for the ideologues, the date of victoryitself remained unknown.

18 Ibidem1/70/82, ark. 19-20; 1/23/784,ark. 17-18; Kyivska pravda (15 October1944) pp. 1-2; Radi- anskaUkraine (15 October1944) pp. 1-2. 1VDAKO1/3/43, ark. 115. 20 TsDAHO 1/70/202,ark. 1-5. 21 Ibidem1/23/1589, ark. 17. 22 DAKO 1/3/222,ark. 8-12 ("nationalmotifs" and "two to three on ark. ark.3-26. 15 years" 8); 1/3/201, TsDAHO 1/70/202,ark. 6, 29-30.

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By Aprilpeople could guess the possible dates; one femalecollective farmer spoke at a Kiev marketabout how wonderfulit wouldbe to celebrateboth Easter and VictoryDay on 5 May.24Soviet officials longed for a similarconcurrence. During a meetingon 4 April,a mid-levelcity bureaucrat named Comrade Drofa mused, "I wouldlike 1 May to becomethis day."25Just as theRed Armycaptured Kiev in timefor Revolution Day, thewar might end appropriatelyenough on theday of workers'solidarity. Such a coincidencewould also be in the interestsof state,for it wouldobviate the need to createa secondmajor holiday (and anotherday oñ) in lateApril-early May. It was thereforeno accidentthat the civic and partyauthorities prepared for 1 May 1945 witha VictoryDay in mind.This probably explains the (which took place - noton Khreshchatykbut on KorolenkoSt., present-day Volodymyrska St.) Kiev's first afterthe liberation, which the local newspapereven billed as the"Victory Parade." Festive meetingsthat were held that day in all organizationscelebrated if not the victory itself, then "theraising of the Victory banner over Berlin."26 Political information reports on thepopular mood,which were submitted at thistime, presented a pictureof universal approval and only occasionalmistaken interpretations, e.g., "victorycame fromGod because churcheswere openduring the war."27 In thehectic first days of May theKiev authoritieslost control over the population, which was anxiouslyawaiting the war's end. On theevening of 2 May loudspeakerson thestreets warnedthat an importantgovernment announcement was comingat 11:00 p.m. Huge crowdsgathered, expecting the declaration of victory,but heard instead Stalin's order con- gratulatingthe Red Armyon thecapture of Berlin.Still, thousands of peoplecelebrated on the streetsall nightlong, dancing, singing, and kissingstrangers. The militaryfired off roundsinto the air. The cityauthorities managed to organizemore formal festive meetings onlyon thefollowing day.28 The storywas repeatedon 9 May,when the news about 'scapitulation fi- nallycame. An officialcommuniqué was broadcastover the radio at 2:15 a.m., although therewas advancenotice, and "thousandsof Kievansgathered around [street] loud speak- ers."29Pre-planned "spontaneous" rallies could not take place becausethe workers had gone home,but truly spontaneous celebrations began at night:their loudest expression took the formof disorderlyshooting in theair and a sometimes-unrulystreet party. At 9:00 a.m.,the radiobroadcast Stalin's victory speech.30 Although the officialannouncement declared 9 May a holiday,many Kievans went to theirworkplaces, where they could listen to theradio andwhere festive meetings could finally take place. (To coverup thenocturnal street party, reportsto Moscowclaimed that meetings in the city actually lasted "from 3:00 a.m. until12 noon.") The Victoryparade and demonstrationbegan in the citycenter at 2:00 p.m. and reportedlyattracted as manyas 200,000Kievans.31 Duringtheir final preparations for Victory Day, Ukrainianbureaucrats registered their concernover two significantissues. The republic'sleading ideologue, Dmytro Manuilsky,

24 DAKO 1/3/221,ark. 5 overleaf. 25 Ibidem1/3/201, ark. 7. 26 Kyivskapravda(1 May 1945)pp. 1-2. 27 DAKO 1/3/221,ark. 5. 28 Ibidem1/3/221, ark. 5-7. 29 TsDAHO 1/70/342,ark. 1. JU Ibidem1/23/1764, ark. 15, 19. 31 Ibidem1/70/342, 2; DAKO 1/3/221,ark. 1 1.

This content downloaded from 208.67.143.49 on Sun, 25 May 2014 06:02:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PublicCelebrations in SovietUkraine under Stalin (Kiev, 1943-1953) 9 who was thenthe secretaryof the CP(b)U CentralCommittee, worried that the people's pridein theirvictory could lower their tolerance toward their harsh working and livingcon- ditions.At a conferenceon 27 Aprilhe said,"Lest we createin thepopulation the impres- sionthat it is all over,it is necessarythat articles [in press]mark the historic victory of the Sovietpeoples but not dampen the [popular]ardor." Manuilsky wanted the media to dis- seminatethe idea thatSoviet military achievements now had to be bolsteredby continued heroiclabor on thehome front.32 Indeed, during 1945 Ukrainiannewspapers often sounded thiscaution.33 Maria Pidtychenko,secretary for propaganda with the Kiev cityparty com- mittee,expressed another fear that was highlyrevealing of theStalinist political restoration in thewar's aftermath.She wantedmunicipal bureaucrats 'to makesure that [Victory Day festivities]do nothappen spontaneously."34 In this the authorities did notquite succeed, but as we shallsee below,the struggle against "spontaneity" in Sovietfestivities continued after thewar.

