Written Statement Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor of Public Interest
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Reflections on Murder, Misdemeanors, and Madison Jonathan Turley
Hofstra Law Review Volume 28 | Issue 2 Article 6 1999 Reflections on Murder, Misdemeanors, and Madison Jonathan Turley Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Turley, Jonathan (1999) "Reflections on Murder, Misdemeanors, and Madison," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 28: Iss. 2, Article 6. Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol28/iss2/6 This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Turley: Reflections on Murder, Misdemeanors, and Madison REFLECTIONS ON MURDER, MISDEMEANORS, AND MADISON Jonathan Turley* I. INTRODUCTION Few crimes seem to concentrate the mind more than simple mur- der. Certainly, murder was on the minds of many of the academics testi- fying in the Clinton impeachment hearing While this offense was never seriously alleged during the scandal, it was very much a concern for academics advocating the "executive function theory. 2 Under this theory, a President could only be impeached for acts related to his of- fice, as opposed to purely personal acts.' Since the impeachment of President Clinton raised matters arguably related to his personal mis- conduct, various academics insisted that the allegations fell outside of * J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law at George Washington University of Law School. 1. See Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitutionof the House Comm. -
American Bolsheviki: the Beginnings of the First Red Scare, 1917 to 1918
Steeplechase: An ORCA Student Journal Volume 3 Issue 2 Article 4 2019 American Bolsheviki: The Beginnings of the First Red Scare, 1917 to 1918 Jonathan Dunning Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.murraystate.edu/steeplechase Part of the European History Commons, Other History Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Dunning, Jonathan (2019) "American Bolsheviki: The Beginnings of the First Red Scare, 1917 to 1918," Steeplechase: An ORCA Student Journal: Vol. 3 : Iss. 2 , Article 4. Available at: https://digitalcommons.murraystate.edu/steeplechase/vol3/iss2/4 This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the The Office of Research and Creative Activity at Murray State's Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Steeplechase: An ORCA Student Journal by an authorized editor of Murray State's Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. American Bolsheviki: The Beginnings of the First Red Scare, 1917 to 1918 Abstract A consensus has developed among historians that widespread panic consumed the American public and government as many came to fear a Bolshevik coup of the United States government and the undermining of the American way of life beginning in early 1919. Known as the First Red Scare, this period became one of the most well-known episodes of American fear of Communism in US history. With this focus on the events of 1919 to 1920, however, historians of the First Red Scare have often ignored the initial American reaction to the October Revolution in late 1917 and throughout 1918. -
Trials Under the Espionage and Sedition Acts During World War I
Where was the First Amendment? Trials Under the Espionage and Sedition Acts During WWI by Kathryn Horrocks HST 499 June 2, 2005 First Reader: Dr. Jensen Second Reader: Dr. Lowe Before the passage of the Espionage and Sedition Acts of 1917 and 1918, the United States government sought to curb anti-war efforts with prosecutions under remaining Civil War conspiracy statutes. However, these statutes were not effective on persons acting or speaking out against the war alone because by definition a conspiracy requires more than one person. 1 To close these loopholes and successfully control public discussions and actions that may have harmed the war effort, Congress passed the Espionage Act in June of 1917 2. This Act censored speech, behavior and publication of information that intended to undermine the US war effort, or aid her enemies.3 However, this element of intent allowed some anti-war speech to go unpunished. Occasional acquittals under the Espionage Act, and violence against political dissidents prompted congress to pass the Sedition Act almost a year later. The Sedition Act was very similar to the Espionage Act, except for the inclusion of a section which forbid the utterance or publication of “disloyal, scurrilous or abusive language” regarding the US, her flag, her military or her government. 4 This closed the loophole created by the element of intent, and its effect was to “ban dissent of any kind.”5 These Acts and their effects came into direct conflict with the First Amendment of the Constitution which clearly prevents congress from “abridging 1 Shirley J Burton, “The Espionage and Sedition Acts of 1917 and 1918: Sectional Interpretations in the United States District Courts of Illinois,” Illinois Historical Journal 87(1) (1994), 41. -
Interrogation's Law
