Metaphors in the Construction of Theory: Ramus, Peirce and the American Mind Laurel Warren Trufant University of New Hampshire, Durham

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Metaphors in the Construction of Theory: Ramus, Peirce and the American Mind Laurel Warren Trufant University of New Hampshire, Durham University of New Hampshire University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository Doctoral Dissertations Student Scholarship Winter 1990 Metaphors in the construction of theory: Ramus, Peirce and the American mind Laurel Warren Trufant University of New Hampshire, Durham Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation Recommended Citation Trufant, Laurel Warren, "Metaphors in the construction of theory: Ramus, Peirce and the American mind" (1990). Doctoral Dissertations. 1634. https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation/1634 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. 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Ann Arbor, MI 48106 METAPHORS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THEORY: Ramus, Peirce and the American Mind BY Laurel Warren Trufant B. A., University of New Hampshire, 1970 M. A., University of New Hampshire, 1972 DISSERTATION Submitted to the University- of New Hampshire in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History December, 1990 This dissertation has been examined and approved. Dissertation co-director, Robert M. Mennel Professor of History 3 ^ \ v f 4 n ________________________ Dissertation co-director, Donald J. Wilcox Professor of History __________________ Charles E. Clark, Professor of History U L M j ^ w l K' iWvog________________________ William R. Jones, Professor of History Six« Robert C.Gilmore, Professor of History ____________ Valentine R. Dusek, Associate Professor of Philosophy ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 1990 Laurel Warren Trufant To Donald J. Wilcox The brightest mind and the gentlest soul I've ever encountered. "If I do anything it will be his work." CP 3.405 i v TABLE OF CONTENTS DEDICATION...............................................iv ABSTRACT......................... vi PROLOGUE................................................. 1 Chapter 1 - CHANGING PLACES: Metaphors in the Construction of Theory...................... 4 Chapter 2 - LAW AND ORDER IN THE OLD WEST: Logical Metaphors in European Legal Models.................. 60 Chapter 3 - ARISTOTLE. RAMUS and BA00N: Logical Metaphors in English Scientific Models............... 96 Chapter 4 - ARISTOTLE. RAMUS and DESCARTES: Logical Metaphors in French Scientific Models............... 131 Chapter 5 - RAMUS. LEIBNIZ and WOLFF: Logical Metaphors in German Scientific Models............... 160 Chapter 6 - RAMUS IN THE NEW WORLD: Logical Metaphors in a Colonial Environment................. 210 Chapter 7 - ORDER IN THE COURT: The Logic of Law in America............................... 252 Chapter 8 - BACON and RAMUS: The Logic of Science in America........................... 296 Chapter 9 - RAMUS. LEIBNIZ and PEIRCE; Metaphors of Continuity in Pragmatic Thought................ 357 Chapter 10 - THE MENDING OF ’KNOWUDGE BROKEN’: Peirce and the Continuity Thesis.......................... 386 Chapter 11 - PARADIGM LOST: Instrumental Variations on a Theme from Peirce.............. 434 EPILOGUE............................................... 487 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................... 491 ABSTRACT METAPHORS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THEORY: Ramus, Peirce and the American Mind by Laurel Warren Trufant University of New Hampshire, December, 1990 This study argues for the mutual impenetration of logical, legal and scientific metaphors and attempts to determine the role played by them in the construction of theory. Specifically it attempts to discover the impact which the metaphors of topical logic may have had on the construction of American ideology. Chapter 1 offers a brief discussion of logical meta­ phors and their relation to the social and intellectual settings which generate them. Chapter 2 extends that dis­ cussion to principles of positive law and political order as they developed in the unstable atmosphere of 16th Century Europe. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 attempt to relate the metaphors defined in Chapters 1 and 2 to the development of the scientific models which emerged during the "scientific revolution" of the 17th Century. These chapters proceed n the context of a discussion of the interaction of Aristotelian, Cartesian and Ramean paradigms. Chapter 6 argues for the crucial importance of topical metaphors in the establishment of order in the American colonies. Chapters 7 and 8 carry the argument for a "New England Mind" into a national setting and discuss how Ramean metaphors contributed to the construction of American conceptions of political order and physical law. These chapters attempt to identify a controlling metaphor of continuity which operated at the base of American models. Chapter 9 claims this metaphor of continuity as the logical ground of pragmatic thought, transmitted to C . S. Peirce through the German logical tradition via Leibniz and Wolff. Chapter 10 extends that discussion to a specific investigation of Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science, considered here as representative of a fundamental commitment on Peirce’s part to a methodology which would underwrite the rest of his thought. Chapter 11 laments the failure of James, Dewey and Royce to appreciate the power of Peirce’s model and discusses the effect which their fragmentation of his continuous reality had on American phil osophy. Peirce’s logic of science emerges as a funda­ mental expression of an "American mind" with roots sunk deep in a Ramean logical paradigm. vi i PROLOQUB This is a germinal study, intended more to suggest than to convince. It skirts many fascinating issues and scans the surface of others. It offers no demographics, no charts, no quantitative analyses -- in short, nothing to gladden the heart of social historians or sober statisticians. Moreover it proceeds under a clear meth­ odological bias to which I may as well confess at the start. It patently assumes that there are such things as "characteristic German models," "a French intellectual milieu," "English epistemolog.v" or "a New England Mind.” I think there are. The question addressed here is why? This study offers a possible answer grounded in the positive role which metaphors play in the construction of theory. It argues for the mutual impenetration of logi­ cal, legal and scientific metaphors embedded in diverse intellectual settings and attempts to determine the role played by those metaphors in generating characteristic principles of order. Specifically it attempts to discover the impact which the peculiar metaphors of the topical logical tradition may have had on the construction of American ideology. Chapter 1 offers a brief narrative of the provenance of those metaphors and their relation to the 2 social and intellectual settings which generated them. It establishes the topical logic of Peter Ramus as legitimate heir to the tradition of Peter of Spain and explores the effects which Ramean logic had on European models as it interacted with existing forms of analysis. Chapter 2 extends that discussion to questions of positive law and political order as they developed in the unstable atmos­ phere of 16th Century Europe. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 attempt to relate the metaphors defined and described in Chapters 1 and 2 to the development of the scientific models which emerged in England, France and Germany during the "scientific revolution" of the 17th Century. These chap­ ters proceed in the context of a discussion of the interac­ tion of Aristotelian, Cartesian and Ramean paradigms. Chapter 6 argues for the crucial importance of topical metaphors in the establishment of order in the American colonies -- an argument
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