Sovietand UkrainianHolidays

Equallyimportant for the authorities was theadjustment of a newcelebratory canon. The war had lefta legacyof well-respectednew holidays,including Victory Day and various anniversariesof battlesand liberations.But it also led to theestablishment of new holidays specifictó differentbranches of the armed forces, such as TankCrewman Day and Artillery Day. These new datesoften commanded the allegianceof veteransand the populationat large,but could conflict with the old Sovietcalendar of holidays- orjam too manyfestivi- tiesin a shortperiod of time. In 1946,for example, festive meetings and military salutes had to be heldboth on 3 September(Day of Victoryover Imperialist Japan) and 8 September (TankCrewman Day).35 In 1944,the Kremlin proclaimed 19 NovemberArtillery Day, whichwas also calledthe Day of Stalin'sArtillery, to be markedwith salutes, festive meetings, and awards.36 After the warended, however, the Soviet leadership restored the distinction between fixed-date cele- brationsthat involved a day offand werereserved for major holidays, and otherevents. In 1945 ArtilleryDay was celebratedon Sunday,18 November,37but ideologues apparently preferredmoving it furtheraway fromRevolution Day, whichwas celebratedearlier in the month.In thenext two years, Artillery Day was celebratedon thethird Sunday in Novem- ber38and thiseventually became a tradition.Thus, Artillery Day sharedthe fate of several previouslyestablished minor holidays that were conveniently grouped together in late July and Augustand alwayscelebrated on a weekend- Navy Day, AviationDay, and Railroad WorkerDay. In 1947,for example, they were marked in Kiev withfestive meetings, outdoor fêtes,and fireworkson 27 July,3 August,and 10 August,respectively.39 But thedecision aboutwhen exactly to hold festivitieshad to be announcedeach year;in 1950 Navy Day

32 TsDAHO 1/70/306,ark. 6-7. 33 See,for example, Kyivska pravda (5 September1945) p. 1. 34 DAKO 1/3/201,ark. 15. 35 Kyivskapravda (5 September1946) p. 6; (8 September1946) p. 1. 36Ibidem November 1. 37 (19 1944)p. Ibidem(20 November1945) p. 1. 38 DAKO 1/3/255,ark. 3; November 1. ™ Kyivskapravda (12 1947)p. See Kyivskapravda (27 July1945) p. 1; (5 August1947) p. 1; (10 August1947) p. 2.

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was celebratedon 23 Julyand in 1952,on 10 August.40There were, of course,no major revolutionaryholidays in July and August. Potentiallymore subversive was theelevation of theday of Kiev's liberation(6 Novem- ber) overthe most sacred date in the Sovietcalendar, 7 November.During 1943-45, the city'snewspapers often referred to these two combined dates as the"double holiday" or "the holidayof theUkrainian capital."41 Although the 7th was theofficial day offas Revolution Day, thecelebration of Kiev's liberationalways spilled over to thisdate and was featured prominentlyin official speeches. In 1945 districtparty committees prepared a singlefestive programfor the secondanniversary of Kiev's liberationand the 28thanniversary of the Revolution,in thatorder.42 On 4 November1945 Kyivskapravda publishedan editorial entitled"On the Eve of Two GreatEvents."43 On 6 November1946 its lead articlewas called"Before the Great Holiday," ostensibly referring to RevolutionDay (hencethe prepo- sition"before"), but in realitycommemorating the thirdanniversary of the Red Army's arrival.44By 1947, 6 Novemberwas disappearingas a separateholiday. But in an article entitled"The HolidayTwice as Dear to Kievans,"the paper's editorialist reflected on the7 Novembercelebrations by noting that the Kiev's liberationwas themain subject of the large picturesthat were mounted on thecity's buildings.45 VictoryDay itselffell victim to the calendar,for its firstcelebration in 1945 was not matchedin subsequentyears. In 1946the marked 1 May by lavishparades and manifestationsin Moscow andKiev, but 9 May saw no paradeand onlyan eveningoutdoor fête(narodnoe gulianie).46 In 1947,9 May featureda track-and-fieldevent, an outdoorfête, - anda salute thesame range of festivities as on ArtilleryDay thatyear.47 Moreover, Victory Day remaineda day offonly for two years,until 1947.48 This throwsinteresting light on recentsuggestions that the war had replacedthe revolution as a centralelement of Soviet mythology.49The stateindeed considered individuals' war records as theultimate proof of theirloyalty, but the evolution of Sovietmass political rituals does notconfirm the victory's prominentplace in Stalinistideology. By 1952 VictoryDay was celebratedonly with lec- turesand thematic films, in additionto themilitary salute in theevening.50 In 1956 a special decreeof theUkrainian Central Committee was neededto raisethe level of celebrationsin thepress from authored newspaper articles back to specialVictory Day editorials- and to reestablishfestive workplace meetings on thatday.51 Holidaysspecific to theUkrainian republic also dilutedthe Soviet canon, for they usually had theUkrainian nation, rather than the Revolutionor the ail-Unionwar effort,as their pointof reference.This is particularlytrue of anniversariesof variousUkrainian cultural

40 Ibidem (23 July1950) p. 1; Radianska Ukraina(10 1; 1. 41 August 1952) p. (12 August 1952) p. Kyivskapravda (6 November 1945) p. 1. 42 DAKO 277/1/98,ark. 189. ** Kyivskapravda (4 November 1945) p. 5. " Ibidem (6 November 1946) p. 1. 45 Ibidem (10 November 1947) p. 2. 46 Ibidem (4 May 1946) p. 4; (1 1 1946) 4. " May p. CompareKyivska pravda (1 1 May 1947) p. 1 and (25 November 1947) p. 3. 48 Nina Tumarkin The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in . New York 1994, p. 104. 49 See Amir Weiner Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution.Princeton 2001. 50 VechirniiKyiv (10 May 1952) p. 3. 51 DAKO 5/6/292,ark. 22.