THEYAEAW JOUNA WILLIAM RANNEY LEVI Interrogation's Law ABSTRACT. Conventional wisdom states that recent U.S. authorization of coercive interrogation techniques, and the legal decisions that sanctioned them, constitute a dramatic break with the past. This is false. U.S. interrogation policy well prior to 9/11 has allowed a great deal more flexibility than the high-minded legal prohibitions of coercive tactics would suggest: all interrogation methods allegedly authorized since 9/11, with the possible exception of waterboarding, have been authorized before. The conventional wisdom thus elides an intrinsic characteristic of all former and current laws on interrogation: they are vague and contestable, and thus, when context so demands, manipulable. A U TH O R. Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2oo; Stanford University, B.A. 2006. Three individuals were central to the development of this project. Jack L. Goldsmith offered invaluable guidance from the beginning; I could not ask for a better mentor. Owen M. Fiss graciously supported this project, providing thoughtful comments and helpful criticism. Harold H. Koh consulted and advised throughout; I am immensely grateful for his encouragement. I am thankful to Mariano-Florentino Cullar, Jeremy M. Licht, Martin S. Lederman, David F. Levi, and Benjamin Wittes. This Note was completed before the Justice Department released four additional memoranda on April 16, 2009. 1434 NOTE CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1436 1. THE LAW'S LATITUDE: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TO THE PRESENT 1442 A. Law and Interrogation: The Central Intelligence Agency 1443 1. The Torture Statute 1444 2. The Fifth Amendment 1448 3. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and the Military Commissions Act 1452 B. -
The National Emergencies Act of 1976 Hearing Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives
THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT OF 1976 HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION FEBRUARY 28, 2019 Serial No. 116–5 Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary ( Available http://judiciary.house.gov or www.govinfo.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 37–840 WASHINGTON : 2019 VerDate Sep 11 2014 04:06 Oct 12, 2019 Jkt 037840 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 E:\HR\OC\B840.XXX B840 dlhill on DSKBBY8HB2PROD with HEARING COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY JERROLD NADLER, New York, Chairman ZOE LOFGREN, California DOUG COLLINS, Georgia, SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas Ranking Member STEVE COHEN, Tennessee F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia Wisconsin THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida STEVE CHABOT, Ohio KAREN BASS, California LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana JIM JORDAN, Ohio HAKEEM S. JEFFRIES, New York KEN BUCK, Colorado DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California MARTHA ROBY, Alabama TED LIEU, California MATT GAETZ, Florida JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington ANDY BIGGS, Arizona VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida TOM MCCLINTOCK, California J. LUIS CORREA, California DEBBIE LESKO, Arizona MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania, GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania Vice-Chair BEN CLINE, Virginia SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas KELLY ARMSTRONG, North Dakota JOE NEGUSE, Colorado W. GREGORY STEUBE, Florida LUCY MCBATH, Georgia GREG STANTON, Arizona MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania DEBBIE MUCARSEL-POWELL, Florida VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas PERRY APELBAUM, Majority Staff Director & Chief Counsel BRENDAN BELAIR, Minority Staff Director SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES STEVE COHEN, Tennessee, Chair JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana, ERIC SWALWELL, California Ranking Member MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania JIM JORDAN, Ohio SYLVIA R. -
Espionage Act of 1917
Communication Law Review An Analysis of Congressional Arguments Limiting Free Speech Laura Long, University of Oklahoma The Alien and Sedition Acts, Espionage and Sedition Acts, and USA PATRIOT Act are all war-time acts passed by Congress which are viewed as blatant civil rights violations. This study identifies recurring arguments presented during congressional debates of these acts. Analysis of the arguments suggests that Terror Management Theory may explain why civil rights were given up in the name of security. Further, the citizen and non-citizen distinction in addition to political ramifications are discussed. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 are considered by many as gross violations of civil liberties and constitutional rights. John Miller, in his book, Crisis in Freedom, described the Alien and Sedition Acts as a failure from every point of view. Miller explained the Federalists’ “disregard of the basic freedoms of Americans [completed] their ruin and cost them the confidence and respect of the people.”1 John Adams described the acts as “an ineffectual attempt to extinguish the fire of defamation, but it operated like oil upon the flames.”2 Other scholars have claimed that the acts were not simply unwise policy, but they were unconstitutional measures.3 In an article titled “Order vs. Liberty,” Larry Gragg argued that they were blatantly against the First Amendment protections outlined only seven years earlier.4 Despite popular opinion that the acts were unconstitutional and violated basic civil liberties, arguments used to pass the acts have resurfaced throughout United States history. Those arguments seek to instill fear in American citizens that foreigners will ultimately be the demise to the United States unless quick and decisive action is taken. -
