China's Assertive Nuclear Posture

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 China’s Assertive Nuclear Posture

China’s nuclear capability is crucial for the balance of power in East Asia and the world. As this book reveals, there have been important changes recently in China’s nuclear posture: the movement from a minimum deterrence posture toward a medium nuclear power posture; the pursuit of space warfare and missile defence capabilities; and, most signiﬁcantly, the omission in the 2013 Defence White Paper of any reference to the principle of No First Use. Employing the insights of structural realism, this book argues that the imperatives of an anarchic international order have been the central drivers of China’s nuclear assertiveness. The book also assesses the likely impact of China’s emerging nuclear posture on its neighbours and on the international strategic balance, especially with the United States. The book concludes by examining China’s future nuclear directions in the context of its apparent shift toward a more oﬀensive-oriented international strategy.

Baohui Zhang is Director, Centre for Asian Paciﬁc Studies, and Professor of Political Science, at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 China Policy Series Series Editor Zheng Yongnian, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore

1 China and the New 7 China’s Information and International Order Communications Edited by Wang Gungwu Technology Revolution and Zheng Yongnian Social changes and state responses 2 China’s Opening Society Edited by Xiaoling Zhang The non-state sector and Yongnian Zheng and governance Edited by Zheng Yongnian 8 Socialist China, Capitalist China and Joseph Fewsmith Social tension and political adaptation under 3 Zhao Ziyang and China’s economic globalisation Political Future Edited by Guoguang Wu and Edited by Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne Helen Lansdowne 9 Environmental Activism in China 4 Hainan - State, Society, and Lei Xei Business in a Chinese Province Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard 10 China’s Rise in the World ICT Industry 5 Non-Governmental Industrial strategies and the Organizations in China catch-up development model The rise of dependent autonomy Lutao Ning Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Yiyi Lu 11 China’s Local Administration 6 Power and Sustainability of the Traditions and changes in the Chinese State sub-national hierarchy Edited by Keun Lee, Joon-Han Edited by Jae-Ho Chung and Kim and Wing Thye Woo Tao-chiu Lam 12 The Chinese Communist Party as 20 China’s Crisis Management Organizational Emperor Edited by Jae Ho Chung Culture, reproduction and transformation 21 China Engages Zheng Yongian Global Governance A new world order 13 China’s Trade Unions – How in the making? Autonomous Are They? Gerald Chan, Pak K. Lee Masaharu Hishida, and Lai-Ha Chan Kazuko Kojima, Tomoaki Ishii and Jian Qiao 22 Political Culture and Participation in Rural China 14 Legitimating the Chinese Yang Zhong Communist Party since Tiananmen 23 China’s Soft Power and A critical analysis of the International Relations stability discourse Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu Peter Sandby-Thomas 24 China’s Climate Policy 15 China and CHEN Gang International Relations The Chinese view and the 25 Chinese Society – Change contribution of Wang Gungwu and Transformation Zheng Yongnian Edited by Li Peilin

16 The Challenge of Labour 26 China’s Challenges to in China Human Security Strikes and the changing labour Foreign relations and regime in global factories global implications Chris King-chi Chan Edited by Guoguang Wu

17 The Impact of China’s 1989 27 China’s Internal and Tiananmen Massacre International Migration Edited by Jean-Philippe Béja Edited by Li Peilin and Laurence Roulleau-Berger Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 18 The Institutional Dynamics of China’s Great Transformation 28 The Rise of Think Tanks Edited by Xiaoming Huang in China Xufeng Zhu 19 Higher Education in Contemporary China 29 Governing Health in Beyond expansion Contemporary China Edited by W. John Morgan Yanzhong Huang and Bin Wu 30 New Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan 35 Social Protest in Contemporary Straits Relations China, 2003–2010 How far can the Transitional Pains and rapprochement go? regime legitimacy Edited by Weixing Hu Yanqi Tong and Shaohua Lei

31 China and the European Union 36 China’s Evolving Edited by Lisheng Dong, Industrial Policies and Zhengxu Wang and Economic Restructuring Henk Dekker Edited by Zheng Yongnian and Sarah Y. Tong 32 China and the International System 37 China Entering the Becoming a world power Xi Jinping Era Edited by Xiaoming Huang Edited by Zheng Yongnian and Robert G. Patman and Lance L. P. Gore

33 China’s Social Development 38 China’s Assertive and Policy Nuclear Posture Into the next stage? State Security in an Anarchic Litao Zhao International Order Baohui Zhang 34 E-Government in China Technology, power and local government reform Jesper Schlæger Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 China’s Assertive Nuclear Posture State Security in an Anarchic International Order

Baohui Zhang Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016

Add AddAddAdd Add Add Add Add AddAddAdd AddAdd AddAdd First published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2015 Baohui Zhang The right of Baohui Zhang to be identiﬁed as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identiﬁcation and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Zhang, Baohui, 1963- China’s assertive nuclear posture : state security in an anarchic international order / Baohui Zhang. pages cm. -- (China policy series ; 38) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Nuclear weapons--China. 2. China--Military policy. 3. China--Foreign relations--21st century. 4. National security--China. 5. Geopolitics--Asia. I. Title. U264.5.C6Z53 2015 355.02’170951--dc23 2014029464

ISBN: 978-1-138-79925-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-75615-8 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis Books Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Contents

List of tables viii Acknowledgement ix Introduction 1 1 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 14 2 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 49 3 Balance of power and China’s expanding oﬀensive nuclear capabilities 78 4 Balance of power and new dimensions of China’s strategic capabilities 97 5 Balance of threat and China’s changing NFU policy 115 6 China’s nuclear assertiveness and East Asian security 150 7 Conclusion 172

Bibliography 182 Index 198 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 List of tables

2.1 China’s missile force 55 7.1 Scenario 1 of China’s future strategic nuclear capability 179 7.2 Scenario 2 of China’s future strategic nuclear capability 180 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Lingnan University for granting me one term of academic leave in 2012 that allowed me to explore deeper into the literature of international relations theory. This leave afforded me a valuable opportunity to survey the field of international relations and enabled me to develop a coherent theoretical framework to tie up my previous research and publications on China’s nuclear deterrent and Sino–US nuclear relationship. I would also like to thank Professor Zheng Yongnian of East Asia Institute, the National University of Singapore, for his kind support of this book project. In fact, his support makes the publication of this book possible. My colleague at Lingnan University, Shalendra Sharma, read the manu- script and made many constructive comments. I hereby express my thanks to him. I want to thank my family for their generous support during the past years. My wife and son put up with many evenings that saw my absence at the dinner table. Their sacrifice and understanding have enabled me to devote more time to research and writing. This book is one of the products of their support. So I would like to dedicate this book to my wife Yinghao and my son Evan. It is built on their selfless sacrifice. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Introduction

In the space of two summer months in 2012, China conducted four strategic missile tests. On July 24, China test fired a newly developed DF-41 missile that is reportedly capable of carrying up to ten independently guided warheads. On August 16, China launched a JL-2 SLBM from a Type 094 SSBN in the Bohai Sea. On August 20, China test fired a silo-based DF-5A intercontinental missile. Finally, on August 30, China launched a road-mobile DF-31A missile that first made its debut in 2009.1 Then, on October 28, 2013, China staged high-profile propaganda about its strategic nuclear submarine forces. All leading national newspapers simultaneously highlighted the issue on their front pages.2 This high-intensity coverage of Chinese sea-based strategic forces represents an important nuclear signaling effort on the part of China. In addition to the above show of force, China’s 2013 Defense White Paper did not, for the first time, mention its long-championed no-first-use nuclear policy. This omission led foreign security observers to wonder if China had modified its most important nuclear doctrine.3 In fact, since the start of the Sino–Japanese East China Sea crisis in 2012, involving a dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, China has pursued a variety of deterrence measures that amount to tacit modifications of its no-first-use nuclear policy. Unsurprisingly, the above developments with China’s nuclear posture took place after the US pivot toward Asia, which was announced with fanfare in late 2011, and in the mist of high tension between China and Japan in the East China Sea that brought them to the brink of war. In fact, the four Chi- Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 nese strategic nuclear tests took place right before Japan’s nationalization of the disputed islands in September 2012. This book examines these recent developments in the context of global geo- strategic changes. It seeks to uncover the linkages between China’s evolving nuclear posture and the structural imperatives of the international system. It argues systemic forces, such as anarchy and the security dilemma, have long shaped China’s nuclear posture. Recently, the waning of unipolarity has generated new and powerful structural incentives that are pushing China away from its established nuclear posture, affecting both force capabilities and deterrence doctrines. The structural perspective of this study provides a fresh 2 Introduction angle to interpret the drivers of China’s nuclear deterrence, dynamics of change, and its future trajectories. This book also seeks to correct the deficiencies of existing studies on China’s nuclear posture, which exhibit a status quo bias in their analyses. Typically, these studies emphasize the constraining effects of China’stwo defining nuclear principles, the minimum deterrence doctrine and the no-first- use doctrine, on the evolvement of its nuclear posture. They tend to emphasize stability over change and as a result cannot explain the recent changes associated with China’s nuclear posture. For example, even the 2014 version of the annual Pentagon report on the military power of China suggests the continuity of its nuclear posture. While the report recognizes the pressure inside China for the modification of its no-first-use (NFU) doctrine, for example suggestions by some People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers to establish conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons first, the Pentagon nonetheless concludes that “there has been no indication that national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China’s NFU doctrine.”4 However, as this book indicates, since 2012 China has tacitly modified its no-first-use principle as a result of the East China Sea dispute with Japan, which has brought the two countries dangerously close to war. China has exercised a variety of nuclear signaling to deter the perceived motives of Japan to escalate the East China Sea crisis into war. The omission of the no-first-use principle in the 2013 Defense White Paper reflects China’s weakening commitment to its most important nuclear doctrine. In addition to the weakening of China’s no-first-use doctrine, its minimum deterrence doctrine, which preaches a small retaliatory-oriented nuclear arsenal, is also in the process of major change. First, China has been actively expanding its nuclear forces. The deployment of a new generation of land and sea-based strategic missiles is rapidly transforming China’soffensive capabilities. More importantly, China’s latest strategic missiles, such as the DF-41, DF-31A, and JL-2, are armed with multiple and independently guided warheads. This deployment pattern represents a major change from China’s traditional single-warhead deployment pattern for its older strategic missiles and will have important implications for the future size of China’s nuclear arsenal. In particular, the DF-41 strategic missile is reportedly capable of carrying up to ten warheads. Another important development concerns China’snewly Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 operational sea-based strategic deterrent. The Type 094 strategic nuclear submarine, together with its matching JL-2 strategic missile, will for the first time provide China with a credible second-strike capability. The results of China’s vastly improving nuclear forces imply an emerging capability that is no longer compatible with the minimum deterrence doctrine, which is traditionally associated with a few dozen pieces of strategic nuclear weapons. The emerging offensive capability of China will easily reach the range of 300 to 400 strategic nuclear warheads. In this case, China’s nuclear capability will resemble that of a classic medium nuclear power, as represented by Britain and France. Introduction 3 In addition to the rapidly expanding Chinese nuclear capabilities, China is pursuing new types of strategic capabilities to complement its offensive capabilities. First, China has been actively pursuing space warfare capabilities to enhance its offensive nuclear forces. China believes that its ability to destroy US space-based assets will be vital for weakening its missile defense and ensuring a successful Chinese nuclear counter-attack. Second, after years of criticizing US missile defense, China has started to build its own missile defense capabilities. Since its first successful mid-course interception test in 2010, China has made consistent progress in the creation of its own defensive capabilities. These two developments will transform China’s nuclear posture from a one dimensional system based entirely on offensive capabilities to a three dimensional system that combines offensive capabilities with space warfare and missile defense capabilities. This new emerging nuclear posture represents a major departure from the old posture that rests exclusively on a small offensive capability characterized by the minimum deterrence doctrine. Therefore, China’s nuclear capabilities and doctrines have seen rapid changes in recent years. While the Chinese nuclear deterrent will become significantly larger and multi-dimensional, key nuclear doctrines, such as the no-first-use principle, have also been tacitly modified since 2012.

Structural realism and China’s nuclear posture This book seeks to make sense of these larger than expected changes in China’s nuclear posture. Existing studies on China’s nuclear deterrence, due to their status quo bias, are obviously incapable of explaining these changes. To correct the current status quo bias, this book champions an alternative analytical approach that focuses on the role of the structural forces of the international system in the shaping of China’s nuclear posture. Structural realism, as pioneered by Kenneth Waltz, provides the basis of this alternative approach.5 According to Waltz, the anarchic order of the international system profoundly affects states’ motives and shapes their behaviors. As he famously put it, in an anarchic system the highest goal of a state is survival.6 Based on this assumption of states’ motives, Waltz stresses that states constantly pursue balancing measures, including both external balancing activities (the forma- Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 tion of alliances with other countries) and internal balancing activities (strengthening one’s own capabilities), to hedge against shifts in the balance of power between states. However, while Waltz emphasizes states’ balance of power motives, Stephen Walt argues that states in fact tend to balance against the greatest threat to their security.7 This balance of power vs. balance of threat debate is trivial, however, as states can simultaneously balance against the most powerful country in the international system and the country that poses the greatest threat to their security. Waltz’s neorealism, as it is often called as opposed to classical realism that emphasizes human nature in the shaping of state behaviors, has given rise to 4 Introduction several variants of structural realism. Among them, defensive realism has offered new and additional insights into states’ motives and behaviors.8 For example, defensive realism argues that states merely crave sufficient power for survival purposes. They also understand that the pursuit of excessive power will trigger balancing efforts by other countries, negating their gains in relative power. Therefore, according to defensive realists, states tend to refrain from reckless behaviors to maximize their power. In contrast, offensive realism, which is another variant of structural realism, argues that the anarchic order of the international system motivates states to try to maximize their power in order to maximize security.9 While defensive realism tends to emphasize the security motive of states and their relatively moderate obsessions with power, it also recognizes the pernicious effects of the anarchic order on inter-state relations. Due to their concerns for security, states tend to exaggerate others’ malign intentions. Therefore, one state’sefforts to improve its own security cause concerns in other countries, which will in turn expand their military capabilities. The ensuing security dilemma triggers mistrust and rivalries among states that pursue purely defensive postures. This book argues that these insights from structural realism, including its defensive realist variant, can shed light on the evolvement of China’s nuclear posture. It suggests that due to the anarchic order, China’s nuclear posture has long been shaped by its balancing motives as well as the security dilemma in international relations. It argues that the evolvement of China’s nuclear capabilities and doctrines reflects both its balancing motives and the imperatives generated by the security dilemma of an anarchic international order. Its key argument is that China has pursued major changes to its nuclear posture to balance against both shifts in the balance of power and threats to its national security. In particular, the expansion of China’soffensive nuclear capabilities and its pursuit of space warfare and missile defense capabilities represent its efforts to balance against the rise of US missile defense capabilities, which have redefined the balance of power among the great powers of the world. In fact, the maturing US missile defense capabilities have caused increasing concerns in the Chinese strategic community. The prospect of US missile defense neutralizing China’s small nuclear deterrent has forced the latter to seek major expansions of its offensive capabilities as well as the development of new Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 types of capabilities in space warfare and missile defense. In contrast, this book argues that China’s tacit modification of its no-first-use doctrine represents its balance of threat behavior in a fast changing international system. The waning of unipolarity has deepened China’s threat perceptions. The perceived containment motives of the USA, particularly its willingness to increase Japan’s role in regional security, has made China increasingly nervous about the end of its “strategic opportunity period,” which began with the 2001 terrorist attacks against the USA. More important, however, China perceives a rising threat from a revisionist Japan. Chinese strategists believe that Japan is taking advantage of the US relative decline to re-emerge as a Introduction 5 major political and military power in the international system. Due to its historical mistrust of Japan, recent Japanese security policies, such as the planned modification of its peace constitution, have drastically intensified China’s threat perceptions. Then, the 2012 East China Sea crisis over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands generated imminent threats to China’s national security. The crisis situation between the two countries has brought them dangerously close to the brink of war. In fact, Chinese strategists see highly realistic prospects of war with Japan. Many believe that Japan possesses both preventive war and pre-emptive war motives. They worry that due to Japan’s conventional military capabilities and its alliance with the USA, Tokyo may have the incentive to escalate the East China Sea crisis into war. In that context, the strategic imperatives of anarchy, in the form of profound insecurity and mistrust between states in conflicts, have forced China to rely on nuclear deterrence to deter crisis escalation and an ensuing war with Japan. As this book reveals, China has in fact pursued a variety of nuclear signaling efforts that imply the possible use of its nuclear weapons in war scenarios in the East China Sea. In essence, China’s tacit modification of its no-first-use principle represents its balance of threat behavior in a crisis situation. The omission of the no-first-use principle from China’s 2013 Defense White Paper was therefore not due to a bureaucratic error.

Major contributions The structural approach of this book, which emphasizes the effect of an anarchic international order on China’s security behaviors, offers much improved analytical accuracy in comparison with existing studies, which tend to see stability rather than change in China’s nuclear posture. Structural realism and its insights on states’ balancing motives allow this book to offer a timely account of the emerging Chinese nuclear posture as well as the latest changes in its nuclear doctrines. Due to its central focus on states’ balancing imperatives in an anarchic international system, this book is able to provide a dynamic account of China’s changing nuclear posture. In fact, states’ balance of power and balance of threats incentives suggest a dynamic process of their adaptation to the Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 changes in the international system, which include both balance of power shifts and the ever changing threat scenarios. In sum, structural realism allows this book to focus on changes rather than stability. This is in sharp contrast to the status quo bias in existing studies, which tend to emphasize stability over change. This book represents a rare effort to combine international relations theory with the study of China’s security policies and behaviors. Existing studies on China’s nuclear posture tend to be policy-oriented and usually shun the use of mainstream international relations theory. This research not only integrates international relations theory with analysis of China’s security behaviors but 6 Introduction also advances theory with findings from the Chinese context. For example, while scholars have been debating whether states seek to balance against power or threat, this study finds that they can simultaneously balance against both the most powerful country in the international system and the state that poses the greatest threat. This book also reveals the primacy of systemic forces over state-level factors. In this sense, it confirms the insights of structural realism, which emphasize states’ concerns for security in an anarchic international order, better explain their foreign policies than unit-level factors, such as strategic culture, bureaucratic politics, and security ideas. This research confirms that while China’s nuclear posture has been influenced by its peculiar strategic culture and security ideas, the imperatives generated by an anarchic system in the end trump state-level factors. While China prefers to abide by its minimum deterrence and the no-first-use doctrines, structural imperatives of anarchy force it to pursue various balancing measures that lead to the weakening of both principles. In fact, as an outcome of its balance of power measures, China’s expanding nuclear capability will soon resemble that of a classic medium nuclear power such as Britain or France. The East China Sea crisis has also forced China to effectively modify its no-first-use doctrine. Another important contribution of this book concerns its timely analysis of China’s actual behaviors in a crisis situation. Indeed, the East China Sea dispute has generated the most realistic and dangerous war scenario facing China since the 1969 Sino–Russian border conflict, which profoundly worried the Chinese leadership about the prospect of major war. As Chapter 5 indicates, the East China Sea crisis, in the eyes of Chinese strategists, provides realistic scenarios of war with Japan. This Chinese perception in fact explains its tacit modification of the no-first-use principle to deter perceived motives of Japan to escalate the crisis into war. In this regard, this book makes a timely contribution by analyzing China’s nuclear-related behaviors in a crisis situation. This observation allows the world to better understand China’s nuclear doctrines. In fact, China’s tacit nuclear signaling since 2012 has revealed its hollow commitment to the no-first-use principle. China’s actual behaviors in a crisis situation indicate that the structural forces of the international system trump unit-level factors in deciding states’ security behaviors. Essentially, the profound pressure of anarchy Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 forces states to use all means available to ensure their security. States’ declaratory principles, such as the no-first-use nuclear doctrine of China, provide little guidance as to how states will actually behave in a real national security crisis. In this sense, this book provides an important correction of the dominant US perspective on China’s no-first-use policy. As quoted at the beginning of the introduction, the 2014 Pentagon report on China’s military power argues that its commitment to the no-first-use principle is relatively robust. Based on the research by this book, this Pentagon perspective could dangerously lead to scenarios of misperceptions of China’s resolve in a crisis situation, thereby increasing the prospect of war between China and the USA. Introduction 7 This book also provides a timely analysis of China’s current strategic assessments of the international system. In particular, it offers extensive reviews of China’s views of a changing international order from unipolarity to multipolarity. For example, it uses the 2013 version of The Science of Military Strategy, which is an important PLA document on China’s security strategy, to assess China’s perception of a fast changing world.10 This includes China’s views of its current grand strategy as well as its understanding of the motives of other major countries such as the USA and Japan.

Plan of the book Chapter 1 of the book provides an extensive survey of the literature on China’s nuclear deterrent. This survey reveals a clear status quo bias in current studies. In fact, most of these studies believe that due to constraints by state-level variables, China’s nuclear posture is highly stable. Its twin defining doctrines, the minimum deterrence principle and the no-first-use principle, continue to shape the size and direction of the development of Chinese nuclear forces. According to this perspective, while the no-first-use principle has been challenged from within the Chinese strategic community, the Chinese government has not wavered in its commitment to the principle. Chapter 1 then attributes the causes of this status quo bias of existing studies to their analytical emphasis of state-level factors, which range from the strategic ideas of great Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping to China’s strategic culture, technological constraints, and organizational politics. As these unit-level factors tend to be stable and consistent, existing studies thus emphasize stability over change in China’s nuclear posture. Chapter 1 then advances an alternative approach that emphasizes the role of structural forces in the shaping of China’s security behaviors, including its nuclear-related behaviors. This structural perspective is based on Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism, which has become the most influential realist international relations approach in the past four decades. The chapter analyzes key insights of Waltz on state motives in an anarchic international system. It also discusses his theory on states’ balancing behaviors to safeguard their own security. The chapter then contrasts Waltz’s balance of power theory with Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory. While international relations scholars have Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 engaged in a long and inconclusive debate on the issue, this book suggests that it is an unnecessary dichotomy, as states can simultaneously pursue balance of power and balance of threat behaviors. In fact, this book reveals that China’s balancing behaviors reflect these twin motives. While China’s expanding nuclear capabilities reflect its motives to balance against the power of the USA, tacit modifications of the no-first-use principle since 2012 represent its motives to balance against long-term and imminent threats posed by Japan to its national security. Chapter 1 then reviews defensive realism and offensive realism, two important variants of Waltz’s original structural realism. It argues that 8 Introduction defensive realism offers a good analytical and empirical fit with the study of China’s nuclear deterrence. Defensive realism argues that states want power for security purposes and they therefore only require modest power sufficient for their survival. They are also aware that the quest for excessive power invites balancing measures by other states, negating their gains in relative power. This perspective of defensive realism has a good match with China’s nuclear doctrines. In fact, China’s minimum deterrence doctrine only seeks a small nuclear capability that is capable of deterring a nuclear attack by other countries. However, defensive realism recognizes the effects of the security dilemma on international relations. States tend to exaggerate others’ malign intentions. Therefore, one state’sefforts to improve its security invite counter measures by others. The results are security rivalries and arms races between purely defensive-oriented states. This book argues that China’s nuclear posture has been shaped profoundly by the security dilemma with the USA. The US quest for missile defense has greatly worried China and caused its counter measures such as the expansion of its offensive capabilities and the development of space warfare capabilities. Finally, Chapter 1 advances four propositions that represent the key insights of this research. They state the centrality of structural forces of the international system in the shaping of China’s nuclear posture. The balancing imperative, the security dilemma, as well as polarity changes all motivate China to constantly modify its nuclear capabilities and doctrines in order to safeguard its national security. Chapter 2 of the book first analyzes the history of the development of China’s nuclear forces. It shows that from the very beginning China’s quest for nuclear weapons was driven by the balance of power and balance of threat motives. The US nuclear threats during the 1950s, in particular, motivated China to pursue its own nuclear capabilities. The chapter then provides an overview of the Chinese nuclear capabilities. It discusses the three phases in the development of China’s strategic nuclear forces. After this part, the chapter analyzes the key nuclear doctrines of China. Among them, minimum deterrence and the no-first-use principles are examined in detail. The next section of the chapter discusses the inherent tensions within Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 China’s nuclear doctrines. Both the minimum deterrence doctrine and the no-first-use doctrine leave China vulnerable in times of nuclear war. Therefore, there have been sustained debates within China regarding possible modifications of these doctrines. While some argue that China’s small nuclear arsenal leaves it vulnerable to a nuclear first strike, others suggest that its conventional military weakness calls for a modification of the no-first-use principle. Chapter 2 then analyzes the 2013 version of The Science of Military Strat- egy (SMS), which is an important PLA document on its security strategies. This latest version of the SMS provides key insights into the current Chinese grand strategy. According to the SMS, the current central security objective of Introduction 9 China is to protect its “strategic opportunity period” which started after the 2001 terrorist attacks against the USA. China believes that this strategic window of opportunity has allowed it to rise rapidly in the international system. The current Chinese strategic priority is to prolong and complete its rise. Hence, the SMS suggests that the current security strategy of China is to prevent war scenarios that harm its further rise. For this central goal, the SMS lists effective control of crisis situations as a top security focus. It argues for effective deterrence of crisis escalation to avoid war scenarios. Most important, the SMS assigns a key role in this regard to China’s strategic nuclear forces. In fact, the SMS implies that nuclear deterrence could play a vital role in the prevention of conventional wars. This suggests possible changes to China’s long-cherished no-first-use principle, which is designed to deter only nuclear attacks against China. The book argues that China’s actual behaviors during the East China Sea crisis have in fact validated the thrust of the SMS. China has indeed exercised implicit nuclear deterrence to prevent a crisis situation escalating into war scenarios. Chapter 3 focuses on China’s balancing behaviors in the form of its expanding offensive nuclear capabilities. The chapter suggests that China’s expansion of its offensive capabilities represent its balance of power motive in the context of rising US defensive capabilities, which have the potential of changing the global balance of power. The chapter thus analyzes China’s evolving perceptions of US missile defense. While Chinese strategists initially maintained confidence in China’s ability to penetrate a primitive missile defense system, the rapid maturing of US missile defense has caused increasing worries that it could soon neutralize the small Chinese nuclear deterrent. Driven by this concern, the chapter then shows sustained Chinese efforts to modernize and expand its offensive capabilities. In particular, it focuses on two aspects of the Chinese efforts that have important long-term consequences. The first concerns China’s attempts to develop a new generation of strategic missiles that are capable of carrying multiple and independently guided warheads. Chinese strategists believe that deploying multiple warheads on China’s strategic missiles is the most effective way to defeat US missile defense. In this regard, the DF-41 ICBM represents the most potent Chinese response to US missile defense. The second aspect of Chinese responses involves its sea-based nuclear deterrent. The Type 094 SSBM and its matching JL-2 SLBM have Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 made rapid progress in terms of providing China with a secure second-strike capability. Chapter 3 argues that China’s balancing efforts, in the form of its expanding offensive capabilities, will transform China’s current nuclear posture, which is based on the principle of minimum deterrence, into one that resembles a medium nuclear power with an arsenal of at least 300 to 400 strategic nuclear warheads. Thus, US missile defense has the unintended consequences of turning China into a much more potent adversary. Chapter 4 of the book examines other Chinese responses to US missile defense. These include its development of space warfare capabilities and 10 Introduction indigenous missile defense capabilities. In fact, the Chinese military has envi- sioned an integrated nuclear-space warfare strategy to counter US missile defense. Chinese strategists believe that to initiate an effective nuclear counter- strike, China must be able to destroy US space-based sensors, such as early warning satellites. The chapter therefore, using the limited information available, attempts to analyze China’s recent progress in its anti-space capabilities. Evidence indicates that since its first anti-satellite test in January 2007, China’s anti-space capabilities have vastly advanced. For example, a recent Chinese test in May 2013, according to US intelligence, reveals its capability to hit satellites at extremely high altitudes. This could even threaten US GPS satellites in a war scenario. The chapter then discusses China’s quest for its indigenous missile defense capabilities. Since its first successful mid-course interception test in January 2010, China has performed further tests in this area. The chapter discusses the Chinese motives behind its new approach to missile defense. Until recently, China had consistently opposed the development of missile defense, fearing its negative impact on the strategic stability of the world. This book- reveals that balancing is the key driver of the new Chinese initiative to develop its own missile defense. The Chinese strategic community argues that China must develop its own defensive capabilities to balance similar US capabilities. Chapter 4 argues that these new types of Chinese strategic capabilities, in the form of integrated nuclear-space capabilities and an indigenous missile defense system, will transform the Chinese nuclear posture from a single dimensional system that rests exclusively on a small offensive capability to a three dimensional one that combines expanded offensive capabilities with space warfare and defensive capabilities. Once complete, the Chinese nuclear posture will no longer be defined by the minimum deterrence principle. Chapter 5 focuses on China’schangingno-first-use principle as a consequence of its balance of threat imperatives. This chapter attributes the causes of China’s changing no-first-use policy to the rapidly changing Sino–Japanese relations in recent years. It suggests that China’s tacit modification of the no-first-use policy represents its attempts to balance against perceived threats posed by Japan to its national security. The chapter first analyzes the recent history of Sino–Japanese relations. It Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 points toward the general trend of increasing security mistrusts and rivalries as a consequence of the rise of China. It then analyzes the origin and process of the 2012 East China Sea crisis over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Island. Japan’s decision to nationalize these islands created the context of a major showdown between the two countries. The next section of the chapter examines China’s threat perceptions in a fast changing international system and its assessments of the prospects of war in the East China Sea. Overall, China believes that the waning of the unipolar system and its own spectacular rise have motivated the USA to shift toward a containment posture toward China in recent years. Even worse, Chinese Introduction 11 strategists believe that the USA has been using Japan to balance a rising China and Japan is taking advantage of the US relative decline to become a normal state. Due to its strong mistrust of Japan, China worries that a resurgent Japan could pose a long-term threat to its national security. In this context, the 2012 East China Sea crisis caused serious Chinese concerns over the prospect of war with Japan. Chapter 5 reveals that the Chinese strategic community sees both preventive war motives and preemptive war motives on the part of Japan. They believe that Japan may use the crisis to stop the rise of China and prevent an inevitable power transition in East Asia. Moreover, the chapter also reveals that China has serious concerns over the inherent dynamics of crisis escalation. In particular, Japan’s threats of use of force before and after its nationalization of the disputed islands make escalation scenarios highly realistic. Finally, the chapter shows that Chinese strategists also worry about Japan’s pre-emptive war motives. They take notice of Japan’s strong tradition of initiating sneak attacks against other countries. Due to the above Chinese assessments of the prospects of war in the East China Sea, China has relied on implicit nuclear deterrence to deter escalation of the East China Sea crisis and prevent the ensuing war scenarios. Chapter 5 shows that China has used a variety of measures to signal nuclear deterrence and they range from sudden announcements of new developments of China’s nuclear forces, tests of new strategic weapons, statements by various PLA and civilian figures on the possible use of nuclear weapons in the East China Sea, to the omission of the no-first-use principle in the 2013 Defense White Paper. This book argues that these Chinese nuclear signalings amount to a tacit modification of its no-first-use principle. Chapter 5 argues that China’s deterrence behaviors in the East China Sea offer the world an important opportunity to observe its nuclear doctrines. The actual Chinese behaviors in a crisis situation have revealed the fragility of its commitment to the no-first-use principle. However, the book argues that China’s tacit modification of its no-first-use principle should not come as a surprise. As structural realism predicts, states would use all means available to protect their own security in an anarchic international system. China’s nuclear deterrence in the East China Sea is fully consistent with the self-help logic of an anarchic order. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Chapter 6 examines the wider implications of the changing Chinese nuclear posture for the security and international relations of the Asia Pacific region. First and foremost, it analyzes the impact of China’s rising nuclear capabilities and a possible shift of its no-first-use policy on Sino–US strategic stability. It argues that the current strategic stability between China and the USA is in a questionable situation, with rising prospects of military conflicts. While mainstream realist international relations theories all have pessimistic predictions for Sino–US strategic relations, recent trends in the foreign policies of both countries seem to confirm these predictions. Moreover, the USA has shifted toward an increasingly hard-line posture to deter the perceived rise in 12 Introduction China’s revisionism. This change in US regional strategy, coupled with China’s more assertive stands on territorial issues, could imply rising prospects of military conflicts between them. This chapter then explores whether China’s emerging nuclear posture will be conducive to Sino–US strategic stability. The Cold War experience suggests that effective mutual deterrence, based on mutual assured destruction, generates strategic stability. A more robust Chinese nuclear posture, with both expanded capabilities and a murkier commitment to the no-first-use principle, should in theory improve the strategic stability between China and the USA. However, some American strategists question this assumption. They argue that accepting mutual deterrence could be destabilizing, as it may embolden China to pursue more aggressive regional strategies. Therefore, these strategists suggest a superiority strategy, which seeks greater missile defense capabilities, to enable the USA to dominate any conflict scenarios. The chapter then examines the impact of China’s emerging nuclear posture on the US regional alliance system. In essence, this issue concerns the US extended deterrence in East Asia. In theory, rising Chinese nuclear capabilities and greater demonstrated will to use them should make it more difficult for the USA to intervene in regional crisis scenarios involving China on one hand and Japan and Taiwan on the other. The key challenge for Washington is that China’s nuclear deterrence should be more credible than US extended nuclear deterrence due to their vastly different stakes in the outcomes of these crisis scenarios. In this context, Chapter 6 then analyzes the impact of China’s nuclear rise and the corresponding declining credibility of US extended deterrence on Japan’s future strategic decisions, in particular whether it may pursue the nuclear option to balance against potential threats from China. Although Japan faces various domestic and international constraints on a possible shift toward the nuclear direction, the insight of structural realism suggests that under sufficient pressure from an anarchic order, Japan may in the end have to pursue the self-help solution by arming itself with nuclear weapons. Finally, the conclusion chapter makes broader observations on the roles of the anarchic international order in explaining states’ behaviors and motives. It argues that due to anarchy, security remains the central concern of states. Economic interdependence and international institutions have not changed, Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 let alone, harness, the anarchic forces in inter-state relations. The conclusion also evaluates the structural perspective of this research against alternative approaches of existing studies on China’s nuclear posture. It argues that structural realism and its defensive realist variant allow this book to offer superior interpretations of the larger than expected changes in China’s nuclear forces and doctrines. This book in fact proves that structural imperatives trump state or unit-level variables in shaping the evolution of China’s nuclear posture. The conclusion then speculates on the future trajectory of China’s nuclear posture. While defensive realism has been able to explain the Chinese nuclear Introduction 13 posture, for example its limited nuclear arsenal and its constant efforts to maintain the existing strategic balance, a rising China may shift toward an offensive realist posture. In fact, offensive realism, as another important variant of structural realism, argues that anarchy forces states to seek to maximize their power and influence. A rising China may eventually embrace such an offensive posture. If so, offensive realism may provide insights into China’s future nuclear trajectory. China may, out of its quest for super power status, seek strategic parity with the USA. If so, China may further expand its nuclear capabilities to be a credible equal of the USA. This will not be a difficult goal for China. The arms control agreements between Russia and the USA obligate them to reduce their respective strategic nuclear arsenal to 1,550 pieces. More- over, the USA has been calling on Russia to reduce their nuclear weapons to 1,000 each. These numbers present a realistic target for China’s future nuclear expansion. If so, the prospect of China “leaping to parity” with the USA should not be ruled out. This will be a particularly likely scenario if both offensive realist and defensive realist dynamics drive China’s future nuclear posture. Its expected quest for super power status and its continuous need to balance against future advancement in American missile defense could together push China to seek nuclear parity with the USA.

Notes 1 For a report on these Chinese missile tests, see Bill Gertz, “Chinese Missile Tests Continues: China Conducts Fourth Flight Test of Mobile ICBM,” The Washing- ton Free Beacon, September 4, 2012, at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/ chinese-missile-tests-continue-2. 2 For this Chinese propaganda campaign, see “Yangshi jiemi zhongguo shouzhi heqianting budui bao zhenkui huamian” (The CCTV Reveals China’s First Nuclear Submarine Forces with Precious Images), October 28, 2013, at http://mil. sohu.com/20131028/n389027813.shtml. 3 See The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo wuzhuang liliang di duoyanghua yunyong baipishu (White Paper: The Diversiﬁed Deployment of China’s Armed Forces), April 2014, at http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/ jrzg/2013-04/16/content_2379013.htm. For reactions of the international community, see James M. Acton, “Is China Changing Its Position on Nuclear Weapons?” The New York Times, April 18, 2013. 4 The Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014 (Washington, DC: The Department of Defense, 2014), p. 28. 5 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). 6 Ibid., pp. 91–92. 7 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 8 For a major analysis of defensive realism, see Jeffrey W. Taliafferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 126–161. 9 For a representative statement of offensive realism, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). 10 The PLA Academy of Military Science, Zhanluexue (The Science of Military Strategy) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2013). 1 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture

This chapter challenges the “status quo bias” in existing studies on Chinese nuclear deterrence, which typically suggest that state-level factors, such as strategic ideas, organizational politics, and technologies pose powerful constraints on the evolution of both the capabilities and doctrines of China’s nuclear posture. This “status quo bias” has failed to predict recent developments in China’s nuclear behaviors. Both the capabilities and doctrines of Chinese nuclear deterrence have been undergoing signiﬁcant changes in recent years. The chapter then advances an alternative structural realist approach to interpret the changing nuclear posture of China. It argues that structural realism, which emphasizes the eﬀects of anarchy and polarity on state behaviors, is able to provide a dynamic account of the changes regarding the Chinese nuclear deterrent.