This content downloaded from 208.67.143.49 on Sun, 25 May 2014 06:02:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PublicCelebrations inSoviet Ukraine under Stalin (Kiev, 1943-1953) 11 figures,which were duly celebrated with festive meetings and bombasticeditorials - butno parades- evenduring the most difficult days of thewar and reconstructionperiod. For in- stance, in March 1944 the 130th anniversaryof the greatestnational poet, Taras Shevchenko,was markedwith festive meetings and concertson thesame scale as less im- portantSoviet holidays. Celebrations included a gatheringat theKiev operahouse in the presenceof mostof the Ukrainianleadership except Khrushchev52 - an honorthat ranks Shevchenko'sbirthday higher than such holidaysas ArtilleryDay. Only slightlyless im- pressivewere the events marking the 150thanniversary of thephilosopher Hryhorii Skovo- roda(December 1944), the 100th jubilee of the playwright Ivan Karpenko-Kary(September 1945),and the 75th anniversary of the poetess Lesia Ukrainka(February 1946).53 However,Stalinist ideologues were always on thelookout for a majorholiday that could be constructedas a SovietUkrainian event. The firstsignificant, if abortive,attempt relates to theanniversary of Ukraine's full liberation. As discussedpreviously, on 14 October1944 therepublic's leadership proclaimed that the liberation of Ukrainewas complete.The first anniversaryof thisevent conveniently fell on Sunday,14 October1945, thuspresenting Ukrainianfunctionaries with an opportunityto organizea majorcelebration. But with7 Novemberlooming large, they also worriedabout the republic's holiday eclipsing an all- Unionevent. As Kost Lytvyn,the secretary for ideology of theCP(b)U CentralCommittee, warnedduring a conferenceon 1 September,"We shouldorganize the celebrationof this holidayin sucha waythat the anniversary of the October Revolution would be markedon a greaterscale."54 An obvioussolution was notto hold a paradeand demonstration;Khrush- chevvetoed an interestingproposal to arrangea paradeof 5,000former partisans in Kiev55- apparently,lest it createdthe impression that Ukraine was liberatedby itsguerillas and not by regularRed Armytroops. In theend, the capital was extensivelydecorated for the holi- day,which featured a majorgathering at theopera house on 13 October,where Khrushchev gave an agenda-settingspeech, "On the Resultsof the FirstYear of Reconstructionin Ukraineand Our Tasks."On the 14th,Kievans enjoyed sport events, outdoor dancing, and fireworks.Still, the event was framedat leastpartly as an ethnicholiday. Khrushchev de- finedthe liberation as a "memorable,unforgettable date in thehistory of the Ukrainian peo- ple" andKyivska pravda led withan editorial,"The Holidayof the Ukrainian People."56 But thedate's proximityto 7 Novemberdid notbode well,and the 1946 ideologicalcampaign againstalleged nationalist deviations in Ukrainianculture was probablythe finalargument againstthis holiday. In futureyears, the anniversary of the liberation was markedonly by the decreasingnumber of newspaper articles. Anotheropportunity presented itself late in 1947,with the approach of SovietUkraine's 30thbirthday. Thirty years was notconsidered a "rounddate" in theSoviet Union; accord- ingto an old governmentdecree, only 25th, 50th, 75th, 100th, 125th, etc., anniversaries were officiallycelebrated. Khrushchev, however, received Stalin's special permission to holdthis festivalbecause in December1942, when the republic turned 25, itwas underNazi occupa-

52 March 1. 53Kyivska pravda (10 1944)p. RadianskaUkraina (16 December1944) p. 3; (17 December1944) p. 1 (Skovoroda);Literaturna hazeta(13 September1945) p. 1 (Karpenko-Kary);Kyivska pravda (24 February1946) p. 5 (Lesia Ukrainka). 54 TsDAHO 1/70/306,ark. 20. 55Ibidem. 56 Kyivskapravda (14 October1944) p. 1 (editorialand Khrushchev); p. 8 (preparationsin Kiev); (16 October1945) p. 6 (celebrationin Kiev).