National Security and Statutory Interpretation
SMU Law Review Volume 53 Issue 1 Article 9 2000 Through a Looking Glass Darkly: National Security and Statutory Interpretation Jonathan Turley Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr Recommended Citation Jonathan Turley, Through a Looking Glass Darkly: National Security and Statutory Interpretation, 53 SMU L. REV. 205 (2000) https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol53/iss1/9 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. THROUGH A LOOKING GLASS DARKLY: NATIONAL SECURITY AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION Jonathan Turley* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 206 II. AREA 51: A CASE STUDY OF THE GRAVITATIONAL EFFECT OF THE COMMON LAW ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY AREA ......................... 210 A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND .............................. 210 B. RELEVANT LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND JUDICIAL R ULINGS .............................................. 214 C. THE GRAVITATIONAL EFFECT OF THE COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE ON THE ANALYSIS IN KASZA AND FRosT ................................................. 219 III. THE INTERPLAY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE COMMON LAW IN THE AREA 51 LITIGATION ............................ 221 A. THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE COMPANY OF THE COMMON LAW ..................... 222 B. PREEMPTION AND JUDICIAL CHOICE: THE USE OF COMMON LAW AS AN OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE ELEMENT IN THE FROST CASE ........................ 228 C. THE ADOPTION OF AN ABSOLUTE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN THE AREA 51 LITIGATION .............. 231 IV. THE LEGISPRUDENCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE COMMON LAW ............................. 237 A. THE DIALOGIC EFFECT OF THE COMMON LAW IN THE AREA OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION .............. -
Statement of Geoffrey R. Stone Edward H
Statement of Geoffrey R. Stone Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law The University of Chicago Hearing on the Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives December 16, 2010 The proposed SHIELD Act1 would amend the Espionage Act of 19172 to make it a crime for any person knowingly and willfully to disseminate, in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States, “any classified information . concerning the human intelligence activities of the United States or . concerning the identity of a classified source or informant” working with the intelligence community of the United States. Although the Act might be constitutional as applied to a government employee who “leaks” such classified material, it is plainly unconstitutional as applied to other individuals who might publish or otherwise disseminate such information. With respect to such other individuals, the Act violates the First Amendment unless, at the very least, it is expressly limited to situations in which the individual knows that the dissemination of the classified material poses a clear and present danger of grave harm to the nation. The clear and present danger standard, in varying forms, has been a central element of our First Amendment jurisprudence ever since Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes first enunciated it in his 1919 opinion in Schenk v. United States.3 In the 90 years since Schenck, the precise meaning of “clear and present danger” has shifted,4 but the principle that animates the standard was stated eloquently by Justice Louis D. -
The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years
The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years David M. Rabbant TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Free Speech Before the Courts 522 A. Supreme Court Cases 524 I. Avoiding First Amendment Issues 525 Resisting Incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment 525 Excluding Publications from the Mails 526 Neglecting First Amendment Issues 529 Limiting the Meaning of Speech 531 2. Addressing First Amendment Issues 533 Justice Holmes and the Bad Tendency of Speech 533 Review of Statutes Penalizing Speech 536 The First Amendment as the Embodiment of English Common Law 539 3. Hints of Protection 540 4. Summary 542 B. Decisions Based on State Law 543 1. The Bad Tendency Doctrine 543 Speech by Radicals 543 Obscenity and Public Morals 548 2. Libel 550 3. Political Speech 551 4. Labor Injunctions 553 5. Speech in Public Places 555 C. The Judicial Tradition 557 t Counsel, American Association of University Professors. 514 Prewar Free Speech II. Legal Scholarship 559 A. The Social Interest in Free Speech 563 B. The Distinction Between Public and Private Speech 564 1. Schofield's Formulation of the Distinction 564 2. Other Scholarly Support for the Distinction 566 C. The Expanding Conception of Free Speech 568 D. The Rejection of Blackstone 570 E. The Limits of Protected Speech 572 1. The Direct Incitement Test 572 2. Pound's Balancing Test 575 3. Schroeder's Test of Actual Injury 576 4. The Benefits of LibertarianStandards 578 F. The Heritage of Prewar Scholarship 579 III. The Role of the Prewar Tradition in the Early Develop- ment of Modern First Amendment Doctrine 579 A. -