The status quo bias of existing studies As a major nuclear power, China’s nuclear posture has long been followed by the academic and security communities in the West. There is a rich literature on the force capabilities and doctrines of Chinese nuclear deterrence. Western studies tend to focus on two core features of China’s nuclear posture, which are the minimum deterrence policy and no-first-use policy. The former dictates a small but sufficient nuclear capability that can protect China from nuclear blackmail and enable it to launch a counter-strike after being attacked by nuclear weapons. The latter pledges that China would not use nuclear weapons Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 first in war scenarios, unless it is attacked by nuclear weapons. Moreover, China will never apply its nuclear weapons in conflicts with non-nuclear countries. In general, existing studies tend to emphasize the stability of China’s nuclear posture while under-estimating the dynamics of change. For example, Jeffrey Lewis suggests that by choice China has maintained just a small and limited nuclear capability and a passive nuclear doctrine in the form of its no-first-use policy.

China has the most restrained pattern of deployment: the People’s Republic of China (PRC) adopts just eighty or so operational warheads Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 15 exclusively for use with land-based ballistic missiles. China’s declared nuclear doctrine rejects the initiation of nuclear war under any circumstance. The PRC does not maintain tactical nuclear forces of any kinds, and its strategic forces are kept oﬀ alert, with warheads in storage.1

As Lewis argues, “The stability of this posture over time and through changes in threat perception suggests that restraint is the result of choice and not expediency. China has long had the economic and technical capacity to build larger forces.”2 Lewis further criticizes predictions made by some American security experts who see possibilities of rapid expansion of China’s strategic capabilities. As he points out, “This choice, evident in Chinese declaratory policy and consistent with China’s deployment history, contradicts the typical strategic assessments of outside observers, especially those that have been most prominently advanced within the United States.”3 In a 2006 study by the Federation of American Scientists, Hans Kristensen, Robert Norris, and Matthew McKinzie also emphasize the stability of China’s nuclear posture. As they point out:

A decade ago, several Western analysts suggested that Chinese thinking about nuclear strategy might be moving toward limited deterrence, which would mean a more dynamic targeting policy with the potential of using nuclear weapons first. Since then, however, Chinese nuclear policy does not appear to have changed noticeably, nor has it affected operational nuclear weapons deployment in any important way. Chinese declaratory policy has always been one of “no first use” with a retaliatory minimum deterrence force aimed at countervalue (i.e. population centers) targets with forces maintained on very low alert or no alert at all.4

Kristensen, Norris, and McKinzie do see persistent Chinese eﬀorts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces. However, due to their emphasis on the stability of China’s nuclear posture, they predict limited change in the overall size and structure of Chinese nuclear forces in the future. As they emphasize:

It is true that China is modernizing its conventional military forces and Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 its nuclear systems. This is hardly surprising given it is every military’s goal to improve itself. What is evident in the Chinese case is that the pace of the eﬀort is taking a long time… Once China’s current upgrade of long-range missiles is completed, the Chinese nuclear arsenal will not be signiﬁcantly bigger than it is today.5

In a joint 2000 study by the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Defense University, Robert Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts argue that while there are possibilities of signiﬁcant changes in China’s nuclear posture, largely due to Chinese concerns for US ballistic missile 16 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture defense, the core doctrines of Chinese nuclear deterrence will continue to restrain the emerging size of Chinese nuclear forces. According to them:

If the essential original purpose of the force was political – to prevent blackmail, to have a seat at the table – then an elaborate force structure is not likely to be seen as necessary. If it had to plans to launch nuclear wars but only to retaliate if attacked, then China needed only a secure retaliatory force, one suﬃcient to reach out to a few large urban centers in the attacking country, to satisfy its deterrence requirements. Thus the assumption that it does not need large numbers of strategic weapons goes hand-in-hand with a doctrine that targets cities and not opposing forces.6

Based on this understanding of the underlying dynamics of Chinese nuclear deterrence, Manning, Montaperto, and Roberts predict that “Minimum deterrence apparently remains the foundation of Beijing’s intercontinental doctrine at this time.”7 For these analysts, key supporting evidence of a limited Chi- nese nuclear posture is that “Beijing can deploy multiple warheads atop its current long-range missiles, although it has not chosen to do so.”8 The above status-quo perspective on China’s nuclear posture is also reﬂec- ted by Taylor Fravel and Evan Medeiros’ 2010 study, which seeks to explain why China has consistently maintained “such a small and vulnerable nuclear force structure for so long.”9 They argue that China merely desires to achieve secure second-strike capability against the enemy’s population centers and this limited requirement negates the need for a large oﬀensive nuclear capability. As they suggest:

In sum, developments in the past two decades indicate that China seeks the capability to hold at risk enough of an enemy’s valued assets – with the threat of unacceptable damage – that adversaries are deterred from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against it. Thus, China desires a capability for assured retaliation, not the kind of assured destruction capabilities that characterized US and Soviet approaches.10

Based on this understanding, Fravel and Mediros argue that China’s nuclear modernization will not fundamentally change its current posture. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 According to them:

Even as the ﬁnancial resources allocated to China’s armed forces have increased rapidly over the past two decades, nuclear modernization has been gradual and measured… There is little evidence that China has plans to expand signiﬁcantly the size of its nuclear arsenal, such as to levels of more than 500 warheads.11

Instead, China has merely focused on “improving the reliability, survivability, and penetrability of its nuclear arsenal.”12 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 17 It should be noted that some experts have discussed possibilities of more significant change in the nuclear doctrines of China. For example, based on reading of numerous internally circulated Chinese language materials, Alastair Iain Johnston argues that Chinese strategists have never genuinely accepted minimum deterrence, which defines China’s nuclear posture. Instead, toward the late 1980s, they began to preach some form of limited warfighting or flexible response. According to Johnston:

Chinese strategists now explicitly distinguish “limited deterrence” from “minimum deterrence” and from what they sometimes call “maximum deterrence” (e.g., counterforce war-ﬁghting doctrines of the United States and the Soviet Union). In limited deterrence, nuclear weapons play a critical role in the deterrence of both conventional and nuclear wars as well as in escalation control (intrawar deterrence) if deterrence fails. In other words, nuclear weapons have a wider utility than proponents of minimum deterrence would suggest.13

As Johnston observes, after 1987 limited deterrence became “the preferred descriptive term used by Chinese strategists.”14 Overtime, Chinese strategists began to draw sharper distinctions between minimum and limited deterrence. They argued that “a limited deterrence means having enough capabilities to deter conventional, theatre, and strategic nuclear war, and to control and suppress escalation during a nuclear war.” To achieve these goals:

Chinese strategists argue that it requires a greater number of smaller, more accurate, survivable, and penetrable ICBMs, SLBMs as countervalue retaliatory forces; tactical and theatre nuclear weapons to hit battleﬁeld and theatre military targets and so suppress escalation; ballistic missile defense to improve the survivability of the limited deterrent; space-based early warning and command and control systems; and anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) to hit enemy military satellites.15

Inevitably, as noted by Johnston, limited deterrence creates tension with China’s no-first-use policy. As he points out, “Very often one finds strategists arguing abstractly in favor of first strikes in conventional and nuclear war, Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 even while claiming that China is committed to a second strike posture.”16 Chinese discussions on a limited deterrence posture would suggest the possibility of a major departure from China’s traditional minimum deterrence posture, which requires only a countervalue second-strike by a handful of nuclear warheads. In contrast, limited deterrence would also require warfighting capabilities in the form of tactical and theater nuclear weapons to perform first-strike missions. Bates Gill, James Mulvernon, and Mark Stokes also recognize the possibility of China moving away from its minimum deterrence posture toward a limited warfighting posture. According to their study, “the Chinese force has 18 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture grown to encompass more than simply minimal deterrent forces, including theater and tactical systems.”17 However, they argue that it is unlikely that China will make a formal doctrinal shift toward limited deterrence, as “such a shift must await shifts in the domestic political hierarchy and its view of the outside world, factors which have consistently driven Chinese doctrinal choices.”18 As seen by Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes, instead of a stark analytical choice between either a doctrine of “minimal deterrence” or one of “limited deterrence,” it is better to adopt a tiered approach for understanding China’s future nuclear posture. According to them,

For the future, the doctrine and force structure of China’s Second Artillery must be analyzed at three distinct levels: a posture of credible minimal deterrence with regard to the continental Untied States and Russia; a more offensive-oriented posture of “limited deterrence” with regard to China’s theater nuclear forces; and an offensively-configured, preemptive, counterforce warfighting posture of “active defense” or “offensive defense” for the Second Artillery’s conventional missile forces.19

According to this conception, while China may continue to adhere to minimum deterrence and the no-first-use policy for its strategic nuclear forces, it could adopt limited deterrence for theater nuclear forces, thereby undermining its no-first-use pledge. In fact, Gill, Mulvernon, and Stokes suggest that limited deterrence could be defined as a flexible response, counterforce warfighting doctrine. While the above studies point toward the possibilities of significant changes in China’s nuclear posture, concerning both its minimum deterrence principle and the no-first-use policy, they have been challenged by other studies. For example, Michael Chase and Evan Medeiros, by examining Chinese military writings on the role of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear operations, conclude that China has not moved toward limited deterrence. They argue that these writings “reflect both an explicit and implicit acceptance of China’sofficial no-first-use pledge.”20 Instead, they suggest that “China has moved to a clearer and more explicit adoption of a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence for its strategic nuclear forces and, thus, its force structure improvements are for now aimed at meeting the requirements of Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 that doctrine.”21 While they do recognize the discussions among some Chinese strategists about moving toward a limited deterrence posture, they emphasize that on balance, “it seems that Beijing is not ready to jettison the minimum deterrence doctrine, at least at the level of strategic nuclear relations with the US and the Soviet Union.”22 Medeiros, in a separate study, also points out the ideational, economic and political constraints on China’s attempts to modify its minimum deterrence posture. As he observes, “The barriers to major doctrinal changes are not insignificant, save a major and dramatic shift for the worse in China’s security situation. There are military, economic, and political impediments.”23 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 19 Kristensen, Norris, and McKinzie also discount the potential of significant changes in China’s nuclear posture. After examining different assessments by the US security and intelligence communities, they argue these assessments tend to exaggerate the potential of China pursuing major modification of its nuclear posture. In fact, “It seems there is no public evidence that China’s nuclear policy is evolving significantly beyond its minimum deterrent and not- first-use pledge.”24 In particular, they contend that China’s no-first-use policy continues to affect China’s nuclear posture. As they point out:

Whether or not the policy would constrain China in a war, the declaratory policy in fact does seem to inﬂuence China’s acquisition and deployment policies, with the result that the country keeps its nuclear forces relatively small. A more ambitious strategy would require larger forces as well as much improved command and control and early warning capabilities.25

Fravel and Mediros examine the issue of rising discussions on a limited deterrence posture inside the Chinese strategic community but conclude that no doctrinal change is underway. According to them, “As China developed and revised its operational doctrines for the use of nuclear weapons beginning in the mid-1980s, it continued to stress deterring nuclear attacks against China and has not shifted to pursue nuclear war fighting. Changes in the composition of China’s nuclear forces have, on balance, emphasized increasing quality over quantity in an effort to achieve a secure second-strike.”26 More important perhaps, while the above Western analysts challenge the notion of potential major modification of China’s nuclear posture, Chinese analysts also downplay the prospect of change. For example, Yao Yunzhu, a nuclear expert of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) disputes the notion that China has been considering a warfighting oriented nuclear doctrine. According to her:

In Chinese strategic literature, we only see the discussion on how to deter a nuclear war from happening, on how to prevent a conventional conﬂict from escalating into a nuclear war, and how to retaliate after suﬀering a nuclear attack – but never how to win a nuclear war. The primacy Chinese Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 perception is that nuclear wars are not to be won, but to be prevented.27

Therefore, although some US scholars, such as Johnston, Gill, and others have proposed possibilities of major modifications of China’s nuclear posture, more seem to reject these scenarios. In fact, Johnston also recognizes the constraints on China moving from minimum deterrence toward limited deterrence. As he points out, a major constraint should be the gap between the doctrine of limited deterrence and China’s nuclear capabilities. For example, China’s nuclear arsenal may not have sufficient warheads “to hit nearly the range of counterforce and countervalue targets that limited 20 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture deterrence theorists have outlined.”28 Moreover, China also lacks the required early warning system for such a doctrine.29 Finally, a warfighting oriented limited deterrence doctrine requires China to have extensive deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. Here, Johnston argues that there is conflicting evidence regarding whether China has even deployed these weapons.30 In addition to the constraints of the doctrine-capabilities gap, Johnston discusses other constraints as well. For example, he argues that limited deterrence would require substantially larger and costlier capabilities in multiple areas, such as tactical nuclear weapons, command and control systems, and missile defense capabilities.31 Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes, while conceiving the possibility of China adopting a more offensive-oriented posture of “limited deterrence” with regard to its theater nuclear forces, also recognize constraints. Similar to Johnston’s analysis, they point to technological and arms control constraints on China’s moving toward limited deterrence. As they argue:

Assuming a continued adherence by China to its testing moratorium, and the possibility that it will ratify the CTBT in the future, we question the ability of China to conﬁdently develop smaller, lighter, and more accurate nuclear warheads (including potential MRV and MIRV capabilities) consistent with the limited deterrent aspired by Chinese analysts in the late 1980s and 1990s.”32

Therefore, Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes suggest that limited deterrence is only “the aspirational doctrine for a future Second Artillery.”33 To sum up, there is a tendency of “status quo bias” in Western studies of China’s nuclear posture. The mainstream view is that minimum deterrence and no-first-use policies, which together define China’s nuclear posture, represent a highly stable paradigm in Beijing’s national security strategy. While there have been Chinese discussions on the need for a more warfighting oriented posture, which would inevitably weaken China’s commitment to both minimum deterrence and the no-first-use policy, most Western analysts object to the notion that China’s nuclear posture has been seeing actual and significant changes. Indeed, even those Western studies that suggest the possibilities of China moving from minimum deterrence toward limited deterrence Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 also recognize important constraints on such a shift.

An analytical preference for state-level factors The status quo perspective in existing Western studies correlates with their analytical favor of emphasizing the roles of state-level factors in the shaping of China’s nuclear posture. They argue that a variety of state or unit-level factors, including strategic culture, orthodoxy views of individual leaders, security ideas, organizational politics, and technological constraints have generated a highly stable nuclear posture by China. These state-level factors Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 21 limit the scope and speed of changes in both the capabilities and doctrines of Chinese nuclear deterrence. For example, some analysts have emphasized the impact of Chinese strategic culture on the nuclear posture of China. By employing China’s strategic traditions, this perspective suggests consistency and continuity in Chinese nuclear deterrence. For example, Chong-Pin Lin, in his study of China’s nuclear strategy, specifically emphasizes the influences of Chinese strategic traditions. He argues that there is a strong correlation between China’s “traditional and contemporary strategic characteristics” and most of the traditional strategic themes “have been manifested in the theory and practice of the Chinese Red Army and the PLA.”34 Lin identifies the primacy of defense as an important strategic characteristic of China with profound contemporary impact. According to him, Chinese strategic tradition “is characterized by an emphasis on defense.”35 In fact, “the primacy of defense has been deeply ingrained in the Chinese mentality.”36 Lin argues that a major cause of China’s cult of defense was that “far-flung Chinese expeditions in history mostly ended up in disasters.” Another important strategic tradition of China, according to Lin, is the idea of minimalism, which emphasizes the use of minimum resources for maximum yield. In particular, Lin points out the Chinese cult of “few victorious over many” (yi shao shang duo) and “the weak victorious over the strong” (yi ruo sheng giang).37 Applying China’s strategic traditions or culture to contemporary Chinese nuclear deterrence, one can easily see overlapping characteristics. China’s minimum deterrence doctrine exemplifies both the primacy of defense and the principle of minimalism. Indeed, minimum deterrence is anchored on a second-strike posture with a small retaliatory capability. China believes that such a defensive and limited posture is an optimal strategy for protecting its national security. Viewed from this angle, China’s strategic culture should imply relative stability in its nuclear posture. Christine Cleary also sees China’s strategic culture as one of the drivers of its nuclear posture. As she points out:

As China considers its nuclear future, the strategic choices of the CCP elite will likely be inﬂuenced to some extent by strategic culture. Histori- Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 cally rooted strategic preferences and assumptions will shape how they think about nuclear policy… The long-standing Chinese disposition toward strategic defense, ambiguity, and deception will likely remain fundamental factors shaping nuclear policy.38

Cleary argues that some of China’s strategic traditions serve contemporary functions. For example, China’s strategically ambiguous and defensive nuclear strategy cloaks any gap between its nuclear aspirations and its operation capability.39 Moreover, she points out that the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was partially an outcome of its arms race with the United States of 22 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture America, may have strengthened China’s “minimalist inclinations,” thereby tempering “the rate at which China moves away from minimalism.”40 While an emphasis on the influence of China’s strategic culture sees relative stability in its nuclear posture, Western experts have also emphasized other ideational factors to reach the same conclusion. For example, some analysts suggest that individual Chinese leaders, in particular Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, have profoundly shaped China’s nuclear thinking. Their ideas on the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear wars continue to define contemporary nuclear doctrines of China and restrain the direction and speed of their changes. This factor is central to Fravel and Medeiros’s interpretation of China’s adherence to assured retaliation and the no-first-use policy. As they argue, this ideational factor constrains the scope and speed of the shift in China’s nuclear posture toward a warfighting oriented one, which is also capable of deterring both nuclear and conventional wars. According to them:

The view and beliefs of China’s top leaders, mainly Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, had a consistently dominant inﬂuence on Chinese nuclear strategy. The salience of their views continued well after their deaths in 1976 and 1997, respectively. Both leaders viewed nuclear weapons, primarily and probably exclusively, as tools for deterring nuclear aggression and countering coercion, not as weapons to be used in combat to accomplish discrete military objectives. Both leaders embraced the idea of deterrence through assured retaliation, in which a small number of survivable weapons would be enough to retaliate and impose unacceptable damage on an adversary.41

Due to the constraint imposed by orthodoxy views of these Chinese leaders, Fravel and Medeiros argue that China has continued to “stress deterring nuclear attacks against China and has not shifted to pursue nuclear war fighting.”42 For example, they point out that Jiang Zemin, the leader who succeeded Deng, issued various statements on China’s nuclear doctrines that were consistent with those of Mao and Deng.43 Essentially, Fravel and Medeiros’ ideational approach assigns a vital and even central role to the thoughts of Mao and Deng on China’s nuclear deterrence. A third ideational approach, as proposed by Alastair Ian Johnston, Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 emphasizes the roles of doctrines in the shaping of China’s nuclear posture. According to Johnston, “PLA strategists have been struggling to figure out how to link conventional and nuclear weapons with the operational requirements of potential high-tech local wars over resources and territory around China’s periphery.” And, they are not satisfied with “an undifferentiated, primitive, countervalue second-strike deterrent status quo.”44 In this context, some PLA strategists have developed the limited deterrence concept “to describe what China’s nuclear forces ought to be able to do.” Limited deterrence requires China to develop the capabilities that include a greater number of tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear weapons for counterforce purposes. Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 23 Johnston argues that based on his “doctrine-driven” model, “the straight- line prediction would be that over the next decade or so, we should expect to see a discernible effort to shift the forces away from a minimum strike-back assured destruction posture, which China now has, toward limited war-fighting.”45 However, while this doctrine-driven model implies and predicts significant changes in China’s nuclear posture, Johnston does recognize multiple constraints that may discourage these changes. He mentions in particular the constraints from current capabilities, economic consideration, and arms control. For example, he argues that China’s lack of real-time intelligence abilities would limit its pursuit of limited deterrence.46 Its limited number of nuclear warheads and missiles also restrains the ability of China to move toward a warfighting doctrine. Moreover, pursuing limited deterrence would imply a financially very costly military option. China’s participation in various arms control agreements, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, could also constrain its ability to develop nuclear weapons technologies necessary for a limited deterrence posture.47 In addition to studies that emphasize various types of ideational factors, such as strategic culture, thoughts of Chinese leaders, and do'ctrinal development, Western analysts have also stressed the roles of other state-level factors in the shaping of the Chinese nuclear posture. Some have noticed the constraining roles of organizational politics. For example, while emphasizing the impact of leaders’ orthodoxy on China’s current nuclear posture, Fravel and Medeiros also point out the organization factor in the Chinese security policy-making process. They argue that organizational constraints have limited “the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to develop nuclear strategy and an associated operational doctrine.”48 As Fravel and Medeiros argue:

China’s political environment was not conducive to such work on strategy and doctrine. Nuclear issues were treated with intense secrecy, limiting knowledge of them and, thus, opportunities for interagency deliberations. Party-led civil-military relations in China and the strength of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) meant that Mao’s and Deng’s views on military strategy, including nuclear weapons, were not questioned for decades.49 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 As this interpretation suggests, the peculiar structure of civil-military relations and the organizational frameworks for the research and development of military strategies have stifled innovation in Chinese nuclear doctrines, thereby generating forces of stability for the current nuclear posture. Lastly, some Western analyses have emphasized the importance of technology in both shaping and constraining China’s nuclear posture. For example, in John Lewis and Hua Di’s study of China’s ballistic missile programs, they argue that “in the early years these programs were essentially technology-driven and that only in the early 1980s did Beijing develop relevant strategic and tactical doctrines for its deployed and planned missile 24 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture forces.50 They specifically suggest that Mao Zedong’s decision to proceed with the strategic missile program in the mid-1950s was not informed by “any overarching strategic doctrine.” In fact, “the program proceeded without such strategic guidance and without a reconsideration of Mao’s doctrine of People’s War.”51 Western studies of more recent Chinese nuclear doctrines and capabilities have also paid attention to the role of technologies. They emphasize China’s technological imperative of updating and modernizing its aging strategic missile forces to make them more survivable and more reliable for assured retaliation. For example, Brad Roberts suggests that China’s modernization of its strategic nuclear forces will continue regardless of external influences. As he points out, “Chinese modernization is driven in significant measures by the aging of deployed systems and the availability of improved technologies.”52 One goal of the Chinese modernization plan is to reduce the vulnerability of strategic missiles to first strike by reducing their size. This requires shifting from liquid-fueled systems to solid-fueled ones. Another goal of nuclear modernization is to increase the mobility of the overall force, which requires shifting from silo-based systems to road-mobile ones. Moreover, Roberts suggests that China’s technological progresses may also lead to wider changes in its nuclear posture. According to him, “The availability of more advanced technologies to China’s strategic designers and engineers has fueled a general push for higher quality in replacement systems. This in itself will mean some important changes to the operational characteristics of the force.”53 For example, “Improved C4ISR capabilities would also permit China to move away from a posture premised on absorbing the first blow and to launch on warning or launch under attack, or something analogous.”54 This technology-driven perspective implies possibilities of changes in the operating doctrines of Chinese nuclear forces. While this technology-driven model explains the dynamics of change in China’s nuclear posture, some Western analysts actually emphasize the constraining impact of technologies on the future direction of Chinese nuclear deterrence. For example, Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes point out that while the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps may prefer a warfighting oriented posture of its theater nuclear forces, it simply does not have the technologies to implement this goal. They suggest that limited deterrence is just the aspirational doctrine Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 for the Second Artillery Corps.55 As a result, they argue that minimum deterrence and no-first-use policies will continue to define China’s nuclear posture. Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang also emphasize the constraining roles of technologies on the evolution of China’s nuclear posture. In their analysis of internal Chinese discussions on limited deterrence, they conclude that there is a “mismatch between China’s limited deterrence doctrine and its actual nuclear capabilities.” They argue that China’s nuclear deterrent will continue to emphasize a limited nuclear retaliation against the soft targets of an enemy. Indeed, “In all likelihood, despite the call of Chinese Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 25 strategists for nuclear doctrinal innovation, nuclear strategic doctrine will remain minimum deterrence until the requirements for limited deterrence can be met.”56 To sum up, Western studies tend to exhibit an emphasis on state or unit- level factors in the shaping of China’s nuclear posture. They include ideational, organizational, and technological factors. These state-level factors tend to lead to analytical conclusions of relative stability in China’s nuclear posture. Either due to influences from strategic culture and leaders’ orthodoxy thoughts or to organizational, political, and technological constraints, these studies inevitably emphasize continuity over change in China’s nuclear posture. However, the “status quo bias” in existing studies on Chinese nuclear deterrence has encountered difficulties in explaining recent developments of China’s nuclear posture. China has been seeking a major expansion of its offensive forces. It has deployed a new generation of mobile strategic missiles, including the DF-31A, and has successfully tested the new DF-41. The importance is that both are equipped with MIRVed warheads. In particular, the DF-41 is said to be able to carry up to 10 warheads. China has also deployed a new generation of sea-based ballistic missile on its 094 strategic nuclear submarines. Evidence suggests that the JL-2 sea-based missile is also equipped with multiple warheads. China’s shift toward a MIRVed deployment pattern for its offensive forces has profound significance for its minimum nuclear posture, which relies on a small countervalue (or city-busting) offensive capability to deter a nuclear attack. Now the emerging nuclear posture of China will possess a much greater offensive capability that resembles a medium nuclear power, as represented by Britain and France. It is believed that China has already deployed four 094 SSBN, with a fifth under construction.57 If China will limit its sea- based deterrent to five SSBN and if each of its 12 missiles carries five warheads, then the total number of sea-based warheads would reach 300. If China also deploys 30 DF-41 ICBMs, each equipped with 6 to10 warheads, the number of warheads carried by this new generation of strategic missile could reach the 180–300 range. Coupled with dozens of already deployed DF- 31A missiles, reportedly capable of carrying up to 5 warheads, the total number of China’s emerging offensive deterrent could easily exceed 500 war- Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 heads. Moreover, as Chapter 3 will examine further, while some Chinese strategists argue that China needs to deploy at least eight strategic submarines, others even recommend a fleet of 12 SSBNs, which is the number maintained by the USA and Russia. In addition to China’s emerging offensive capabilities, which implies a departure from the minimum deterrence posture, China is also innovating its nuclear deterrence in other important ways. The first is the development of an integrated nuclear-space warfare doctrine, which hinges upon anti-satellite capabilities. In fact, as Chapter 4 will examine in detail, China has made steady progress with regard to its space warfare capabilities, which are designed to 26 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture ensure a successful nuclear counter strike in times of war. Another emerging aspect of China’s nuclear posture is its pursuit of missile defense capabilities. Since its first successful mid-course interception test in January 2010, China has made steady progress in advancing its missile defense capabilities, which will constitute a key component of its future nuclear posture. The significance of these new types of strategic capabilities is that China’s nuclear posture will no longer rest exclusively on a small offensive capability for a countervalue second strike. Instead, it will become a three dimensional posture that incorporates offensive capabilities with space warfare and missile defense capabilities. China’s minimum deterrence posture has also seen other important changes. Recent evidence suggests that China has deployed tactical nuclear warheads on its tactical ballistic missiles. Until recently, Western analysts believed that as China’s minimum deterrence posture only requires a strategic retaliatory capability, it did not deploy tactical nuclear weapons, which are geared for warfighting purposes. As observed by one study, “Scholars have been unable to determine conclusively whether China currently possesses any tactical nuclear weapons.”58 Recent evidence suggests, however, that China has in fact deployed tactical nuclear weapons. For example, in June 2012 China officially announced that the PLA Second Artillery Corps’ conventional missile brigades are now equipped with tactical nuclear weapons.59 China claims this change has ushered in “a new era of deterrence.” This development shows that China is moving toward a limited deterrence posture that incorporates warfighting functions and seeks to deter both conventional and nuclear wars. Finally, recent evidence indicates that China has tacitly modified its no-first-use policy. The omission of this founding principle of Chinese nuclear deterrence from the 2013 Defense White Paper was no fluke. As Chapter 5 will examine in detail, the strategic imperatives generated by the Sino–Japanese East China Sea dispute laid the basis for this important shift in China’s nuclear doctrine. In fact, evidence suggests that since 2012 China has exercised tacit nuclear deterrence to deter the prospects of conventional war in the East China Sea. As Medeiros once suggested, “An issue that would benefit from continued research is China’s views on nuclear signaling, especially wartime signaling.”60 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Since 2012, China has used a variety of nuclear signaling to deter rising probabilities of war with Japan and the US–Japan alliance in the East China Sea. As Chapter 5 will elaborate, the intention of nuclear signaling explained the four strategic missile tests in July and August of 2012. These recent and important developments imply that China is seeing important changes in its nuclear posture. The emerging Chinese nuclear posture will incorporate much-expanded offensive capabilities that are combined with missile defense capabilities and space warfare capabilities. The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and the softening of the no-first-use principle also Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 27 suggest that China is moving toward limited deterrence, which seeks warfighting capabilities to deter both nuclear and conventional wars. Given the above and forthcoming changes in China’s nuclear posture, there is a need to develop an alternative perspective to explain these changes. In this regard, the book argues that structural realism offers an important correction of the “status quo bias” of existing studies, which tend to emphasize the constraining roles of state-level factors such as strategic culture, security ideas, organizational politics, and technologies. Various structural realist theories present more dynamic perspectives that can better explain changes in both the capabilities and doctrines of Chinese nuclear deterrence

Structural realism and state security Realism has profoundly influenced the study of international relations. According to Stephen Walt, there is no single realist theory.61 Instead, “the realist tradition encompasses a family of related arguments sharing certain common assumptions and premises.”62 As he says, “Realist theories seek to explain politics as it really is, as opposed to normative theories that offer prescriptions for how politics ought to be. The realist tradition also tends to emphasize the continuity of historical experiences and is skeptical of efforts to transcend the competitive nature of political life.”63 According to Walt:

The central conclusion of all realist theories – what might be called the realist problematique – is that the existence of several states in anarchy renders the security of each one problematic and encourages them to compete with each other for power or security. Realist theories see the insecurity of states (or groups) as the central problem in international relations, and they portray international politics as a self-help system where states must provide security for themselves because no one else will. Thus the realist tradition places power at the center of political life.64

Joseph Grieco also analyzes the core assumptions that underline the different schools of the realist tradition. One of such assumptions is that “states coexist in a context of international anarchy, that is, the absence of a reliable central authority to which they can appeal for protection or redress of grie- Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 vances.”65 This assumption has important implications for states. In a state of anarchy, states have to worry about their survival. As E. H. Carr suggests, in an anarchic context “the possibility that force will be used by one or another of the parties looms always as a threat in the background.”66 Another realist core assumption is that “the absence of a centralized authority means that states are by deﬁnition self-help agents.”67 States have to rely on their own eﬀorts to provide security. They cannot entrust their survival to other states or international institutions. Third, related to anarchy and self-help assumptions, the realist tradition assumes the centrality of power in international relations. States recognize 28 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture that they need to possess adequate power to ensure their own security. Moreover, states also understand that power is relative. They are thus constantly wary of changes in the balance of power, as these shifts could jeopardize their own security, even survival.68 As Walt puts it, realism “sees the acquisition and management of power as the main issue that political actors face.”69

Neorealism and its balancing insights In 1979 Kenneth Waltz published his Theory of International Politics, which proposes a structural approach to study state behaviors and international outcomes.70 This seminal study of international politics forms the basis of various contemporary schools of realist theories, such as defensive realism, oﬀensive realism, and neoclassical realism. According to William Wohlforth, the structural approach of Waltz constitutes a transition from classical realism to neorealism. The former includes “all the realist works of the interwar and early cold war years” and is best represented by Hans Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations.71 As Wohlforth argues, before Waltz, classical realism had failed to develop a rigorous realist theory of international politics.72 This included Morgenthau, who ostensibly sought to develop “a realist theory of international politics.” However, while Morgenthau examined a wide range of phenomena such as war, peace, cooperation, diplomacy, ethnics, and international organization, where he:

Obviously fell short was in convincing the scholarly community of the plausibility and internal logical coherence of his theory. Even fellow realists found Morgenthau’s theory beset by “open contradictions, ambiguity and vagueness.” Key concepts such as the “national interest” and “the balance of power” were either undeﬁned or deﬁned in multiple and mutually contradictory ways.73

Waltz sought to correct classical realism’s lack of rigor and internal coherence by developing a structural approach to the study of international politics. He suggested that classical realists’ understanding of international politics Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 was compromised by their focus on human nature, rather than the international system of states, to explain states’ behaviors such as their quest for power and tendencies of conﬂicts with each other. According to Waltz, while classical realists correctly identiﬁed power as a central element of international politics, for them:

The desire for power is rooted in the nature of man. Morgenthau recog- nized that given competition over scarce goods with no one to serve as arbiter, a struggle for power will ensue among the competitors, and that consequently the struggle for power can be explained without reference to Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 29 the evil born in man. The struggle for power arises because people want things and not necessarily because of the evil in their desires. This he labels one of the two roots of conﬂicts, but even while discussing it he pulls toward the “other root of conﬂict and concomitant evil”–the animus dominandi, the desire for power.74

Indeed, according to Waltz, “Both Hobbs and Morgenthau see that conflict is in part situationally explained, but both believe even were it not so, pride, lust, and the quest for glory would cause the war of all against all to continue indefinitely. Ultimately, conflict and war are rooted in human nature.”75 As Waltz characterized classical realism, “Power is seen as an end in itself.”76 According to this perspective, “Conflicts occurred because humans craved power or because certain states had revisionist goals, and because there was no central authority to stop them from pursuing these ambitions.”77 The above approach of classical realism was criticized by Waltz for failing to see the effects of the international system on its units, the states. As he commented on Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations:

I have great respect for it. But Hans Morgenthau, in his search for what he sometimes called a “rational theory,” was able to deal only with how the acting units aﬀected the outcomes produced. There was nothing but the acting units to shape those outcomes. In other words, there was no concept of a structure of international politics because he had no concept of the structure of international politics. That is, he only saw the behavior and the interacting units, and did not see them within some kind of a structure, so the outcomes inferred had to depend directly on the qualities of the actors.78

Waltz sought to correct the deﬁciencies of classical realism by developing a structural approach to the study of international politics. According to Waltz, the anarchic international system is an active and autonomous causal force that shapes states’ behaviors and aﬀects international outcomes. In fact, as put by Waltz, “Theories of international politics that concentrate on causes at

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 the individual or national level are reductionist; theories that conceive of causes operating at the international level as well are systemic.”79 According to Waltz:

A system is then deﬁned as a set of interacting units. At one level, a system consists of a structure, and the structure is the systems-level component that makes it possible to think of the units as forming a set as distinct from a mere collection. At another level, the system consists of interacting units. The aim of systems theory is to show how the two levels operate and interact.80 30 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture In fact, as Walt suggests, “Any approach to international politics that is properly called systemic must at least try to infer some expectations about the outcomes of states’ behavior and interactions from a knowledge of system-level elements.”81 In particular, Waltz argues that a systemic theory of international relations must understand how the structure of the international system shapes the behaviors of states. As he puts it:

Systems theories, whether political or economic, are theories that explain how the organization of a realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it. From them, we can infer some things about the expected behavior and fate of the units: namely, how they will have to compete with and adjust to one another if they are to survive and flourish…Systems theory explain why different units behave similarly, and despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall within expected ranges. Conversely, theories at the unit level tell us why different units behave differently despite their similar placement in a system.82

In Waltz’s conception, a system is composed of a structure and interacting units, and a structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. As he points out, “Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system.”83 Waltz argues that the ordering principles of domestic politics and international politics are fundamentally different.

Domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic. The parts of international- political systems stand in relations to coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic. The ordering principles of the two structures are distinctly diﬀerent, indeed, contrary to each other.84

In fact, the structure or ordering principle of international politics resembles the market. According to Waltz:

International-political systems, like economic markets, are individualist in Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended. In both systems, structures are formed by the coaction of their units. Both systems are formed and maintained on a principle of self-help that applies to the units.85

Waltz suggests that the anarchic structure of international politics profoundly aﬀects states behaviors. It forces states to be highly concerned with their own survival. As Waltz argues, “the aims of states may be endlessly varied; they may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone. Survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have, other than the goal of promoting their own disappearance as political entities.”86 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 31 As Waltz sees it, in an anarchic system “units worry about their survival, and that worry conditions their behavior.”87 As a consequence, “each of the units spends a portion of its eﬀort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others.”88 According to Waltz:

To achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy – be they people, corporations, states or whatever – must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves. Self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order.89

According to Waltz’s structural approach, states’ pursuit of power is thus not due to human nature, as believed by classical realism. Instead, it is an outcome of the anarchic order of the international system. States need appropriate power, which is deﬁned by Waltz as capabilities, to ensure their own survival. As Waltz argues, “Neorealists, rather than viewing power as and end in itself, see power as a possibly useful means, with states running risks if they have either too little or too much of it. Weakness may invite an attack that greater strength would dissuade an adversary from launching.”90 States’ concerns for survival and their reliance on self-help lead to one of the most important insights of Waltz, which is the dynamics of balancing in international politics. According to Waltz, the anarchic order of international politics leads to law-like behaviors of states, which include their balancing activities to secure their own survival. As he says, a balance of power theory begins with assumptions about states:

They are unitary actors, who at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination. States, or those who act on behalf of them, try in more or less sensible ways to use the means available in order to achieve the ends in view. Those means fall into two categories: internal eﬀorts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external eﬀorts (moves to strengthen or enlarge one’s own alliance or to weaken or shrink the opposite one).91 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016

States’ internal and external balancing efforts, according to Waltz, define the dynamics of a self-help system. Indeed, anarchy induces balancing as the expected rational behavior of states. According to neorealism, balancing behavior is prompted by the structural characteristics of the international system. Waltz argues that the balancing tendency in international politics stands in sharp contrast to the more common bandwagoning behavior in domestic politics. While different coalitions may compete for power, “As soon as someone looks like the winner, nearly all jump on the bandwagon rather than continuing to build coalitions intended to prevent anyone from winning 32 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture the prize of power. Bandwagoning, not balancing, becomes the characteristic behavior.”92 In international politics, however, anarchy dictates that balancing is the normal behavior of states. As Waltz says, “In the competition for the position of leader, balancing is sensible behavior where the victory of one collation over another leaves the weaker members of the winning coalition at the mercy of the stronger ones.”93 Therefore, “Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them.”94 Waltz’s balance of power theory, informed by his structural approach that emphasizes the effects of the anarchic international system, is deductively built and can powerfully predict general tendencies of state behaviors. However, what exactly motivates states to pursue balancing behaviors remains debated.95 A key disagreement among balance of power theorists is whether states balance against the strongest power in the international system or against the greatest threats to their interests. For Waltz, imbalances of power, which is defined as material capabilities, pose a threat to the security of states, compelling them to pursue balancing behaviors of various kinds. In this conception, states balance against material power. Stephen Walt, however, argues that states tend to balance against countries that generate the greatest threat to their security. As he claims in his study of alliance formation, “It is more accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that poses the greatest threat.”96 His balance of threat theory retains the primacy of states’ security concerns in an anarchic system but includes additional variables to improve the insights of structural realism. According to Walt:

States risk their own survival if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong. To ally with the dominant power means placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence. The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can.97

Walt argues that balancing is usually framed solely in terms of power. Indeed, balancing is alignment with the weaker side. As he points out: Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016

This view is seriously ﬂawed, however, because it ignores the other factors that statesmen will consider when identifying potential threats and prospective allies. Although power is an important factor in their calculations, it is not the only one. Rather than allying in response to power alone, it is more accurate to say that states will ally with or against the most threatening power.98

As Walt argues, four factors determine the level of threats that states may pose: aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 33 intentions. The greater a state’s total resources, the greater a potential threat it can pose to others. The overall power that states can wield is an important component of the threat perceived by others. States also tend to respond to threats from proximate power. According to Walt, as the ability to project power declines with distance, “states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away.” Moreover, “All else being equal, states with large offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke an alliance than those who are either militarily weak or capable of only defending.” Finally, “states that appear aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them.” Indeed, as Walt emphasizes, “Perception of intent plays an especially crucial role in alliance choices.”99 Whether states balance against the strongest power, as Waltz argues, or against the greatest threat, as suggested by Walt, has led to continuing debates among scholars of international relations. In a review of the balance of power literature, Jack Levy suggests:

That one thing both sides would agree on is that states, and particularly great powers, will balance against a state that threatens to achieve a position of hegemony over the system, because any state strong enough to threaten hegemony will in most cases be the greatest single threat to the interests of other great power.100

Indeed, according to Levy, “The primary aim of all states is their own survival, defined in terms of some combination of autonomy and territorial integrity.”101 This requires “the avoidance of hegemony, a situation in which one state amasses so much power that it is able to dominate over the rest and thus put an end to the multistate system.”102 Therefore, as Levy argues in his synthesis of the difference between Waltz and Walt, the strongest power in the international system typically represents the greatest threats to other states. Moreover, the above debate mistakenly assumes that states only seek to balance against one other state in the international system, either because it is the most powerful or the most threatening one. A more realistic situation is that a state may simultaneously balance against several other states and its balancing behaviors involve both balance of power and balance of threat motives. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Indeed, this book argues that states can simultaneously balance against both the strongest power in the system and the greatest threat to its security. Developments with China’s nuclear posture in general reflect China’s balancing efforts. However, while some of these developments, such as the expansion of China’soffensive nuclear capabilities, embody its balancing efforts against the USA, which is the strongest power in the international system, other developments, such as the tacit modification of the no-first-use nuclear principle, are driven by China’s attempts to balance against Japan, which is considered to be the greatest threat to its national security due to the sharp escalation of tension between the two countries since 2012. 34 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture Defensive realism and offensive realism Waltz neorealism forms the basis of various sub-schools of structural realism such as defensive realism and offensive realism, both of which share the basic premise that the anarchic order of the international system profoundly shapes states’ behaviors. However, defensive realism and offensive realism differ on state goals in an anarchic system. While defensive realism argues that states try to maximize security, offensive realism suggests that states try to maximize power. In important ways, defensive realism is a direct offshoot of Waltz’s neorealism. As summarized by Steven Lobell, “In general, defensive realists maintain that states try to maximize security, not power, preserve the existing balance of power, are not inherently aggressive, and avoid relative losses to shifts in their relative position and ranking.”103 Waltz himself contributed to some of these core claims of defensive realism. As argued by Waltz in his analysis of whether states tend to balance against the most powerful country or coalition of countries or bandwagon with them:

If states wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side, we should see not balances forming but a world hegemony formed. This does not happen because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system. This ﬁrst concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system.104

According to Waltz:

In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, proﬁt, and power. Because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions. They cannot let power, a possibly useful means, become the end they pursue. The goal the system encourages them to seek is security.105

Joseph Grieco has further developed Waltz’s insight on states’ security- related incentives by arguing that they are “defensive actors.”106 He suggests

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 that as states “have security as their principal interest,” they are highly concerned with their relative power versus other states.107 As he points out, “Tying this realist argument to the realist view that anarchy causes states to be concerned about their security and survival, realist theory argues that anarchy causes states to be defensive positionalists.”108 Grieco thus agrees with Waltz that states only want to preserve the existing balance of power and their relative position in the international system. According to defensive realists, excessive pursuit of power is actually counter-productive. This insight is based on Waltz’s balance of power logic in that states’ quest for too much power will lead to counterbalancing behaviors Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 35 by others, negating the unilateral quest for hegemony. As Waltz argues, “In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads others to balance against it.”109 Therefore, the pursuit of hegemony will only lead to counter- productive outcomes. Based on this insight, Waltz criticized the US eﬀorts since the end of the Cold War to prolong the “unipolar moment.” According to Waltz:

The very effort to maintain a hegemonic position is the surest way to undermine it. The effort to maintain dominance stimulates some countries to overcome it. As theory shows and history confirms, that is how balance of power are made. Multipolarity is developing before our eyes. Moreover, it is emerging in accordance with the balancing imperative.110

In addition to the above insights on state motives and behaviors, another important insight of defensive realism concerns the security dilemma in international politics. As Jeffrey Taliaferro points out in an important review of defensive realism, the security dilemma is a key concept that informs defensive realists’ understanding of the dynamics of inter-state relations and their policy prescriptions for decision makers.111 According to Robert Jervis, “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.”112 This security dilemma “causes states to worry about one another’s future intentions and relative power. Pairs of states may pursue purely security-seeking strategies, but inadvertently generate spirals of mutual hostility or conflict.”113 Therefore, according to defensive realists, the security dilemma is “one tragedy of anarchy.”114 Due to their recognition of the negative and unintended consequences of the security dilemma, defensive realists argue that states should exercise strategic restraint in their pursuit of power. According to Charles Glaser, states should try to increase their security by preventing the security dilemma, hostility spiral, and arms race. To achieve these goals, states need to limit their offensive capabilities, exercise strategic restraint, and signal benign intentions.115 To sum up, defensive realism has important insights on the roles of power in state strategies. If states try to promote their security, they should pursue power modestly in order to avoid balancing and the security dilemma. If a state tries to become too powerful, the imperative of balancing and the Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 security dilemma will generate counterbalancing efforts by other states, leav- ing the aspiring hegemon less secure. Therefore, it is in a state’s interest to maintain the status quo rather than maximize its power. Offensive realism disagrees with the above insights of defensive realism. Starting with the same assumptions about states’ concerns for security in an anarchic system, offensive realists argue they tend to maximize their power, to the extent of becoming the hegemon of the international system. According to offensive realism, the anarchic international system provides strong incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power and influence at the expense of their rivals. As Lobel puts it, “Simply, a state with more power is more 36 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture secure than a state with less power.”116 There are multiple reasons for this behavior of states. Fareed Zakaria argues that states all care greatly about their relative power in an anarchic system. If a state does not try to maximize its influence and chooses to forgo an opportunity to expand, other states will take advantage of the opportunity.117 Moreover, as John Mearsheimer suggests, defensive realism has a status quo bias in arguing that states merely crave security and the preservation of the existing balance of power. He points out that states can never be sure that they have sufficient power to provide their own security, as power is inherently difficult to measure.118 Moreover, power shifts among states are constant and common. Given the above uncertainties, states can never be sure how much power is enough for their survival. As a result, they prefer to have as much power as possible. As Mearsheimer puts it:

The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon – that is, the only great power in the system.119

Mearsheimer thus makes his famous claim that “There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face constant incentives to change it in their favor.”120 According to Mearsheimer, the structure of the international system “forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other.” In this anarchic system, “states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival. Indeed, the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon, because no other states can seriously threaten such a mighty power.”121 Therefore, while both defensive realism and offensive realism recognize the imperative of survival in an anarchic international system, they have very different understandings of states’ motivesandtheirstrategiesinthepursuitof power. As pointed out by Stephen Walt in an important review of realist interna- Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 tional relations theory, “offensive realism sees anarchy as an even more powerful disposing force than Waltz’s neorealist theory did. Where Waltz argued that the fear that others will balance discourages attempts to maximize power, offensive realists argue that power maximization is precisely what the system encourages.”122 According to defensive realism, a state merely seeks security, and power is the means to security. Moreover, states only pursue a modest amount of power, as they understand that too much power will invite balancing by other states. For offensive realism, states seek to maximize power to ensure their survival in an anarchic system. Power is thus the end in itself, as the more Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 37 power states have relative to other states, the greater the prospect of their survival. Indeed, states all prefer to become a hegemon, as this is the most secure position in the system.

China’s nuclear posture: a structural realist approach This research argues that structural realism offers important insights on states’ security-related behaviors in an anarchic international system. Great powers’ foreign and security policies are inevitably shaped by the structural forces of the international system. China’s nuclear deterrence is no exception. Employing a structural realist approach to the study of China’s nuclear posture can address the inadequacies in current studies, which typically focus on unit or state-level factors. In particular, structural realism’s insight on balancing is key to understanding China’s nuclear deterrence and can explain the greater than expected recent shifts in its nuclear posture. The balancing approach, informed by the insights of structural realism, is a dynamic model that emphasizes China’s constant responses to changes in the international system. These changes involve both shifts in the balance of power and shifts in China’s threat perceptions. The security dilemma, which is a central concept in defensive realism, reinforces the above dynamics by aggravating China’s concerns for balance of power shifts and by amplifying China’s threat perceptions. This book argues that neorealism’s balance of power theory is highly relevant for the study of China’s nuclear posture. China has constantly sought to balance against US power in the strategic nuclear aspect of their security relations. In particular, this book suggests that China’s responses to US missile defense have profoundly affected its nuclear posture in recent decades. China views the rise of US defensive abilities as an attempt to change the existing strategic balance of power, which is defined as China’s ability to launch a secure second-strike in times of nuclear conflicts between the two countries. However, US missile defense threatens to upset that delicate balance by neutralizing a successful Chinese counterattack. To maintain the existing balance, China has sought to use a variety of efforts to counterbalance US missile defense. As Chapter 3 discusses in detail, these efforts first include the expansion and modernization of China’soffensive nuclear capabilities. Most importantly, Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 China has sought to deploy MIRV technologies in its latest strategic missiles, such as the new DF-41 ICBM, to overcome US missile defense and restore the strategic balance. Second, China has sought to develop new capabilities and doctrines for space warfare, which is considered vital for penetrating US missile defense and ensuring a successful Chinese nuclear counterattack. In fact, as Chapter 4 will discuss further, China has been pursuing an integrated nuclear-space warfare strategy to balance against advances in US missile defense. Third, China has been pursuing its own missile defense to balance against rising US defensive capabilities. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, 38 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture Chinese strategists cite China’s pursuit of missile defense as a balancing effort against US missile defense. In this regard, China has made steady progress since 2010 when it conducted its first successful mid-course interception test. In addition to the neorealist balance of power insight, Walt’s balance of threat argument also applies to China’s nuclear deterrence. While China has been pursuing the above countermeasures to balance against the USA, which is the most powerful state in the international system, it has been modifying its nuclear posture to balance against the greatest threats to its national security. Chapter 5 of the book reveals China’s rapidly changing threat perception after the sharp escalation of territorial disputes with Japan in the summer of 2012. In fact, China believed that the prospect of war with Japan and the US–Japan alliance was highly realistic and significant. In this context, China used a variety of nuclear signaling measures to deter the prospect of conventional war scenarios in the East China Sea. These included an intensive strategic missile test schedule in the summer of 2012, high profile announcement that China’s conventional missile forces are now armed with tactical nuclear warheads, and comments by various PLA figures that implied possible use of nuclear weapons if Japan dared to attack first. These measures indicate that China effectively exercised nuclear deterrence to prevent crisis escalation and the outbreak of wars between the two countries. Therefore, this book argues that China has in effect tacitly modified its no-first-use principle since 2012. Its nuclear deterrence behaviors in 2012 and afterwards lend powerful evidence to this argument. The book further suggests that China’s balance of threat behavior could explain the omission of the no-first-use principle from the 2013 Defense White Paper. This omission of the most sacred principle of Chinese nuclear deterrence was thus no fluke. It reflected an important, albeit tacit, shift in China’s nuclear posture. A key argument of this book is that China’s threat perception is closely linked to the changing polarity of the international system. The waning of the unipolar system in recent years and the rise of a nascent multipolar system have sharpened China’s sense of insecurity. Here, structural realism again offers important insights. For neorealism, both the anarchic order and polarity shape state behaviors. According to Waltz, while the anarchic ordering principle of the international system remains constant, the structure of the system can vary through changes in the distribution of capabilities across Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 states.123 In Waltz’s neorealist conception of world politics, polarity shapes both the behaviors of states and outcomes of the international system. According to him:

Students of international politics make distinction between international- political systems only according to the number of their great powers. The structure of the system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system. And changes in structure change expectations about how the units of the system will behave and about the outcomes of their interactions will produce.124 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 39 Waltz applied this perspective to study states’ balancing-related behaviors. For example, he argued that balancing in the post-1945 bipolar system was relatively efficient and effective as the two super powers had to rely on their own internal capabilities to maintain the balance. In contrast, in multipolar systems states tend to exhibit buckpassing behaviors, expecting other states to balance against the most powerful country in the system. The result is that the strongest power could be underbalanced in a multipolar system, making it less stable than a bipolar system. However, as pointed out by his critics, Waltz only analyzed a limited range of state behaviors under alternative polarity.125 This book suggests that his polarity insight could be extended to analysis of state threat perceptions. Specifically, it is argued here that polarity affects states’ perceptions of system stability and thus threats to their national security. A multipolar system, compared to a unipolar one, to a greater extent approximates an anarchic order. In contrast, a unipolar system approximates some form of hierarchy. This key difference inevitably affects states’ sense of security and insecurity. Waltz only studied the effects of multipolar and bipolar systems on state behaviors. He did not believe that a unipolar system is even feasible, as a state’s quest for dominance or hegemony invites counterbalancing by other states. However, in a 2011 interview, Waltz said that if he were to write his seminal book again, “I certainly would add something about unipolarity. I wrote about multipolar systems and bipolar systems, that is, structural changes that produce changes in behavior. I identified two different kinds of structure. And it did not occur to me that we would move from bipolarity to unipolarity.”126 While Waltz did not study the effects of unipolar systems, others have. Since the mid-1990s scholars of international relations have extensively examined how the US-led unipolar system has affected state behaviors and international outcomes. They argue that the unipolar system was characterized by relative stability, which refers to low levels or an absence of traditional security rivalries among the great powers.127 This “unipolar stability” was an outcome of US hegemony, which used its overwhelming power to maintain a relatively orderly international system. In this unipolar system that approximates a hierarchical order, second-tier powers, such as China, Britain, France, Russia, and Japan, had reduced concerns for potential threats from their peers. This relatively benign threat perception by the second-tier great Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 powers reduced the incentives for security rivalries with each other.128 However, as the international system is moving away from the US-led unipolar system toward a nascent multipolar system, great powers inevitably begin to exhibit rising concerns for their security. Compared to a hegemonic system, a multipolar system approximates the anarchic order as no one is in charge. In this self-help context, states have to worry more about their security. As a consequence, a multipolar system negatively affects states’ threat perceptions and intensifies the security dilemma in their relations. This book argues that the changing polarity of the international system has profoundly affected China’s threat perceptions. During the unipolar era, 40 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture China, like other second-tier states, had a generally positive assessment of its security environment. In fact, China officially characterized this era as a “strategic opportunity period,” implying low probabilities of major challenges to its security. However, the waning of the unipolar system and the rise of a nascent multipolar system in recent years have sharpened China’s sense of insecurity and intensified the security dilemma in its relations with the USA and Japan. In particular, China worries that an America in relative decline will have increasing incentives to contain its further rise, particularly by strengthening its military alliance with Japan. It also worries about Japan’s revisionist motives to take advantage of the new multipolar order to re-claim its great power status. In particular, many Chinese are concerned that under US encouragement, Japan will shift toward a hostile posture toward China, threatening China’s territorial and security interests in East Asia. This book contends that China’s rising sense of insecurity under an emerging multipolar system has motivated it to pursue balancing activities to deter perceived threats to its national security. Specifically, China’s changing threat perceptions have had important effects on its nuclear posture. During the 2012 crisis that involved China and Japan in a dangerous territorial dispute in the East China Sea, Beijing effectively exercised its nuclear deterrence and tacitly modified its no-first-use doctrine. In addition to the insights from structural realist balance of power and balance of threat theories, defensive realism also sheds lights on China’s nuclear posture. First, defensive realism argues that states only seek sufficient power to maintain the existing balance and this insight is highly relevant to the study of China’s nuclear deterrence. Under the assumption of defensive realism, as states ultimately seek security, they tend to be satisfied with a modest amount of power that is adequate for their survival. This insight is perfectly suitable for analyzing China’s nuclear posture, which is indeed, defined by its minimum deterrence doctrine. China merely seeks sufficient capabilities to allow a secure second-strike against an enemy that has initiated a nuclear attack. China believes that a small retaliatory force of several dozen warheads is adequate to deter such an enemy. As defensive realism prescribes, China’s nuclear posture does not seek maximization of power. Instead, it is content with adequate power, in the form of assured retaliation, for its own security. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 However, recent changes in China’s nuclear posture have proven the neorealist logic of balancing. Once other states’ power enhancement efforts, such as the US attempt to supplement its offensive nuclear capabilities with defensive ones, begin to threaten the existing strategic balance, China takes countermeasures to try to restore the balance and to ensure the viability of its minimum deterrence strategy. These balancing measures include expansions of its offensive capabilities, the development of integrated nuclear-space war capabilities, and an indigenous missile defense system. Defensive realism’s insight on the security dilemma is also highly relevant to explaining the changing nuclear posture of China. According to Charles Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 41 Glaser, defensive realism offers powerful explanations of arms races between purely security-seeking states. As he points out, in the development of a theory of arms race:

Structural realism, especially defensive realism, provides a start on such a theory. Defensive realism focuses on states that are motivated only by security, and it assumes states’ knowledge of others’ motives is based only on the information communicated by their international policies. The security dilemma plays a central role, explaining how states that have fundamentally compatible goals can still end up in competition.129

Indeed, both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 indicate the effects of the security dilemma on the Sino–US nuclear relationship. China is highly wary of the motives of US missile defense. While some Chinese strategists recognize the defensive motives behind US missile defense, in an anarchic international system China nonetheless has to take appropriate measures to hedge against the negative consequences associated with the changing strategic balance of power. In fact, the security dilemma is a key driver of the changing Chinese nuclear posture. It explains not only China’s worry of the changing balance of power, which is induced by the rise of US defensive capabilities, and its various counterbalancing efforts, but also China’s threat perceptions. Indeed, China’s relations with Japan have been deeply affected by the mutual mistrust of each other’s intentions. This security dilemma powerfully shaped China’s perceptions of the probability of war in the summer of 2012 and afterwards, when its territorial disputes with Japan pushed them seemingly to the brink of militarized conflict. In contrast to neorealism and its defensive realist offshoot, offensive realism, as another variant of structural realism, may be more accurate in analyzing the general and actual behaviors of great powers in an anarchic international system. As argued by John Mearsheimer, historical evidence suggests that great powers tend to be “reckless” in their pursuit of power. They rarely exercise self-restraint, as believed by neorealism and defensive realism. Great powers tend to take advantage of opportunities to expand their power.130 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 However, this book argues that offensive realism is not appropriate for the study of China’s current nuclear posture, which practices minimum deterrence to protect its security. The current Chinese nuclear posture only seeks adequate capabilities for assured retaliation, not maximization of capabilities. This posture is consistent with the core arguments of defensive realism. In the long term, however, offensive realism could play a role in predicting the future trajectories of China’s nuclear posture. As discussed in the conclusion chapter, China may be shifting toward a grand strategy for global pre- eminence. If so, nuclear parity with the USA may become China’s strategy to 42 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture promote its international status. China may decide to build a nuclear force that serves more than purely security purposes, such as deterrence. Instead, seeking a force capability compatible with the status of a super power may become a goal of China’s nuclear posture. In that context, offensive realism could become a powerful theory for understanding and predicting the future trajectories of Chinese nuclear deterrence.

Key propositions Based on the insights of structural realism, especially those of neorealism and defensive realism, this book thus proposes the following four propositions, which form the key arguments of this research. Proposition 1: China’s nuclear posture is driven by the balancing imperatives of an anarchic international system. China constantly seeks to balance against US efforts to shift the strategic balance of power through its quest for missile defense. As neorealism predicts, China has pursued a variety of countermeasures to maintain the existing balance, defined as its ability to deliver an assured retaliation in a strategic nuclear war scenario involving the USA. Proposition 2: China’s balancing efforts are profoundly shaped by the security dilemma in its strategic relations with the USA. While Chinese strategists recognize the defensive motives behind the US pursuit of missile defense, China has to pursue balancing efforts to hedge against potentially negative consequences for its security. The expansion of its offensive nuclear capabilities, the development of integrated nuclear-space warfare capabilities, and an indigenous missile defense system all represent China’s balancing efforts to counter potential US dominance in their strategic nuclear relationship. Proposition 3: While China’s nuclear posture seeks to balance against the strongest power in the international system, which is the USA, it also balances against the greatest threat to its national security. China’s tacit modifications of its no-first-use principle and various nuclear signaling attempts since 2012 represent its efforts to balance against threats posed by Japan to its national security. In fact, China perceives a significant prospect of war with Japan due to their East China Sea disputes. Chinese strategists believe that Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Japan may possess both preventive war and pre-emptive war motives. Thus, the omission of the no-first-use principle in the 2013 Defense White Paper is no simple fluke. Proposition 4: China’s threat perception is profoundly shaped by the changing distribution of power in the international system. The end of unipolarity and the rise of a new multipolar system have substantially increased China’s sense of insecurity. In particular, Japan’s recent attempts to re-emerge as a great power and the tightening of the US–Japan alliance, both of which are symptoms and outcomes of an emerging multipolar system, have intensified Chinese concerns regarding wars in the western part of the Asia Pacific Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 43 region. In this context, China has increasingly relied on its nuclear deterrence to control crisis escalation and to prevent armed conflicts with Japan and the US–Japan alliance. The structural realist approach of this book offers a dynamic perspective that emphasizes the imperatives of balancing in an anarchic international system. It thus stands in sharp contrast to current studies that tend to focus on various state or unit-level factors and stress stability over change in China’s nuclear posture. The structural realist balancing approach focuses on the interactions between changes in the balance of power and China’s responses to these changes. This approach is inherently dynamic, emphasizing change over stability. This structural realist approach can therefore better account for the greater than expected shifts in China’s nuclear posture than most of the existing studies. China’s move toward a MIRV deployment pattern of its strategic missiles, its pursuit of integrated nuclear-space warfare capabilities, and the rise of its own missile defense capabilities together represent a major modification of China’s nuclear deterrence posture, which has so far rested exclusively on a small offensive capability. According to the balancing approach of this study, these changes are hardly surprising. Later chapters will reveal that the above changes in China’s nuclear posture are driven by its counter efforts against US attempts to change the existing balance, which is defined as China’s ability to launch a secure second-strike after being attacked by the nuclear weapons of another state. Specifically, the US efforts to change the current strategic balance by combining its offensive capabilities with defensive ones have posed a fundamental challenge to China’s core security interests. China has thus pursued a multipronged balancing strategy to restore the strategic balance. The outcome of these balancing efforts point to a major change in China’s nuclear posture that combines significantly expanded offensive capabilities with space warfare capabilities and ballistic missile defense. In addition to the above Chinese efforts to balance against power shifts, China has also pursued balance of threat activities by tacitly modifying its no-first-use principle. The 2012 summer announcement of China’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and an intensive strategic missile test schedule suggest that part of the previous understanding of China’s nuclear Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 deterrence has been falsified by a high profile crisis situation that led to a realistic prospect of war in the East China Sea. In fact, this tacit modification of China’s no-first-use principle is hardly expected by existing studies of China’s nuclear deterrence. Only a balance of threat approach can adequately account for this change. Since 2012, China has been very much worried about the prospect of war in the East China Sea. The threat to regime survival and China’s continuous rise in the international system have dictated the implicit exercise of nuclear deterrence during the crisis and afterwards. Some of the existing studies do recognize the impact of US missile defense on China’s nuclear deterrence, implying the balancing motive in Chinese 44 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture strategic calculations.131 However, they do not explicitly treat the structural imperatives of an anarchic order as the independent variables that shape China’s nuclear evolvement. Unlike this study that sees balancing and the security dilemma as the central drivers of China’s nuclear posture, they see US missile defense as an intervening variable, albeit an important one, that may influence the trajectory of China’s nuclear developments. Indeed, they emphasize the central roles of unit-level factors such as strategic culture, doctrinal constraints, organizational politics, and technologies. The only exception in this regard are the studies by international relations theorists, such as Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter’s research that explicitly employs states’ incentives to maintain the current balance to analyze and predict China’s responses to US missile defense.132 Moreover, existing studies on China’s nuclear posture tend to shun the use of international relations theory to shed light on Chinese nuclear deterrence. In fact, some, such as Fravel and Medeiros, ostensibly reject the structural realist approach, citing the need to understand China’s nuclear posture through analysis of its peculiar unit-level attributes.133 Finally, existing studies, while recognizing China’s concerns for US missile defense, fail to systematically treat the security dilemma, which is an important defensive realist concept for understanding states’ security policies, as a driving force behind China’s balancing and arms race behaviors. Avery Goldstein’s study of medium nuclear powers represents an exception through its distinctive structural realist approach. Goldstein uses both anarchy and polarity, the twin independent variables of neorealism, to explain why China, France, and Britain decided to pursue their independent nuclear deterrents.134 He argues that the fear of abandonment by their super power allies in a bipolar system explains their decisions. The three countries had to pursue nuclear capabilities to provide their own security. In essence, Goldstein uses the neorealist balancing logic to analyze the security policies of China, France, and Britain. However, Goldstein’s study is limited to explaining these countries’decisions to pursue independent nuclear deterrents, not the evolutions of their nuclear postures.

Notes 1 Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007), p. 1. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 2. 4 Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and US Nuclear War Planning (Washington, DC: The Federation of American Scientists, 2006), p. 4. 5 Ibid., p. 12. 6 Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts, China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), p. 32. 7 Ibid., p. 87. 8 Ibid., p. 86. Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 45 9 M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2010), p. 48. 10 Ibid., p. 79. 11 Ibid., p. 81. 12 Ibid. 13 Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’sNew‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/6), p. 12. 14 Ibid., p. 19. 15 Ibid., p. 20. 16 Ibid., p. 21. 17 Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, eds, The People’s Liberation Army as Organization (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2002), p. 546. 18 Ibid., p. 549. 19 Ibid., p. 557. 20 Michael S. Chase and Evan Medeiros, “China’s Evolving Nuclear Calculus: Modernization and Doctrinal Debate,” in James Mulvernon and David Finkelstein, eds, China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese Liberation Army (Arlington, VA: CAN, 2002), p. 123. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., p. 153. 23 Evan S. Medeiros, “Evolving Nuclear Doctrine,” in Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner, eds, China’s Nuclear Future (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), p. 72. 24 See Kristensen, Norris, and McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and US Nuclear War Planning,p.33. 25 Ibid., p. 31. 26 See Fravel and Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” p. 52. 27 Yao Yunzhu, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence,” Strategic Insights, Vol. IV, Issue 9 (September 2005), p. 3. 28 See Johnston, “China’sNew‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” p. 31. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., pp. 34–35. 31 Ibid., p. 38. 32 See Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” p. 559. 33 Ibid. 34 Chong-pin Lin, China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988), p. 35. 35 Ibid., p. 19. 36 Ibid., p. 20. 37 Ibid., p. 33. 38 Christine A. Cleary, “Culture, Strategy, and Security,” in Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner, eds, China’s Nuclear Future (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), p. 27. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., pp. 27–28. 41 Fravel and Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” p. 51. 42 Ibid., p. 52. 46 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 43 Ibid., p. 60. 44 Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” p. 19. 45 Ibid., p. 41. 46 Ibid., pp. 31–37. 47 Ibid., pp. 38–39. 48 Fravel and Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” pp. 51–52. 49 Ibid., p. 52. 50 John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Program: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), p. 7. 51 Ibid., p. 5. 52 Brad Roberts, China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Institute of Defense Analysis, 2003), p. 37. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” pp. 557–559. 56 Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China’s Security: The New Roles of the Military (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 129. 57 Images taken with Google Earth satellite in October 2013 showed what could be the fifth type 094 SSBN under construction at Huludao shipyard, which builds China’s nuclear powered submarines. See “Is this China’s5th Type 094 SSBN Under Construction?” at http://osimint.com/2014/04/01/is-this-chinas-5th-type- 094-ssbn-under-construction. 58 Christopher T. Yeaw, Andrew S. Erickson, and Michael S. Chase, “The Future of Chinese Nuclear Policy and Strategy,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), p. 67. 59 Xhinhua News Agency, “Zoujin zhongguo changgui daodan budui: kaiqi hechang jianbei shuangchung weishe xinjiyuan” (China’s Conventional Missile Forces: Beginning the New Era of Conventional/Nuclear Dual Deterrence), June 10, 2012, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-06/10/c_123260296.htm. 60 Evan S. Medeiros, “Evolving Nuclear Doctrine,” in Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner, eds, China’s Nuclear Future (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), p. 73. 61 Stephen M. Walt, “The Enduring Legacies of the Realist Tradition,” in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds, Political Science: the State of the Discipline (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), p. 199. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid., p. 200. 65 Joseph M. Grieco, “Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics,” Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds, New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 164. 66 Ibid., p. 165. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid., p. 167. 69 Walt, “The Enduring Legacies of the Realist Tradition,” p. 200. 70 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). 71 William C. Wohlforth, “Realism,” in Duncan Snidal and Christian Reus-Smit, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 136. 72 Ibid., p. 137. Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 47 73 Ibid. 74 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 1990), p. 35. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Walt, “The Enduring Legacies of the Realist Tradition,” p. 202. 78 See Theory Talk # 40, “Kenneth Waltz: the Physiocrat of International Politics,” pp. 6–7, June 3, 2011, at www.theory-talks.org/2011/06/theory-talk-40.html. 79 Waltz, Theory of International Politics,p.18. 80 Ibid., p. 40. 81 Ibid., p. 50. 82 Ibid., p. 72. 83 Ibid., p. 80. 84 Ibid., p. 88. 85 Ibid., p. 91. 86 Ibid., pp. 91–92. 87 Ibid., p. 105. 88 Ibid., p. 105. 89 Ibid., p. 111. 90 Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” p. 36. 91 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 118. 92 Ibid., p. 126. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid., p. 127. 95 See Jack S. Levy, “Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design,” in John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, eds, Realism and the Balance of Power: A New Debate (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), p. 129. 96 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 21. 97 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), p. 5. 98 Ibid., p. 9. 99 Ibid., pp. 10–11. 100 Levy, “Balances and Balancing,” p. 123. 101 Ibid., p. 131. 102 Ibid., p. 131. 103 Steven E. Lobell, “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism,” in Robert A. Denemark, ed., The International Studies Encyclopedia (Oxford: Willy-Blackwell, 2010), p. 6658. 104 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 126. 105 Ibid. 106 Joseph M. Grieco, “Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics,” Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds, New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 167. 107 Ibid., p. 166. 108 Ibid. 109 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), p. 916. 110 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 36–37. 111 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), p. 129. 112 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics,Vol.30, No. 2 (January 1978), p. 169. 48 Analyzing China’s nuclear posture 113 Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” p. 129. 114 Steven E. Lobell, “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism,” p. 6660. 115 Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 68–69. 116 Lobell, p. 6653. 117 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World’s Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 29–30. 118 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), pp. 32–35. 119 Ibid., p. 2. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid., p. 3. 122 Stephen Walt, “The Enduring Legacies of the Realist Tradition,” in Ira Katz- nelson and Helen V. Milner, eds, Political Science: the State of the Discipline (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), p. 207. 123 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 129. 124 Ibid., p. 97. 125 For this criticism of Waltz, see Bernard I. Finel, “Black Box or Pandora’sBox: State Level Variables and Progressivity in Realist Programs,” Security Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Winter 2001/02), pp. 187–227. 126 “Theory Talk # 40, Kenneth Waltz: the Physiocrat of International Politics,” p. 5. 127 See William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5–41; Michael Mastanduno and Ethan B. Kapstein, “Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War,” in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds, Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 1–21. 128 For an analysis of how unipolarity shaped security strategies of second-tier powers, see Brock F. Tessman, “System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu,” Security Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2012), pp. 192–231. 129 Charles L. Glaser, “The Causes and Consequences of Arms Race,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 (2000), p. 266. 130 John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism,” International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 2009), pp. 241–256. 131 For a representative study that recognizes the effects of US missile defense on China’s nuclear posture, see Brad Roberts, China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Institute of Defense Analysis, 2003). 132 Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 40–92. 133 M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2010), p. 49. 134 Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000). 2 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines

The chapter analyzes China’s traditional nuclear posture, including both its nuclear forces and doctrines. It outlines the evolution of China’s nuclear forces and their supporting doctrines. It then defines the core features of Chinese nuclear deterrence and points out its inherent pressures for change. Moreover, this chapter examines the apparent contradictions between China’s nuclear posture and its security needs. It shows that while China officially adheres to the no-first-use nuclear principle, its current strategic imperatives question the validity of such policy. The chapter will digest the 2013 version of The Science of Military Strategy (SMS), which is published by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Science, to illustrate the new focus of China’s military strategy and how it creates obvious conflicts with the no-first-use nuclear policy. Specifically, the SMS emphasizes the key roles of nuclear deterrence in controlling crisis situations that involve China and other countries and deterring their escalations. This role for China’s nuclear deterrent in the prevention of wars is at odds with its no-first-use principle.