This content downloaded from 208.67.143.49 on Sun, 25 May 2014 06:02:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 12 Serhy Yekelchyk tion.57(In otheryears, the event was markedmerely by newspapereditorials.) The procla- mationof Sovietpower in Ukrainehad takenplace on 25 December1917, a datetoo close to twoothers: the New Year and ChristmasDay forsome of Ukraine'snational minorities. The authorities,therefore, moved the celebration to 25 January1948, decreeingthat it be markedas a "nation-wide(ysenarodnyi) holiday of the Ukrainian people."58 The festivitieseclipsed all otherholidays in Ukraineduring the Stalinist period. Follow- inglead-up meetings in the districts, the lavishly decorated capital saw a militaryparade and a civiliandemonstration, followed by an eveningfête with salute and fireworks.59A monu- mentto GeneralVatutin, whose troops had liberatedKiev in 1943 and who was mortally woundedby nationalistguerillas in 1944, was unveiledduring the celebrationsand the foundationswere laid foranother monument, to MykolaShchors, a Soviethero of the Civil War in Ukraine.60In an unprecedentedgesture, Stalin's deputy, Viacheslav Molotov, at- tendeda jubilee sessionof therepublic's parliament in Kiev, wherehe made an important ideologicalpronouncement, namely that 'the Ukrainianpeople were the firstto join the greatRussian people" in theirmarch toward communism. The officialconfirmation of their second-among-equalsstatus came completewith holiday congratulations from Comrade Stalinin person, as stressedby Molotov in his jubilee speech.61 The Ukrainianauthorities tried to offsetthe national features of thisholiday by making constantreferences to thehelp the Ukrainians had receivedfrom the Russian people during theRevolution and, especially, by profuselythanking Stalin in variousspeeches and open letters.During his welcomespeech at therailway station, city party secretary Petro Matsui askedMolotov to pass on to StalinKievans' profoundthanks for his care and attentionto them.62At a jubileesession in parliament, Khrushchev ended his orationwith the salutation, "Long live ourwise leader,the best friend of theUkrainian people, beloved and greatSta- lin!"63Parliament sent Stalin an addressthanking him for, among other things, the creation of a SovietUkrainian state64 - althoughhis real inputin the 1917 decisionwas unclear. Holidaydecorations included so manyportraits of Stalinthat some celebrantsreportedly said thatwhen they saw Molotovat theKiev railwaystation, they imagined seeing Stalin himself.65 Ifthe impressive, albeit one-time, festivities on 25 January1948 did not interfere with the regularSoviet holidays, the 10th anniversary of the "reunification ofthe Ukrainian people in a UkrainianSoviet state" did. Marking ten years since the Soviet conquest of Eastern Poland (or,more properly, the anniversary of the ensuing proclamation uniting these lands with the UkrainianSSR), thisevent fell on 30 October1949 - thusnecessitating another mass dem- onstrationin thecity center mere days before 7 November.A fittingeditorial in theofficial

57 TsDAHO 1/23/5075,ark. 344. 58 Ibidem1/70/647, ark. 36. The firstdraft of this decree envisaged the festivities on 27 and28 Decem- ber1947. See ibidem1/23/4486, ark. 12-13. 59 See TsDAHO 1/23/5075;1/70/1291; Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady i Ukrainy(thereafter TsDAVOV) 1/18/58;Radianska Ukraina (24-26 January1948). upravlinnia60 TsDAHO 1/23/5075,ark. 131-132; Kyivska pravda (27 January1948) p. 3 61 Kyivskapravda (25 January1948) p. 1; PromovaV. M. Molotovana iuvileiniisesii Verkhovnoi RadyURSR v den30-richchia Radianskoi Ukrainy, in: Bilshovyk Ukrainy, no. 1 (1948) pp. 1-5. 62 TsDAHO 1/23/5075,ark. 25. 63 PromovaN. S. Khrushchovana iuvileiniisesii Verkhovnoi Rady URSR, in:Bilshovyk Ukrainy, no. 1 10. (1948)°* p. (27 January1948) p. 1. 03Kyivskapravda DAKO 1/3/511,ark. 30.

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JournalBilshovyk Ukrairty was entitled"A GreatHistorical Event in theLife of theUkrain- M ian People," and the eventwas indeedcelebrated as an essentiallyethnic holiday. In Khrushchev'sspeech - indeedin almostevery type of propaganda- Stalinwas credited withthe reunification,67 buteven this did notmake the holiday more "Soviet." Instead, al- thoughthe usual parade took place on 7 November,practically all thepropaganda work on theground during October and earlyNovember was concentratedon theanniversary of the reunification.The KP(b)U68Central Committee instructed the local authoritiesto keep the decorationsand slogansfrom the reunification events for 7 November.69Many organiza- tions,like the Kiev aircraftplant, united the two holidays under one headingin theirreports on propagandawork in thefall.70 Perhaps not realizing that this diminished the Revolution Day parades,the KP(b)U CentralCommittee's internal memos hailed the 30 Octoberdem- onstrationinKiev as "thebest organized and the most interesting" inrecent years.71 Like theydid withmost other public events, Ukrainian ideologues framed the tenth anni- versaryof reunification as a thankingritual. According to a reportby thecity party commit- tee,the festivities "demonstrated [the people's] unity with the Bolshevik party, their bound- less love forand devotionto thegreat leader of peoples,Comrade Stalin."72 A temporary sculptureof Stalinwas erectedon KhreshchatykAvenue at InstytutskaSt., as thoughthe Sovietleader were viewing the parade.73 In contemporaryeditorials and in Khrushchev's speechat thejubilee sessionof theUkrainian parliament, Stalin was creditedboth with the creationof theUkrainian republic in 1917 and withthe unification of theUkrainian people in 1939.74The parliament'sjubilee addressto the Soviet leaderread, "ComradeStalin, pleaseaccept a deepbow fromthe Ukrainian people, who are singingand will always,gen- erationafter generation, sing praises to you."75Yet, if thankingStalin was an obligatory markerof Sovietness, on thisoccasion Ukrainians thanked him as a separateethnic group. Ethnicholidays triumphed over Sovietcelebrations in the mostspectacular fashion in May 1954,when the tercentenary ofUkraine's union with Russia was markedas a majorall- Unionholiday. With Stalin dead, but Stalinismlargely intact as an ideologicalmodel, the extraordinarilylavish celebrations in Kiev and Moscow markedthe biggest festival of the decade.Even though Ukrainians were supposed to commemoratethe historical guidance of theRussian people, at thesame timethey could celebratetheir past and theirnational he- roes.76In additionto theRevolution, the Sovietholiday canon increasingly celebrated the Nation.