The First and the Second
The First and the Second ____________________________ Kah Kin Ho APPROVED: ____________________________ Alin Fumurescu, Ph.D. Committee Chair ___________________________ Jeremy D. Bailey, Ph.D. __________________________ Jeffrey Church, Ph.D. ________________________________ Antonio D. Tillis, Ph.D. Dean, College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences Department of Hispanic Studies The Second and the First, An Examination into the Formation of the First Official Political Parties Under John Adams Kah Kin Ho Current as of 1 May, 2020 2 Introduction A simple inquiry into the cannon of early American history would reveal that most of the scholarly work done on the presidency of John Adams has mostly been about two things. The first, are the problems associated with his “characteristic stubbornness” and his tendencies to be politically isolated (Mayville, 2016, pg. 128; Ryerson, 2016, pg. 350). The second, is more preoccupied with his handling of foreign relations, since Adams was seemingly more interested in those issues than the presidents before and after him (DeConde, 1966, pg. 7; Elkin and McKitrick, 1993, pg. 529). But very few have attempted to examine the correlation between the two, or even the consequences the two collectively considered would have domestically. In the following essay, I will attempt to do so. By linking the two, I will try to show that because of these two particularities, he ultimately will— however unintentionally— contribute substantially to the development of political parties and populism. In regard to his personality, it is often thought that he was much too ambitious and self- righteous to have been an ideal president in the first place. -
PILOT the Evolution, Exercise, and Extent of Free Speech in US History
PILOT TEACHING CIVICS through HISTORY The Evolution, Exercise, and Extent of Free Speech in US History (Middle School) by John McNamara and Ron Nash OVERVIEW This unit is one of the Gilder Lehrman Institute’s Teaching Civics through History resources, designed to align to the Common Core State Standards. The lessons can also be modified to conform to the C3 Framework. These units were developed to provide students with foundational knowledge of the historical roots of current civic and social issues facing their communities and the nation while building their literacy, research, and critical thinking skills. By connecting the past with current events, the program will 1) enable students to understand that history is made of up individual actions, 2) empower students to develop their civic voices and encourage them to take civic action, and 3) help students recognize their ability to influence history in their own communities and nationwide. In this unit, over the course of one to two weeks, students will learn and practice literacy skills that will help them develop knowledgeable and well-reasoned points of view on the history of freedom of speech in the United States. They will examine and assess primary and secondary sources, demonstrate what they have learned through their analysis and assessment of the primary sources by writing a response to essential questions posed in the unit, engage in an analysis of current news articles written from different perspectives using materials presented by the AllSides.com website, and then develop a civic engagement project that integrates their knowledge of freedom of speech in the past and today. -
Written Statement Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor of Public Interest
Written Statement Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law George Washington University "The President's Constitutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the Laws" Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives 2141 Rayburn House Office Building December 3, 2013 Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and members of the Judiciary Committee, my name is Jonathan Turley and I am a law professor at George Washington University where I hold the J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Chair of Public Interest Law. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the constitutional concerns raised by recent nonenforcement polices and the President’s duty to faithfully execute the law of the United States. The issue before the Committee is clearly a difficult one. It is often difficult to separate the merits of the underlying policies from the means used to achieve them. It so happens that I agree with many of the goals of the Administration in the various areas where the President has circumvented Congress. However, in the Madisonian system, it is often more important how you do things than what you do. We have long benefited from a system designed to channel and transform factional interests in the political system. When any branch encroaches upon the authority of another, it not only introduces instability into the system but leaves political issues raw and unresolved. However, to paraphrase one of Benjamin Franklin’s favorite sayings, the Constitution helps those branches that help themselves. Each branch is given the tools to defend itself and the Framers assumed that they would have the ambition and institutional self-interest to use them.