Jon Craig and William Allan the Concept of Tax Expenditures Was De
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FISCAL TRANSPARENCY, TAX EXPENDITURES, AND BUDGET PROCESSES: AN 1 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE Jon Craig and William Allan The concept of tax expenditures was developed in the United States and Germany in the 1960s and spread to a significant number of OECD countries in the 1980s. There has been a renewed international interest of late, with Brazil and Korea and a few non-OECD members adopting the practice of reporting tax expenditures to the public. This paper outlines the work being initiated through the IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency to promote the tax expenditure concept as a standard feature of national budget presentation. A. Fiscal Transparency and Tax Expenditures The international community has sought to promote more openness about the conduct of fiscal and other policies in member countries. To that end, the Fund staff developed a Code of Good Practices in Fiscal Transparency that was initially approved by the Executive Board of the Fund in April 1998, and a slightly modified version was approved by the Board on March 26, 2001. The fiscal transparency code defines a set of specific principles, and, under each of these principles, a set of operational good practices.2 Member countries implement the code on a voluntary basis. Countries indicate their commitment to transparency by participating in a Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), which involves, first, consideration of their practices against a self-assessment questionnaire and then an assessment by IMF staff against each of the good practices defined in the code, including suggestions of priority areas to improve transparency. ROSCs will be periodically updated as part of the Fund’s regular consultation with the authorities (surveillance). Transparency and tax expenditures. Major emphasis is given in the fiscal transparency code to achieving good practices in presenting the conventional budget and accounts data in a timely, reliable, and analytically meaningful way. The code goes beyond this, however: it aims to extend the 1 The authors wish to thank Messrs. Emil Sunley, John Crotty, Michael Keen, Howell Zee and other colleagues from the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) of the IMF for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The views expressed are those of the authors, however. 2 A regularly updated overview of work on promoting standards and codes (including the fiscal transparency code) by the IMF, in conjunction with the World Bank and other international agencies, is given on the IMF website through the Standards & Codes page http://www.imf.org/external/standards/index.htm. sesion 3- conferencistas-Allan.prn January 28, 2002 (3:43 PM) - 2 - coverage of fiscal information to cover all fiscal activity and to extend the information horizon over a longer timeframe, rather than simply improve practices in what governments presently choose to put in the public budget and accounts. It specifically covers reporting on the use of tax concessions as an alternative to spending programs similar to that originally proposed by Surrey (1973). Section 2.1.3 of the code advocates that “statements describing the nature and fiscal significance of central government contingent liabilities and tax expenditures, and of quasi-fiscal activities, should be part of the budget documentation.” More generally, the code (section 3.1.1) seeks clarity in statements of fiscal policy, including tax policy. Within the industrial world, there is a continuing need to document tax expenditures in a more systematic and internationally comparable manner, both to facilitate budget discipline and to foster tax reforms that seek to attain the advantages of broad tax bases and low statutory rates. The importance of tax expenditures has been also growing within developing countries, and an increasing reliance on inefficient incentives (tax holidays, indirect tax exemptions, and geographical incentives) has been observed, 3 particularly among the countries that are least integrated into the international capital markets. Of particular concern is the evidence of regional patterns to the incentives offered by countries, suggesting the advent of unhelpful competitive “copycat” behavior and pointing to the desirability of greater regional coordination. Staff recommendations on implementing tax expenditure budgeting through the transparency manual and individual ROSCs,4 have thus far been largely confined to suggesting preliminary work on estimating revenue foregone through tax concessions with reference to practices pursued by various OECD countries. It has become clear that more precise guidelines need to be developed. In the absence of an agreed standard definition, neither tax expenditures nor the benchmarks against which they should be measured are clearly defined. Moreover, no clear guidance is provided from country practice on how such estimates might best be integrated into the budget process. The fiscal transparency framework may avoid some of the contention that has surrounded debate among some OECD countries on these issues, since it is specifically concerned with the promotion of open budget processes and the code clearly separates transparency 5 objectives from tax policy arguments. 3 See Tanzi and Zee (2000). 4 See http://www.imf.org/external/standards/index.htm. 5 Some of the literature on tax expenditures in the budget process tends to advocate a particular view of tax policy rather than simply promoting transparency in tax policy and budget decisions. Thus, to some, Surrey’s original rationale for introducing tax expenditures gave strong emphasis to the policy goal of eliminating tax preferences, implicitly supporting a pure form of the Haig Simons concept of comprehensive income as the appropriate basis for tax policy. Similarly, over the years, there have been many critics of this concept including Bartlett (2001), who noted the lack of conceptual and methodological consistency but again advocated a particular and very different view of the appropriate basis for tax policy. - 3 - B. Tax Expenditure Benchmarks and International Experience In considering the present state of tax expenditure estimation in member countries four main points emerge. First, and most importantly, the data available are sparse. Only about a tenth of the present Fund membership of 183 countries produces any tax expenditure estimates. In the context of the fiscal transparency code, Table 1, drawn from ROSCs that have been completed and other published information on transparency, shows that few countries other than a number of the advanced economies report tax expenditures—and these countries also make extensive use of other off-budget mechanisms to conduct fiscal policy. Second, as discussed below, the variety of approaches used makes international comparisons very difficult and obscures analysis of the tax and budget issues that are a central reason for making such estimates. Third, the range of taxes covered by those that produce estimates is not complete. Very few countries make any assessment of tax expenditures under social security contribution arrangements or of those made through the smaller indirect taxes (such as motor vehicle taxes or excises), and none of the countries attempts an assessment of tax expenditures from taxes on international trade. Finally, tax expenditure data most often do not cover the total general (central and subnational) government sector of any country. While subnational governments in a number of countries produce tax expenditure data, it is not complete or readily available in any centralized form and, therefore, is very difficult to utilize in compiling a picture of tax expenditures by the general government sector. Tax expenditures are measured as deviations against a “normal tax structure” or benchmark. In the literature, there is considerable discussion of the appropriate concept of a tax benchmark. When the concept was being developed in the United States in the 1960s, the Haig Simons comprehensive income base was the preferred option. However, this discussion was framed against the background of the importance of the personal and corporate income tax within the federal budget. Other bases have been proposed including a labor income base, and expenditure or consumption base, and a lifetime’s consumption approach. All have proponents and detractors, but none is seen as entirely satisfactory.6 In order to define their benchmarks, countries generally use three broad approaches: (i) a conceptual approach which seeks to link the benchmark to a “normal tax structure,” the most important being the Haig Simons concept for income taxes and, in some cases, the concept of a “pure” VAT baseline; (ii) a reference law approach which uses a country’s existing tax law as a basis to define both the benchmark (for example, income subject to tax) and the concessions giving rise to tax expenditures; and (iii) an approach that seeks 6 The Canada Department of Finance (2000) budget document summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of different benchmark concepts. - 4 - Table 1. Reporting Off-budget Fiscal Activity Country 1/ Tax Expenditures Contingent Liabilities Quasi-fiscal Activities Developing Economies Cameroon No No No Honduras No No No but small Mozambique No No No but small Papua New Guinea No No No and sizeable Tunisia No No No; unknown Uganda No No No; unknown Zambia No No and sizeable Transition Economies Azerbaijan No No* No and sizeable Armenia No No No and sizeable Bulgaria No 2/ No 2/ No; /2 unknown Estonia No No No but small Kyrgyz Republic