66 Velyka istorychnapodiia v zhyttiukrainskoho narodu, in: BilshovykUkrainy, no. 9 (1949) p. 1. 67 TsDAHO 1/30/1349;Vsenarodne sviato, in: Partiinezhyttia, no. 9 (1949) pp. 1-58. KP(b)U is theUkrainian and Russian acronymfor the CommunistParty (Bolshevik) of Ukraine. m DAKO 5/3/2491,ark. 52; TsDAHO 1/30/1738,ark. 2. /ü DAKO 1/6/332,ark. 2. 71 TsDAHO 1/70/1731,ark 6. 72 DAKO 5/3/2594,ark. 61. Ibidem ark. 64. No permanentmonument to Stalin was built in Kiev afterthe city's liberation.In- stead,during major holidaysthe municipal authorities installed temporary sculptures of the Leader, appar- entlymade of plaster.One such sculpturestood on Stalin Square, at the end of Khreshchatyk,between November 1947 and May 1948, but it was removedafterwards (TsDAVOV 1/18/58, ark.39-40). Kyivskapravda (30 October 1949) p. 1; Velyka istorychnapodiia v zhyttiukrainskoho narodu, in: BilshovykUkrainy, no. 9 (1949) p. 2. 75 Kyivskapravda (3 1 October 1949) p. 2. 76 The mostrecent analysis of the tercentenarycelebrations is in Serhy Yekelchyk Stalin's Empire of Memory:Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet HistoricalImagination. 2004, pp. 154-159.

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RestoringSymbolic Order

Even thoughthey had arrangedtheir list of holidays,Stalinist ideologues remained con- cernedwith how celebrations were to proceed.Customary parades and demonstrationsfor 7 Novemberresumed in 1945,as Kiev celebratedthe 28th anniversary of theRevolution and the second anniversaryof the liberation.The republicanleadership, however, was not pleasedwith the first effort. After the demonstration Khrushchev summoned all thedistrict partysecretaries in thecity to his officefor a scolding.Although no recordsof his remarks areextant, in February1946 the first secretary thus explained the problem to a conferenceof oblastparty chiefs: "We weredissatisfied with the way thedemonstration went on 7 No- vember.A verylarge number of peopleturned out. The moodwas exceptionallygood. But thedemonstration did notproceed in a veryorganized fashion; [the people] were walking in a crowd(skopom), spontaneously (stikhiino), and there was no requiredorder."77 In thesame monthKhrushchev attended a conferenceof Kiev partyorganizers, during which the secre- taryof thecity party committee, Borys Horban, acknowledged problems with the very first massevent of 1945,the 1 May demonstration.As soon as Horbansaid thatthe demonstra- tionhad becometoo stretchedout, turning into a leisurelywalk, the Ukrainian leader inter- ruptedhim, "Not a promenade,but a disorganizedcrowd." Horban agreed, "We did not formthe columns properly."78 Khrushchev'sjiggling with the notions of orderand spontaneityis highlyrevealing here. In his effortsto restoreSoviet political rituals in postwar Kiev, Khrushchev was particularly frustratedby themarchers' failure to maintainsymbolic order, thus turning a ritualof sym- boliccommunication between marchers and thoseviewing the parade into a simple"stroll" thatlacked the proper political air. The Ukrainianleader's next critical comment about pub- lic celebrationsonly confirms this interpretation. In January1946 Khrushchevturned his attentionto theway festivemeetings were being organized.On 21 January,when key city activists had gatheredin theKiev operahouse for the anniversaryof Lenin's death,the sightof manyempty seats offendedthe Ukrainian leader.Moreover, most of thefaces in theaudience were familiar to him.An investigation revealedthat tickets had been distributedprimarily among the republic- and city-levelbu- reaucrats,who, according to Khrushchev,were attending mostly because of a freeconcert of Ukraine'sbest artists,which was includedin the program."And whereare the workers, white-collaremployees, and the intelligentsia?" Khrushchev asked angrily.79 In otherwords, he wantedto see themeetings as pointsof interactionwith the "people," where the party leadershipand the audience could fulfill their symbolic roles. The resultingdecree of theUkrainian Politburo dealt both with demonstrations and fes- tivemeetings. Interestingly enough, its main demands pointed in theopposite direction: the restorationof order at open-airevents and increasedparticipation of Stakhanovitesand other representativesof the people at by-invitationonly meetings. Needless to say,the resolution didnot make any mention of theviolation of symbolicorder. Rather, the writers of thetext

77 TsDAHO 1/23/2884,ark. 136. In defenseof thedemonstration organizers it mustbe notedthat 7 November1945 was a frostyday. As one partyorganizer explained at a latermeeting, his columnwas supposedto startmoving to thecity center at 9:00 am, butbecause another district's column was latein arriving,they had to wait for two hours. The hands of many marchers were cold. See DAKO 1/3/304,ark. 38. 78 Ibidem1/3/304, ark. 6-7. 79 TsDAHO 1/23/2884,ark. 137.

