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FREEDOM of EXPRESSION in WARTIME " Thomas I

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FREEDOM of EXPRESSION in WARTIME FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN WARTIME " THomAs I. EMERSON t War and preparation for war create serious strains on a system of freedom of expression. Emotions run high, lowering the degree of rationality which is required to make such a system viable. It becomes more difficult to hold the rough give-and-take of controlled controversy within constructive bounds. Immediate events assume greater importance; long-range considerations are pushed to the back- ground. The need for consensus appears more urgent in the context of dealing with hostile outsiders. Cleavage seems to be more dan- gerous, and dissent more difficult to distinguish from actual aid to the enemy. In this volatile area the constitutional guarantee of free and open discussion is put to its most severe test. It is not surprising, therefore, that throughout our history periods of war tension have been marked by serious infringements on freedom of expression. The most violent attacks upon the right to free speech occurred in the years of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the approach to the Civil War, the Civil War itself, and World War I-all times of war or near-war.1 Yet it was not until the end of World War I that judicial application of the first amendment played any significant role in these events. Up to this point there had been no major decision by the Supreme Court applying the guarantees of the first amendment. Then, in 1919, the Court issued the first of a series of decisions dealing with federal and state legislation that had been enacted to restrict free expression during the war, and thus began the long development of first amendment doctrine. During World War II, in contrast to prior wartime periods, freedom of speech to oppose the war or criticize its conduct was not seriously infringed. This unusual turn of events may have been due, in part, to the increasing judicial protection afforded free expression through the first amendment, particularly by the liberal decisions which began in 1930 under the Hughes Court, and the ensuing education of public opinion that those decisions engendered. Some of these gains * This article is a chapter in a forthcoming book on freedom of expression. t Lines Professor of Law, Yale University. A.B. 1928, LL.B. 1931, Yale Uni- versity. 1 For a collection of materials dealing with these periods, see 1 T. EMERsoN, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CiviL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 35-38 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as POLITIcAL AND CiviL RIGHTS]. (975) 976 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.l16:975 were lost during the McCarthy era in the early 1950's, which coincided with the hostilities in Korea. On the whole, however, the free speech issues of that period did not relate directly to the war itself, but rather to a more general fear of Communism within the United States. At the present time, during the Vietnam hostilities, the contro- versy over freedom of speech in wartime has moved to another level. The general right to oppose the war by speech is fully recognized, but there are, as always, serious problems of realizing in practice the acknowledged rights guaranteed in theory. More important, however, new modes of opposition have developed which raise different issues concerning the border area between expression and action. The purpose of this article is to explore some of these questions, employing first amendment doctrines I have proposed elsewhere.2 In briefest summary, the thesis of these doctrines is that maintenance of a system of freedom of expression requires recognition of the distinc- tion between those forms of conduct which should be classified as "expression" and those which should be classified as "action"; and that conduct classifiable as "expression!' is entitled to complete protection against governmental infringement, while "action" is subject to reason- able and non-discriminatory regulation designed to achieve a legitimate social objective. Under this theory, "expression" is functionally de- fined. The definition is based upon the individual and social purposes served by freedom of expression in a democratic society; upon the administrative requirements for maintaining an effective system of free expression in actual operation; and upon the proposition that, normally, harm inheres not in such conduct itself, but resides only in the ensuing "action." This theory requires the court to determine in every case whether the conduct involved is "expression," and, if so, whether such expression has been infringed by the exercise of govern- mental authority. Where the court so finds, the regulation must be declared invalid under the first amendment. The test is not one of clear and present danger, of incitement or balancing of interests. The balance of interests was struck when the first amendment was put into the Constitution. The function of a court in applying the first amend- ment is to define the key terms of that provision: "speech" (or ex- pression), "abridge," and "law." The definitions of "abridge" and "law," like the definition of "expression," must be functional in char- acter, derived from the basic considerations underlying a system of freedom of expression. Where the court finds that "expression" is 2 T. EmERsoN, TowiiuD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FiRST AMENDMENT (1966). The material was first published in an article of the same title in 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963). 1968] FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN WARTIME "abridged" by "law," the doctrine of full protection for expression must be applied. This article deals with the main problem areas concerning freedom of expression as it relates to war and defense.3 These areas include (1) the law of treason; (2) general criticism of the war effort; (3) more specific forms of expression which may lead to insubordina- tion in the armed forces, obstruction of recruitment, or resistance to conscription; (4) other forms of protest; and (5) practical problems of protecting wartime dissent against illegitimate harassment. Issues relating to marches and demonstrations, issues which do not differ greatly from those involved in the right of assembly generally, are not covered here. I. THE LAW OF TREASON Historically, one of the major legal weapons employed by govern- ments to protect themselves against external and internal dangers has been the crime of treason. In England before the nineteenth century, and to a lesser extent in the American colonies, treason was given a very broad definition. It was used to eliminate almost any form of political opposition, violent or peaceful, by action or by utterance. When the American revolutionaries came to draw up the Constitution they took particular care to give the crime of treason a limited meaning and 8 One factor requires brief notice here. When dealing with freedom of expression connected with war or defense, there must be some delineation of the boundaries be- tween the civilian and military sectors of our society. Generally speaking, the military sector embraces the conduct of military operations and the internal governance of the military establishment. The latter includes the military law governing the armed forces, martial law, and military government of occupied territory. This military system is outside the civilian system of freedom of expression and is subject to different rules. See generally, Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-Martial Convictions, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 40 (1961); Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 181 (1962) ; Note, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial,64 COLUm. L. REv. 127 (1964) ; Note, The Court of Military Appeals and the Bill of Rights: A New Look, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 435 (1967) ; Note, Servicemen in Civilian Courts, 76 YALE L.J. 380 (1966). The problem, then, is to determine when civilian expression enters the domain of the military, and when members of the military are under the protection of the civilian system. Some of the points of contact are clear. Certainly, general discussion of the organization, procedures or operations of the military by civilians is well within the system of free expression, indeed is essential to maintaining the principle of civilian control. Similarly, expression dealing with all facets of the civilian economy which supplies the armed forces is part of the civilian sector. On the other hand, communi- cations dealing with military movements in wartime are plainly subject to military censorship. Likewise, dissemination of information classified as a military secret is subject to controls based on the requirements of the military system, although the issue of what constitutes a military secret may be subject to civilian judicial review. Access to military installations for purposes of exercising the right of free speech is also subject to different rules than is access to non-military public places. More difficult questions involve the extent to which civilian communication can be addressed across the border to members of the military, as in the insubordination cases, and the rights of a member of the military to enjoy the benefits of the free expression system when temporarily acting in a civilian capacity. 978 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.l16:975 to surround it with procedural safeguards. The provision they in- cluded in the Constitution, one of the few protections for individual rights embodied in the original document, reads as follows: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.4 Thus, the crime of treason is given an express constitutional definition which cannot be extended by any act of the legislature or judiciary.
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