China’s quest for nuclear deterrence China began its quest for nuclear weapons in the middle of the 1950s and has since become one of the ﬁve major nuclear powers of the world. China’s determination to become a nuclear power was chieﬂy motivated by its national security needs. According to John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s quest Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 for nuclear capabilities was underlined by genuine security imperatives. As they argue:

For years throughout the 1950s, the American government had attempted to exploit a calculated nuclear threat against China in Korea, Indochina, and the Taiwan Strait. Washington had issued its threats in ways never dared by Soviet leaders toward the allies of the United States. Those in the United States who fear and oppose nuclear proliferation would do well to remember that it was the United States that made the Chinese program essential to Chinese Security.1 50 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines As argued by Zhu Mingquan, a Chinese expert on nuclear deterrence, although Mao often publicly showed contempt for nuclear weapons and defied the mighty military power of the USA, he nonetheless viewed them as “a real tiger, not a paper one.”2 Thus, Mao saw vital importance in the development of China’s nuclear capabilities to defend its national security. At a Politburo meeting on 25 April 1955, Mao categorically stated that “Although we are now more powerful than the past and will become even more powerful, we still need more airplanes and cannons. Moreover, we need atomic bombs. In this world, to avoid abuse by others, we cannot afford not to have this thing.”3 According to Zhu, the Chinese leadership felt compelled to pursue nuclear capabilities due to perceived nuclear blackmails by the USA during the 1950s. During the Korean War, the First Indochina War of 1950–1954, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–1955, and the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958, China believed that the USA either contemplated actual use of tactical nuclear weapons or exercised implicit nuclear threats. As Zhu argues, these crises “generated huge nuclear pressure on China,” motivating it to pursue its own nuclear capability.4 Avery Goldstein emphasizes the structural imperatives of self-help and how it motivated China to pursue nuclear weapons. He argues that although the Chinese leadership believed that a large-scale US invasion and occupation of the mainland was unlikely, they nonetheless faced other security threats posed by Washington. On the one hand, the USA armed and supported the Kuomingtang regime in Taiwan, which often conducted raids against China’s coastal regions. On the other hand, the possibility of the USA using its nuclear weapons in conflicts involving China was considered realistic. As Goldstein points out:

Perhaps most worrisome, President Eisenhower’s coercive diplomacy during the closing months of the Korean conﬂict, as well as the 1954 and 1958 crises in the Taiwan Straits, compelled Beijing to face the possibility that the United States might actually resort to the option of employing nuclear weapons against China to realize American foreign policy goals.5

According to Goldstein, China faced the pressure of defending its national Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 security in an anarchic international system. In such a system, China would need to balance the US threat and power through self-help. As structural realists suggest, states have two options for exercising self-help. One is the external balancing strategy that seeks to use alliances to counter perceived threats. The other is the internal balancing strategy that seeks to boost one’s own defensive capabilities. As Goldstein argues, while the Chinese sought to enlist security help from its alliance with the Soviet Union, they nonetheless had profound mistrust of the Soviet commitment. The Chinese believed that the Soviet Union had a “preference for sacriﬁcing its comrades’ interests if that was the only way to China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 51 avoid a risky military clash with American forces.”6 According to Goldstein, the fear of abandonment by the Soviet Union and the lack of a credible alliance to defend its security motivated China to opt for the nuclear path. In essence, China had to rely on internal balancing to provide its own security. After China successfully conducted its ﬁrst nuclear test on 16 October 1964, the Chinese government issued a statement that unambiguously outlined the balancing motives behind China’s nuclear program. According to the statement:

Defending oneself is the inalienable right of every sovereign country. Defending world peace is the responsibility of all peace-loving countries. Facing the ever-increasing nuclear threats from the United States, China cannot aﬀord to do nothing. China has been compelled to conduct nuclear tests and develop nuclear weapons.7

To further illustrate the balancing motive, the Chinese statement proclaimed that China’s nuclear program was aimed at “breaking the nuclear monopoly” by the major powers. As it stated:

More and more countries have come to realize that if nuclear weapons are monopolized by American imperialists and their collaborators, they will then face rising danger of nuclear wars. Once those who oppose them also possess nuclear weapons, they can no longer be arrogant. Their nuclear blackmails and threats will also cease to be eﬀective.8

The above indicates that from the very beginning China’s quest for nuclear capabilities was motivated by the self-help logic of an anarchic international system. More specifically, in the tense and dangerous Cold War context China had to balance the US power and the threats it posed to China’s national security. Therefore, structural realism provides vital insight into the motives and security behaviors of China in the nuclear age. According to Peng Guangqian, a noted PLA strategist, there were three phases in the development of China’s nuclear deterrents. The first phase covered the mid-1950s to mid-1960s period and the main task facing China was to develop nuclear weapons technologies and transform itself from a non- Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 nuclear power to a nuclear one. According to Peng, the Chinese leadership decided to develop nuclear weapon technologies in April 1956.9 In the spring of that year, China initiated “A Guideline for the Long-term Scientific and Technological Development Plan for the 1956–1967 Period,” which listed atomic bombs and guided missiles as key priority projects. In August of 1956, China proposed to the Soviet Union to seek its technical assistance in the above areas. In September, Marshall Nie Rongzhen headed a Chinese dele- gation to Moscow and concluded a bilateral agreement in October. According to this agreement, the Soviet Union would supply China with both the samples and blueprints of four types of atomic bombs as well four types of 52 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines missiles, including a tactical missile with a range of 1000 kilometers and capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.10 Based on Soviet technical assistance, China initiated a massive and highly complex domestic scientific and technological plan to acquire both atomic bombs and nuclear capable ballistic missiles by the middle of the 1960s. However, the souring of Sino–Soviet relations in the late 1950s and early 1960s vastly complicated China’s quest for these capabilities. In fact, the Soviet Union suspended the further transfer of related technologies in October 1959 and withdrew all its experts from China in August 1960. This setback did not discourage the Chinese leadership. At a meeting in the summer of 1960, Mao Zedong affirmed China’s goal of pursuing indigenous atomic and missile technologies and set the target of a successful atomic bomb test in 1964.11 Due to the dedication of China’s nuclear research personnel and their ingenious efforts, China successfully conducted its first nuclear explosion on October 16, 1964.12 On May 14, 1965, China conducted its second successful nuclear test by the air-drop method. This implied that China began to possess combat-ready nuclear capabilities. Then, on June 17, 1967, China conducted its first successful thermonuclear bomb test. In the meantime, China also made important progress in the development of delivery means for its nuclear weapons. On November 5, 1960, China tested a short-range ballistic missile modeled after the Soviet P-2 missile. In 1964, China was able to lunch its first indigenously designed medium-range ballistic missile. Finally, on October 27, 1966, China successfully tested a ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead, which exploded at the pre-set height above the target. According to Peng, this successful combination of a nuclear warhead and medium-range ballistic missile signaled a true milestone in China’s quest for a nuclear deterrent.13 The above tests meant the official transformation of China from a non-nuclear power to a nuclear one. Indeed, China officially established its strategic deterrent force on July 1, 1966 and it was named the PLA Second Artillery Corps.14 The second phase of the development of China’s nuclear forces, according to Peng, lasted from the early 1970s to the early 1980s.15 During this period, China sought to diversify the range of its nuclear deterrent and make it combat effective. Based on its experience with the development of short and Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 medium-range ballistic missiles, China set its eyes on long-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. In September 1971, China conducted a successful test of a long-range ballistic missile. Then, on May 18, 1980, China launched an intercontinental ballistic missile toward the South Pacific. After flying for 30 minutes and a distance of more than 9,000 kilometers, the missile landed in an area 1,350 kilometers north-northwest of Fiji. This important test completed China’s quest for inter-continental deterrence capabilities and symbolized its status as a major nuclear power. In addition to the development of land-based ballistic missile capabilities, China also launched an ambitious program to acquire a sea-based nuclear China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 53 deterrent.16 On October 12, 1982, China successful tested its first submarine- launched solid-state ballistic missile JL-1. According to Peng, the successful test of the JL-1 meant that China became the fourth country in the world to independently develop a sea-based nuclear deterrent. Together with China’s first generation nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine, the Type 092 SSBN, the JL-1 also meant China’s initial acquirement of a secure second-strike capability.17 The third stage of the development of China’s nuclear forces, according to Peng’s study, began in the 1980s and it was characterized by the maturation of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. China’s nuclear forces became:

A strategic deterrent capable of eﬀective and integrated counter-strikes. During this stage, strategic missile forces continue to improve their comprehensive combat capabilities. They have also developed a system of strategic, operational, and tactical doctrines. China’s strategic nuclear deterrent has become an important force that defends its national security interests, buttresses its international status, and safeguards world peace.18

Over the recent decades, China has acquired a full range of nuclear capabilities. According to John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China has been consistently modernizing its strategic, theater, and tactical nuclear missiles. So far, it has developed two generations of long-range and intercontinental strategic missiles. The first generation included the liquid-propellant DF-3, DF-3A (a range-extended version of the DF-3), DF-4, and DF-5 missiles. As Lewis and Xue point out, although these missiles had reasonable soft-target kill capability, their slow response and vulnerable basing made them obsolete. Therefore, the second generation of Chinese strategic missiles all use solid- propellant and are road-mobile. They include the DF-31, DF-31A (an extended range version of the DF-31), and the latest DF-41.19 Moreover, as any credible strategic nuclear power should have done, China has also been pursuing sea-based strategic strike capabilities. Its first generation strategic nuclear submarine, the Type 092 SSBN, was equipped with the JL-1 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) armed with a single warhead. However, the high noise level of the Type 092 and the limited range of the JL-1 made them highly unlikely to provide China with a secure second- Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 strike capability. So in recent years China has begun to deploy the next generation Type 094 Jin-class SSBN. It is significantly quieter and armed with the new JL-2 SLBM that has an estimated range of more than 7,400 kilometers. According to the Pentagon’s 2013 annual report to Congress regarding China’s military power, “The Jin-class and the JL-2 will give the PLA Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.”20 As the report claims, “China continues to produce the Jin-class SSBN, with three already delivered and as many as two more in various stages of construction.”21 The Pentagon estimated “the JL-2 appears ready to reach initial operational capability in 2013.”22 54 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines According to Lewis and Xue, China’s nuclear capable bombers constitute one leg of the triad “but were considered by many its weak link.”23 The main reason is that China’s H-6 medium-range bombers, which were based on an original Soviet design of the 1950s, are technologically outdated. They have little probability of penetrating a sophisticated air-defense system. However, in recent years, China has significantly upgraded its H-6 fleet and armed them with long-range stand-off weapons such as cruise missiles. This upgrade has turned the latest H-6K model into a formidable platform for air-based Chinese nuclear strike capabilities. As recent Chinese reports claim, the H-6K is equipped with Russia’s D30-KP-2 engines that are more powerful and efficient than the original WP-8 engine. This new engine gives the H-6K a significantly longer-range than previous models. Moreover, it can carry six nuclear-capable CJ-10 cruise missiles with a range of 2000 kilometers.24 According to Kanwa Defense Review, an overseas-based Chinese language defense magazine, the above capability will give China a credible air-based nuclear deterrent. For example, by just staying inside China’s airspace the H-6K is capable of striking Japan and US bases in the western Pacific. Moreover, within 20–30 minutes of the warning of an incoming nuclear attack, the H-6K can get airborne, giving it higher survival ability than China’s land-based missiles. As Kanwa Defense Review suggests, the new capabilities of the H-6K allow it to become a true strategic bomber and constitute one leg of China’s strategic nuclear triad.25 As Lewis and Xue point out, starting in the 1980s China began to develop short- and medium-range missiles armed with low-yield tactical nuclear warheads.26 The most significant Chinese missile for theater operations is the DF-21 series that has a range of about 1,700 kilometers and can be armed with both conventional or nuclear warheads. In recent years, a new generation of Chinese medium-range missiles, with longer reach and larger payloads, has entered service. The most important new missiles in this category are the DF-25 and DF-26.27 The DF-25 officially debuted in October 2012 in a Chinese newspaper report, which was then widely circulated through the Chinese media.28 The report came after Channel 7 of China’s CCTV showed documentary footage of the DF-25 operating in the field. According to this report, the DF-25 is China’s second-generation medium-range strategic missile and “can carry three independently guided nuclear warheads. In fact it is the world’s only Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 medium-range missile capable of carrying multiple warheads.” As the report claims, the DF-25 has an estimated range of 3,200 kilometers. Chinese reports have labeled the DF-25 “the king of missiles,” as it is a flexible platform to accomplish multiple tasks. Due to its MIRVed capability, Chinese reports claim the DF-25 will “render US missile defense useless.”29 In addition to its nuclear strike function, the DF-25 can also perform anti-ship functions like the shorter-range DF-21D. It can even be used for anti-space tasks, effectively becoming an anti-satellite weapon.30 Beside the DF-25, Internet photos from China have shown a larger missile that has yet to be officially identified. Compared to the ten-wheeled launch China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 55 Table 2.1 China’s missile force System Missiles Launchers Estimated range ICBM 50–75 50–75 5500+ km IRBM 5–20 5–20 3000–5500 km MRBM 75–100 75–100 1000–3000 km SRBM 1000–1200 200–500 <1000 km GLCM 200–500 40–55 1550+ km

Source: The Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop- ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012 (Washington, DC: The Department of Defense, 2012), p. 29. Notes: The above ﬁgures are based on the Pentagon estimate in 2012. The new generation of China’s medium-range missiles, such as the DF-25, and intermediate-range missiles, such as the DF-26C, were revealed after 2012. Therefore, the latest number of Chinese nuclear missiles in these categories could be larger in the coming years.

vehicle for the DF-25, the launch vehicle for this larger missile has 12 wheels.31 According to Bill Gertz, an American expert on Chinese missile programs, the US intelligence agencies have conﬁrmed that China is deploying a new intermediate-range nuclear missile called the DF-26C.32 As a Chinese report claims:

The DF-26 is the most advanced two-stage solid propellant missile. It is a ﬂexible system through interchangeable components. With special warheads it can perform anti-ship functions. Adding another stage it will become a mini-intercontinental missile. With a KKV interceptor it can become an anti-satellite missile. Overall, the DF-26, with an estimated range of 4500 kilometers, will be able to wipe out American troops based in Guam.33

The above shows that China has developed a full-range of ballistic missiles for its nuclear deterrent, including land, sea, and air-based missiles. Moreover, China also possesses an array of theater and tactical missiles that are capable of performing nuclear strike roles. Chinese nuclear capabilities at the tactical and theater levels indicate that its nuclear posture is also geared toward war- ﬁghting functions, which contradict China’s long-standing claim that its nuclear deterrent only serves deterrence functions to deter a nuclear ﬁrst strike by another country. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 The Pentagon’s 2012 report to Congress on the military power of China provides the following table that gives estimated numbers of various types of Chinese ballistic missiles.

Nuclear doctrines According to Peng Guangqian, the Chinese government immediately announced the core principles of its nuclear doctrine on the day of its ﬁrst successful nuclear test.34 In its statement after the test, China outlined several key principles of its nuclear policy. First, China’s nuclear weapons are for 56 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines purely defensive purposes. As the statement proclaims, “China develops nuclear weapons for defensive purposes, to defend the Chinese people from U.S. threats of nuclear wars.”35 As Peng argues, the defensive nature of China’s nuclear deterrent means:

It will not use nuclear weapons to blackmail others and to contest for nuclear dominance. Even after becoming a nuclear power, China has nonetheless steadfastly continued its independent and peaceful foreign policy. Among the nuclear powers of the world, China is the only country that pledges not to use nuclear weapons ﬁrst.36

Second, based on its defensive nature, no-ﬁrst-use has become the foundation of China’s nuclear doctrine. According to Peng,

No-ﬁrst-use of nuclear weapons means no ﬁrst strike. This policy is consistent with the strategy of active defense that China has consistently pursued. It is not only the basic state strategy of China but also the most fundamental principle for the exercise of its nuclear forces. If its enemies do not use nuclear weapons, China will also not use them. If the enemies use them, China then has the right of nuclear counter-strike.37

Third, because of its defensive posture, China will not engage in any nuclear arms race regardless of its comprehensive national capabilities. Instead, as Peng suggests, China’s nuclear capabilities will follow the principle of suﬃciency and they will be set on a level that provides “a minimum level of eﬀective deterrence. Both the size of nuclear capabilities and the goals of nuclear counter-strikes are therefore very limited.”38 Finally, Peng argues that a long-term nuclear principle of China is:

The eventual elimination of nuclear weapons in the world. China has pursued nuclear capabilities with the aim of limiting their use and eliminating their existence. Based on this goal, the Chinese government has been supportive of international arms control initiatives, seeking to use practical measures and procedures to eventually eliminate nuclear weapons.39 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016

Yao Yunzhu, a noted PLA expert on nuclear deterrence, further elaborates the basic principles of China’s nuclear doctrine. According to her, China’s no-first-use pledge, which was first announced in the Chinese government’s statement on October 17, 1964, implies that by conceding the first-use option, “China has limited itself to retaliatory nuclear use only.”40 With regard to its limited nuclear capabilities, Yao argues that although China has kept its nuclear arsenal to the lowest level necessary for self-defense, it has to make sure that its small nuclear arsenal is a credible deterrent. This requires that “China must make sure that its nuclear forces should be able to survive a China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 57 devastating first nuclear strike. In Chinese nuclear literature, China seeks to build a ‘small but effective’ nuclear capability.”41 Yao also suggests several other underlying principles of Chinese nuclear doctrine, which are summarized as follows. Strategic rather than operational and tactical deterrence: According to Yao, China sees nuclear weapons as a political instrument to be utilized mainly at the level of grand strategy, not as a winning tool in military operations. The military value of nuclear weapons lies only in their deterrent effect against nuclear attack. Therefore, the Second Artillery Corps has only two declared missions, which are to deter the use of nuclear weapons against China, and to launch an effective nuclear counter-attack in the case of such an attack. As Yao points out, China has not made distinctions among the categories of nuclear operations. According to her,

In Chinese strategic literature, there is only discussion on how to deter a nuclear war from happening, on how to prevent a conventional conﬂict from escalating into a nuclear war, and how to retaliate after suﬀering a nuclear attack – but never how to win a nuclear war. The mainstream Chinese thinking is that nuclear wars are not to be won, but to be prevented.42

Retaliatory oriented deterrence: Yao argues that the Chinese strategic thinkers believe that nuclear weapons only serve deterrence functions. As nuclear wars are not winnable, nuclear weapons do not have battleﬁeld functions. The deterrence value of nuclear weapons lies in the vast pains they inﬂict through retaliation. Based on this understanding, China has pursued counter-value as opposed to counterforce nuclear strategies to strengthen its deterrence posture. As Yao argues:

Just a small number of nuclear weapons will satisfy China’s deterrent needs. Both Mao and Deng were very explicit in suggesting that the eﬀectiveness of deterrence does not increase in proportion with numbers of nuclear weapons. Even a small but survivable nuclear arsenal can have the same deterrence eﬀectiveness as a large arsenal.43

General rather than specific deterrence: Yao also points out that during the Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Cold War, the two super powers directed their nuclear deterrence specifically against each other. In contrast, “China’s deterrence has been more of a general nature – in which China tries to form a multilateral deterrence relationship with all the nuclear powers.”44 This implies that China does not practice nuclear deterrence against a specific country in a specific context. Minimum rather than limited or maximum deterrence: Yao argues that based on Western terminology of deterrence, China practices minimum deterrence, which only seeks to deter a nuclear attack by other countries with a small retaliatory capability. She criticizes the argument that China may have shifted toward a limited deterrence posture, which implies China could 58 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines employ nuclear weapons to deter both nuclear and conventional wars. Yao argues that China’s nuclear logic has not changed during the past decades and it still sees nuclear weapons as a means to deter nuclear attacks. However, as she points out, “I think the word ‘minimum’ has too strong a quantitative connotation that is misleading. It sometimes suggest a quantitative standard instead of a qualitative standard.”45 Instead, Yao emphasizes that Chinese strategists take the concept as a relative one:

Deﬁned not only by pure numbers, but more importantly by such key criteria as invulnerability of nuclear forces, assured retaliatory capabilities, and credibility of counter- attack. If China says it intends to possess nuclear weapons only at the lowest level for the needs of self-defense, it means to have the minimum but assured capabilities for a retaliatory second-strike.46

The above analyses by Chinese nuclear experts indicate that China’s nuclear doctrines are defined by two core principles: minimum deterrence and no-first-use, both of which are intricately linked to Chinese conceptions of nuclear deterrence. According to a PLA study of strategic deterrence, “The massive destructive abilities of nuclear weapons render them unusable. Nuclear weapons, after people realizing the consequences of a nuclear winter, have increased their deterrence effect against nuclear wars and provided the foundation of nuclear deterrence theory after World War II.”47 As the study concludes, “Nuclear doctrines therefore can only be doctrines for deterrence, not doctrines for wars.”48 The 2013 edition of The Science of Military Strategy (SMS), which is published by the PLA Academy of Military Science, also emphasizes the deterrence roles of nuclear weapons. As it argues:

The unique qualities of nuclear weapons dictate that they are weapons mainly for deterrence purposes. Indeed, exercising deterrence is the main form for one to apply its nuclear capabilities. In fact, both nuclear countries and those at the nuclear threshold all situate nuclear deterrence at the heart of their nuclear thinking.49 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Based on the above Chinese understanding of nuclear deterrence, the twin principles of minimum deterrence and no-first-use make perfect sense. Due to the massive destructive power of nuclear weapons, even a limited nuclear capability by China can generate effective deterrence against a nuclear first- strike by other states. As pointed out by a PLA study on strategic deterrence:

Due to the massive destructive ability of nuclear weapons, no country is willing to face a nuclear attack of even the most limited scale. Therefore, once a country acquires nuclear power, it can eﬀectively deter an enemy and maintain stability by simply maintaining a small number (such as China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 59 several dozen warheads) of thermonuclear weapons that are aimed at enemy’s cities and its population.50

According to this study, the minimum deterrence doctrine thus argues that instead of unlimited expansion of nuclear arsenals, which will exhaust a country’s ﬁnancial resources and will not establish unilateral advantages due to arms races, “it is better to maintain a relatively small nuclear arsenal of average quality. Although it is at a disadvantage compared to the adversary, it is more than suﬃcient to strike at enemy’s cities.”51 While this PLA study does recognize the vulnerability of a small nuclear force to a pre-emptive strike by a superior adversary, it nonetheless argues that minimum deterrence “is suitable for those countries with limited national capabilities and limited strategic goals.”52 The SMS also emphasizes the feasibility of minimum deterrence due to the unique qualities of nuclear weapons. As it states:

Nuclear explosions have super destructive impacts. Moreover, missiles as delivery vehicles are diﬃcult to be intercepted by defense. Thus, once a country possesses nuclear weapons, it has established basic nuclear counter- strike capabilities. No matter how many nuclear weapons it actually has, they will impose constraint on other countries’ military activities and play a role in defending its own security. This eﬀect is due to the inherent qualities of nuclear weapons and does not depend on the size of the nuclear arsenal and its actual capabilities.53

According to the SMS, China’s decision to pursue nuclear capabilities was motivated by the above logic. It sought to break the monopoly of the major nuclear powers by simply acquiring its own nuclear weapons. China has practiced the “You have it, I have it too” approach, assuming that “the mere existence of nuclear weapons generates deterrence.”54 Also due to the peculiar destructive effects of nuclear weapons, a commitment to no-first-use does not fundamentally leave China at a disadvantage. As long as China can launch an effective retaliatory strike, it should be able to deter an adversary from initiating a first-strike. China believes that a successful retaliatory strike by several to several dozen thermonuclear warheads Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 against population centers would generate unacceptable destruction to an adversary that possesses superior nuclear capabilities. Therefore, assuming that China possesses a small but assured retaliatory capability, its no-first-use principle should theoretically be able to provide adequate deterrence against a nuclear attack by other states.

Tensions within China’s nuclear doctrines These twin core principles of China’s nuclear doctrine have been under pressure for change in recent decades. Starting from the 1980s, China has 60 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines witnessed internal discussions on the continuing validity of these principles. The triggers of the discussions have been the strategic imperatives facing China. On the one hand, China’s conventional military forces have consistently faced the dilemma of providing adequate protection to its national security. On the other hand, China’s small nuclear force that practices no-first-use has the questionable ability to deliver an effective counter strike against a superior nuclear state. Since the 1980s, the above dilemmas have forced some quarters of the Chinese strategic community to consider modifications of the minimum deterrence principle and the no-first-use principle. According to Alastair Iain Johnston’s study, China’s conventional inferiority to the Soviet Union motivated Chinese strategic thinkers to look beyond minimum deterrence, which is based exclusively on the possession of strategic nuclear weapons to deter a nuclear attack initiated by other countries. Initially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, PLA strategists began to ponder about the roles of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in actual combats. The trigger of such thinking was the Chinese conventional disadvantages vis- à-vis the Soviet Union. The Chinese strategists were highly concerned about how to “stop a Soviet armored blitzkrieg across the northern and western borders” and they began to explore the role of tactical nuclear weapons in warfare.55 However, as Johnston points out, “research on the operational use of TNW was relatively underdeveloped among Chinese strategists.”56 It was toward the later part of the 1980s that Chinese strategists began to articulate a more coherent doctrine called limited deterrence. As observed by Johnston, the term appeared as early as 1987 and over time Chinese strategists have drawn the distinction between minimum and limited deterrence much more sharply. According to a number of Chinese strategists, “a limited deterrent means having enough capabilities to deter conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear war, and to control and suppress escalation during a nuclear war. That is, a limited deterrent should be able to respond to any level or type of attack from tactical to strategic.”57 The war-fighting orientation of limited deterrence is different from the pure deterrence orientation of minimum deterrence and involves the use of tactical nuclear weapons to attack an enemy’s battle field targets as well as theater-level targets such as command centers.58 As Johnston points out: Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016

Chinese strategists in the1980s and 1990s have been relatively clear about their preference for a TNW system. As one strategist at the NDU (National Defense University) succinctly put it, having TNW “greatly enriches” a state’s nuclear stockpiles. Their small size and limited yields mean that their use does not carry as great a risk as strategic nuclear retaliation. They help create a “nuclear ladder” and thus enhance deterrence.59

Inevitably, limited deterrence, with its emphasis on war-fighting, tactical nuclear weapons, and their pre-emptive usage in war scenarios, conflicts with China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 61 the minimum deterrence and no-first-use principles that define China’s nuclear deterrence. According to Johnston, while some Chinese strategists note that the NFU pledge carries political image benefits, many believe it is a considerable military handicap.60 To resolve this tension between limited deterrence and China’s no-first-use principle, “Very often one finds strategists arguing abstractly in favor of first strikes in conventional and nuclear war, even while claiming that China is committed to a second-strike posture.”61 Other studies have also identified mounting pressures on the minimum deterrence and no-first-use principles. According to You Ji, minimum deterrence is a nuclear strategy that emphasizes the ability of China’s small deterrent to survive a pre-emptive strike by another country, which is a highly questionable scenario if the latter possesses overwhelming advantages. More- over, minimum deterrence is designed to deal only with nuclear attacks by other countries and has no relevance for more realistic scenarios of nuclear and conventional war involving China.62 As a result, You Ji argues that during the 1990s the PLA started to transform nuclear weapons from a pure deterrence tool to something that could be used in wars. According to him, “some military planners are now tempted to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in an escalation of conventional war, which they believe may place a nation’s survival at stake just as much as nuclear attack.”63 Specifically, the PLA began to try to “grasp the nature, process, and consequences of a tactical nuclear war.”64 According to You Ji, the need to expand the role of nuclear weapons “is based on the fact that the PLA’s conventional weaponry is too backward to serve as a meaningful deterrent to the major powers.”65 The result is that the world may see the transition of China’s nuclear forces “from basically a ‘hiding power’ to a ‘fighting power.’ This requires a qualitative change in the mentality of PLA generals, which has been shaped by the concept of minimum deterrence.”66 The above studies show the inherent tensions within China’s nuclear doctrines and the pressures for change. Fundamentally, minimum deterrence and no-first-use cannot resolve the challenges facing China’s national security in recent decades. China’s conventional military disadvantages vis-à-vis its main adversaries, such as the USA and Japan, render it vulnerable in war Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 scenarios. Until the 1990s, China’s nuclear deterrent represented just one component of its overall strategic deterrence, as it then also preached the doctrine of “People’sWar” to deter a large-scale invasion by other countries. As pointed out by John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, in that context China’s nuclear deterrent only served to deter a nuclear attack by other countries.67 However, after the mid-1980s the Chinese leadership assessed the strategic landscape and came to the conclusion that a large-scale invasion by other countries was highly unlikely. More realistic war scenarios facing China involved “limited wars under high-tech conditions” at its peripheries, such as territorial and maritime conflicts as well as secessionist attempts by Taiwan.68 62 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines However, China’s likely adversaries in those war scenarios involve countries that possess advanced conventional military capabilities, such as the USA and Japan. These scenarios have posed fundamental dilemmas for China’s national security, as it is widely agreed that its conventional forces are at vast disadvantages when compared to these adversaries. In particular, the 1990–1991 Gulf War demonstrated the effects of revolution in military affairs and the vast conventional superiority of the USA. This war profoundly changed the Chinese perceptions of the future form of wars and deepened China’s sense of vulnerability.69 Due to China’s vast conventional disadvantages and likely war scenarios that involve adversaries such as the USA, its core nuclear principles inevitably face internal pressures for change. Specifically, some Chinese strategists favor the use of nuclear weapons to deter and fight a conventionally superior enemy. They keenly understand that a defeat in conventional war scenario would gravely jeopardize China’s core national interests. It was in this context that a highly publicized challenge to China’s no-first- use principle took place in 2005. On July 14, Major General Zhu Chenghu, a senior PLA strategist at the National Defense University, told a group of foreign journalists that China would use nuclear weapons in a war scenario across the Taiwan Strait. As he warned, if the USA dared to use its precision conventional weapons to attack China, the latter would be forced to rely on nuclear weapons to defend itself. According to Zhu, “We Chinese people will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all the cities east of Xian. Of course, the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds of cities will be destroyed by the Chinese.”70 Zhu’s statement set off a major controversy between China and the USA. Although the Chinese government denied that Zhu’s comment represented a change in China’s long-standing no-first-use policy, many in the USA were not convinced. For example, Bruce Blair points out that Zhu revealed a predicament in China’s security, that it may lose Taiwan if it does not override its own no-first-use pledge.71 Indeed, some Chinese strategists concur with this assessment. According to Shen Dingli, a prominent Chinese nuclear expert, the advancement of the revolution in military affairs and the US commitment to defend Taiwan put mounting pressure on its no-first-use (NFU) policy. As he says, “If China’s conventional forces are devastated in a Taiwan conflict, it Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 is inconceivable that China would not use nuclear weapons as a true means of deterrence.”72 According to Shen, “Frankly speaking, in a military contingency, no adversary would fail to prepare for a change in China’s position on NFU, as this choice is always an option for China.”73 Peng Guanqian and Rong Yu argue that China’s no-first-use policy puts its national security at risk. While praising China’s NFU policy for moral reasons, they point out that the vast conventional superiority of the USA, especially its advantages in precision conventional attacks, poses fundamental threats to China’s national interests during times of war. As Peng and Rong suggest: China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 63 There is a visible and growing asymmetry between a party armed with high-tech conventional weapons and the one who has a small number of nuclear weapons but suffers from an overall military inferiority. If the latter state abjures from using its limited nuclear force and its conventional force is not strong enough to deny the devastating attack, the only outcome is defeat and annihilation. If, on the other hand, the state uses its limited nuclear weapons as the last resort, there might be a chance for the state to survive. Although either path could lead to the annihilation of the state, at least theoretically, a first-use policy gives the state more choice in the outcome. NFU policy may conform to the rule of morality, but it does not necessarily conform to the laws of survival. This is perhaps the most serious paradox facing an NFU policy.74

Other studies by Chinese nuclear experts also suggest the pressures on China’s minimum deterrence and no-ﬁrst-use principle. Zhu Mingquan, a scholar at Fudan University, organized a research project that examined China’s nuclear relations with the USA.75 This research project involved the participation of Wu Tianfu, who was a professor of strategy at the Command Academy of the PLA Second Artillery Corps. Wu is in fact widely considered the pre-eminent strategist of the Second Artillery Corps. According to Zhu, China’s traditional nuclear principles have been extensively discussed and challenged from within its strategic community. There have been mounting pressures to re-consider and even modify China’s core nuclear principles, such as minimum deterrence and no-ﬁrst-use. However, as Zhu argues:

The majority of people are more cool-headed and rational. They believe that if China adopts the suggestions of major modifications of its minimum deterrence doctrine, the outcome could be delays in its economic development, just like the experience of the Soviet Union. Moreover, they will further weaken the stability of Sino–U.S. nuclear relations, which will only please the real anti-China elements in America. Thus, China should in principle maintain its previous nuclear deterrence policies and only make some necessary and non-qualitative tuning to safeguard Sino–U.S. nuclear stability. These views can be summarized as the following. First, China should insist on continuing its retaliatory-oriented deterrence Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 strategy. Wu Tianfu argues that China’s nuclear doctrine should be based on “active defense, second-strike, and limited retaliation.” Although their exact expressions are different, the basic concept is the same, namely, China’s nuclear strategy should continue to be based on limited but effective retaliation to deter enemies’ nuclear attack…. Next, China should insist on the no-first-use principle. They argue this principle is consistent with the fundamental goal of China’s development of its nuclear deterrent, which is to deter the super powers from launching nuclear attacks against China. This is to say, China does not seek nuclear first strike. As long as an enemy does not employ nuclear weapons, China 64 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines will also not use them. However, if China is attacked by nuclear weapons, it will immediately launch a counter strike.76

While Zhu outlines the mainstream view in China that favors the continuation of its current nuclear policies, he nonetheless acknowledges that even the more moderate strategic thinkers recognize the need for some modiﬁcations. As he observes:

Of course, these people also believe that due to changes in the international security environment and the weakening of Sino–U.S. nuclear relations, China, while maintaining its nuclear principles, must initiate minor changes in them. For example, some have suggested that China should modestly expand its nuclear arsenal, especially by improving its structure and quality. As said by Wu Tianfu, “China’s nuclear capabilities have big gaps with those of the United States and Russia. If no forceful measure are made, the gap will only expand.” Therefore, “The size of China’s nuclear capabilities should be greater than those of Britain and France. At least they should not be smaller than Britain and France.” Moreover, “Based on its economic and technological capabilities, China should gradually build a multilevel deterrent with strategic, theater, and tactical nuclear capabilities.”77

According to Zhu, in addition to the above suggestions for a moderate expansion of China’s nuclear deterrent, these Chinese strategists also propose to ﬁne-tune China’s no-ﬁrst-use principle:

Furthermore, they believe that China’s no-first-use principle should be conditional. Wu Tianfu points out that while China should politically adhere to the no-first-use principle, militarily “it should be conditional no-first-use of nuclear weapons.” As they argue, when the no-first-use principle “is inadequate in deterring serious nuclear threats by an enemy or deterring large-scale conventional invasion or an enemy initiating superbly destructive conventional attacks,” applying conditional no-first- use “will no doubt generate huge deterrence effect.” They further point out, “at the critical moment, exercising conditional no-first-use can Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 achieve unexpected results.” Their views are actually like this: On the one hand, China should in principle maintain the no-first-use position. On the other hand, if China faces truly serious military situations, such as when an enemy uses high-tech weapons to pose extraordinary dangers to China or when it uses nuclear weapons to generate fundamental threats to China, China can announce that its no-first-use policy is conditional, which implies that it may use nuclear weapons first, if necessary.78

The above discussions and debates among China’s strategists indicate that there are significant pressures on the twin core principles that buttress its China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 65 nuclear posture. The imperatives of China’s national interests and security have led many to challenge these principles. Instead of unconditional adherence to minimum deterrence and no-first-use, some propose greater roles for nuclear weapons in defending China’s national security. From the Chinese discussions on limited deterrence to the more recent controversies involving the no-first-use principle, it is obvious that China has a difficult time recon- ciling the contradictions between its security imperatives and its long-standing nuclear principles.