This content downloaded from 208.67.143.49 on Sun, 25 May 2014 06:02:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PublicCelebrations inSoviet Ukraine under Stalin (Kiev, 1 943-1 953) 15 justifiedtheir attention to festivemeetings and demonstrationsby extollingthem as "a pow- erfultool in thepolitical education of the masses [and] their mobilization for the fulfillment ofthe most important political, military, and economic tasks."80 A closerlook at the filesof thecity and districtparty committees reveals the kindsof problemsthat were uncovered during the investigationof theNovember 1945 demonstra- tion.Some organizations,such as the fish-processingfactory (Zaliznychy district), Hotel ManagementTrust, the Directorate of Military Hospitals, Construction Design Bureau (all in Leninskydistrict), the SupremeCourt, the AttorneyGeneral's office (both in Pechersky district),and the governmentgarage (Molotovsky district) failed to send any marchers, whichresulted in reprimandsto theirmanagement. However, a moreserious punishment was expectedfor those who had sentsome people but failed to coachthem as conscientious demonstratorsrepresenting model citizens. The CityCommunal Construction Office (Pech- erskydistrict) had 120 employees,but only 40 showedup forthe demonstration, and a mere 25 to 30 remainedby the time their column marched past the government platform. To make mattersworse, the manager of this office, Comrade Trubylo, was so drunkthat district party organizersdid notallow himto march.Trubylo ended up witha "severereprimand with a notationon his partyrecord card," just one stepshort of expulsionfrom the party.81The SixthFurniture Factory (Pechersky district) provided only 40 marchersfrom among its 200 employeesand did notsupply them with any portraits or banners.The factoryparty organ- izer,Comrade Iemelianov, left even before his groupmarched past the central platform and losthis position as a result.82 It was easierfor the Ukrainian authorities to reestablishthe desired order at indoorfestive meetings,at leastat theprincipal events that were usually held at theKiev operahouse with the republic's leadershipin attendance.Assigning seats to several hundredreliable Stakhanovitesafforded an easy fixto the problemof representingthe "people." A 1949 reportabout the meeting on theoccasion of Stalin's70th birthday specifies, for example, that950 of the 1,800attendees were Stakhanovites.83 But theleadership still wanted to see mass participationin the celebrations,which would not featurea civiliandemonstration. Festivemeetings at workplacesand smallerindoor festivities in each ofthe districts were to symbolizethe people's involvement in suchcases. Duringthe last decade of Stalin'srule, the party leadership in theUkrainian capital could notprovide close ideologicalsupervision of such eventsand limitedits effortsto making surethat these meetings took place. The lastcase of failingto celebrateimportant anniversa- ries or majorpolitical events with a district-levelgathering was recordedon 22 February 1944 in Stalinskydistrict. That day 570 keyactivists of the district were supposed to assem- ble at theclub of theInstitute of Land Reclamationto celebrateRed ArmyDay. (Actually, thisholiday was celebratedon the23rd, but meetings in thedistricts always took place the daybefore the main event at theopera house). The districtparty committee distributed 500 invitationsto the largestenterprises and organizations,while the districtparty secretary personallyhanded in another70 invitationsto variouslocal dignitaries.Only 50 people showedup, all of themdistrict bureaucrats, and thefiasco triggered an investigationresult- ingin a numberof reprimands.84

80 Ibidem1/6/904, ark. 1. 81 DAKO 1/3/222,ark. 25-39. 82 Ibidem791/1/238, ark. 85. 83 TsDAHO 1/30/1348,ark. 54. 84 DAKO 1/3/222,ark. 6-7.

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Festivemeetings in smallerorganizations did noteven register on theauthorities' radar. Thosearranged in reaction to unexpectedpolitical events - as opposedto pre-plannedSoviet holidays- apparentlyturned into a pureformality. This is how one lower-levelparty organ- izer in 1946 describedthe mechanismof thesemeetings: "A phonecall comes fromthe district[party] committee to organizea meetingand have a reportready in two hours.But one mustprepare for a meeting."85In otherwords, almost no timewas leftfor the prepara- tionof speeches,a taskthat routinely fell to local partyand Komsomolorganizers. At the sametime, regular holidays in smallerorganizations were turning into communal gatherings withmeals that also featureda politicalspeech or two. As earlyas 1945,for example, the employeesof theKiev oblastcentral library marked Revolution Day witha communaldin- nerand thepurchase of giftsfor their children. By 1947 theywere arranging a communal breakfastbefore leaving to join thedemonstration. The workerscollected 920 rublesfor that aimand considered purchasing take-out meals from a restaurant.86 In additionto supervisingsuch celebrations in individualorganizations, holding (indoor) district-levelfestive meetings before all majorholidays, and gathering the district column for city-widedemonstrations, district authorities were also expectedto manageoccasional open- airrallies in response to selectpolitical events other than calendar holidays. As was thecase withfestive meetings, the party apparatus concentrated its attention on ensuringattendance. One case in June1945 sentan importantsignal to thecity's industrial managers and district bosses.Apparently overwhelmed by a stringof newholidays in 1945,Comrade Kanovsky, thedeputy director of Plant no. 768 - also knownas "Tochelektropribor,"a major producer of electricalequipment - refusedto sendworkers to participatein thedistrict-level festive rallyon the occasionof Transcarpathia'sofficial transfer from Czechoslovakia to Soviet Ukraine.Although Kanovsky argued that the plant was strugglingto meetproduction norms and armyorders could go unfulfilled,he was stillpunished with a severereprimand with a notationon hisparty record card.87 FollowingKhrushchev's intervention in January 1946, attendance at majorfestive events in thecapital was assured,but the leadership continued to worryabout the proper response fromaudiences. In preparationfor Artillery Day (23 November1946), secretaiy of thecity partycommittee Petro Matsui reminded district secretaries about a problemthat had oc- curredat an unspecifiedfestive meeting earlier that year: "At the last meeting[Sydir] Kovpakshouted a sloganbut no one followedsuit. I am toldthat there were preparations, butit all happenedbecause people fromthe districtstook seats in differentplaces. If the people weresitting around the comradesfrom their districts, such as the secretaryof the districtparty committee and the active,the districtsecretary could show an exampleand otherswould join in."88This arrangement,long used at partycongresses, was eventually replicatedat thelocal level. Massive open-airdemonstrations were more difficult to regiment.The filesof district partycommittees and party groups at variousorganizations show that mobilizing people for demonstrationswas a perennialconcern. Usually a weekbefore the two majorholidays, 1 May and 7 November,party and Komsomolgroups in workplacesheld meetingsthat in- variablyadopted resolutions calling "to ensure100-percent attendance" of employeesat the

85 Ibidem1/3/304, ark. 38. 86 Ibidem178/1/1, ark. 19-19 overleaf; 178/1/7, ark. 15. 87 Ibidem277/1/98, ark. ark. 29. 8 Ibidem1/3/308, ark. 128. SydirKovpak was a celebratedSoviet partisan commander, who after the waroccupied several prominent, albeit largely symbolic, government positions.

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demonstration.Sometimes party members were also expectedto bringtheir dependents or votersfrom the ward where they served as agitators.Either a factorydirector or partyor- ganizerwould then read the list of "right-flank"and "left-flank"keepers, who wererespon- sible formaintaining their row in thecolumn. Large enterprises would sometimesprovide trucksto bringin workers from distant suburbs.89 After1946 partydocuments register no incidentsof unsatisfactoryattendance at mass politicalevents. But therecords of the local administrationshow that lower-level bureau- cratsremained deeply concerned with popular participation as themost obvious marker of individualpolitical loyalties. In rarecases, when party or Komsomolmembers missed these eventswithout good reason,they were reprimanded.90Controlling the entirenon-party populationwas, of course,impossible, but those in theworkforce were expected to march and theoverwhelming majority of themdid. Archivalsources do not indicateany formal reproachor administrativeaction against non-party individuals failing to putin an appear- ance. The managementof industrialenterprises, however, sometimes identified groups that werelikely to showpoor attendance - primarilyyoung workers or, more specifically, young workersliving in dormitories.91This mostmobile group, which had littleto lose, required theorganizers' special attention. As manydemonstration participants afterwards headed out to informalparties involving drinking,the local authoritiesalso worriedabout saving all thebanners and signs.Getting these itemsready was the responsibilityof organizationsand enterprisesthat provided marchers.92Managers and partyorganizers entrusted the decorations only to themost reli- able partymembers, and eventhey received annual reminders about bringing them back in good shape.93The odd case ofdesignated sign-bearers declining this honor or botchingtheir taskwas classifiedas a manifestationof "anti-partybehavior." In 1952 a certainComrade Herasymenkofrom the "Bilshovyk" plant refused to acceptresponsibility for a largepicture mountedon a cartbecause this would involve bringing it back to theplant after the parade, thusjeopardizing his travel plans for later in theday. Even thoughhis motiveswere clearly non-ideological- in fact,Herasymenko offered instead to carrya smallerportrait of the SovietBelarusian leader, P. K. Ponomarenko- his actionswere subject to a partyinvestiga- tion.Taking into consideration Herasymenko's wartime service as an officerin the Red Army,his party colleagues preferred issuing a severereprimand with a notationon his party cardto outrightexpulsion.94 Withattendance firmly under their control, the authorities remained dissatisfied with the symbolicfunction of festivedemonstrations. Factory managers sometimes acknowledged thatthe most important thing for them was fortheir column "to pass by theplatform in an orderlymanner."95 But manymarchers failed to do eventhat. In preparationfor Revolution Day in 1952,the second secretary of the oblast party committee, Olha Ivashchenko,lectured thekey activists of the district party:

89 See forexample DAKO 1/24/2430,ark. 101-102; 1/23/4289,ark. 153-154; 282/1/6,ark. 58; 178/1/7,ark. 15; 5156/2/1,ark. 93; TsDAHO 1/24/1417,ark. 9-10, 247-248. 90 See, forexample, DAKO 282/1/5,ark. 44; 282/1/6,ark. 59; TsDAHO 1/24/2423,ark. 73-74; 1/24/2430,ark. 108. 91 TsDAHO 1/24/1417,ark. 9; 1/23/4289,ark. 154. 92 DAKO 5/5/895,ark. 3. 93 TsDAHO 1/24/1417,ark. 9, 248. 94 Ibidem1/24/2432, ark. 73-74. 95 Ibidem1/24/1417, ark. 9.