Strategic deterrence and its challenges to China’s nuclear traditions In fact, the latest PLA strategic doctrines indicate that these contradictions continue to pose dilemmas for China’s national security strategies. The 2013 version of The Science of Military Strategy (SMS) which is published by the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, outlines key roles for China’s nuclear deterrent in deterring large-scale wars, which include purely conventional scenarios. This strategic perspective of the SMS thus poses dilemmas for China’s no-first-use principle. According to the 2013 edition of the SMS, the purposes and functions of China’s military power must be consistent with its current grand strategy. This implies that China’s military power, including its nuclear forces, must complement and enhance its overall strategic goals. In various sections, the book outlines China’s grand strategic objectives, the functions of its military power in achieving these objectives, and the roles of nuclear deterrence in the exercise of Chinese military power. Broadly speaking, the SMS argues that China’s strategic imperatives are dictated by its current rise in the international system. China’s success in building up its comprehensive national capabilities, however, has also generated forces that threaten to derail its further rise. Hence, China’s grand strategy is to ensure its continuous rise in the international system and this requires robust strategic deterrence to maintain an environment that facilitates this rise. In this context, China’s nuclear deterrent is considered a vital and key instrument to deter external challenges to its further rise in the international system. From this perspective, the role of China’s nuclear deterrent is no longer confined to its traditional function of deterring only nuclear attacks Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 by other countries. Now, it is a key component of China’s power tools to enhance its grand strategic goals. This conception of the roles of China’s nuclear deterrent questions its adherence to the no-first-use principle. Indeed, the SMS preaches a vital role for China’s nuclear deterrent in controlling crisis situations and deterring their escalations, implying that, if necessary, China needs to exercise nuclear deterrence to deter wars that threaten its further rise. Chapter 3 of the SMS analyzes China’s current strategic situation. According to the SMS, “China has never been this close to realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”79 China believes that the broader 66 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines contemporary strategic situation is favorable to its rise in the international system. This strategic assessment has led the Chinese leadership to define the current international situation as “a period of strategic opportunities.” According to the SMS, “Before 2020, our country will continue to be situated in a strategic opportunity period for its development. This is the fundamental strategic assessment by the party center.”80 The Chinese assessment is based on the following three factors. First, China believes that due to the “rise of the rest,” the international system is moving from a unipolar structure toward a multipolar one. As a result, the “ability of the hegemonic power to enforce unilateralism and dominate international affairs has declined.” As the SMS argues, this change in the structure of power distribution of the international system has created “an opportunity for China to exercise influence on the international stage, expand its presence, and reduce strategic pressure it faces.”81 Second. “Economic globalization and informationization have provided vital dynamics for China’ssustaineddevelopment.” The global flows of technologies, capitals, and information have “made China one of the greatest beneficiaries of economic globalization and informationization.”82 Third, China’s rising power has given it increasing abilities to shape its own environment. As the SMS argues, “Due to neighboring countries’ rising economic dependence on us, nobody can afford to take on the cost of initiating confrontations with China. This situation can deter others from challenging our core security interests.”83 However, while the SMS sees a favorable international environment that facilitates China’s current rise, it also emphasizes challenges ahead. As it argues, “Opportunities are always mixed with challenges.” In fact, the SMS claims that China faces both “long-term concerns and short-term worries.”84 First, the SMS argues that the USA and the West have

initiated a new strategic containment against our country. Facing our country’s continuous rise, while the United States and Western countries have attempted to use engagement and cooperation to trap China inside their controlled international system, the containment orientation in their China strategies has become increasingly apparent. Of particular concern is the accelerated eﬀort by the United States to return to the Asia Paciﬁc Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 region. It has pursued “strategic rebalancing” to relocate its strategic focus to the region and has also adopted an “Air-sea battle doctrine” that treats China as its main adversary.85

Second, the SMS argues that China’s peripheral challenges and threats have also increased. As China is situated in a region that sees the convergence of influences of the world’s most powerful countries, its relations with the neighboring countries are inevitably complex and conflict-prone. As the SMS points out, “Due to the rapid rise of our country, some neighboring countries, while enjoying the benefits of our economic progress, have also increased their China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 67 worries and concerns. Conflicts are thus rising on issues such as national boundaries on the sea, possessions of islands, and maritime interests.”86 The SMS further emphasizes that some outside powers, namely the USA, have been taking advantage of China’s rising conflicts with the neighboring countries to weaken its position in the region. Finally, the SMS suggests that the Taiwan issue will continue to negatively shape China’s domestic politics and foreign relations. While the bilateral relations have improved since 2008, the SMS argues that “the fundamental problems that underline the Taiwan issue have not been resolved.”87 Accord- ing to the SMS, the USA has not changed its strategy of “using Taiwan to contain China.” As it points out, “The long but unresolved Taiwan issue has become a significant factor that is consuming our country’s political, economic, diplomatic, and military resources. It has become a long-term concern for realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”88 Based on the above assessment of China’s strategic situation, Chapter 5 of the SMS argues that deterring war and prolonging China’s strategic opportunity period constitute the highest goals of its military strategies. As it stresses:

Under the new historical conditions, while the military strategy needs to continue to maintain its essence as a strategy for war, safeguarding world peace and protecting the strategic opportunity period also require the military strategy to shift its vision from war to peace. It should unify the related but diﬀerent strategic needs of containing wars and winning wars.89

The SMS points out that “effective control” should become a key objective for China’s active defense military strategy.90 As the SMS sees it, there are three aspects of the exercise of “effective control.” The first concerns proac- tive shaping of China’s strategic environment. This aspect of effective control requires “that military instruments need to be integrated with political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural instruments to create a strategic posture that is conducive for maintaining domestic stability and external peace.”91 The second aspect of “effective control” has a more direct relationship with China’s military strategy and it concerns crisis management. As the SMS Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 points out, “Crises are between peace and war. They are dangerous situations that can trigger wars.”92 Controlling crises thus represents the key issue for protecting China’s strategic opportunity period and its continuous rise in the international system. According to the SMS:

The forthcoming period is both a period of strategic opportunities for our country and a period of strategic risks. There will inevitably be various kinds of complex crises. If they are not properly managed, they will generate fundamental damages to the country’s development and security, even reversing its rise. Therefore, we must see containing crisis as an 68 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines important aspect of the military strategy. We must strengthen crises management, in particular by employing military deterrence and non- military actions, to prevent minor crises from becoming major problems and crises escalating to war.93

The third aspect of effective control relates to managing the process of wars. According to the SMS, “Managing wars means controlling the initiatives of war and using the lowest costs to achieve favorable outcomes. If peace is jeopardized, we must follow the rules of limited wars in the information age to exercise control over the battlefields, resolutely seek victories, and maintain the strategic initiatives.”94 Specific guidelines also include assuring initial victories, avoiding stalemates, and termination of military conflicts. The above analyses of the SMS outline the core objectives of China’s contemporary military strategy. In particular, the second aspect of “effective control” very much reflects the contemporary Chinese strategic emphasis, which is to use effective deterrence to prevent crises escalation and the ensuing wars, that threaten to derail China’s current rise in the international system. As the SMS argues, China’s current strategic situation requires its military strategy to shift its focus from winning wars to safeguarding peace, which in turn requires effective strategic deterrence to prevent crises from escalating into wars. Indeed, in the preface of the 2013 edition of the SMS, the authors highlight the key differences from previous two editions, including the more recent 2001 edition. According to the preface, the new edition differs in its focus on “the use of military power during peacetime.”95 It is in this context that the SMS assigns vital roles to China’s nuclear forces in the exercise of strategic deterrence. As it claims:

On the basis of various future strategic needs, our military must treat deterrence as an important form of strategic operation. As a vital instrument for military struggles during both peace and war, the exercise of deterrence through the demonstration of military capabilities and the will to use them can achieve victory without ﬁghting. In the coming era, the most fundamental goal of deterrence is to use an integrated nuclear- conventional deterrence to deter major military crises, contain the outbreak of wars, and control the escalation of wars, all for the aim of Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 safeguarding the strategic opportunity period and national security.96

To achieve the above deterrence goals, the SMS suggests decisive measures to control and manage crises. As it states, “During crises, especially major military crises, we must maintain a high-intensity deterrence posture, demonstrate both the resolve for a fight and massive capabilities, and force the adversary to stop on the verge of war.”97 Chapter 7 of the SMS focuses on the guidelines for exercising strategic deterrence. According to the SMS, the 16th congress of the Chinese Commu- nist Party, held in 2002, already set “safeguarding the strategic opportunity China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 69 period” as the primary goal of deterrence. As the political report of this party congress suggests, “It is not easy to see the arrival of a strategic opportunity period. Therefore, safeguarding and effectively utilizing the strategic opportunity period require hard efforts.”98 Operationally, according to the SMS, “Taking precautions against predictable and unpredictable challenges, resolving crises, deterring wars, effectively containing different kinds of regional conflicts, and avoiding the escalation of conflicts and wars constitute the essence of ensuring the strategic opportunity period not to be disrupted and even stopped.”99 Among the many elements of a complex deterrence system to serve these purposes, the SMS first emphasizes the central role of China’s nuclear deterrent. As it stresses:

We should keenly recognize the important roles of nuclear deterrent in ensuring the status of a great power, non-violation of its core national interests, and sustaining a peaceful environment for development. We must thus resolutely develop a limited but eﬀective nuclear deterrent and situate it at the core of a deterrence system.100

The SMS further suggests that China needs an integrated nuclear-conventional deterrence system. However, the SMS clearly values nuclear deterrence above conventional deterrence. According to the SMS, “Nuclear capability is the fundamental means for our country to deter large scale foreign invasions and is thus the pillar that buttresses its great power status.” In contrast, conventional capability is merely “an important component of our military’s strategic deterrence system.”101 The SMS apparently contradicts China’s established nuclear principles, which suggest that its nuclear deterrent is only to deter nuclear attacks by other countries and that China will not use nuclear weapons first. The SMS suggests otherwise. First, it emphasizes the vital role of China’s nuclear forces in deterring wars in general, which include the conventional types. Indeed, throughout its discussions on the importance of deterring wars to safeguard China’s strategic window of opportunity, the SMS does not mention scenarios of nuclear attacks by other countries. Instead, Chapter 4 of the SMS states specifically that while the most threatening war scenario facing China involves powerful adversaries (implying the USA) attempting to eliminate China’s war Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 potentials for preventive purposes, the most realistic war scenario concerns limited but high-intensity wars due to Taiwan’s succession attempts or maritime disputes with other countries.102 Therefore, when the SMS discusses the vital necessity for China to be able to control crises escalation and deter the outbreak of wars, it is not referring to nuclear scenarios that involve other countries initiating a nuclear first strike. Indeed, throughout the chapters on safeguarding China’s strategic opportunity period and the importance of effective deterrence, this nuclear scenario is not mentioned once. Moreover, the four realistic war scenarios discussed in Chapter 4 are all of conventional types. 70 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines Chapter 7, while situating China’s nuclear deterrent at the center of an overall deterrence system, does not even mention its roles in deterring nuclear wars. It in fact suggests that nuclear deterrence is vital for protecting China’s “core national interests.”103 This inevitably implies that China sees a vital role for its nuclear deterrent in the general deterrence of wars, including conventional types, which threaten its core national interests. Also, on page 152, the SMS stresses that “nuclear deterrent is our country’s fundamental means to deter large-scale foreign invasions,” which is a conventional war scenario.104 The above perspectives of the 2013 SMS on the roles of nuclear deterrence in safeguarding China’s continuous rise and its importance for controlling crisis escalation are at odds with China’s traditional positions that its nuclear forces are only to deter nuclear attacks by other countries. As such, the 2013 SMS seems to indicate major changes in China’s nuclear doctrines. China’s nuclear deterrent is no longer just for deterring nuclear attacks. It now has wider applications in deterring all kinds of wars, including conventional types, which threaten China’s continuous rise in the international system. This emphasis on the role of nuclear deterrent in China’s general deterrence posture implies the weakening of its no-first-use principle. To deter adversaries from escalating a crisis situation into war, China must possess superior or at least equal conventional capabilities. However, it is widely agreed that it does not possess this capability when facing major military powers such as Japan and the USA and particularly their alliance. Thus, the logic of the SMS inevitably implies that, if necessary, nuclear deterrence could be exercised against these adversaries to prevent them from escalating military crisis into wars. Looking from this perspective, the omission of the no-first-use principle in China’s 2013 Defense White Paper was not due to oversight. It is the first time that the Chinese defense white paper did not mention the no-first-use principle in the section on China’s strategic deterrent.105 Although some of China’s nuclear experts, such as Yao Yunzhu, have denied any changes in its nuclear principles, the 2013 SMS seems to offer clues to why the omission could be intentional, as it may truly reflect the latest strategic thinking of China.106 However, the SMS also contains self-contradictions. For example, Chapter 9 specifically examines nuclear, space, and cyber security issues. In its discussion Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 of the main characteristics of Chinese nuclear deterrence, the Chapter points out that “China pursues a limited deterrence objective. China’s development and application of nuclear weapons seek to deter enemy states from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear deterrent will not be applied to deter enemy’s non-nuclear military activities.”107 This paragraph seems to contradict previous discussions on the importance of nuclear forces in deterring crisis escalation and the prospect of war. As aforementioned, these sections do not even suggest scenarios of other countries initiating nuclear attacks on China. In fact, the four realistic war scenarios mentioned by the SMS in Chapter 4 are all of the conventional type. China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 71 To further complicate the matter, Chapter 10, which discusses various services of the Chinese military, again seems to endorse the above perspective. In the section on the PLA Second Artillery Corps, the SMS repeats its earlier discussions that see a vital role for China’s nuclear deterrent in safeguarding its national interest. As it observes, “At the moment and during the forthcoming period, nuclear deterrence is no doubt the core and the main basis of China’s strategic deterrence, performing a vital role in deterring large-scale wars and in balancing the main adversaries.”108 This statement clearly suggests that nuclear deterrence is essential for deterring non-nuclear military scenarios. This section of the SMS also repeats the central role of the Second Artillery Corps in safeguarding China’s strategic opportunity period. As it says, “The Second Artillery Corps must fully perform its role as the backbone of our national security by containing threats to the strategic opportunity period. Prolonging the strategic opportunity period and a positive environment for our peaceful development requires effective deterrence of wars, especially the outbreak of large-scale wars.”109 Once again, this statement makes no distinction between conventional and nuclear wars. It is argued by this book that the 2013 SMS and the 2013 Defense White Paper both reflect a genuine change in China’s nuclear doctrines. Nuclear deterrence is no longer exclusively for the purpose of deterring nuclear attacks on China. Instead, China now uses its nuclear deterrent to also contain crisis situations and deter their escalations into wars. Effective containment of crises, which is a central theme of the 2013 SMS, is seen as vital for China to protect its current strategic window of opportunities. The best evidence, as Chapter 5 will discuss in detail, is that during the current Sino–Japanese crisis over the East China Sea, China has strictly followed the above principle by implicitly exercising nuclear deterrence to deter Japan from escalating the crisis into war for either preventive or pre-emptive purposes. As ample evidence indicates, facing rising possibilities of war with Japan and the Japan-US alliance, which is a war that China cannot hope to win, it exercised tacit nuclear deterrence as part of a broader deterrence effort to contain the East China Sea crisis. The weakening of China’s long-standing nuclear principles in a real crisis situation, like the 2012 East China Sea crisis, should come as no surprise. It is dictated by China’s current strategic imperatives. Safeguarding the current Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 strategic window of opportunity is the top priority for China’s current national security strategy. This task requires China to be able to effectively contain crisis situations that may escalate into wars and reverse its rise. Due to both this strategic imperative and its continuing conventional inferiority vis-à-vis Japan and the USA, China’s tacit modification of its nuclear traditions is unsurprising. The East China Sea crisis, which in the eyes of Chinese leaders brought China and Japan dangerously close to war, resulted in China implicitly exercising nuclear deterrence. By doing so, China has effectively modified both its no-first-use policy and its policy that China will never use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. 72 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines China’s changing nuclear posture The above evidence indicates internal pressures for change in the Chinese nuclear posture. Indeed, this posture has seen major changes in recent years, reflected in the modifications of both minimum deterrence and no-first-use principles. First, China’s expansion of its offensive strategic capabilities is moving its nuclear posture beyond minimum deterrence. While it is correct for Chinese strategists, such as Yao Yunzhu, to suggest that minimum deterrence should not have a quantitative connotation, it nonetheless stands for a small nuclear deterrent. International observers tend to think that until recently China’s nuclear arsenal was limited to several dozens of strategic warheads capable of reaching the USA. However, as Chapter 3 examines in detail, China’s recent expansion of its offensive capabilities, in the form of a new generation of land and sea-based strategic missiles that are armed with multiple warheads, will soon allow it to acquire between 300–500 strategic nuclear weapons. If so, China’s nuclear posture will no longer be defined by minimum deterrence. Instead, it will begin to resemble a classic medium nuclear power, as represented by Britain and France. Moreover, by moving toward a medium nuclear power, China is also acquiring assured destruction capability. In contrast, minimum deterrence only seeks assured retaliation capability. Second, China’s nuclear posture is moving away from a single dimensional system toward a three dimensional one. Until recently, China’s nuclear forces have been defined exclusively by a small offensive capability of a few dozen land and sea-based strategic nuclear missiles. While this offensive capability is expanding, China is also adding new dimensions of capabilities to its nuclear posture and these are space war capabilities and missile defense capabilities. As Chapter 4 will analyze in detail, China has conceived an integrated nuclear-space warfare doctrine to counter US missile defense and has been developing the relevant capabilities. Moreover, China has also been pursuing missile defense capabilities to supplement its strategic deterrent. Since 2010, China has made steady progress in its anti-missile capabilities. The result of the above Chinese efforts will be the transformation of China’s nuclear posture from a one-dimensional system that is based purely on a small offensive capability toward a three-dimensional one that also incorporates

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 space warfare capabilities and missile defense capabilities. Third, China has officially announced its tactical nuclear capability. It is often assumed by existing studies that China only possesses strategic nuclear capabilities. This assessment is based on the standard Chinese position that its nuclear deterrent only seeks to deter nuclear attacks by other countries and they are not oriented toward warfighting, which would require tactical and theater nuclear weapons. However, there is now systematic evidence suggesting that China has widely deployed tactical and theater nuclear weapons. Indeed, in June 2012 the Chinese military announced, with a lot of fanfare, that its conventional missile brigades are now armed with nuclear weapons.110 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 73 Moreover, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Chinese media has indicated that China’s DF-25 medium-range missiles are armed with three independently guided nuclear warheads.111 Last, China seems to have modified its no-first-use principle. Until recently, China has been claiming that its nuclear forces are designed only to deter nuclear attacks by other countries and that China will never use nuclear weapons first. However, as the 2013 Defense White Paper and the 2013 version of The Science of Military Strategy suggest, China may have abandoned these traditions. Now, nuclear deterrence is seen as a vital instrument for deterring crisis escalation and wars in general, which by implication include conventional military conflicts. The best evidence of China moving away from the no-first-use principle is its deterrence behavior since 2012. As Chapter 5 will analyze in detail, China in fact exercised implicit nuclear deterrence in the East China Sea. Indeed, China’s behaviors have strictly followed the guidelines set by the 2013 version The Science of Military Strategy for effective prevention of crisis escalation. Taken together, the above developments of China’s nuclear posture indicate major transformations of both its nuclear capability and doctrines. This book argues that the changes in China’s nuclear posture are driven primarily by its balancing motives in an anarchic international system. In a nutshell, the structural forces generated by such a system have forced China to pursue both balance of power and balance of threat actions to safeguard its national security. According to this study, China’s expansion of its offensive nuclear capabilities and its recent pursuit of space warfare capabilities and missile defense capabilities reflect China’sefforts to counter the shifts in the balance of power of the international system. More specifically, they represent Chinese balancing efforts against US missile defense, which threatens to neutralize China’s limited strategic nuclear deterrent. China’s recent weakening of its no-first-use principle, on the other hand, reflects its efforts to balance against the rising threats in recent years. China believes that its conflicts with Japan and the Japan–US alliance in the East China Sea generate increasing prospect of wars. Then, the 2012 East China Sea crisis over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands profoundly amplified Chinese concerns regarding wars. As Chapter 5 will document, many Chinese strategists believe that Japan may have preventive Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 war or pre-emptive war motives. In that context, China implicitly exercised nuclear deterrence to balance the perceived threat from Japan and deter a crisis situation from escalating into war. As aforementioned, Chinese behavior during a crisis situation is completely consistent with the guidelines of the 2013 version of The Science of Military Strategy, which emphasize the vital importance of effective control of crisis situations and the prevention of their escalation into war. This book therefore argues that the omission of the no-first-use principle in the 2013 Defense White Paper is no fluke. It actually reflects the strategic imperatives facing China’s national security since 2012 and its balance of threat behavior. 74 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines Fundamentally, the above changes in China’s nuclear posture, both its capabilities and doctrines, indicate the profound importance of structural forces in the shaping of states’ security policies and behaviors. According to structural realism, anarchy forces states to pay utmost attention to their national security and motivate them to use balancing efforts of various types to ensure their survival. The security dilemma, which is a key concept of defensive realism, further exaggerates states’ sense of insecurity and gives rise to security rivalries and arms races among defensively oriented states. China’s attempts to balance US missile defense by expanding its offensive capabilities reflect the impact of the security dilemma. The result is a de facto offense-defense arms race between the two countries.

Notes 1 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 229. 2 Zhu Mingquan, “Zhong mei he waishe zhengce” (Nuclear Policies of China and the United States), in Zhu Mingquan, Wu Cunsi, and Su Changhe, Weishe yu wending zhong mei he guanxi (Deterrence and Stability: China–US Nuclear Relations) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2005), p. 115. 3 Ibid., p. 108. 4 Ibid., pp. 117–119. 5 Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21stCentury: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 64. 6 Ibid., p. 66. 7 See “Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo zhengfu shengming” (The Statement of the Government of People’s Republic of China), October 16, 1964, at http://cpc. people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66675/4493741.html. 8 Ibid. 9 Peng Guanqian, “Zhongguo di he liliang yu he zhence” (China’s Nuclear Forces and Nuclear Policies), in Peng Guanqian, Zhongguo junshi wenti yanjiu (Studies on China’s Military Issues) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2006), p. 62. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid., p. 63. 12 For further details on the development of China’s nuclear weapon, see Lewis and Xue’s China Builds the Bomb. 13 Peng, “Zhongguo di he liliang yu he zhence,” p. 65. 14 Ibid., pp. 66–67. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 15 Ibid., p. 67. 16 For further information on China’s quest for sea-based nuclear capabilities, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994). 17 Peng, “Zhongguo di he liliang yu he zhence,” p. 69. 18 Ibid. 19 Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 235. 20 The Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (Washington, DC), p. 6. 21 Ibid., p. 31. China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 75 22 Ibid. 23 Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 234. 24 See “Quanmian jiexi hong 6K pei changjian hou cheng zhanlue hongzhaji” (A Comprehensive Analysis of H-6K: A Strategic Bomber with CJ-10 Missiles), April 11, 2014, at http://mil.news.sina.cn/2014-04-11/1101773470.html. 25 This analysis of H-6K by Kanwan Defense Reviewis reported by The China Times, a Taiwan newspaper. See China Times, “Lu hong 6K changjian 10 heti ke hong quan riben” (Mainland’s H-6K and CJ-10 Combination Can Attack the Entire Japan), The China Times, December 27, 2013, at www.chinatimes.com/ newspapers/2013122700104-260309. 26 Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 235. 27 See “Jiemi erpao san kuan xinxing zhongcheng daodan ke jianmie guandao meijun” (Unveiling the Secrets of Three New Types of Medium Range Missiles of the Second Artillery Corps, Can Wipe Out US Forces Based in Guam), January 23, 2014, at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2014-01-23/115476 1435.html. 28 The original title of the report is “Zhongguo dongfeng 25 duju liu da benling” (China’s DF-25 Has Six Unique Abilities), Shangxi wanbao, October 12, 2012, at http://mil.sohu.com/20121012/n354710262.shtml. 29 See “Hangmu shashou dongfeng 25 tupo lanjie xitong daji fanwei fugai yatai diqu” (Aircraft Carrier Killer DF-25 Can Penetrate Missile Defense and Strike the Entire Asia Pacific Region), October 12, 2012, at http://military.people.com. cn/n/2012/1012/c1011-19245732.html. 30 See “Unveiling the Secrets of Three New Types of Medium Range Missiles of the Second Artillery Corps, Can Wipe out US Forces Based in Guam,” January 23, 2014, at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2014-01-23/1154761435.html. 31 See William Lowther, “China Developing New Nuclear Missiles,” The Taipei Times, March 6, 2014, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/03/06/ 2003584976. 32 Bill Gertz, “China Fields Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missile: DF-26C Deployment Confirmed,” March 3, 2014, at http://freebeacon.com/china-fields- new-intermediate-range-nuclear-missile. 33 See “Jiemi erpao san quan xinxing zhongcheng daodan ke jianmie guandao meijun” (Unveiling the Secrets of Three New Types of Medium Range Missiles of the Second Artillery Corps, Can Wipe Out US Forces Based in Guam), January 23, 2014, at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2014-01-23/1154761435.html. 34 Peng, “Zhongguo di he liliang yu he zhence,” p. 72. 35 See “Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo zhengfu shengming” (The Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China), October 16, 1964, at http://cpc. people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66675/4493741.html. 36 Peng, “Zhongguo di he liliang yu he zhence,” p. 73. 37 Ibid., p. 75. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 38 Ibid., p. 76. 39 Ibid. 40 Yao Yunzhu, “Zhongguo di he zhanlue” (China’s Nuclear Policy), in Yan Xuetong, ed., Zhongguo xuezhe kanshijie guoji anquan juan (The World in the Eyes of Chinese Scholars: International Security Issues) (Beijing: Xin shijie chubanshe, 2007), p. 348. 41 Ibid., pp. 348–49. 42 Ibid., p. 350. 43 Ibid., p. 351. 44 Ibid., p. 352. 45 Ibid., p. 353. 46 Ibid., p. 354. 76 China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 47 See Ning Ling, Zhang Huaibi, and Yu Fei, Zhanlue weishe (Strategic Deter- rence) (Beijing: junshi yiwen chubanshe, 2010), p. 55. This book was originally published in 2006 and won the 2007 PLA Book Award. 48 Ibid., p. 60. 49 PLA Academy of Military Science, Zhanluexue (The Science of Military Strategy) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2013), pp. 171–172. 50 Ning Ling, Zhang Huaibi, and Yu Fei, Zhanlue weishe (Strategic Deterrence), p. 57. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 PLA Academy of Military Science, Zhanluexue, p. 172. 54 Ibid. 55 Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’sNew‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), p. 27. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid., p. 19. 58 Ibid., pp. 27–28. 59 Ibid., pp. 26–27. 60 Ibid., p. 20. 61 Ibid. 62 You Ji, “Nuclear Power in the Post-Cold War Era: The Development of China’s Nuclear Strategy,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 18 (1999), p. 246. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid., p. 256. 66 Ibid., p. 257. 67 Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, p. 232. 68 PLA Academy of Military Science, Zhanluexue, p. 100. 69 For Chinese studies on the revolution in military affairs, see Wang Baocun, Shijie xin junshi biange (The World’s New Military Transformations) (Beijing: Jiefanjun chubanshe, 2005). 70 Jonathan Watts, “Chinese General Warns of Nuclear Risk to US,” The Guardian, July 16, 2005. 71 Bruce G. Blair, “General Zhu and Chinese Nuclear Preemption,” China Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 15–22. 72 Shen Dingli, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century,” China Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 2005), p. 13. 73 Ibid., p. 12. 74 Peng Guangqian and Rong Yu, “Nuclear No-First-Use Revisited,” China Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 2009), p. 83. 75 Zhu Mingquan, Wu Cunsi, and Su Changhe, Weishe yu wending zhong mei he guanxi (Deterrence and Stability: China–US Nuclear Relations) (Beijing: Shishi Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 chubanshe, 2005). Zhu Mingquan was the leader of this research project. 76 Zhu Mingquan, “Zhongmei he guanxi” (Sino–US Nuclear Relations), in Zhu Mingquan, Wu Cunsi, and Su Changhe, Weishe yu wending zhong mei he guanxi (Deterrence and Stability: China–US Nuclear Relations) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2005), pp. 213–214. 77 Ibid., p. 215. 78 Ibid., p. 216. 79 PLA Academy of Military Science, Zhanluexue,p.69. 80 Ibid., p. 80. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid., p. 82. China’s nuclear forces and doctrines 77 84 Ibid., p. 79. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid., pp. 79–80. 87 Ibid., p. 80. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid., p. 109. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid., pp. 112–113. 92 Ibid., p. 113. 93 Ibid., p. 114. 94 Ibid., p. 115. 95 Ibid., p. 2. 96 Ibid., p. 119. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid., p. 143. 99 Ibid., p. 144. 100 Ibid., p. 148. 101 Ibid., p. 152. 102 Ibid., pp. 99–100. 103 Ibid., p. 148. 104 Ibid., p. 152. 105 The Government of People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo wuzhong liliang di duoyanghua yunyong baipishu (The White Paper on the Multiple Applications of China’s Military Forces), April 16, 2013, at http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov. cn/jrzg/2013-04/16/content_2379013.htm. 106 Yao Yunzhu, “China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy,” PacNet #29, April 23, 2013, at http://csis.org/files/publication/pac1328.pdf. 107 The PLA Academy of Military Science, Zhanluexue (The Science of Military Strategy) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2013), p. 172. 108 Ibid., p. 229. 109 Ibid., p. 231. 110 Xhinhua News Agency, “Zoujin zhongguo changgui daodan budui: kaiqi hechang jianbei shuangchung weishe xinjiyuan” (China’s Conventional Missile Forces: Beginning the New Era of Conventional/Nuclear Dual Deterrence), June 10, 2012, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-06/10/c_123260296.htm. 111 See “Hangmu shashou dongfeng 25 tupo lanjie xitong daji fanwei fugai yatai diqu” (Aircraft Carrier Killer DF-25 Can Penetrate Missile Defense and Strike the Entire Asia Pacific Region), October 12, 2012, at http://military.people.com. cn/n/2012/1012/c1011-19245732.html. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 3 Balance of power and China’s expanding offensive nuclear capabilities

Recent evidence suggests that nuclear deterrence is emerging as an important security issue between China and the USA. The March 2009 Impeccable incident, which involved Chinese harassment of a US surveillance vessel in the South China Sea, was a good example of the trend. According to reports, the US spy ship was tracking China’s new strategic nuclear submarines based in Hainan Island. The incident clearly indicated rising US concerns about China’s expanding strategic nuclear forces. Indeed, according to James Lyons, a retired admiral and former commander in chief of the US Paciﬁc Fleet, the USA must not “let the South China Sea become a ‘safe haven’ for China to launch ballistic missiles at the United States or our allies.”1

The nuclear dimension of Sino–US relations Nuclear deterrence is likely to gain more prominence in US-China relations in the years to come due to China’s recent assertiveness in the area. In February 2009, Jing Zhiyuan, commander of the Second Artillery Corps, which is the strategic missile force of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), published an important article that called for a major improvement of China’s nuclear deterrence. As he argued, the Second Artillery “is now at a new historical starting point” and “will evolve onto much higher levels.”2 This assertive attitude has been reflected in China’s new willingness to display its strategic weapons to the world. For example, China recently unveiled its latest strategic nuclear submarine. Several high-resolution photos on the Internet showed two Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 new Type 094 strategic nuclear submarines at the Huludao shipyard.3 More- over, on October 1, 2009, Beijing officially debuted its new DF-31A intercontinental ballistic missile at a military parade celebrating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. As recently observed by Bates Gill, a longtime observer of the Chinese military, “Among the major nuclear powers China stands out in its effort to modernize, expand and improve its nuclear weapons capability.”4 The rapid progress of Chinese nuclear expansion has caused US policy- makers to worry, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. At a June 2008 conference on Asian security held in Singapore, Gates and a top PLA China’s expanding nuclear capabilities 79 general sparred over China’s new intercontinental nuclear missiles. Gates questioned Chinese motives for deploying these missiles, stating, “I don’t know what you use them for if it’s not for offensive capabilities.” General Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the General Staff of the PLA, countered by criticizing US missile defense for undermining the security of other countries and forcing them to seek remedies.5 Since then, China’s strategic nuclear programs have only quickened their paces of development. For example, on July 24, 2012 China test fired a newly developed DF-41 missile that is reportedly capable of carrying up to ten MIRVed warheads. In the next month, on August 16, China launched a JL-2 SLBM in the Bohai Sea.6 If already deployed on the Type 094 strategic nuclear submarines, this missile will for the first time give China a truly secure second-strike capability. These two new strategic missiles, respectively land and sea-based, saw further tests recently. On December 13, 2013 China conducted the second test of its DF-41 strategic missile. On December 22 it was reported that China launched a JL-2 missile from Bohai Sea toward a testing ground in Xingjiang.7 This chapter analyzes the motives behind China’s nuclear modernization and expansion. It argues that China’s evolving perception of US missile defense has been a key driver of its expanding offensive nuclear capabilities. As Joan Johnson- Freese and Thomas Nichols point out, although missile defense offers Americans the allure of stopping a nuclear attack from the homeland, “it is unsurprising that other nations would logically view the same capability as a direct threat to the effectiveness of their own nuclear deterrent.”8 Indeed, China believes that the US defensive capability has degraded the credibility of its nuclear deterrence and hence justifies a major expansion of Chinese offensive capability. As outlined in Chapter 1, structural realism and its defensive realist variant offer important insights into the dynamics of the Sino–US offense-defense arms race. As structural realism suggests, states constantly attempt to maintain a power balance in the international system.9 The anarchic international system forces states to pay utmost attention to their national security. They have to rely on self-help to ensure their survival under the condition of anarchy. If some countries seek to improve their relative power, even if driven purely by defensive motives, these acts typically invite counter-actions by other states. The system imperatives force states to try to restore the balance Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 of power upset by other countries. However, Kenneth Waltz argues that states merely crave a balance of power, not power superiority. This perspective on state motives represents a key insight of defensive realism. Waltz suggests that since states are driven by the survival motive, they are content with achieving a balance of power and typically refrain from seeking excessive power.10 They also understand that seeking additional power will invite balancing efforts by other states, thereby negating any gains in power. This “status quo” perspective defines defensive realism and sets it apart from offensive realism, which is also a structural realist theory but emphasizes states’ incentives to maximize power. 80 China’s expanding nuclear capabilities The “status quo bias” of defensive realism has been criticized by both offensive realism and classical realism. Offensive realism argues that states can never be sure of how much power is needed to ensure their survival. Moreover, other states are constantly improving their relative power. Mearsheimer argues that states are therefore motivated to maximize their power, to the extent of becoming the most powerful country of the international system.11 Classical realism also criticizes the “status quo bias” of defensive realism. Randall Schweller argues that some states already have security but still want to expand their power for purposes not related to survival.12 These include territorial expansion and the quest for glory and status. Indeed, history has seen plenty of cases of revisionist states that tried to expand their power for these purposes. Nonetheless, defensive realism is highly relevant for the study of China’s nuclear deterrence. It offers a “good fit” with China’s nuclear posture. For decades, China’s nuclear posture has been characterized by the minimal deterrence doctrine, which simply requires a limited capability to ensure a counter-strike against another country’s population centers. China thus forsakes the quest for nuclear superiority. The result of China’s defensive realist behavior has been that its nuclear capability is the smallest among the five major nuclear powers. US missile defense, however, upsets the existing strategic balance and forces other states, such as China, to try to restore the balance. The Chinese balancing efforts include both the expansion of its offensive nuclear forces and the development of new deterrence doctrines, such as an integrated nuclear-space warfare strategy and China’s own missile defense capabilities, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. These responses by China validate the balancing insights of structural realism. It is clear that American military and security officials have come to recognize the impact of US missile defense on an offense-defense arms race with China. For example, at a defense gathering in November 2009, Air Force General Kevin Chilton, commander of the US Strategic Command, pointed out that “We have to be cautious with missile defense. Missile defense can be destabilizing on how you array it.” If hundreds of interceptors are deployed along the Western side of the USA, “That kind of makes you feel more secure, doesn’t it? But what would it make the Chinese think about their Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 deterrent?” Chilton asked. He argued that this scenario would inevitably force China to expand its nuclear capabilities: “That might encourage them to in fact double, triple, quadruple their current nuclear force. Because they would feel that their deterrent was no longer viable.”13

China’s nuclear posture and US missile defense China’s nuclear posture has traditionally been defensive and limited.14 Its defensive nature is based on the no-ﬁrst-use doctrine and its entirely retaliatory purpose. Its limited nature has been expressed by the doctrine of minimal China’s expanding nuclear capabilities 81 deterrence, which holds that China can deter a nuclear ﬁrst strike by the mere capability of retaliating with a few dozen large nuclear warheads against the population centers of the enemy. As a result, until recently it was estimated by the West that China could have deployed only two to three dozen strategic nuclear missiles armed with single warheads. According to a recent study, two elements characterize the limited nature of Chinese nuclear deterrence:

First, the number of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles is small, even when compared to British and French nuclear forces that numbered in the 200 to 500 range. Second, the Chinese rely on a single basing mode for the country’s nuclear deterrent, while both Britain and France maintained multiple modes of delivery for most of the Cold War.15

As a result, “Chinese leaders shifted resources away from a sea-based deterrent” to favor land-based missiles. Further, “China has not deployed multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) ballistic missiles.”16 China’s minimal deterrence posture certainly has no doctrinal rational for an arms race with another nuclear power, since its aim is to maintain a capability of delivering a few dozen (or perhaps just several) large nuclear warheads in a retaliatory strike. This lack of built-in incentives for an arms race could explain why China has maintained a limited deterrence capability for so long. In fact, US analysts contend that China’s nuclear posture will remain more or less the same in the years to come. As one predicts, “China does not appear to be moving away from its current nuclear posture.”17 Indeed, “So far, none of the US intelligence community’s dire predictions about China’s nuclear forces have come to pass. Chinese nuclear forces today look remark- ably like they have for decades.”18 The Federation of American Scientists shares that assessment of China’s future nuclear posture. As it states in a major study from 2006, “Once China’s current upgrade of long-range missiles is complete, the Chinese nuclear arsenal will not be significantly bigger than it is today.”19 However, these analyses have failed to recognize the major change in the incentive structure of China’s nuclear forces. In the past, China did not use Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 another country’s deterrence capability as a reference point to guide its own force development. Today, however, China does have such a reference point—the new and expanding US defensive capability. China used to believe that the ability to counterstrike with a few large nuclear warheads against an enemy’s population centers would be sufficient to deter a first strike. This practice conforms to the logic of defensive realism in that states only crave for sufficient power to ensure their survival. Now, the US defensive capability could thwart such a limited Chinese retaliation. Thus, the rise of the US defensive capability has fundamentally altered the incentive structures for China’s nuclear posture. 82 China’s expanding nuclear capabilities Starting in the 1990s, just as predicted by the balancing logic of structural realism, Chinese strategic planners began to pace the development of China’s offensive nuclear capability with the advancement of the US defensive capability. As the next part of this article examines in detail, the changes in China’s nuclear posture are reflected in the three aspects that used to define the limited nature of Chinese nuclear deterrence: size, basing mode, and warhead deployment patterns. In this case, Brad Roberts was one of the few US experts who correctly predicted that missile defense would trigger a major change in China’s nuclear posture.20 Charles Glasner and Steve Fetter, in a 2001 analysis of the impact of US national missile defense (NMD), also correctly predicted major changes in China’s nuclear posture. They specifically used a defensive realist perspective to predict China’s attempts to restore the strategic balance. As they observed, “US NMD would require a further expansion of the Chinese force, perhaps significantly beyond the current plans.” In fact, “we believe that China will try to deploy at least as many warheads as the number of deployed US NMD interceptors, subject to production constraints.”21 Recent evidence from China has validated these predictions made by the balancing logic of defensive realism. According to Major General Zhu Chenghu, a strategist at the PLA National Defense University, China “will have to modernize its nuclear arsenal” because the deployment of a missile defense system “may reduce the credibility of its nuclear deterrence.” Zhu argues that US missile defense “undermines the strategic stability” and “therefore Beijing will have to improve its capabilities of survival and penetration.”22 As the next section examines in detail, China has made sustained efforts to modernize and expand its offensive nuclear capabilities. As a result, China is rapidly moving toward the capabilities of a genuine medium nuclear power. Although China has long been considered one of the five major nuclear powers, because of its policy of minimal deterrence, it did not qualify as a true medium nuclear power. But as this chapter shows, as a consequence of its offensive response to US missile defense, its emerging nuclear capability will allow China to become a medium nuclear power. This rapidly modernizing and expanding Chinese strategic nuclear force will also allow China to move from merely assured retaliation to assured Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 destruction. In the Chinese conception, assured retaliation means that China must possess the capability for a limited nuclear counter strike. When China practiced minimum deterrence, it only sought the capability to be able to strike back against the USA with a very small number (such as several to two dozen) of strategic nuclear missiles armed with single warheads. Now, as a response to US missile defense, China is quickly acquiring the capability for assured destruction through a new generation of land- and sea-based strategic missiles armed with multiple warheads. Glasner suggests that “assured destruction is generally understood to require the ability to inflict a given level of retaliatory damage, which is roughly comparable to the destruction of a China’s expanding nuclear capabilities 83 country’s major cities.”23 The emerging Chinese nuclear posture will surely be able to achieve such a capacity.

Evolving Chinese perceptions of US missile defense China’s recent efforts to modernize and expand its offensive nuclear capabilities are rooted in the rise of the US defensive systems that could seriously compromise Chinese nuclear deterrence. US missile defense, which includes both ground-based midcourse defense system (GMD) and various theater-oriented missile defense (TMD) systems, is widely seen by Chinese military experts as a fundamental threat to its strategic deterrence. Until recently, the Chinese military tended to believe that US missile defense could not effectively deter major nuclear powers such as China and Russia. However, due to the steady maturing of a multilayered US missile defense, Chinese nuclear experts are losing confidence in China’soffensive capabilities. This pessimism is best shown in an important 2008 interview of Wang Wenchao in a Chinese military magazine. As identified by the magazine, Wang is the chief designer of China’s sea-based strategic missiles. In this interview, Wang expressed grave pessimism about the ability of Chinese nuclear forces to penetrate US missile defense. As he stated, “I have done a research: facing a multi-tiered missile defense system, if any single layer can achieve a success rate of 70%, then 100 single warhead missiles could all be intercepted even if they are mounting a simultaneous attack.”24 Therefore, Yao Yunzhu, a PLA nuclear strategist at the Academy of Military Sciences, suggests that US missile defense has had a profound impact on China’s nuclear deterrence. As she points out, “missile defense has made China increasingly worried about the credibility of its deterrence against the United States. … Among the many influences on Chinese nuclear thinking, the development and deployment of missile defense is the most important one. China must consider how to maintain a credible second strike capability against US missile defense.”25 Wu Chunsi, a civilian expert on nuclear deterrence, emphasizes the impact of US missile defense on China’s no-first-use doctrine. She argues that missile defense makes the doctrine increasingly difficult to maintain because it gives the USA a double advantage in offensive first-strike capability and a credible defensive capability. As she observes: Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016

China’s No First Use constrains its ability to counter American missile defense systems. Assuming a war between the two countries, China, limited by its No First Use policy, obviously could not launch a first strike against the United States. On the other hand, the limited number of Chinese nuclear missiles would definitely become targets for American preemptive strikes. Given the US ability to attack hard targets, how many of China’s intercontinental missiles could survive a first strike and then manage to penetrate American missile defense systems? This obviously is an important issue for the Chinese strategic community to consider.26 84 China’s expanding nuclear capabilities Recently, Chinese strategists have been focusing on the threat posed by a sea- based theater missile defense (TMD) system. This system, based on Aegis- equipped warships, is already becoming operational and is being deployed very close to China. A Chinese military magazine organized a symposium to examine the impact of US sea-based missile defense on China’s nuclear deterrence. One article claims that this sea-based capability will “forwardly extend US anti-missile deployment and compromise deterrence effectiveness by our strategic nuclear forces.”27 Analysts believe that if Chinese strategic missiles were launched from the first layer of inland provinces such as Henan and Jilin, where China’s nuclear forces are rumored to be deployed, US TMD in the Pacific could intercept these missiles during the boost phase of the flight, when the missile speed is relatively slow. Further, these American warships could serve as an early warning for missile defense in North America, improving the probability of eventual successful interception of Chinese nuclear missiles. The latest PLA assessments believe that US missile defense will achieve significant progress toward combat effectiveness by 2030. According to Li Fang and Yang Zhu, two PLA analysts, by then the US mid-course interception system will “possess full and complete combat capabilities.” In the meantime, the US ability for boost phase interception will also “see steady breakthroughs.” Most importantly, the sea-based Aegis missile defense system “will possess the ability of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles.”28 Thus, US missile defense has sown the seeds for China’s nuclear expansion. Indeed, Chinese military strategists all recommend such a course of action to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence. For example, Yao Yunzhu claims that “China must evaluate the survivability and sufficiency of its nuclear arsenal. China must also consider what kind of nuclear capability can ensure the mutual deterrence between the two countries.”29 Other PLA strategists are more blunt in their recommendations. As proposed by Hou Xiaohe and Zhang Hui from the PLA National Defense University, “We must first massively improve the development and modernization of our strategic weapons, increase the accuracy and penetration ability of our medium and long range missiles to allow our lance to pierce the shield of missile defense, and thereby restore strategic nuclear balance between China and the United States.”30 More specifically, Hou and Zhang suggest that Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 China needs to “develop nuclear missiles equipped with multiple warheads to overwhelm the US defensive system.”31

China’soffensive responses to US missile defense The rise of US missile defense has altered the incentive structure for the force development of Chinese nuclear deterrence. Until the 1990s, China subscribed to the doctrine of minimal deterrence. Now, US missile defense has provided a powerful reference point for the development of Chinese nuclear forces. China must make sure that its offensive capability can keep pace with any China’s expanding nuclear capabilities 85 advancement in US defensive capabilities. Thus, contrary to the view that the Chinese nuclear posture has not undergone major changes, China’s response to missile defense has in fact critically affected warhead deployment patterns, basing modes, and the size of its strategic nuclear force. First, in recent years China has successfully developed and deployed a new generation of strategic weapons systems. For example, in addition to the DF- 31 strategic missile, which has a range of 8,000 kilometers and is road mobile, the longer-range DF-31A was officially debuted at a military parade on October 1, 2009. The missile has a range of at least 11,000 kilometers and is thus capable of striking the entire USA. This capability was confirmed by Zhang Guangzhong, commander of the DF-31A squadron that partici- pated in the military parade. During an interview with Xinhua News Agency, Zhang claimed that the missile “is capable of hitting all important strategic targets.”32 More importantly, China has clearly abandoned its previous single-warhead deployment pattern in order to counter US missile defense. After its debut in October 2009, an important Chinese military magazine published an article on some of the details of the DF-31A. It claimed that the missile is capable of carrying either a single warhead of one-megaton yield or three to five warheads of 90 kiloton yield.33 This magazine, published by the Chinese defense industry, has good credibility due to its special access to China’sstrategicweapons research establishment. As the following paragraphs show, it has published a series of lengthy interviews with Wang Wenchao, a chief designer of China’ssea- based strategic missiles, on ballistic missile and nuclear warhead designs. More- over, as discussed in Chapter 2, Chinese reports in October 2012 claimed that China’s DF-25 medium-range missile is the world’s first missile of its class to carry three independently guided nuclear warheads. If China can put three warheads on the DF-25, the much larger intercontinental DF-31A should certainly be able to carry multiple warheads. Indeed, in the age of US missile defense, equipping its strategic missiles with multiple warheads has become a necessity for China to maintain an effective nuclear deterrence. In fact, Chinese assessments suggest that deploying multiple and independently guided warheads is vital for the penetration of defensive systems. As revealed by two Chinese missile experts, “According to studies, when warheads number between 5 and 10, a missile’s penetration Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 probability approaches 1. This means the interception probability by missile defense is almost zero.”34 After China tested the new DF-41 missile in July 2012, which is reportedly capable of carrying 10 MIRV warheads, a Chinese missile expert offered an analysis to highlight the vital importance of MIRV technologies. As he pointed out:

The main purpose of MIRV technologies is to improve penetration probabilities and to ensure the credibility of nuclear deterrence. Assuming that the enemy’s defensive system can achieve a success rate of 80% 86 China’s expanding nuclear capabilities against a single warhead, then the penetration rate of the single warhead should be 20%. However, three warheads will improve the penetration rate to 48.8%. The penetration rate of ten warheads will be 89.26%.35

In an interview on ballistic missile design, Wang Wenchao argued that “facing a complex missile defense environment, without the aid of penetration technologies and stealth measures, missiles will not be able to survive, let alone hit their targets. Penetration technologies primarily refer to multiple and independently targeted warheads.”36 In another interview focusing specifically on nuclear warhead design, Wang discounted the effectiveness of using decoys to elude missile defense, citing the rapidly improving technologies that can differentiate real warheads from decoys. Instead, Wang argued that deploying multiple warheads was the only guarantee of successful penetration of missile defense.37 Indeed, according to Wang’s research, 100 single-warhead-equipped missiles cannot penetrate a multilayered missile defense, even if they are mounting a simultaneous attack. In this interview, Wang actually provided the blue- print of a design that contained five warheads.38 Although there is no evidence that this particular design is used by the newest Chinese strategic missiles, it certainly matches the claimed number of warheads deployed on the DF-31A. The possibility that China’s new generation of strategic missiles are armed with multiple warheads has been further established by recently released photos of the JL-2 SLBM. In October 2010, the Channel 7 of China’s CCTV showed documentary footages of a JL-2 being lunched from under the sea.39 This was the first time that pictures of this new sea-based strategic missile were released to the public. According to a sequence of images, the missile has a blunt nose design that suggests it is armed with multiple warheads. It is completely different from the cone-shaped nose design of China’s first-generation SLBM, the single-warhead equipped JL-1. According to Tang Zhicheng, a nuclear expert of the PLA Second Artillery Corps, the nose shape of strategic missiles “is primarily determined by the number of warheads carried and the ways they are arranged inside the missile.”40 According to Tang, while a cone-shaped nose is used for single warhead missiles, blunt nose designs are necessary to accommodate the space need of multiple warheads. Tang specifically used US Trident II D-5 and French M51 SLBM as examples of this latter design. Both of them can Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 carry 8–10 warheads. The JL-2 shown in the CCTV documentary has exactly the same blunt nose design as Trident II D-5 and M51. This is the most convincing evidence so far that China’s new generation of SLBM could be armed with multiple warheads. In contrast, the single-warhead equipped JL-1 has the classic cone-shaped nose. China’s newest strategic missile, the DF-41, represents the most important efforts by the Chinese military to employ MIRV technologies to ensure penetration of US missile defense. The missile first made its debut in a widely circulated photo on the Internet. On July 24, 2012 China performed the first test of the missile. The missile saw its second test on December 13, 2013. China’s expanding nuclear capabilities 87 According to analyses, this road-mobile missile, by being able to carry up to ten warheads and being able to reach the entire USA, is tailor-made for US missile defense. One Chinese analysis argues that the missile’s ten MIRV warheads “will make them extremely difficult to be intercepted.” In fact, the analysis claims that the DF-41 will “render US missile defense useless.”41 Another analysis argues that DF-41 could resolve the challenges of coordi- nating a counter attack by single warhead missiles during times of war. As it states, “In theory, one hundred single warhead missiles could be launched simultaneously to increase penetration probabilities. However, in front of a potent missile defense system, if effective simultaneous launches are not possible, then each warhead will face the possibility of being defeated indivi- dually. This scenario will destroy China’s nuclear counter-attack.”42 Instead, the DF-41 will be far more likely to penetrate missile defense by carrying multiple warheads and decoys. Therefore, Chinese analyses argue this missile is capable of re-shaping the strategic balance between China and the USA. As an editorial of the Global Times claims, the DF-41 “is an offensive oriented strategic missile and possesses extremely potent deterrence and balancing capabilities” and will “fundamentally change the US perception of Chinese power.”43 Given their ability to vastly improve China’soffensive nuclear capabilities, US security experts are taking notice of the DF-41 strategic missiles. According to Larry Wortzel, an expert on the Chinese military, “The bigger implication of this is that as they began to field a force of missiles with multiple warheads, it means everything we assume about the size of their nuclear arsenal becomes wrong.”44 Second, contrary to recent claims by some US experts that China has shifted resources away from its nuclear submarines in favor of land-based systems, the Chinese actually saw breakthroughs with the deployment of their new 094 strategic nuclear submarine and JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which is adapted from the DF-31. The Chinese efforts to develop a new generation of strategic nuclear submarines are also motivated by the need to achieve a balance with US missile defense. China’s nuclear experts believe that due to the rise of US defensive capabilities, its land-based strategic missiles face a gloomy prospect for mounting a successful counter attack. For example, Tang Zhicheng, a strategist at the Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Command Academy of the PLA Second Artillery Corps, suggests that US missile defense could seriously limit the effectiveness of China’s nuclear counter-strike ability. As he argues:

As most of (China’s) nuclear capabilities would be destroyed during a US pre-emptive strike, only a limited number of missiles will be able to survive. Moreover, the counter attacks will be most likely conducted without effective central command. So the counter-strike will be sporadic, dis- persed, and unsustained. This will greatly improve the probabilities of successful interception by a missile defense system.45 88 China’s expanding nuclear capabilities In this context, a sea-based deterrent, by its superior ability to survive a US preemptive strike, can muster a concentrated and coordinated counter-strike to improve China’s ability to penetrate the US missile defense system. There- fore, to overcome the challenges posed by US missile defense, there is an imperative for China to pursue sea-based nuclear deterrents. Its new generation Type 094 SSBM and its matching JL-2 missile reflect such an imperative. After the Type 094 SSBM was first identified by Google’s satellite in July 2007, some high-resolution pictures, taken at close range, were circulated on the Chinese Internet.46 They showed two subs at the docks of the Huludao shipyard, which builds China’s nuclear powered submarines. Recently, images taken by Google Earth satellite in October 2013 showed what could be the fifth type 094 SSBN under construction at Huludao shipyard.47 So far, little information has been made public about the technical aspects of the new submarine. However, at a July 2009 exhibition of Chinese military achievements, organized by pro-Beijing political groups in Hong Kong in conjunction with the PLA, some clues about the submarine surfaced.48 The exhibition displayed close to 100 scale models of China’s latest military equipment, ranging from tanks to destroyers. Among the displays was a scale model of the Type 094 strategic nuclear submarine. According to the description, the submarine is 135 meters long and 12.5 meters wide. It has a displacement of 9,000 tons above water and 11,500 tons submerged. The sub is also capable of achieving a dive depth of more than 300 meters. Since the models displayed at the exhibition were provided by PLA Factory 6108, which presumably specializes in producing scale models for the Chinese military, this technical information could be credible. The Type 094 has major implications for the future size of China’soffensive nuclear forces. American assessments tend to predict five to six 094s eventually deployed.49 China clearly understands that its strategic nuclear submarines will be fighting against the most powerful antisubmarine force in the world—the US Navy. In an interview, Wang Wenchao claimed that “within the range of antisubmarine forces, the survival chance for submarines is very low.”50 This perceived vulnerability of Chinese strategic submarines may indicate that China could indeed deploy the predicted five to six Type 094s to achieve the necessary redundancy. If so, China’soffensive nuclear capability will undergo a complete change. A Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 limited capability reflecting the doctrine of minimal deterrence and assured retaliation will be replaced by a much larger force commensurate with a medium- sized nuclear power and capable of assured destruction. Indeed, five Type 094s, assuming each of its 12 missiles carries five warheads, would result in 300 warheads. This number alone would allow China’s nuclear capabilities to match and even surpass those of Britain and France. As the next section reveals, a latest Chinese analysis of its future sea-based nuclear forces even suggests a fleet of 12 strategic nuclear submarines to match the numbers of Russia and the USA. Therefore, China’s new generation of sea-based nuclear deterrents will profoundly change its nuclear posture. A Chinese military journal argues that the China’s expanding nuclear capabilities 89 Type 094 SSBN has the historical significance of giving China its first true second-strike nuclear capability. The article further suggests that China has downgraded minimum deterrence in favor of a new strategy of “effective deterrence,” which emphasizes a significant offensive capability to maintain credibility against the maturing US missile defense.51 This transition indicates that China’s nuclear capability, as a default outcome of its response to US missile defense, is moving away from assured retaliation and toward assured destruction.

The future of Sino–US offensive-defensive arms race The rise of US missile defense has thus transformed the posture of Chinese strategic nuclear deterrence. The tilting strategic balance has forced China to seek expansion of its offensive nuclear capabilities. China has sought to employ MIRV technologies on its strategic missiles to ensure penetration of US missile defense. The DF-31A ICBM and the JL-2 SLBM, based on Chinese information and discussions, could be armed with multiple warheads. If there is still doubt, the latest DF-41 is clearly designed to use MIRV technologies to defeat US missile defense. In addition, China has steadily developed its second generation strategic nuclear submarine, the Type 094, and its matching JL-2 SLBM to ensure greater survivability of its nuclear deterrents. Only a sea-based deterrent is capable of delivering a concentrated and coordinated counter-strike. As observed by Tang Zhicheng of the PLA Second Artillery Corps, such a concentrated and coordinated second-strike will be vital for China’s nuclear forces to penetrate US missile defense. Therefore, China’sefforts to pursue MIRV technologies for its strategic missiles and its efforts to develop reliable sea-based deterrents represent China’s balancing attempts against US defensive capabilities. Given the continuous improvement of US missile defense, China should be expected to further expand its offensive capabilities to maintain the strategic balance. As an aforementioned PLA assessment believes, by 2030 the US ground-based mid- course interception system will be able to achieve “full and complete” combat capabilities. Moreover, the sea-based Aegis system will be able to intercept intercontinental strategic missiles.52 Therefore, China could be expected to further improve its offensive Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 capabilities to offset US improvement in defensive capabilities. China’sefforts will include both land-based and sea-based strategic nuclear programs. A recent special issue of a Chinese military magazine analyzed the respective advantages of land- and sea-based nuclear programs. Dai Yanli, a PLA strategist, emphasized the unique advantages of land-based nuclear missiles.53 One of them concerns the relative costs required for land- and sea-based strategic missiles. For example, a nuclear submarine with 16 missiles costs far more to operate and maintain than 16 land-based missiles deployed in silos or 16 missiles based on mobile launchers.54 Moreover, land-based nuclear forces possess more reliable command and control systems. According to Dai, air-borne 90 China’s expanding nuclear capabilities command and control systems are highly survivable during an enemy’spre- emptive strike.55 In contrast, command and control for sea-based nuclear deterrent faces far more challenges. Dai also pointed out that land-based strategic missiles, especially silo-based ones, are less constrained by weight and design issues. This allows them to have much larger throw-weights than the physically confined submarine-based missiles. Moreover, land-based missiles are still more accurate than sea-based missiles, which allow them to conduct first-strike missions, for example attacking an enemy’s hardened targets such as silo-based strategic missiles.56 Wang Jixin, on the other hand, emphasizes the unique strengths of sea- based nuclear deterrents. In addition to their vastly improved survivability, which is the major advantage of sea-based forces over land-based ones, nuclear submarines possess much more concentrated unit firepower. Accord- ing to Wang, a single Ohio-class submarine of the USA can carry 240 warheads, which equal the firepower of 6–7 regiments of Russia’s SS-25 strategic missiles.57 This advantage allows even a limited sea-based nuclear capability, such as three to four strategic submarines, to generate powerful deterrence against potential enemies. Therefore it can be predicted that China will continue to pursue expansion of both land-based and sea-based offensive nuclear capabilities. In one analysis of the composition of China’s nuclear forces, the author points out the necessity of a co-emphasis on these two different capabilities. According to him, a strategic deterrent incorporating both land and sea elements “maximize the deterrence effects.” Indeed:

Without considering the economic costs, a model that equally emphasizes land and sea elements carries huge military implications. Although land- based missiles are less survivable, they have the ability to deliver precise attacks against an enemy’s point targets. On the other hand, sea-based forces can deter enemy’s pre-emptive attacks and are also suitable for enemy’s civilian and economic targets.58

While this analysis emphasizes the importance of a balanced nuclear deterrent, the author also notices its problems. One of these is the ﬁnancial implication. In particular, the author suggests that operating a sea-based nuclear Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 deterrent is highly costly and diverts resources away from other worthy defense programs. Moreover, China still has a long way to go in terms of creating a reliable communication and command system for its sea-based nuclear forces.59 Another Chinese analysis, however, suggests that China should gradually give more weight to its sea-based nuclear deterrent. The author contends that the imperative of such a shift is caused by the peculiar nuclear doctrine of China. As he argues:

China has long practiced the No First Use policy. This implies the only way for China to use its nuclear weapons is through second strikes. China’s expanding nuclear capabilities 91 However, the ﬁrst wave of a nuclear strike will seek to destroy China’s nuclear forces and to take out its retaliatory capabilities. In that context, China’s nuclear deterrent must meet two conditions: survivability and eﬀective deterrence.60

According to the author, “Comparing survivability, strategic nuclear submarines possess outstanding concealment and mobility. They can survive much better than land-based mobile strategic missiles.”61 According to the author, while in the past there were financial and technical challenges for China to maintain both land- and sea-based strategic deterrents, today it no longer faces such constraints due to the rapid rise of its aggregate capabilities. The author, however, warns against a limited-sized sea- based nuclear deterrent. As he puts it, “It must be pointed out, based on the deterrence need against a great power, a nuclear submarine force cannot just have three boats.” Instead, “The number of submarines necessary to deter great powers may require twelve or even more.”62 The author points to the USA, which still maintains 14 Ohio class SSBMs, to support his view. Based on this understanding of future deterrence need, the author suggests that China should start to implement a long-term plan to build a sea-based nuclear deterrent of 12 strategic nuclear submarines.63 While the above analysis proposes greater emphasis on sea-based nuclear deterrents, the latest developments with the land-based DF-41 ICBM and the sea-based JL-2 SLBM indicate that the Chinese military is still pursuing a balanced strategy to expand its offensive nuclear capabilities. According to reports, China tested the DF-41 and JL-2 in the summer of 2012 and again in December 2013. This suggests that China perceives different advantages associated with land and sea-based offensive capabilities. Given the continuous improvement of US missile defense, we will see further progress in China’s land-based strategic missile programs as well as its sea-based ones.

China moving beyond minimum deterrence China’s accelerated expansion of its nuclear capabilities is moving its nuclear posture beyond minimum deterrence. While Yao Yunzhu has correctly argued that minimum deterrence should not have a quantitative connotation as it is Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 in fact synonymous with assured retaliation, the principle does signify a small nuclear capability.64 Until recently, it has been widely agreed that China possessed just a few dozen strategic nuclear weapons that could reach the USA. Indeed, according to China’s understanding of nuclear deterrence, by targeting other countries’ population centers, this limited nuclear capability is sufficient to deter them from initiating a nuclear first strike. However, due to China’s recent expansion of its nuclear forces it is quickly acquiring the capability of a medium nuclear power as symbolized by France and Britain, each of which possesses between 300 and 400 strategic nuclear weapons. As this chapter indicates, China’s latest generation of land- and sea-based 92 China’s expanding nuclear capabilities strategic missiles, such as the DF-31A, DF-41, and JL-2, are armed with multiple and independently guided warheads. By simply deploying these missiles, the number of warheads capable of striking the USA will easily reach beyond 500. In particular, the DF-41 is said to be capable of carrying 10 warheads. Just a few dozen DF-41 will be able to transform China’s nuclear capability from a minimum deterrence posture to that of a medium nuclear power. Moreover, satellite photos indicate that China is already building its fifth Type 094 SSBM. While there is no evidence that China will limit its future strategic nuclear submarine fleet to five boats, they alone will carry 300 additional strategic warheads, assuming that each of the JL-2 missiles on the Type 094 SSBN is armed with five warheads. This emerging nuclear capability of China implies that its nuclear posture is moving beyond minimum deterrence, which is defined by a small nuclear capability of a few dozen strategic nuclear weapons. The emerging capability will at least possess several hundreds of these weapons. More importantly, this emerging capability will allow China to move beyond assured retaliation toward assured destruction. While minimum deterrence only seeks a retaliatory strike against a few major population centers of another country, the emerging capability of China’s strategic nuclear forces will be capable of assured destruction of that country. In fact, both France and Britain, by being medium nuclear powers, possessed this assured destruction capability to deter the Soviet Union. Now, China, by moving toward a medium nuclear power posture, is also acquiring assured destruction capability. This chapter suggests that the current and forthcoming expansions of China’s offensive nuclear forces are outcomes of its balance of power initiatives. The US quest for missile defense has significantly shifted the balance of power among the major countries of the world. As structural realism predicts, states pursue balancing activities against shifts in the balance of power. In the eyes of Chinese strategists, the advancement of American missile defense, which has become a sophisticated multi-layered defensive system, has the potential of giving the US vast advantages over other countries. In fact, China’s small nuclear deterrent could be neutralized by the emerging US defensive capabilities. As Waltz and other structural realists suggest, the balance of power logic of an anarchic international order inevitably requires China to respond to the rise of US defensive capabilities. As this chapter suggests, Chinese strategists Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 are greatly alarmed by the prospect of China losing its nuclear counter-strike capability due to the maturing of US missile defense. In the context, China is forced to expand its offensive capabilities by a variety of measures. The most important measure concerns the change of the deployment pattern of China’s strategic nuclear warheads. China has abandoned the single-warhead deployment pattern that characterizes its old strategic missiles. Now, to overcome US missile defense, China has been developing a new generation of strategic missiles armed with multiple and independently guided warheads. These outcomes of China’s balance of power efforts suggest it will become a more potent strategic adversary of the USA in the coming years. This China’s expanding nuclear capabilities 93 unintended outcome of the US pursuit of missile defense affirms the insights of defensive realism, which cautions against the quest for unilateral dominance. As defensive realists argue, the quest for excessive power will invite counterbalancing by other countries. This is why Waltz consistently criticized the US quest for hegemony during the post-Cold War era. He argued that such attempts by the USA would invite self-defeating outcomes.65 The results of China’s balance of power initiatives in the strategic nuclear area confirm Waltz’s insights. Due to the deployment of a new generation of much more potent land and sea-based strategic missiles, China is shifting away from its traditional minimum deterrence posture toward that of a medium nuclear power. As a consequence, China will become a more formidable strategic adversary of the USA in the coming decades.

Notes 1 James Lyons, “A New Challenge at Sea,” Washington Times, March 22, 2009. 2 Jing Zhiyuan and Peng Xiaofeng, “Jianshe zhongguo tece zhanlue daodan budui” (Constructing a Strategic Missile Force with Chinese Characteristics), Qiushi, February 2009. Qiushi is monthly published by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 3 These pictures are also available in Jane’s Naval Forces News, “Photograph Reveals China’s Jin-class SSBN,” October 16, 2007, at www.janes.com/news/ defense/naval/jdw071026_1_n.shtml. 4 This comment by Bates Gill is quoted in Richard Spencer, “China Modernising Nuclear Weapons Arsenal,” The Daily Telegraph, May 8, 2008. 5 Associated Press, “Gates, Chinese Defense Official Spar over Military Growth,” June 1, 2008, at www.foxnews.com/story/2008/06/01/gates-chinese-defense-official- spar-over-military-growth/. 6 The maiden test of the DF-41 was first reported by Bill Gertz, “Manchu Missile Launch: China Test Fires New Long-range Missile,” August 15, 2012, at www. freebeacon.com/manchu-missile-launch. For the JL-2 test on August 16, 2012, see Bill Gertz, “Chinese Missile Tests Continue: China Conducts Third Long-range Missile Test in 4 Weeks,” August 23, 2012, at http://freebeacon.com/Chinese-missile-tests-continue. These tests were later confirmed by the China’s Defense Ministry, see Huanqiu shibao, “Guofangbu huiying zhongguo jinqi jinxing duozhong xinghao dandao daodan fasha” (The Ministry of Defense Responding to Reports on China Conducting Tests of Multiple Models of Ballistic Missiles), August 30, 2012. 7 For these missile tests in December 2013, see Huanqiu shibao, “Zhongguo shi tian nei jinxing liang zhong xinxing zhouji he daodan fashe shiyan” (China Conducted Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Tests of Two New Models of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles During the Past Ten Days), December 24, 2013, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/militaryvision/2013-12/ 2721810.htm. 8 Joan Johnson-Freese and Thomas Nichols, “Space, Stability and Nuclear Strategy: Rethinking Missile Defense,” China Security, Vol, 6, No. 2 (2010), pp. 3–24. 9 For a classical statement of structural realism, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). For an analysis of defensive realism, see Jeffrey W. Taliafferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128–61. 10 For Waltz’s view on the issue, see his “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Summer 2000), pp. 5–41. 94 China’s expanding nuclear capabilities 11 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 2. 12 Randall Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” in Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatement and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 102–103. 13 For Chilton’s remarks, see Phil Stewart, “US Missile Defense May Backfire if too Robust: General,” Reuters, November 10, 2009, at www.reuters.com/article/politics News/idUSTRE5A94NH20091110. 14 For recent studies of Chinese nuclear deterrence, see Jeffrey G. Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007); Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKin- zie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and US Nuclear War Planning (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council, 2006); Lyle J. Goldstein, ed., China’s Nuclear Force Modernization (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006); Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner, eds, China’s Nuclear Future (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006). 15 Lewis, Minimum Means of Reprisal,p.78. 16 Ibid., p. 80. 17 Ibid., p. 200. 18 Ibid., p. 206. 19 Kristensen, Norris, and McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and US Nuclear War Planning,p.12. 20 Brad Roberts, “Alternative Futures,” in Bolt and Willner, China’s Nuclear Future, pp. 167–92. 21 Charles L. Glasner and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 58, 83. 22 Zhu’s comments are quoted in Fredrik Dahl, “Missile Shield May Spark China Nuclear Upgrade: Officer,” Reuters, July 18, 2012, at www.reuters.com/article/ 2012/07/18/us-china-nuclear-idUSBRE86H16H20120718. 23 Charles L. Glasner, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 103. 24 For this interview, see Jiang Hao, “Zhuanjia xitan dandao daodan di dantou” (Expert’s Analysis of Warheads for Ballistic Missiles), Binggong keji, October 2008, p. 23. 25 Yao Yunzhu, “Zhongguo di he zhanlue” (China’s Nuclear Policy), in Yan Xuetong, ed., Zhongguo xuezhe kan shijie guoji anquan juan (The World in the Eyes of Chinese Scholars: International Security Issues) (Beijing: Xin shijie chubanshe, 2007), pp. 357–358. 26 Wu Chunsi, “Zhongmei he guanxi di zouxiang” (Trends in Sino–US Nuclear Relationship), in Zhu Mingquan, Wu Chunsi, and Su Changhe, eds, Weishe yu wending: zhongmei he guanxi(Deterrence and Stability: China-US Nuclear Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Relationship) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2005), pp. 296–97. 27 See Dai Yanli, “Wuo zhoubian zousidun jian di yunxing ji weixie” (Aegis-Equipped Warships Pose Threats around Our Periphery). The article was part of a symposium organized by Jianchuan zhishi for its September 2007 issue. 28 Li Fang and Yang Zhu, “Meiguo daodan fangyu xitong fazhan xianzhuang ji nengli yuce fenxi” (Analysis and Predictions of the State and Capabilities of US Missile Defense), Xiandai junshi, July 2012, p. 51. 29 See Yao Yunzhu, “China’s Nuclear Policy,” p. 357. 30 Hou Xiaohe and Zhang Hui, Meiguo daodang fangyu jihua toushi (An Analysis of the US Missile Defense) (Beijing: Zhongguo minhang chubanshe, 2001), p. 358. 31 Ibid., p. 242. China’s expanding nuclear capabilities 95 32 Xinhua News Agency, “He daodang fangzhen zhang guangzhong: gai dan ke gongji suoyou zhongyao zhanlue mubiao” (Zhang Guangzhong of the Nuclear Missile Squadron: It Can Hit All Important Strategic Targets), October 6, 2009, at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2009-10-06/1038569252.html. 33 Guo Hua, “DF-31A zhouji dandao daodang” (DF-31A Intercontinental Ballistic Missile), Binggong keji, Special Supplementary Issue on the National Day Parade, November 2009, p. 85. 34 This Chinese assessment was revealed in an analysis of India’s success with launching ten satellites on one rocket. See Xue Wenli and Zhang Yanwen, “Yi jian shi xing, jietu indu weixing fashe chenggong” (One Rocket, Ten Satellites: Analyzing India’s Successful Satellite Launch), Binggong keji, July 2008, p. 14. 35 Wong Zongbo, “Rang he dantou zai fei yihui er MIRV jishu qiantan” (Let Nuclear Warheads Fly A Bit Longer: An Analysis of MIRV Technologies), Bingqi, November 2012, p. 16. 36 For Wang’s comments, see Jiang Hao, “Zhanlue daodan di sheji nandian fang wuo guo zhuming daodan zhuanjia wang wenchao” (The Challenges Facing Strategic Ballistic Missile Design: An Interview with Renowned Ballistic Missile Expert Wang Wenchao), Binggong keji, March 2009, p. 24. 37 Ibid., p. 23. 38 Ibid., p. 18. 39 For a report on this CCTV documentary, see “Waijie caice julang 2 zhouji daodan xianshen jiafangjun 10 yue junyan” (The Outside World Surmises that JL-2 Inter- continental Missile Debuted in the October PLA War Game), at http://war. news.163.com/10/1208/10/6NCHNKFT00011MTO.html. This report showed three still images of the JL-2 emerging out of the sea. They were adapted from the CCTV documentary. 40 Tang Zhicheng, “Huashuo dandao daodan zhengliuzhao” (Nose Cones of Ballistic Missiles), Binggong keji, No. 12 (June 2010), p. 61. 41 See “Dongfeng-41 fugai weiguo quanjing zengjia mei jun fandao lanjie nandu” (DF-41 Covers the Entire United States and Increases the Difficulty of Intercep- tions by US Missile Defense), December 18, 2013, at http://mil.sina.com.cn/2013- 12-18/1723755580.html. 42 See “Dongfeng-41 daodang shi zhongguo hezhanlue di zhongyao zhuangbei zhicheng” (DF-41 Constitutes an Important Element of China’s Nuclear Strategy), December 30, 2013, at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2013-12-30/18357556.html. 43 See Huanqiu shibao, “Dongfeng-41 jiang gaibian mei dui zhongguo liliang di renzhi” (DF-41 Will Change US Perception of China’s Power), December 19, 2013, at http://opinions/huanqiu.com/editorial/2013-12/4675859.html. 44 Wortzel’s comments are quoted in Keith Bradsher, “China Is Said to Be Bolstering Missile Capabilities,” The New York Times, August 25, 2012. 45 Tang Zhicheng, “Zhanglue daodan di zuozhan shiyong” (Strategic Missiles in Combat Operations), Bingqi zhishi, March 2013, p. 22. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 46 Jane’s Naval Forces News, “Photograph Reveals China’s Jin-class SSBN,” October 16, 2007, at www.janes.com/news/defense/naval/jdw071026_1_n.shtml. 47 See Open Source Imaging and Geospatial Intelligence, “Is this China’s5th Type 094 SSBN Under Construction?” at http://osimint.com/2014/04/01/is-this-chinas- 5th-type-094-ssbn-under-construction. 48 The exhibition was held in Kwan Tang Community Center, July 3–5, 2009. For coverage by the media, see Wenweipo, “Zuguo zhi guang junpei moxing zhan kaimu” (The Pride of the Motherland Military Exhibition Opened), July 5, 2009. 49 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense), p. 31. 96 China’s expanding nuclear capabilities 50 This interview was conducted in the context of India’s recent SLBM test that alarmed the Chinese security establishment. See “Jiedu indu qianshe daodan shiyan fang wuoguo zhuming qian di daodang sheji shi wang wenchao” (Analyz- ing the Indian Test: An Interview with Renowned SLBM Designer Wang Wenchao), Binggong keji (Weapons Technologies), May 2008, p. 14. 51 See Hai Tian, “Xin yidai ‘julang’ tisheng he wishe liliang” (The New Generation “Giant Wave” Has Strengthened Nuclear Deterrence), Junshi wenzhai, July 2007, pp. 25–28. 52 See Li Fang and Yang Zhu, “Meiguo daodan fangyu xitong fazhan xianzhuang ji nengli yuce fenxi” (Analysis and Predictions of the State and Capabilities of US Missile Defense), Xiandai junshi, July 2012, p. 51. 53 Dai Yanli, “Luji he liliang di youshi” (The Advantages of Land-based Nuclear Forces), Bingqi zhishi, March 2013, pp. 26–29. 54 Ibid., p. 29. 55 Ibid., p. 27. 56 Ibid., p. 29. 57 Wang Jixin, “Haiji he liliang di youshi” (The Advantages of Sea-based Nuclear Forces), Bingqi zhishi, March 2013, p. 24. 58 Wen Cheng, “Wuoguo he liliang jiegou tansuo” (An Exploration of the Composition of Our Country’s Nuclear Forces), Bingqi zhishi, March 2013, p. 32. 59 Ibid., p. 33. 60 Da Simo, “Zhongguo haiji he liliang di weilai fazhan yu sikao” (Thoughts on the Future Development of China’s Sea-based Nuclear Deterrents), Xiandai jianchuan, November 2013 (B edition), p. 30. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., p. 31. 63 Ibid. 64 Yao Yunzhu, “China’s Nuclear Policy,” p. 355. 65 Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” pp. 36–37. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 4 Balance of power and new dimensions of China’s strategic capabilities

The previous chapter details China’s response to US missile defense through the modernization and expansion of its offensive nuclear capabilities. These efforts effectively involve a nascent arms race between China’soffensive capabilities and US defensive capabilities. They represent China’sefforts to maintain the strategic balance so that its nuclear forces can conduct successful counter-strikes against the United States during scenarios of nuclear conflicts. China’s expansion of its offensive capabilities represents its efforts to balance against the rise of US defensive capabilities. China’s balancing efforts, which are predictable outcomes suggested by the logics of structural realism, also include the pursuit of new type of strategic capabilities to enhance its nuclear deterrent. These new capabilities also seek to restore the tilting strategic balance generated by a maturing US missile defense system. On the one hand, China has been pursuing integrated nuclear-space warfare capabilities to counter US missile defense. On the other hand, after criticizing US missile defense for decades, China has embarked on the quest of its own defensive capabilities. These recent moves by China represent important changes to its nuclear posture. China’s emerging nuclear posture will soon combine offensive capabilities with space warfare and missile defense capabilities. The result will be the transformation of China’s nuclear posture from a one dimensional system to a three dimensional one. China’s quest of new type of strategic capabilities is driven by its balancing Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 motives. China believes that its ability to destroy US space-based assets, such as early warning satellites, will be critical for the Chinese nuclear forces to penetrate US missile defense. China also believes that a maturing US missile defense system will significantly shift the global balance of power. In this context, China needs to develop its own missile defense capabilities. However, China’s pursuit of new types of strategic capabilities could have notable long- term security implications for Sino–US relations. In particular, the Chinese military space program, which is importantly driven by China’s integrated nuclear-space warfare motives, could trigger a broad and sustained military space rivalry with the USA. 98 China’s new strategic capabilities Defensive realism and the security dilemma According to defensive realism, the security dilemma represents an important phenomenon of international relations. Due to concerns for their security in an anarchic international system, states must rely on self-help to ensure their survival. This implies that they need to build and maintain sufficient military capabilities to deter potential threats from other states. In an anarchic system, however, these self-help efforts trigger suspicions on the part of other countries, which have to take counter actions by bolstering their own military capabilities. In anarchic international relations, one country’sefforts to improve its security could degrade the security of others by changing the balance of power between them. Inevitably, the US quest for greater security through its missile defense system invites counter measures from other countries. As Kenneth Waltz observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since “maintaining status quo is the minimum goal of any great power.”1 According to Robert Jervis, another defensive realist, the above phenomenon generates the security dilemma that pushes states into arms races. As he puts it, “The heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one state’s security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imagined hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations.” In this context, “Even if they can be certain that the current intentions of other states are benign, they can neither neglect the possibility that the others will become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves will remain peaceful.”2 Inevitably, when one state seeks to expand its military capability, such as the US quest for missile defense, others have to take similar measures, which can in turn lead to a spiral of arms race. In the case of US missile defense, Chinese security experts believe that the USA seeks “absolute security” in order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats.3 This means that China at least recognizes some of the defensive motivations behind the US quest for missile defense. However, in an anarchic international system other states have to hedge against the worst-case scenarios, which may involve other states using their military capabilities for expansionist purposes. As Andrew Kidds 4 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 suggests, interpreting other countries’ intentions are inherently difficult. Moreover, states can change their intentions in the future. These inherent difficulties facing states’ efforts to interpret other countries’ intentions force them to adopt an assuming-the-worst approach for their own security policies. If some states improve their military capabilities, other states must attempt to restore the balance. Due to China’s incentives to counter-balance US missile defense, it has taken different strategies to restore the strategic balance. In addition to persistent and extensive efforts of China to modernize its offensive nuclear capabilities, which are discussed in Chapter 3, it has also sought to develop China’s new strategic capabilities 99 new types of strategic capabilities to enhance its nuclear deterrent. They include integrated nuclear-space warfare capabilities and indigenous missile defense capabilities.