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"If districtsecretaries are going to conductconferences with party organizers, they need to men- tioncertain organizations that march in disorderlyfashion [neorganizovanno]. As a rule,we have good signs,and some districtcolumns march well, for example, that of Zhovtnevyand Zaliznychnydistricts. In some districtcolumns, such as thatof Stalinsky,the head walkswell andthe tail not so well.There are organizations that never respond to greetings[from the central platform].I believe the district secretary knows these organizations and theirparty organizers. You needto tellthem that their column marches particularly badly."96 As the Soviet economy slowly recoveredafter the war,the Ukrainian leadership increasingly stimulatedthe marchers' morale with extra food deliveries. Tacitly acknowledging that Stalin's citizens needed more than marchingpast the Politburoplatform to be joyful, the authoritiesgradually restoredthe prewar practice of increased consumptionon holidays. Festive food provisionshad come a long way since 1945, when 1 May was markedby the distributionof two kilogramsof potatoes to everyemployed Kievan and one kilogramto a dependant,as well as the issuing of a guaranteethat for two days the usual inferiorbread rationswould be replaced with white bread.97By 1952 food rationinghad ended, but the availability of cheap and diverse foodstuffremained an issue. That year the municipal authoritiesprepared for 7 November by supplyingshops by 5 November withan additional 520 tons of meat; 785 tons of sausage; 2,360 tons offish products;126 tons of cheese; 3,000 tons of sugar; 5.5 million litersof vodka; 10 million rubles' worthof wine; cotton fabric worth29 million; leatherfootwear worth 17.5 million; and expensive perfumeworth 1.5 millionrubles - and the listgoes on. For the benefitof Kievans working9:00 to 5:00, forthe threedays beforethe holiday all grocerystores were to be open until midnight,and other storesuntil 10:00 p.m.98Far fromkeeping silentabout these pragmaticholiday preparations, which one could read as an implicit"deal" between the powers thatbe and the people, the press trumpetedthem as evidence of risingliving standards.99 These consumeristinfusions were clearly meant to raise the citizens' mood before the holidays, and lower-level functionarieswould sometimes say as much. For instance,the partyorganizer at the Administrationof Liquor Industrycentral office, Comrade Lazebna, spoke in 1946 of ensuringdeliveries of food and goods in order"to create a holiday feeling in our collective."100High-ranking functionaries could not be caught using the same lan- guage, but they relied on similar measures to frameparades in the Ukrainian capital as popular fetes.In this,too, the municipalauthorities had come a long way since 1946, when theyfirst discussed the idea of settingup soda kiosks at public events.101By 1952 some 800 kiosks and stands were serving participantsof demonstrations,selling books and helium balloons in additionto food and beverages.102This numberdid not include officecafeteria and workers' canteens,all of which opened early- and witha festivemenu - on the morn- ing of the demonstrationday.103 To accommodate marchersand spectators,for three days startingon 6 November the city food industryproduced greatlyincreased amounts of ice

96 DAKO 5/5/895,ark. 2. 97 Ibidem1/3/201, ark. 40. 98 Ibidem1/1 1/661, ark. 49-54; 5/5/938,ark. 29-32. 99 See, forexample, Kyivskapravda (14 October1950) p. 2; (5 November1950) p. 3. 100 DAKO 5156/1/3,ark. 7. 101 Ibidem1/3/304, ark. 29. 102 Ibidem1/11/661, ark. 53. 103 Ibidem5/5/895, ark. 4.

This content downloaded from 208.67.143.49 on Sun, 25 May 2014 06:02:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PublicCelebrations inSoviet Ukraine under Stalin (Kiev, 1943-1953) 19 cream(120 tons),cakes (45,000), boxes of candy(38,000), and bottlesof lemonadeor root beer(210,000).104 But by turningofficial holidays into popular fêtes, the authoritieswere implicitlyac- knowledgingthat the holiday crowds were celebrating Soviet achievements by enjoyingnew opportunitiesfor consumption. This, of course,tainted the symbolic interaction between the peopleand the leadership. Instead of rejoicingin a genuineexpression of theirinner Soviet selves,marchers could be viewedas thankingthe central platform for goods obtainedand foodconsumed. Yet, itis tellingthat this concern does notregister in ideologicaldocuments of thetime. This indicatesthe increasingly ritualized character of Stalinistpolitical life in whichthe act of "thankingStalin" was moreimportant than the exact object of thesethanks andwhether the gratitude was sincere. The mass spectaclesof Stalinistfestivals in SovietUkraine were intended to inculcatea newcollective memory that would combine socialist and ethnic components. The authorities graduallydowngraded the importanceof the victory,for it was to be seen as yet another symbolicgift from Stalin and the party, rather than an achievementof the people. Although individualwar experiencesremained paramount as the supremeproof of allegianceto the system,the victory's prominent place amongSoviet holidays was rapidlyeroding. In addi- tionto theirimportance in theformation of collectivememory, holidays functioned as sites of symbolicinteraction between the authorities and thepeople. During the first decade after Kiev's liberation,however, the Ukrainianleadership was repeatedlyfrustrated first by "spontaneity,"and then by the masses' failureto displayproper discipline. In theend, those who wereviewing parades and launchingfestive meetings had to settlefor their increased ritualizationaccompanied by thebribing of participantswith increased deliveries of food and clothing.With the most recent page of Ukraine'shistory, at once tragicand heroic,not reflectedin the holidaycanon, Soviet celebrationswere becomingincreasingly divorced frompeople's life experiences.

Summary

This articleexamines mass celebrations in SovietUkraine during 1943-1953 with the aim of ana- lyzingpostwar evolution, inner tensions, and identity-shapingfeatures of the Stalinistcalendar of holidays.Public celebrations are interpretedhere as politicaland culturalpractices establishing citi- zens' symbolicrelationship to thestate. There were, however, numerous challenges to suchsymbolic interactionin theUkrainian capital of Kiev. New liberationdates conflicted with old revolutionary holidaysand eventsspecific to Ukrainecompeted with all-Union festivals. In addition,the Ukrainian leadershipconstantly struggled with "spontaneity" and the lack of disciplinedisplayed by ordinary peopleduring the festivities. By theend of Stalin'slast decade the authorities systematized their cele- bratorycanon by downgradingwar-related holidays while promoting festivals aimed at thestrength- eningof a SovietUkrainian identity. The symbolicfunction of celebrations, however, was corruptedby massivedeliveries of food and goods in daysleading up to majorfestivals.

104 Ibidem1/11/661, ark. 51-52.

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