China’s integrated nuclear-space warfare capabilities China’s military space program and its strategies for space warfare have caused rising concerns in the USA. In fact, China’s military intention in outer space has emerged as one of the central security issues between the two countries. In November 2009, after the commander of the Chinese air force called the militarization of space “a historical inevitability,” General Kevin Chilton, head of US Strategic Command, urged China to explain the goals and objectives of its rapidly advancing military space program.5 Indeed, after China’s January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, many US experts have attempted to identify the Chinese motives. One driver of China’s military space program is its perception of the forthcoming revolution in military affairs. The PLA sees space as a new and critical dimension of future warfare. The aforementioned comment by the commander of the Chinese air force captures this perception of the PLA.6 In addition, China’s military space program is seen as part of a broad asymmetric strategy designed to offset conventional US military advantages. For example, as observed by Ashley J. Tellis, “China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies, and those of the George W. Bush administration in particular, but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capabilities of the United States.”7 Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France, two US Air Force officers, contend that “Chinese interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential US–Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race.” Instead, they argue that China’s military space program is driven by a desire to “counter the space-enabled advantage of US conventional forces.”8 This perspective implies that, given the predicted US superiority in conventional warfare, China feels compelled to continue its offensive military space program. Inevitably, this perspective sees China as the main instigator of a possible space arms race, whether implicitly or explicitly. Although China’s interpretation of the revolution in military affairs and Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 its quest for asymmetric warfare capabilities are important for understanding the 2007 ASAT test, this chapter suggests, however, that the Chinese military space program is also influenced by China’s concern about US missile defense, which could potentially weaken Chinese strategic nuclear deterrence. Many PLA analysts believe that a multilayered ballistic missile defense system will inevitably compromise China’soffensive nuclear forces. China’s response is to attempt to weaken the US space-based sensor system that serves as the eyes and brains of missile defense. Thus, US missile defense has forced China to contemplate the integration of nuclear war and space war. 100 China’s new strategic capabilities In fact, many Chinese security experts believe that the US has been attempting to rewrite the established rule of nuclear deterrence, which is the mutually assured destruction (MAD) principle that governed the Cold War era. According to Glasner and Fetter, the USA has been pursuing a new deterrence posture that combines offensive capabilities with defensive ones.9 Indeed, the Bush government rejected Chinese calls for discussions about regulating the military use of space. As one report by the New York Times pointed out, the Bush administration did this “in order to maintain maximum flexibility for developing antimissile defense.”10 Chinese strategists therefore believe that, to a significant degree, the US military space program is driven by these missile defense concerns. For example, in a study organized by the General Staff of the PLA, Major Gen- eral Xu Hezhen charges that the USA is developing space-based laser weapons for missile defense. According to him, “a total of 14–24 satellites deployed on different orbits will constitute a defensive system. Relying on data from early warning systems, it can intercept ballistic missiles launched from anywhere in the world.”11 In another study, Major General Ling Yongshun argues that the USA is implementing a coherent plan to neutralize other countries’ strategic deterrence through the deployment of space-based missile defense. As he observes:

Using space weapons to attack ballistic targets is a major goal of space weapon development. The United States believes that others’ ballistic missiles pose signiﬁcant threats to its security. To be immune from this threat, the United States is putting major eﬀorts into ballistic missile defense, with space-based weapons as one of the important intercepting platforms.12

In October 2008, the US Congress approved US $5 million for an independent study of possible space-based missile defense.13 This move gravely alarmed the Chinese military, which believed that the deployment of space- based missile defense could become inevitable. In fact, Wu Qin, a PLA strategist, claimed that “Star Wars has come back.” Li Daguang of the PLA National Defense University even charged that this decision by the US Congress amounted to “declaring a new Cold War against China.”14 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Chinese military strategists believe that US missile defense poses a real threat to China’s nuclear deterrence. Until recently, the Chinese military tended to believe that US missile defense could not effectively deter a major nuclear power like China or Russia. It was thought that a range of countermeasures, such as deploying decoys and multiple warheads, could be employed to deceive and overwhelm US missile defense. Now, however, due to the maturing of a multilayered missile defense system by the USA and its allies, Chinese nuclear experts are losing confidence in China’soffensive capabilities. As discussed in Chapter 3, this pessimism is illustrated in a 2008 interview of Wang Wenchao in a Chinese military magazine. Wang, credited China’s new strategic capabilities 101 with being the chief designer of China’s sea-based strategic missiles, expressed grave pessimism about China’soffensive nuclear capability against US missile defense.15 This is why Wu Tianfu, who is arguably the most important nuclear strategist of the Second Artillery Corps of the PLA, charges that the USA has “forced China to engage in a space arms race.”16 More specifically, US missile defense has forced China to integrate space warfare with its strategic nuclear deterrence. China must possess the ability to weaken American space- based assets, such as early-warning satellites, to ensure the credibility of its offensive nuclear forces. Thus, space war and nuclear war are now intertwined in Chinese strategic thinking. Indeed, China’sofficial media have credited Wu with establishing the PLA’s first space war research institute. A Chinese report in fact suggests that Wu could have started his research on space warfare strategies as early as 2002.17 According to this report, Wu was the leader of a major research project that “had important strategic implications for the Second Artillery Corps” and “filled a void in our country’s research on space strategies.” Shen Dingli, a prominent Chinese nuclear expert, also states that the January 2007 ASAT test was crucial for China’s nuclear deterrence: “When an America with both superior nuclear and conventional arsenals aspires to build missile defense, China’s response is first to oppose it verbally, then counter it with action if the United States refuses to stop. China cannot afford to lose the effectiveness of its still-limited nuclear deterrent.”18 The result is an emerging integrated space-nuclear strategy. As argued by Hou Xiaohe and Zhang Hui, two strategists at the PLA National Defense University, space war will aim at the eyes and ears of missile defense, which are early-warning satellites and other sensors deployed in space. Crippling these US space assets will significantly weaken the effectiveness of missile defense, allowing less time and providing less accurate information to guide ground-based interceptors toward the incoming missiles.19 As Hou and Zhang also point out, this strategy is more cost-effective than merely expanding China’s nuclear missiles. As they observe, “Using limited resources to develop anti-satellite weapons to attack enemy space assets that are costly and easily damaged will become an important choice for weaker countries.”20 Lieutenant General Ge Dongsheng, who was the Political Commissar of Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 the PLA’s Second Artillery, gives the most systematic elaboration of a new integrated space-nuclear strategy. As he argues, “Developing space capability and creating a new type of integrated space-nuclear strategic force is the guarantee of effective deterrence and counter-strike.” According to General Ge, this strategy is now a necessity with the emerging link between space war and nuclear deterrence:

With the development and integration of space and information technologies, we must recognize that early warning, surveillance, tracking, communication, and guidance, which are all critical for nuclear war, are 102 China’s new strategic capabilities increasingly dependent on space systems. Thus, improving nuclear capability through space capability is now an unavoidable trend. We therefore must accelerate the development of space capability to create a new type of integrated space-nuclear strategic force.… Through anti-satellite weapons, we can clear a pathway for nuclear missiles so that our nuclear force can survive, eﬀectively penetrate, and accurately hit targets.21

Given General Ge’s position as a top commander of the PLA Second Artillery Corps, his views on an integrated nuclear and space warfare doctrine carries special signiﬁcance. Other PLA nuclear strategists have also promoted such a strategy. For example, Tang Zhicheng, a strategist at the Command Academy of the PLA Second Artillery Corps, argues that China must “innovate its combat doctrines” to counter US missile defense. He speciﬁcally emphasizes the importance of anti-satellite capabilities. As he puts it:

Once these satellites are destroyed, the war machine of the USA will come to a grinding halt, which will then improve the probabilities of our missiles to penetrate US missile defense. Therefore, given the fixed orbits of satellites and their lack of effective self-protection, we should continue to develop anti-satellite technologies based on ballistic missiles and space rockets. This is to ensure that, if needed, we will possess the abilities to blind and destroy enemy’s satellites, cut off his information chains, and narrow the gap in military capabilities between China and the USA.22

The Chinese eﬀorts to integrate its nuclear and space warfare capabilities is an inevitable response to the security dilemma created by US missile defense. As Joan Johnson-Freese and Thomas Nicols point out, “it is unsurprising that other nations would logically view the same capability as a direct threat to the eﬀectiveness of their own nuclear deterrent.” They argue that given the very limited size of the Chinese nuclear deterrent, US missile defense has forced China to pursue space war capabilities as a countermeasure.23 Evidence suggests that China has been pursuing a wide range of anti- satellite warfare technologies. In an interview in 2013, Wang Wenchao, a Chinese strategic missile designer and a former vice president of the Second Academy of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 (CASIC), gave a detailed analysis of anti-satellite technologies. According to him:

Depending on the launch methods, there are two types of anti-satellite weapons, which are direct ascent types and co-orbital types. Direct ascent anti-satellite weapons are powered by rockets and projected toward their targets, destroying them either by direct kinetic hit or explosives. Co- orbital types of anti-satellite weapons are projected by rockets to the same orbits of the targets. They will then approach the targets at slower speeds, destroying them by direct hit or explosives.24 China’s new strategic capabilities 103 On January11, 2007 China conducted its first anti-satellite test through a direct ascent weapon, which destroyed a malfunctioned Chinese weather satellite. It is reported that China used a KT-1 interceptor, which is a modified DF-21 intermediate-range ballistic missile, for the mission. On May 13, 2013 it was reported that China conducted another anti- satellite test, again using the direct ascent technology. The difference was that China was said to have used a new DN-2 interceptor that can reach very high altitudes and destroy US GPS satellites. According to a US defense official, “It was a ground-based missile that we believe would be their first test of an interceptor that would be designed to go after a satellite that’s actually in orbit.”25 According to Chinese analyses, the new DN-2 interceptor stands for Dongneng or kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) and is capable of reaching as high as 10,000 kilometers.26 As one Chinese analysis claims, if successful, this test should allow China to “become the only country in the world possessing the ability to destroy global positioning satellites which include the US GPS system.”27 Brian Weeden, a former US Air Force space analyst, published a 47-page analysis in March 2014 to interpret the significance of the test on May 13, 2013.28 According to him, on that day China launched a rocket from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan Province. The Chinese Academy of Science stated the launch was intended for a high-altitude scientific mission. However, as Weeden argues, “evidence strongly suggests that China’s May 2013 launch was the test of the rocket component of a new direct ascent ASAT weapons system derived from a road-mobile ballistic missile.”29 According to Weeden, “The system appears to be designed to place a kinetic kill vehicle on a trajectory to deep space that could reach medium earth orbit (MEO), highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and geostationary earth orbit (GEO). If true, this would represent a significant development in China’s ASAT capabilities.”30 Weeden’s claim that the test was in fact a Chinese ASAT test was in part based on his analysis of satellite images of the launch site at Xichang. According to these images, the rocket was not launched from a fixedlaunchpad. Instead, images showed the presence of a mobile tansporter-erector-launcher (TEL) at the Xichang Satellite Launch Center. As Weeden argues: Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016

The presence of a TEL on a newly-constructed mobile launch pad gives signiﬁcant credence to the claims regarding the mobile nature of the Chinese direct ascent ASAT system. It supports, but does not conclusively prove, the theory that China is using a mobile ballistic missile as the basis for its direct ascent ASAT system.31

In addition to direct ascent anti-satellite weapons, China may be also pursuing co-orbital types of technologies. In October 2013 China successfully performed a space test that involved one satellite, called Shiyan-7 104 China’s new strategic capabilities (Experiment-7), capturing another one with robotic arms. Pentagon officials saw the test as “asignificant step forward for Beijing’s space warfare program.” An unidentified US official claimed that the test “was part of Beijing’s covert anti-satellite warfare program.”32 According to Richard Fisher, an expert on the Chinese military, “An SY-7-like ASAT gives China the option to attack enemy satellites without creating a large cloud of debris that may also damage other Chinese satellites.”33 Also in October 2013, China conducted another test that was geared toward space warfare. In this case, China launched a rapid-response orbital launch vehicle called Kuaizhou-1 (Swift Boat-1).34 According to Chinese reports, this rapid response launch vehicle matches small satellites with solid- fuelled rockets and could be launched rapidly to replace satellites damaged or destroyed by an enemy attack.35 Chinese sources claim that Kuaizhou could be launched on mobile platforms that resemble China’s DF-31A intercontinental ballistic missiles. As reported by a Chinese analysis, “The pre-matched satellites and rockets will be waiting in storage. If needed, within days or even hours the mobile launch vehicles can move to a safe location and launch the satellites, replacing those destroyed. Therefore, this is a powerful reserve unit for the space force.”36 Another Chinese analysis reveals additional details of the Kuaizhou system. According to this analysis:

The physical size of the Kuaizhou rapid response system should be between those of the DF-21 and DF-31 ballistic missiles. The satellite, rocket, and the launch vehicle are already integrated into a single system when coming out of the factory. It physically looks like a missile and is transported by large missile transporters. In sealed containers, they should have combat readiness for up to ten years. The Kuaizhou system should be operated by the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps. In a war scenario, they could be launched from anywhere in large numbers. The payloads should be surveillance satellites and communication satellites. These satellites use mature technologies and have low production costs. They therefore can be deployed in large numbers as medium-range missiles.37 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 The above indicates that China has made steady efforts to develop anti-satellite technologies as well as other technologies important for space warfare. China’s emerging integrated nuclear-space warfare strategy represents an important driver of its anti-satellite technologies. As put by various Chinese strategists, the ability to destroy space-based sensors, such as early warning satellites, will be vital for China to penetrate US missile defense. Therefore, an integrated nuclear-space warfare strategy indicates an important change to China’s nuclear doctrines. In essence, they represent China’sefforts to restore the strategic balance tilted by the rise of US defensive abilities. China’s new strategic capabilities 105 China’s indigenous missile defense capabilities While China has sought to counter US missile defense through an integrated nuclear-space warfare strategy, it has made additional doctrinal changes to its nuclear posture to ensure effective deterrence. These include China’sefforts to build an indigenous missile defense system, which has seen rapid progress in recent years. This effort by China to supplement its offensive nuclear capabilities with defensive ones represents a major change to its nuclear doctrine. For decades, China has been criticizing US missile defense for upsetting the existing balance of power and potentially weakening global stability. However, in recent years China has begun to pursue its own missile defense capabilities in order to ensure the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence. Interestingly, China attempted to build an indigenous missile defensive system during the 1960s and 1970s. According to recently released information, Mao Zedong met with Qian Qisen, the founder of China’s ballistic missile program in February 1964 to discuss China’s need for missile defense.38 This was motivated by the worsening relationship with the Soviet Union and China’s concerns for pre-emptive nuclear attacks by the two superpowers. The following effort by China was code-named Project 640, which involved both anti-missile interceptors and long-range early warning and tracking radar. The interceptor was code-named Fanji-1 (Counter Attack-1), which was a two-stage missile with semi-active radar guidance. According to the Chinese information, China twice tested Fanji-1 in August 1979 and achieved successful results. The PLA was satisfied with the results and planned to build China’s first anti-missile system around Beijing to defend against strategic attacks by other countries.39 In the meantime, China also developed the matching 7010 long-range early warning and tracking radar. The radar was successfully developed in 1976 and then deployed in Xuanhua of Hebei province, about 200 kilometers from Beijing. The radar, measuring 40x20 meters, had a detection range of 3000 kilometers. According to Chinese sources, on July 18, 1981 the radar successfully tracked a long-range Soviet rocket being tested in the Pacific Ocean and accurately identified its lunch and landing spots as well as its flight 40 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 range. However, Project 640 was canceled in March 1980 due to a combination of factors. First, the USA and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972, which put political pressure on China’s missile defense system. Second, by the early 1980s China had shifted its national focus from security to economic development. The post-Mao Chinese leadership made important changes in its assessments of the prospect of major wars and believed that the international environment of China was largely benign. This assessment motivated the Chinese leadership to downsize its military and freeze existing programs. 106 China’s new strategic capabilities The emergence of US defensive capabilities, however, has caused new Chinese assessments of potential threats to the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. As discussed in this chapter and the previous one, the steady maturing of a multi-layered US missile defense system has shifted China’s perception of the reliability of its nuclear deterrent. The result has been the revival of China’s own missile defense system. Recent evidence indicates that China has decided to modify its nuclear deterrence posture by supple- menting offense with defense. This effort, just like China’s new integrated nuclear-space warfare strategy, represents changes to China’s minimum deterrence doctrine, which has so far relied exclusively on a small offensive capability. On January 12, 2010 China made a surprise announcement that it had conducted a successful mid-course anti-missile test. This test proved that China was developing its own defensive capabilities to restore the strategic balance upset by US missile defense. Wu Tianfu, a strategist of the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps, outlined the motives of China’s missile defense test. He argued that China’s test was driven by “the imbalance between its offensive and defensive means” and it “was compelled by the situation.”41 According to him, “If a major Western country does not persist in developing a strategic missile defense system, then China absolutely has no need to conduct this anti-missile test.” Wu further stated that China’s anti-missile test “will be conducive to breaking the monopoly of missile defense technologies by advanced Western countries and for maintaining the strategic balance of the world.”42 Wang Mingzhi, a strategist at the PLA Air Force Command Academy, also emphasized the balancing motive of China’s own missile defense scheme. As he argued, “Missile defense concerns the strategic balance.” He suggested that the stability of the world is maintained by mutually assured destruction. However, “When one side has anti-missile capabilities, this strategic balance no longer exists. The side that possesses missile defense technologies then commands a position of superiority.”43 Wang claimed that although the official pretext of US missile defense emphasizes threats from rogue states:

The real intentions of the United States is to weaken the nuclear deter- Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 rents of China and Russia, and to ensure American strategic superiority. Although missile defense is a defensive system, it can weaken others’ nuclear deterrents, thereby improving one’s own deterrence capabilities. Therefore, from its conception to the present, missile defense has been an essential issue for strategic balance.44

Li Daguang of the PLA National Defense University also emphasized the balancing logic of China’s ﬁrst anti-missile test. Like Wu Tianfu, Li argued that China’s pursuit of missile defense is “compelled by the strategic imperatives.”45 According to him: China’s new strategic capabilities 107 To maintain the strategic balance, China once opposed the development and deployment of missile defense systems. However, the USA has been relentless in this regard. It not only possesses anti-missile systems but also proliferates them in the world, especially in the Asia Paciﬁc region. These have posed serious challenges to China’s limited nuclear deterrence capabilities and weakened its ability to safeguard national security. Facing this situation of some countries wielding both swords and shields, China was compelled to conduct its own anti-missile test.46

In the eyes of the PLA’s strategists, therefore, China has made adjustments to its nuclear deterrence doctrine out of the necessity to restore the broken strategic balance. Facing the rise of US defensive capabilities, China has to modify its minimum deterrence doctrine that has so far relied exclusively on a limited offensive capability to deter other countries. As the maturing and multilayered US missile defense system could seriously compromise the effectiveness of China’s limited offensive capabilities, the latter has to restore the balance by initiating its own defensive abilities. On January 27, 2013 China announced that it had successfully conducted its second mid-course anti-missile test. After this test, an unnamed expert of the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps was interviewed by the Chinese media and he claimed that China may have established “initial combat capabilities” for its missile defense.47 However, he emphasized that China still had a long way to go. In particular, China does not possess the ability to intercept multiple missile targets. It is also questionable that China’s missile defense can successfully intercept targets in war scenarios. Moreover, China lags far behind the USA in terms of early warning abilities and rapid response abilities. Chinese experts have extensively discussed the strategies for missile defense. Wang Wenchao points out there are three phases of a ballistic missile’s flight trajectory: the boost or ascending phase, the mid-course phase, and the terminal or re-entry phase.48 He argues that during the boost phase a missile’s engine and warhead are not yet separated and this creates a large signature for radar detection. However, other countries have little time to react during the boost phase of a missile launch, which lasts for only a few minutes. Therefore, the mid-course interception represents a more realistic option for Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 missile defense. As Wang suggests, “For intercontinental missiles, the flight time lasts between 30 and 40 minutes. The mid-course stage is about 20 minutes long, up to half an hour. This will give the defending country enough time to prepare the interception.”49 Wang Mingzhi of the PLA Air Force also emphasizes the importance of mid-course interception. He argues the middle part of a missile’s trajectory is “a steady and relatively long phase. This creates conducive conditions for its interception. Therefore, missile defense normally focuses on mid-course interceptions. If successful, the incoming missiles would be destroyed at a distance far away from a country’s territory.”50 In contrast, Wang points out 108 China’s new strategic capabilities that terminal interception is technologically challenging. According to him, the flight time for the re-entry stage lasts between 900 to 1500 seconds. Nonetheless, Chinese analyses also emphasize the importance of a multilayered missile defense system that should also incorporate terminal phase interception. One analysis suggests that China already possesses mature technologies for land-based terminal-phase missile defense. For example, China’s long-range air defense missile HQ-9 is capable of defending an area of 100 square kilometers at a height of 25–30 kilometers.51 Moreover, this analysis also recommends China to pursue sea-based missile defense systems. It suggests that China should copy the US Standard-3 series of mid-course interception system that is capable of a range of 500 kilometers and a height of 160 kilometers. The advantage of sea-based missile defense is its mobility, which provides the ability to intercept enemy missiles further away from a country’s territory.52 Chinese analysts believe that China’s successful mid-course interception tests prove that it is making significant progress toward a combat-ready missile defense system. As Wang Wenchao argued after the first Chinese test:

This test’s signiﬁcance is that we have achieved success with kinetic kill vehicle technologies. We can deploy them to the targeted area and accurately hit a warhead. The following challenges require us to build an early warning and tracking system. Then we will realize a full and complete mid-course interception system.53

Recent evidence indicates that China may have developed a new anti- ballistic missile interceptor called HQ-19 to enhance its defensive capabilities. According to the analysis by a Chinese military magazine, the HQ-19 missile is the equivalent of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THADD). It is designed to intercept ballistic missiles with a range of 3,000 kilometers or less.54 As this analysis suggests, while China has already deployed point-defense capabilities to intercept short-range ballistic missiles, it must also develop the capabilities to intercept medium-range missiles and satellites at an altitude of 80 kilometers and above.55 According to this analysis, the HQ-19 missile is designed for this purpose. Due to its similarity to THADD, the HQ-19 will allow China to become the second country in the world to Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 acquire high altitude terminal interception capabilities.56 Another Chinese analysis argues that the HQ-19 will form an important part of China’s emerging missile defense system. However, the analysis suggests that the HQ-19 missile will represent just one part of a three-tiered defensive system. According to this analysis, the first layer of defense concerns mid-course interceptions. This will be the core element of China’s defensive system. The reported DN-1 and DN-2 interceptors will form the backbone of China’s mid-course interception capabilities. The second layer of defense concerns high-altitude terminal interceptions and here the HQ-19 will play an important role. The last layer of defense involves low-altitude terminal China’s new strategic capabilities 109 defense and will rely on China’s HQ-9 missile, which is similar to the US PAC-3 system.57 According to this analysis, China’s successful mid-course interception test on January 13, 2013, involved a nascent missile defense system, which included the DN-1 interceptor launched from a test base in Inner Mongolia, a long- range early warning and tracking radar based in Xinjiang, and a secretly launched early-warning satellite.58 While China seems to have made significant progress with its missile defense capabilities, Chinese analyses agree that China is far away from an effective missile defense system. In particular, they point out the need of a space-based early warning system. Wang Xianghui, a professor of strategy at the Beijing Space and Aviation University, points out that a full missile defense system includes not only interceptors but also early warning, tracking, and command and control systems.59 Song Xiaojun, a military expert, thus suggests that the next step toward an operational missile defense system involves the development of early warning satellites. As he puts it, “Without our own early warning satellites, mid-course missile defense could not be realized.”60 According to Kanwa Defense Review, China is currently preparing to build a satellite-based early warning system against ballistic missiles. The initial plan is to deploy an early warning system composed of five satellites that use infrared technologies to provide 25–30 minutes of early warning against intercontinental ballistic missiles.61

China’s emerging nuclear posture and prospects for arms race These recent developments in China’s nuclear posture reveal the balance of power logics of structural realism. China has been pursuing new types of strategic capabilities to balance against the US advantages in missile defense. This pursuit represents China’s attempts to restore the strategic balance. While integrated nuclear-space warfare capabilities seek to penetrate the US missile defense, China’s indigenous missile defense program intends to complement its offensive nuclear capabilities with defensive ones. China’s nuclear posture is thus moving away from a single dimensional system toward a three dimensional one. Until recently, its nuclear posture has Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 been defined exclusively by a small offensive capability. While this offensive capability is expanding, China is also adding new dimensions of capabilities and these are space warfare and missile defense capabilities. The result of the above Chinese efforts will be the transformation of China’s nuclear posture from a one-dimensional system that is based purely on a small offensive capability toward a three-dimensional one that also incorporates space warfare and missile defense capabilities. However, China’s counter-balancing efforts, as expected outcomes of structural realism, may lead to further US attempts to bolster its missile defense. Indeed, China’s military space program has further intensified the 110 China’s new strategic capabilities security dilemma between the two countries and may cause new arms races between US missile defense and Chinese countermeasures. Many American experts see China’s military space program, which is partly motivated by concerns for its nuclear deterrents, as one of the most significant revisionist elements in China’s security strategy. For example, Christopher Griffin and Joseph Lin argue that since “the militarization of space inspires the most revisionist elements of the Chinese strategy,” the USA must prepare to win the space arms race.62 As Johnson-Freese points out:

There are some in the United States with a “bring it on” attitude toward a space arms race. These advocates seem to believe that the United States can outspend China, forcing the People’s Republic into a spending race reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s doomed attempt to compete with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).63

In particular, after China’s 2007 ASAT experiment, Republican Senator Jon Kyl called for immediate funding for a space-based missile defense test bed for both kinetic and directed-energy weapons to destroy missiles in their boost phase.64 In fact, an arms race in outer space could be accelerating. In April 2014, Chinese leader Xi Jinping called for the establishment of an air force that possesses integrated air-space capabilities.65 According to a Chinese analysis, Xi’s open call for the development of space warfare capabilities should imply a more aggressive Chinese strategy in this area. In fact, the analysis compares Xi’s bolder approach toward space warfare with that of his predecessor Hu Jintao, who specifically said in 2009 that China would not pursue the “weaponization of space.”66 If China did indeed pursue more aggressive strategies for its space warfare capabilities, an arms race with the USA in outer space could become inevitable. With an arms race increasingly likely between China and the USA, more dialogue is needed to reduce their mutual concerns. According to Joan Johnson- Freese, for China and the USA to limit the impact of the security dilemma, “Better strategic communication is required to prevent history from repeating itself… Misunderstandings are better avoided through direct communications than inferences and speculations based on sometimes less than credible Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 sources.”67 She also points out that the USA “must decide what message it wants to send to China and other countries about space, and do so clearly and consistently. The effort would be very useful in alleviating the security dilemma.”68 Since the nuclear security dilemma also has its roots in US missile defense, the USA must take measures to address China’s concerns for its strategic nuclear deterrence. If so, China could lose the incentives to integrate its nuclear and space warfare capabilities. Joan Johnson-Freese and Thomas Nichols suggest that the USA needs to limit its national missile defense (NMD) system. They argue that while the US should continue to develop its theatre missile China’s new strategic capabilities 111 defense (TMD) capabilities to protect American troops on the battlefield, “rejecting a larger NMD system designed to protect the United States is a signal, however tenuous, that Washington is not trying to steal a march on the Chinese by suppressing its nuclear deterrent.”69

Notes 1 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 191. 2 Ling Yongshun, Wuqi zhongbei di xinxi hua (The Digitization of Weapons) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2006), p. 363. 3 For further Chinese discussions on the US quest for “absolute security,” see Wu Qin, “Ri mei fan dao hezuo kuaibu qianjin” (Japan–US Missile Defense on a Fast Track), Xiandai junshi, March 2008, pp. 17–20. 4 Andrew H. Kidd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 5 For a report on General Xu Qiliang’s statement on the militarization of space, see Kathrin Hille, “China Chief Foresees Military Space Race,” The Financial Times, November 4, 2009. For General Kevin Chilton’s response, see “China’s Military Making Strides in Space: US General,” Agence France-Presse, November 3, 2009, at www.spacewar.com/reports/chinas_military_making_strides_in_space_us_general_ 999.html. 6 For Chinese views on space warfare and the revolution in military aﬀairs, see Cai Fengzhen, Kong tian yiti zuozhan xue (Doctrines for Integrated Air-Space Warfare) (Beijing: Jiefanjun chubanshe, 2006). 7 Ashley J. Tellis, “China’s Military Space Strategy,” Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Autumn 2007), pp. 44–45. 8 Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France, “The Chinese Threat to U.S. Space Superiority,” High Frontier, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005), pp. 18–23. 9 Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), p. 58. 10 Michael R. Gordon and David. S. Cloud, “US Knew of China’s Missile Test, But Kept Silent,” New York Times, April 23, 2007. 11 Xu Hezhen, Zuozhan fangshi di geming xing bianhua (Revolutionary Changes in Combat) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2004), p. 249. 12 Ling Yongshun, Wuqi zhongbei di xinxi hua (The Digitization of Weapons) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2006), p. 363. 13 For more information on the congressional decision, see Bill Gertz, “Space-Based Defense,” Washington Times, October 16, 2008, at www.washingtontimes.com/news/

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 2008/oct/16/inside-the-ring. 14 Wu Qin, “Xingqiou dazhan juantu chonglai” (The Return of Star Wars), Xindai junshi, February 2009, pp. 38–42; Li Daguang, “Meiguo xingqiou dazhan jian zhi zhongguo zhankai yichang xin lengzhan” (The Sword of US Space War Plan Points Toward China and Indicates a New Cold War), October 21, 2008, at http:// world.huangiu.com/roll/2008-10/258122.html. 15 For this interview, see Binggong keji, “Zhuanjia xitan dandao daodan di dantou” (Expert’s Analysis of Ballistic Missile Warheads), October 2008, p. 23. 16 See Huanqiu shibao, “Er pao zhuanjia jinggao mei peshi zhongguo jingxing taikong junbei jingsai” (Expert from the Second Artillery: The United States Is For- cing China to Engage in a Space Arms Race), June 3, 2008, at http://mil.huanqiu. com/china/2008-06/130647.html. 112 China’s new strategic capabilities 17 For an official biography of Wu Tianfu, see Guangming ribao, “He zhanlue lilun zhuanjia wu tianfu di tansuo guiji” (The Path of Nuclear Deterrence Expert Wu Tianfu), August 30, 2006. 18 Shen Dingli, “China’s Defensive Military Strategy: The Space Question,” Survival, Vol. 50, No. 1 (February–March 2008), p. 174. 19 Hou Xiaohe and Zhang Hui, Meiguo daodang fangyu jihua toushi (An Analysis of US Missile Defense) (Beijing: Zhongguo minhang chubanshe, 2001), p. 255. 20 Ibid., p. 299. 21 Ge Dongsheng, “Yi fazhan hangtian liliang wei tupokou, tuijin wuo jun xinxihua jianshe, wei weihu guojia fazhan zhongjiao jiyu qi tigong anquan baozhang” (Developing a Space Capability to Promote Military Digitization and to Provide Security Protection for National Development), in Ba Zhongyan, ed., Zhanlue jiyu qi di bawuo he liyong (Seizing and Utilizing the Strategic Opportunity Period) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2006), p. 22. 22 Tang Zhicheng, “Weiguo dong ya fandao dixi zhongguo pojie zhi ce” (China’s Strategies to Defeat US Missile Defense in East Asia), Xiandai bingqi, September 2012, p. 50. 23 Joan Johnson-Freese and Thomas Nichols, “Space, Stability and Nuclear Strategy: Rethinking Missile Defense,” China Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2010), pp. 14–15. 24 This interview was reported in Binggong keji, “Fan weixing wuqi zongheng tan” (Anti-Satellite Weapons), August 2013, p. 14. 25 For this test and the comment by the US official, see Andrea Shalal-Esa, “US Sees China Launch as Test of Anti-Satellite Muscle: Source,” Reuters, May 15, 2013, at www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/15/us-china-launch-idUSBRE94E07D20130 515. 26 See “Meiti cheng zhongguo DN-2 daodan jiang jubei cuihui mei GPS weixing nengli” (Media Claims that China’s DN-2 Missile Will Be Capable of Destroying US GPS Satellites), May 25, 2013, at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2013-05-25/ 0905725830.html. 27 See Nanfang ribao, “Zhongguo ni juxing di san ci fan weixing shiyan” (China Is Thought to Have Conducted Its Third Anti-Satellite Test, Using a DN-2 Missile), May 14, 2013, at http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2013-05-14-/110327116342.shtml. 28 Brian Weeden, “Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian Anti- satellite Testing in Space,” March 17, 2004, Secure World Foundation, at www. thespacereview.com/article/2473/1. 29 Ibid., p. 1. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., p. 12. 32 For these quotes, see Bill Gertz, “China Testing New Space Weapons,” October 2, 2013, at http://freebeacon.com/china-testing-new-space-weapons. 33 Quoted in ibid. 34 See Gregory Kulacki, “Kuaizhou Challenges US Perceptions of Chinese Military Space Strategy,” September 27, 2013, at http://allthingsnuclear.org/kuaizhou-chal Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 lenges-u-s-perceptions-of-chinese-military-space-strategy. 35 See Qianjiang wanbao, “Zhongguo kuaizhou ganchao meiguo huo nengxiang DF- 31A jidong fashe” (China’s Kuaizhou Catching Up with the US: Could Be Mobile Launched Like the DF-31A), October 1, 2013, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/ 2013-10/4412275.html. 36 Ibid. 37 See “Jiexi kuaizhou huojian yiyi weixing huo xiang daodan ban daliang bushu” (An Analysis of the Significances of Kuaizhou Rockets: Satellites Could Be Deployed in Large Numbers Like Missiles), January 22, 2014, at http://mil.news. sina.com.cn/2014-01-22/1104761249.html. 38 See Bingguo keji, “640 gongcheng zhongguo fandao shiyan zaoqi tansuo” (Project 640: China’s Early Exploration Into Anti-Missile Tests), March 2010, p. 19. China’s new strategic capabilities 113 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., p. 20. 41 Wu Tianfu, “Zhongguo fandao lanjie jishu shiyan jiedu” (An Explanation of China’s Anti-Missile Test), Liaowang xinwen zhoukan, No. 3 (January 18, 2010), at http://lw.xinhuanet.com/htm/content-5340.htm. 42 Ibid. 43 Wang Mingzhi, “Zhongduan fandao shiyan di zhanlue hanyi” (The Strategic Implications of the Mid-Course Anti-Missile Test), Bingqi zhishi, No. 3b (2010), p. 10. 44 Ibid., p. 11. 45 Li Daguang, “Zhongguo fandao chushi fengmang” (China’s Missile Defense Makes Its Debut), Huanqiu junshi, No. 2 (2010), p. 7. 46 Ibid. 47 See Huanqiu shibao, “Er pao zhuanjia: zhongguo fandao chuju zhanli zhongmei chaju reng henda” (Expert of the Second Artillery: China’s Missile Defense Achieving Initial Combat Capabilities, Still a Big Gap with the USA), January 29, 2013, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2013-01/3593756.html. 48 This interview was published in Dong Shihong, “Zhuzhao zhongguo tiantun, zhongguo luji zhongduan fandao lanjie shiyan shendu fenxi” (Building China’s Space Shied: An In-depth Analysis of China’s Land-based Mid-Course Anti-Missile Test), Binggong keji, March 2010, p. 10. 49 Ibid., p. 11. 50 Wang Mingzhi, “The Strategic Implications of the Anti-Missile Test,” p. 11. 51 Dong Feng, “Zhongguo yeyou NMD, jiemi zhongguo daodan fangyu xitong” (China Also Has Its NMD: Unveiling China’s Missile Defense System), Binggong keji, June 2011, pp. 16–17. 52 Ibid., p. 20. 53 In Dong Shihong, “Building China’s Space Shied: An In-depth Analysis of China’s Land-based Mid-Course Anti-Missile Test,” p. 18. 54 Nie Mo, “Hongqi 19 zhongguo di THAAD?” (HQ-19: China’s THAAD?), Jianchuan zhishi, April 2014, p. 55. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid., p. 58. 57 See “Jiemi zhongguo di fandao xitong he fazhan hongqi 19 cheng zhuli” (Uncovering the Development of China’s Missile Defense System, HQ-19 Missile to Become Its Backbone), February 13, 2014, at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2014- 02-13/1659764116.html. 58 Ibid. 59 See “Zhuanjia reyi zhongguo fandao shiyan: xia yibu is yujing weixing” (Experts Discussing China’s Anti-Missile Test; the Next Step Will Be Early Warning Satel- lites), Caijing ribao, January 13, 2013, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2010- 01/686960.html. 60 Ibid. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 61 This report by Kanwa Defense Review was reported in “Zhongguo yanfa daqiceng wai lanjieqi fandao maixiang quanqiou yujing” (China Developing Extra- atmospheric Interceptors, Missile Defense Marching Toward Global Early Warning), October 4, 2013, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2013-10/04/c_125482172.htm. 62 Christopher Griffin and Joseph E. Lin, “China’s Space Ambition,” Armed Forces Journal, April 28, 2007, at http://www.afji.com/2008/04/3406827. 63 Joan Johnson-Freese, “US Plans for Space Security,” in John M. Logsdon and James Clay Moltz, eds, Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives (Washington, DC: Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, 2008), p. 106. 64 See ibid. 65 See Xinjingbao, “Xi Jinping jian kongtian yiti gongfang jianbei di kongjun” (Xi Jinping: Building an Air Force that Possesses Integrated Air-Space Capabilities as 114 China’s new strategic capabilities well as Both Offensive and Defensive Capabilities), April 15, 2014, at www.bjnews/ com.cn/news/2014/04/15/312988.html. 66 See Nanning wanbao, “Zhongguo fazhan kongtian yitizhan shi jueding weilai zhanzheng shengfu shou” (China’s Development of Integrated Air-Space Capabilities Will Decide Victory or Defeat in Future Wars), April 22, 2014. This report is available at http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2014-04/4977336.html. 67 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 240. 68 Ibid., p. 243. 69 Joan Johnson-Freese and Thomas Nichols, “Space, Stability and Nuclear Strategy: Rethinking Missile Defense,” China Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2010), p. 16. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 5 Balance of threat and China’s changing NFU policy

While the previous two chapters analyzed China’s evolving nuclear capabilities as a consequence of its balance of power behaviors, this chapter discusses changes in its nuclear doctrines, in particular the no-first-use policy, to balance external threats. The no-first-use policy has been the cornerstone of China’s nuclear doctrines ever since it first successfully tested an atomic bomb in 1963. However, Chapter 2 suggests that this policy has been actively debated since the 1980s, when some Chinese strategists explored the role of nuclear weapons in deterring both nuclear and conventional wars. Major General Zhu Chenghu’s 2005 comments on China using nuclear weapons to fight the USA in a Taiwan Strait war scenario rekindled the debate on the no-first-use policy. As argued by Chinese nuclear experts such as Shen Dingli and Peng Guangqian, China’s no-first-use policy puts its national security at a grave disadvantage when facing conventionally superior adversaries. Zhu Mingquan shows that some Chinese nuclear experts, including Wu Tianfu of the PLA Second Artillery Corps, suggest that China should adopt a conditional no-first-use policy. Chapter 2 also outlines the new approaches of the 2013 version of The Science of Military Strategy (SMS) which suggests that effective deterrence of crisis escalation has become the central national security objective of China. To prevent crises from escalating into wars, the SMS assigns the key deterrence role to China’s nuclear forces. This chapter argues that the East China Sea crisis between China and Japan, which began in the second half of 2012, has offered an important opportunity to analyze Beijing’s nuclear deterrence-related behaviors, including Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 its commitment to the no-first-use policy. It suggests that evidence indicates that China has exercised implicit or tacit nuclear deterrence to prevent crisis escalation and the outbreak of war in the East China Sea. In effect, China has modified its no-first-use policy. In this crisis China has perceived significant prospects of crisis escalation, leading to a war scenario between the two countries. Its tacit nuclear deterrence has been designed to deter this scenario. In fact, China’s nuclear deterrence activities represent balance of threat behaviors. In contrast, China’s modernization and expansion of its nuclear forces are mainly driven by its balance of power motives in the context of the Sino–US strategic relationship. 116 China’s changing NFU policy This chapter first provides an overview of China–Japan relations in recent decades. It then outlines the process that led to the East China Sea crisis of 2012. The chapter then examines China’s threat perceptions and its assessments of the prospect of war. The changing global distribution of power, in particular the relative decline of the USA, has deepened China’s concerns about regional stability. Many believe that while the USA has pursued a strategy of using Japan to balance China, Japan is taking advantage of the end of unipolarity to pursue a revisionist foreign policy. Even worse, Chinese strategists believe that Japan could choose to escalate the East China Sea crisis into war due to its preventive or preemptive war motives. In this context of intensifying Chinese threat perceptions and genuine concerns regarding the prospect of war, China chose to exercise implicit nuclear deterrence to deter Japan’s possible escalation of crisis into war. The chapter then discusses various Chinese nuclear signaling measures that amount to a tacit exercise of nuclear deterrence to deter Japan’s war motives. These efforts range from strategic missile tests, implicit and explicit comments of possible use of nuclear weapons by various PLA and civilian figures, and high-profile announcements of the latest developments with China’s nuclear capabilities. In fact, these tacit nuclear deterrence measures are totally consistent with the deterrence strategies and practices outlined in important PLA publications such as The Science of Military Strategy. This chapter therefore suggests that the omission of the no-first-use policy in the 2013 Defense White Paper was no fluke. It reflected important modifications of China’s nuclear doctrine as an outcome of its balance of threat behavior in a fast changing world.

China–Japan relations: from cooperation to conflict The troubled relations between China and Japan reflect a confluence of historical animosities, strategic mistrust, and territorial disputes. The last issue evolves around disputes over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands (Chinese name) or Senkaku Islands (Japanese name). While this dispute represents a long unresolved issue between the two countries, for many decades the controversy was effectively managed by China’s tacit acceptance of Japan’s administrative control over the island. In recent years, however, China’s rise Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 has redefined the dynamics of its relations with Japan and the island dispute has become the focal point of an increasingly tense bilateral relationship. In the end, the island dispute turned into a major diplomatic crisis in the second half of 2012, indeed pushing the two countries to the brink of war. During the Cold War, China and Japan normalized their relations in September 1972. Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai held negotiations on a wide range of issues such as the official termination of the state of war between the two countries, China for- saking the right to demand war reparations, and Japan severing its official relations with Taiwan. The two sides issued the China–Japan Joint Statement China’s changing NFU policy 117 to establish full diplomatic relations between the two countries.1 In 1979, the two countries furthered their relations by signing the 1979 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China, which obligates the parties to forsake the use of force in resolving disputes. Accord- ing to Liang Yunxiang, a Chinese expert on Japan at Peking University, the bilateral relationship entered its honeymoon period during the 1980s, which was characterized by extensive diplomatic, economic, cultural, and societal exchanges. Japan provided large-scale official development assistance to China, which amounted to more than 30 billion US dollars of long-term low interest loans as well as technological assistance.2 However, after the end of the Cold War, Sino–Japanese relations began to encounter increasing tensions. According to Liang, China’s economic rise and the removal of the Soviet Union as a common security threat began to sow the seeds of mounting friction between the two countries. As Liang sees it, during the 1990s both China and Japan began to change their national trajectories in the international system. While China’s miraculous rise started to catch the attention of the world, Japan began to seek greater diplomatic and political influences on the world stage. This “twin rise” by both China and Japan led to mounting mistrust between the two countries. On the one hand, China’s rising power, both economic and military, seemed to pose long-term threats to Japan. On the other hand, Japan’s quest for the status of a “normal state” worried China with regard to changing regional stability. In particular, Liang suggests that the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, during which China fired ballistic missiles near Taiwan to deter its separatist tendency, caused increasing Japanese concerns regarding Beijing’s long-term security intentions. This concern led Japan to strengthen its military alliance with the USA, which in turn triggered Chinese worries over the containment motives behind the alliance.3 Huang Dahui, a Japan expert at Renmin University, also emphasizes the effects of China’s economic rise and Japan’s quest to be a normal state on their bilateral relations. As he points out, China’s rise “will inevitably cause concerns among the neighboring countries, especially Japan.”4 In fact, as Huang argues, “Japan is the instigator of the ‘China threat’ thesis. This perspective became popular after the end of the Cold War. This is due to the fact that China’s rapid rise has vastly exceeded the expectations of Japan.”5 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 According to Huang, due to China’s rise, East Asia has entered a new era characterized by the co-existence of two powerful states, which is a historical anomaly. Before the Meiji reform of Japan, China had long been the dominating power in the region. After Japan’s defeat of China in the 1884–85 war and Russia in 1904–05, Japan became the dominating power. As Huang argues, China’s rise in recent decades has led to a new regional bipolar system. This structural change, however, has caused increasing strategic mistrust and rivalry between China and Japan.6 In addition, China and Japan began to see rising conflicts over history issues and territorial issues. In 1996 Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro 118 China’s changing NFU policy Hashimoto visited the controversial Yasukuni shrine and this act caused strong criticism from the Chinese government. After Junichiro Koizumi was elected prime minister in 2001, he paid six visits to the shrine, often in open defiance of protests from China and South Korea. In 2001 and 2004 Tokyo also caused controversies with China and South Korea due to the revisionist history textbooks introduced into Japan’s public schools. The shrine and history textbook issues pushed Sino–Japanese relations into a downward spiral, causing a series of large-scale anti-Japanese protests in China in the spring of 2005.7 On top of the history issues, China and Japan began to experience rising territorial conflicts in the East China Sea. Starting in the late 1990s, both countries began to explore offshore oil and natural gas in the East China Sea. However, they had overlapping claims over rights and jurisdictions. One particular dispute concerned China’s Chunxiao natural gas field. Japan claimed that this exploratory site violated Japan’s due rights in the same area.8 According to Liang, starting in the second half of the 1990s, the bilateral relations between China and Japan began to “demonstrate structural conflicts.”9 These conflicts concern strategic mistrust, historical animosities, and territorial disputes. Ironically, the sovereignty dispute over the contested Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands was not particularly prominent during the post- 1990s period. The reason dated back to the Chinese formula regarding the dispute. As widely agreed among China’s experts on Japan, during the negotiations over the Sino–Japanese peace treaty of 1979, the then Chinese great leader Deng Xiaoping adopted the “shelving” strategy to resolve the contested sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. According to this formula, while China insists on its sovereignty claim, it tacitly accepts Japan’s administrative control over the island. Deng said that if the dispute could not be resolved, then the two countries should postpone the issue to future generations. Moreover, the two countries could pursue joint development of the undersea resources, such as oil, to promote cooperation and peaceful settle- ment of disputes.10 This Chinese formula for the island dispute, according to Chinese analyses, has contributed to the relative stability of the issue since the 1970s. While Sino–Japanese relations went into a downward spiral during the Koizumi period, the election of Abe Shinzo as Japan’s prime minister in 2006 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 created momentum for a renewal of cooperation. Soon after his election as the prime minister, Abe visited China in October 2006 on an “ice breaking” trip to seek a restoration of the badly damaged relations between the two countries. He indicated that he would not visit the controversial Yasukuni shrine and proposed to build a “mutually beneficial strategic relationship” with China.11 In return, in April 2007, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao paid an “ice melting” visit to Japan. He and Abe reached broad agreement on the contents of a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.” The two sides decided to take measures to promote mutual trust, deepen dialogs between the respective governments, political parties, and China’s changing NFU policy 119 parliaments, expand cooperation in areas such as energy, environment, finance, and intellectual property rights, and promote exchanges between the two people.12 Moreover, China made important concessions to improve its relations with Japan. For example, it accepted Japan’s proposal to pursue joint history projects to narrow the different historical perspectives of the two countries. Many Japanese believe that China’s strong anti-Japan tradition is partly due to the nationalist history perspectives of the ruling Communist Party, which exaggerate Japan’s war time crimes against the Chinese people. Therefore, during Shinzo Abe’s October 2006 Beijing visit, he proposed to set up a joint history project to allow historians of both countries to explore sensitive historical issues. The Chinese government, which has often criticized Japan’s positions on history issues, accepted this proposal as a concession to Tokyo. In December 2006, the China–Japan Joint History Commission, which was composed of historians from both countries, met for the first time in Beijing.13 In addition, China also made concessions for East China Sea territorial disputes. To manage its conflicts with Japan over oil and natural gas explorations in the East China Sea, China agreed to freeze its own activities at the contested Chuanxiao natural gas field. Beijing and Tokyo signed a bilateral agreement on June 18, 2008 that effectively represented a concession by China. Although the official Chinese announcement of this agreement was vague and terse, a later analysis by Yu Zhirong, a former high-ranking official of the China Maritime Surveillance Authority, revealed that China in effect suspended its own activities at Chunxiao natural gas field.14 The above measures taken by both Japan and China after 2005 began to restore the bilateral relationship. In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan won the election and Yukio Hatoyama became Japan’s prime minister. He began to re-orient Japan’s post-war foreign policy posture that had relied on its bilateral alliance with the USA as the cornerstone of its national security. According to Hatoyama, Japan should re-emphasize its Asian identity and seek to promote its national interests through further integration with other Asian countries including China. Indeed, building an East Asian Community constituted a key objective of Hatoyama’s foreign policy and in fact was his main strategy to resolve the security mistrust among Asian countries.15 By shifting Japan’s post-war foreign and security posture away from the Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 USA, many in Washington were gravely concerned.16 In contrast, Hatoyama’s new grand strategy led to optimistic views in China that he could move Sino–Japanese relations away from mutual mistrust and security rivalry toward common interests and cooperation.17

The crisis over Japan’s 2012 island nationalization While the post-2006 relationship between China and Japan seemed to have steadily improved, largely due to efforts by both countries, the momentum was suddenly and gravely reversed by a singular event in September 2010, 120 China’s changing NFU policy which then fundamentally changed the course of direction of China–Japan relations. On the morning of September 7, 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats in disputed waters near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The captain, named Zhan Qixiong, was arrested by Japan for obstruction of the performance of a public duty and illegal fishing.18 The captain and the crew were then transferred to Ishigaki Island of Japan for detention. The Chinese government quickly lodged a strong protest and demanded that Japan immediately release the ship and its crew.19 In fact, China summoned Japanese ambassador Uichiro Niwa six times. The fishing boat and the crew were released on September 13, 2010. However, Japan not only kept the captain in detention but further extended the detention by ten days on September 19. This act by Japan led to a major escalation of Chinese counter measures. On September 20, China detained four Japanese employees of Fujita Cor- poration for illegally entering a military area near the city of Shijiazhuang.20 In addition, China suspended the export of rare earth elements to Japan, a key raw material for Japanese high-technology industries.21 On September 22, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, while attending a meeting of the United Nations in New York, issued an angry and sternly worded warning to Japan, promising further retaliations if the captain was not released.22 Large-scale anti-Japan demonstrations also took place in multiple Chinese cities.23 The Japanese government, under pressure from China, decided to release the captain on September 24, 2010. While Japan’smoveofficially ended this major diplomatic row with China, the incident generated lasting and irreversible damage to the relations between the two countries. Most importantly, it began to shift the dynamics of Japan’s China policy as well as its security policies regarding the disputed Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands. China’s high-handed approach during the crisis further contributed to the rising concerns among the Japanese security community about Beijing’s long-term intentions in the East China Sea. These concerns included both China’s naval ambitions in the area and its plan for the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. The 2010 fishing boat incident thus gravely deepened Japanese concerns and changed the course of the bilateral relations between China and Japan. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Specifically, the legacy of the fishing boat incident set the stage for a much bigger crisis regarding the disputed islands exactly two years later. Japan began to reassess the strategic situation in the East China Sea and started to take precautionary measures to hedge against Chinese efforts to undermine its de facto control over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. For example, the National Institute for Defense Studies, which is affiliated with the Ministry of National Defense, in its 2011 East Asian Strategic Review criticized China for moving toward a “less cooperative, more assertive posture.”24 In particular, the report used the Chinese navy’s increasing activities around the first island chain as examples of an assertive China.25 The report also quoted several incidents of China’s changing NFU policy 121 Chinese military planes and vessels operating dangerously against Japanese ships that were tracking them. Japanese concerns about China’s naval threats led to the 2010 National Defense Policy Guideline that asked for refocusing of Japan’s military capabilities to the defense of the small islands in the southern Nansei chain that stretches from Japan’s main islands toward Taiwan. According to Jun Azumi, senior vice-minister of defense, “The biggest change from previous guidelines will be the shift from north to south. Strengthening defense in the Nansei area is going to be a major pillar.”26 Kunihiko Miyake, a security expert at the Canon Global Institute, argued that the fishing boat incident “helped generate the political will to overcome institutional resistance to change” from within the Japanese defense establishment.27 It is in this context of Japan’s rising concerns about the Chinese threats in the East China Sea that the disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands began to escalate. In April 2012, the nationalist Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara proposed to buy Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from its private owner as a measure to better protect it from Chinese threats.28 This move by Ishihara set in motion a chain of reactions that led to a major crisis between China and Japan later that year that brought them to the brink of war. While China protested the proposed island purchase by Ishihara’sTokyo metropolitan government, the Japanese government also sought to contain the damage caused by this initiative. In the summer of 2012, the Democratic Party of Japan government under Yoshihiko Noda decided to pre-empt Ishihara’s move by nationalizing the islands.29 However, China did not accept this rationale for nationalization of the disputed islands. During a brief meeting on September 9 between Chinese President Hu Jintao and Noda at the APEC summit meeting in Vladivostok, Russia, Hu sternly warned Noda not to proceed with the nationalization plan.30 However, Noda’s government ignored China’s protest and the potential consequences of nationalization. On September 11, the Japanese cabinet officially approved the purchase of the islands from their private owners for nearly US$30 million. The Chinese government reacted strongly. A statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the purchase of the island by the Japanese government “cannot alter the fact the Japanese stole the islands from China.”31 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Most importantly, China did not stop with words. On September 14, China dispatched six ships of China Maritime Surveillance to enter the Japanese claimed territorial water.32 This act by China was designed to challenge Japan’s de facto control over the island since 1970, when the USA, amid protests from both China and Taiwan, transferred the right of administrative control of these islands to Japan. Until the Japanese nationalization of the islands, China had consistently respected Japan’s de facto control over the area due to Deng Xiaoping’s formula for this difficult issue between the two countries. Now, as Japan had defied China’s protests against their nationalization, Beijing felt no 122 China’s changing NFU policy longer bound by the formula. Since September 14, 2012, China has regularly intruded into the Japanese claimed territorial waters around the islands. It is widely reported that the above forceful Chinese response was coordinated by Xi Jinping, then the designated heir to the top Chinese leadership position. He was supposed to take over the reigns from Hu Jintao at the end of 2012. Chinese sources claim that in the summer of 2012 Xi was given the charge of leading the “Diaoyu Islands Response Group” to “manage the crisis, defend sovereignty, and initiate diplomatic struggles.”33 It is reported that Xi issued a guideline for the Chinese response to Japan’s island nationalization that are summarized in 16 Chinese characters. Xi proposed a comprehensive approach that did not rule out the possibility of war.34 The above guideline suggests that the Chinese leadership sees war as a distinct possibility in relation to the East China Sea crisis. In fact, the following section indicates that China has serious concerns regarding the prospect of crisis escalation and an ensuing war with Japan. China perceives Japan’s preventive and preemptive war motives as likely to escalate the crisis. In this context of genuine Chinese fears of war, it has initiated a wide spectrum of deterrence activities to prevent crisis escalation. Among them has been China’s implicit exercise of nuclear deterrence. China’s deterrence behaviors since 2012 have been completely consistent with the guidelines set by the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, which emphasizes the vital importance of crisis management and the prevention of wars.

China’s threat perceptions and assessments of the prospect of war The escalating crisis between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands inevitably raises the question of whether military conflicts could be an outcome. Chinese strategic thinkers certainly have not ruled out such a possibility. In fact, they believe there are realistic possibilities of the crisis escalating into military conflicts with Japan. China’s perceptions of the issue are shaped by its understanding of the motives of Japan in both strategic and operational contexts. Specifically, Chinese strategic thinkers believe that Japan, due to either preventive or preemptive war motives, may choose to escalate the crisis into military conflicts. Moreover, they also believe that domestic politics, especially Japan’s recent shift towards a nationalist direc- Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 tion, also generate powerful incentives for it to choose war over peace. Finally, some of the Japanese assessments of China–Japan military balance of power resulted in optimistic predictions of victories for Japan. These optimistic Japanese assessments caused concerns among Chinese strategists. However, before this section examines the above issues, it will first analyze China’s broader threat perceptions in the context of the changing structure of global power distribution. In general, Chinese strategists believe that the changing polarity of the world has increased the uncertainties facing China. Its spectacular rise and the waning of the unipolar system have motivated the USA to shift toward a containment-oriented China policy.35 Many Chinese China’s changing NFU policy 123 believe that the Obama administration’s strategic rebalancing initiative reflects such a change in the China policy of the USA. As argued by Zhang Yunling, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “The US return to Asia has a clear target, which is the rising China. The goal is to prevent China from dominating Asia and the Asia Pacific region.”36 Major General Luo Yuan suggests that the US pivot is designed to “change the momentum of the Asia Pacific region in order to contain the rise of China” with the ultimate goal of “maintaining its hegemonic position in the region and prevent the rise of a regional system that excludes the United States.”37 According to Chinese analysts, while the USA intends to shift a greater percentage of its military resources to Asia Pacific, it also seeks to contain the rise of China by strengthening its alliances in the region. In particular, Chinese strategists believe that the US has given a greater role to Japan in regard to maintaining the existing balance of power in the region. For example, Peng Guangqian of the PLA argues that the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands is:

Essentially a contest between China and the United States. The rising saliency of the island issue is due to the shift of the US strategic focus toward the Asia Paciﬁc region. Ishihara saw the opportunity from this macro development. For Japan, the US strategic shift is an opportunity. The US is also willing to let Japan out of the cage to contain China.38

Yu Zhirong, a Chinese expert on maritime strategy, also suggests that the USA has deliberately provoked a dispute between China and Japan to strengthen its position in the Asia Pacific region. The dispute can be traced back to the US decision to hand over the right to administer the island to Japan in the early 1970s with the aim of sowing a long-term seed of conflict between China and Japan. As he points out, “The China–Japan island sovereignty dispute is dictated by the United States. Its goal is to let China and Japan quarrel with each other short of a fight. This situation will allow the United States to gain the greatest benefit.”39 According to Yang Yunzhong, a PLA strategist:

The United States is the instigator of the redrawing of the security map of East Asia. To prevent the rise of China, Japan’s position in the US game Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 plan for East Asia has been rapidly elevated. It has become a pillar of the US return to the Asia Paciﬁc region and a hit man in fact. Due to its domestic troubles and relative decline, the US has been removing the constraints on Japan in order to use it to balance China. This is highly dangerous to our country, Asia, and even the whole world.40

Therefore, as Chinese strategists see it, the end of the unipolar era and the rise of a new multipolar system have underlined the dynamics behind the US adoption of a containment posture toward China. The same dynamics also explain the strengthening of the US–Japan alliance and Washington’s support 124 China’s changing NFU policy for Japan to play a greater role in the security affairs of Asia Pacific. There- fore, the narrowing of the power gap between China and the USA and the broader change in the polarity of the international system have redefined China’s security environment through Japan’s re-emergence as a key security player in the region. This Chinese understanding of the dynamics of an emerging multipolar system has profoundly intensified its threat perceptions and its sense of insecurity. Indeed, what is truly worrisome for China’s security experts has been Japan’s turn toward the nationalist direction in recent years. They believe that Japan has been taking advantage of the US pivot to accelerate its quest for the status of a “normal state.” In particular, China worries about the rise of nationalism in Japanese politics and increasing influence by right-wing political forces. Chinese strategists suggest that these developments have been pushing Japan toward an aggressive posture. They point out that Japan has been using the US strategic rebalancing and the so-called “China threat” to rebuild its war machine. As one analysis by the PLA strategists suggests, “Japan’s 1947 Peace Constitution was designed to constrain the revival of militarism and prevent Japan re-embarking on the road of external expansion. It has played important roles in these regards. However, Japan has never given up its dream of becoming a political great power buttressed by a powerful military.”41 According to this analysis, “A constitutional revision, which is pushed by right wing forces, is about to be launched and will be irreversible.”42 In fact, “Recent signals indicate that due to political dominance by the right wing forces, Japan’s post-war defense posture and even its grand strategy are at a major turning point.”43 Chinese analysts also worry that Japan is using the threat from China as a pretext to re-vamp its military. As they see it, the Japanese government’s recent defense guidelines intend to vastly expand Japan’s military capabilities in the name of balancing China’s threat. As one PLA study points out, “If these plans get implemented, Japan’s military capability will far exceeded the need of self-defense and will acquire an offensive posture. A Japanese military arming to the teeth will once again let the world’s peace-loving people see the shadow of militarism.”44 Japan’s recent efforts to revise its 1947 Peace Constitution have caused deep concerns among Chinese security experts. According to Liu Qiang, Director Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 of the Center on International Security at the PLA Institute of International Relations, Japan’s constitutional revision is to “turn the self-defense force into a regular military with missions similar to the militaries of other countries.” He believes that Japan’s war machine, once re-started, will bring “incalculable harms to other countries.”45 The above analyses show that China’s understanding of the changing dynamics of the international system has profoundly deepened its threat perception in recent years. In the eyes of Chinese strategists, the end of unipolarity and the rise of a multipolar system have dramatically increased the level of threats to China’s national security. The containment motives of the China’s changing NFU policy 125 US China policy and Japan’s seizing of the US strategic rebalancing as an opportunity to re-emerge as a normal military and political power have caused deep worries among China’s security and international relations experts. In particular, Japan’s turn towards the nationalist direction has greatly magnified the perceived threats to China’s security. The China–Japan island dispute crisis of 2012 and onward has been unfolding in the above context of China’s changing threat perception. While China has seen a rising strategic threat from an increasingly revisionist Japan, it also has more immediate concerns regarding the prospect of war in the East China Sea. The crisis over the island dispute, in the eyes of Chinese strategists, has generated highly realistic scenarios of war between the two countries. Thus, in addition to the rising long-term threat from Japan and the US–Japan alliance, the crisis involving the island dispute posts a more imminent threat to China’s national security. China’s concern about crisis escalation and the ensuing war with Japan is an outcome of its assessment of both Japan’s strategic motives and the operational-level dynamics that underline the island dispute crisis. The following part of this section examines these separate Chinese concerns regarding the prospect of war between the two countries. On the strategic level, some Chinese security experts worry about the preventive war motives of Japan. Specifically, they believe that the current changing balance of power, which essentially traps Japan in a position of hopeless relative decline vis-à-vis. China, may motivate the former to use war to stop China’s further rise. For example, Ma Yong, a scholar at the Insti- tute of Modern History of the Chinese Social Science Academy, wrote a highly influential analysis of Japan’s preventive war motives.46 As he sees it, Japan twice reversed China’s modernization efforts by war. The 1884–85 China–Japan war disrupted China’s slow but steady modernization that began during the 1860s. The Japanese invasion in 1937 again stopped China’sefforts to rebuild a centralized state that started in 1928. Ma points out current motives of Japan to use war to reverse China’s rise. As he observes:

The main reason behind Japan’s provocation is the Japanese belief that another twenty years of peaceful development by China will allow the latter to resolve the dispute in its favor. Then, not only will Japan’s GDP Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 not be able to match China’s, its sense of superiority of more than one century will also evaporate.47

Thus Ma warns that the East China Sea crisis puts China again at a critical juncture, with its third modernization effort likely to be stopped by Japan. Ma’s warning was widely circulated in the Chinese media. An analysis by the Global Times, a newspaper that specializes in international affairs, also sees Japan’s preventive war motives. According to this analysis, some right wing politicians of Japan see the struggle between the two countries as the decisive battle between continental and maritime states. What 126 China’s changing NFU policy should worry China is the preventive war motives of these people. As the analysis points out, “Ever since the 2010 fishing boat incident, Shintaro Ishihara and other right wing politicians have been plotting to have a showdown with China before its naval capability is fully developed. Thus, right wing elements have been very active around the Diaoyu Islands, ready to create a sudden incident.”48 A Chinese current affairs magazine affiliated with the People’s Daily had a special issue in October 2012 to examine the East China Sea crisis and it also shows concerns regarding the preventive war motives of Japan. As the preface of the special issue suggests:

Japan grabbed Diaoyu Islands after the 1884 war. One hundred years later, when China is on the rise, some political forces in Japan are once again attempting to stir up conﬂicts around the Diaoyu islands so as to disrupt China’s rise… The dispute looks like a mere incident but actually reﬂects evil designs. It contains vicious strategic ploys.49

The above Chinese concerns regarding Japan’s preventive war motives represent some of the most malign interpretations of Japanese strategic intentions. China’s painful experiences with Japan inevitably lead to an exag- geration of Tokyo’s evil motives by Chinese strategists. Thus, according to Yang Yunzhong, a PLA strategist, Japan’s provocations to China “have a strategic purpose. The catalyst of China–Japan conflict is the Diaoyu Islands. However, the essence of the conflict concerns a strategic contest between the two countries. It involves the future of each nation.”50 While some Chinese strategists have concerns over the strategic motives of Japan to provoke a war with China, more have concerns regarding Japan’s operational-level motives to escalate the crisis over the island dispute. A major cause of Chinese concerns involves the inherent dynamics of crisis escalation. In particular, Chinese strategists worry that Japan’s response to China’s actions in connection with the island may generate a dangerous momentum toward war. Indeed, this Chinese concern regarding the inherent dynamics of crisis escalation was well justified. The Japanese government, predicting forceful Chinese reactions to its nationalization of the island which might include China Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 sending its personnel onto the island, repeatedly tried to deter such Chinese actions by promising decisive counteractions, including the possible deployment of Japan’s military. For example, according to Chinese reports, on July 26, 2012 Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda declared in the Japanese parliament that Japan would consider deploying its self-defense force to the Diaoyu/Senkaju Islands if another country invaded them.51 Indeed, on September 11, 2012, the eve of Japan’s cabinet officially approving the nationalization, Noda once again told Japan’s Self Defense Forces to ready themselves for emergency.52 These deterrence measures by the Japanese government caused serious worries among China’s security and international relations experts, who China’s changing NFU policy 127 feared a dangerous chain of reactions and counter-reactions if Japan decided to deploy its military to the disputed islands. For example, some worried that Noda’s warnings implied Japan’s willingness to use force against China. After Chinese ships began to enter the Japanese territorial waters after Japan’s nationalization of the islands, Qu Xing, Director of the China Institute of International Studies, which is a think tank affiliated with the Chinese Foreign Ministry, suggested that Japan’s threat of deploying its military to the area would “trigger a qualitative change in the situation” by turning it toward a much worse direction.53 Liu Youfa, who is deputy director of the same think tank, also worried that Japan’s deployment of its military to the conflict zone would dangerously “change the bottom line of both parties.”54 Japan’s talk of deployment of its military to the islands, as measures to deter Chinese intrusion on the Japanese claimed territorial water after the nationalization decision, would inevitably force China to dispatch its own navy to the area, triggering a dangerous spiral of crisis escalation and increasing the probability of accidental military conflicts. According to Li Li, a strategist at the PLA National Defense University, there is a probability that Japan “could take the risk” of confronting Chinese ships in its claimed territorial water, which will certainly increase the possibility of military conflicts.55 In fact, Chinese security experts had real concerns over Japan using its military against Chinese ships within its 12 miles of territorial water. As suggested by Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo in an interview with Chinese television, “If the ships of Japan’s Self Defense Forces try to evict Chinese ships which are not armed, it will amount to the use of force even without opening fire. This is due to the fact that ships of the Self Defense Forces are military ships.”56 Yin also pointed out that Japan’s minister of defense had already asked Japan’s military to get ready to enter the disputed island. As he concluded, “This implies that Japan’s military is preparing to use military force to resolve the conflicts at the Diaoyu Islands.” In the same interview, Teng Jianqun, a prominent security expert at the China Institute of International Studies, even claimed that Japan had definitely made the decision to escalate the crisis by deploying its military to the islands. According to him, “Looking at it, Japan is certainly ready for a fight with China in the area around Diaoyu Islands. This preparation is under way. Thus, we cannot hold unrealistic expectations and must get ready for military struggles.”57 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Therefore, in the eyes of Chinese strategists, Japan’s various statements about possible deployment of its military to defend its sovereignty over the disputed islands posed realistic scenarios of crisis escalation and the ensuing military conflicts between the two countries. Hu Yiwen, a Chinese strategist, suggests that Japan’s tough deterrence messages amount to “playing with fire.”58 According to Hua, Japan was betting on American military support if it escalated the crisis by deploying its military to the islands. He argues that repeated official announcements by the US that its security treaty with Japan covers the disputed islands have encouraged the Japanese government to consider escalating the crisis. 128 China’s changing NFU policy After China began to regularly enter the Japanese claimed territorial water and airspace, Japan’s other deterrence gestures and messages also raised Chinese concerns over escalation of the crisis and increased chances of accidental military conflicts. For example, in January 2013 Japan said it may fire warning shots to keep foreign aircraft from violating its airspace.59 This warning came after Japanese fighters were confronted by Chinese fighters in the area surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. According to China, the Japanese fighters were then tailing unarmed Chinese surveillance aircraft that had been regularly flying in the area after Japan’s nationalization decision. Japan’s threat of firing warning shots against Chinese military aircraft raised deep concerns in China and invited a strong warning from its government. On January 9, 2013, the Chinese foreign ministry proclaimed that if Japan dared to pursue this action and if Chinese aircraft were damaged, then military conflicts between China and Japan would immediately ensue.60 However, the brinkmanship game of Japan, perhaps designed as deterrence measures against China’s challenge to its de facto control over the disputed islands, continued. In October 2013 the Japanese government approved a plan to shoot down foreign unmanned drones in its airspace. As Chinese unmanned drones had been flying around the disputed islands, technically they might have violated Japan’sairspace.61 This decision by Japan raised grave Chinese concerns regarding the escalation of the crisis at the disputed islands and prospects for military conflicts there. In fact, Gao Hong, Deputy Director of the Center for Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, saw this planned action by the Japanese government as the “most dangerous provocation of Japan since it instigated the Diaoyu Islands dispute last September.”62 So the Chinese military quickly responded by suggesting that any such acts by Japan would amount to acts of war and China would reciprocate without hesitation.63 The above reveals Chinese concerns over the spiral dynamics of crisis escalation around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Chinese security experts with both PLA and civilian backgrounds worry about Japan’s unintentional or intentional escalation of the crisis to gain the upper hand in this crisis. Chinese concerns started with Japan’s warning before the nationalization that it would deploy its military to handle China’s expected responses. In particular, China believed that such a move by Japan would certainly lead to an escalation of the crisis and increase the probability of military conflicts. Then, Japan’s various Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 warnings concerning the possible use of force against Chinese aircraft in its claimed sovereign air space around the disputed islands further alarmed China about the possibility of the crisis turning into military conflicts. In addition to the above Chinese concerns, which relate to the spiral dynamics of a crisis situation, China also sees possibilities of war due to other reasons. These include perceived Japanese optimism in relation to military victories over China and Japan’s long tradition of pre-emptive wars. Chinese strategists believe that while Japan fears the long-term balance of power between the two countries, it is contemptuous of the current military capabilities of China. They thus worry that Japan’s perception of its present China’s changing NFU policy 129 military advantages could motivate it to pursue wars to resolve the East China Sea crisis. For example, two days after Japan’s nationalization of the islands, the Chinese media invited ten general ranked PLA officers to analyze the crisis situation. Rear Admiral Zheng Ming pointed out that he saw a dangerous tendency in Japan’s perception of Chinese military capabilities. According to him, “While the Japanese in some aspects exaggerate the threat from China, including its naval threat, in reality they very much look down upon China. They believe we are not worth a fight. Thus, how to reveal our capabilities to gain respect from them is an important issue.”64 Indeed, the Chinese media widely reported in October 2012 that Japan’s Self Defense Forces had just conducted a war simulation game that led to the prediction of its victory in the East China Sea. According to Chinese reports, Japan predicted a victory that would see the destruction of China’s East China Sea and North Sea fleets at a cost of losing just six surface warships.65 This reported Japanese war simulation outcome caused profound Chinese concerns, fearing that Japan’s optimism may lead it to escalate the crisis into war. Two PLA officers attached to the Defense Ministry immediately responded through the People’s Daily.66 They emphasized that Japan’s prediction of victory was purely based on wishful thinking. They also criticized the unreliable nature of computer-based war simulations. At the same time, however, these PLA officers pointed out the danger associated with Japan’s optimism. As they argued, “We must be highly alert to Japan’s dangerous impulse after the war simulation. We must resolutely beat back its simmering war motives and the ever crazy fantasy.”67 In fact, as the next section of the chapter discusses in detail, China’s concern regarding this Japanese war simulation outcome was so serious that it led to General Luo Yuan’s public comment that China could use nuclear weapons to prevent a defeat. In addition to concerns about Japan’s contempt of its navy, Japanese views of China’s air power also worry China. In August 2013, a Hong Kong-based current affairs magazine interviewed Toshio Tamogami, a former chief of staff of the Japanese airforce. According to Tamogami, while the Chinese air force has seen vast improvement, it still far trails behind its Japanese counterpart. In particular, the training of Chinese pilots is 30 years behind that of Japanese pilots and it was therefore impossible for China to defeat Japan in an air war.68 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Due to Tamogami’s former position, his assessment of the Chinese air force again alarmed the PLA, which felt compelled to correct the Japanese perception. China’s Xinhua News Agency immediately published a lengthy rebuttal of Tamogami’s assessment. It emphasized that currently Chinese military pilots receive on average of 200 hours of flight training, which is similar to the level of the US air force.69 China also quickly responded to another Japanese assessment of its air- power, by a Japanese military magazine. It is reported by the Chinese media that the March 2014 issue of a Japanese aviation magazine concluded that Japan still possesses clear technological superiority over China, especially in 130 China’s changing NFU policy the early warning and command and control aspects. These Japanese advantages would ensure Japan’s victory over China in war scenarios.70 This Japanese assessment once again compelled China to issue a quick rebuttal. Song Xinzhi, a PLA expert on air combat, provided a widely disseminated interview with the Chinese media in which he rebuked Japan’s claimed superiority.71 He pointed out that Japan’sF-15fighters use older technologies than the current generation of Chinese fighters such as the J-10 and J-11B. For example, due to the limit of their radar most of Japan’s F-15s cannot use fire-and-forget medium-range active guided air-to-air missiles. In contrast, the latest Chinese fighters are equipped with these missiles which would give them significant advantages in air combat. The above indicates China’s serious concerns in relation to Japan’s under- estimating its military capabilities. Chinese strategists fear that Japan’s sense of superiority could dangerously motivate it to escalate the island dispute crisis into war. Indeed, as the next section reveals, the reported October 2012 Japanese war simulation result so worried the Chinese that some of China’s strategists immediately responded by threatening the use of nuclear weapons. In addition to perceived Japanese optimism in relation to its military advantages over China, Chinese strategists have other concerns regarding Tokyo’s motives to escalate the crisis to war. Many Chinese military experts take notice of Japan’s long pre-emptive war tradition. They are highly concerned by the prospect of another Pear Harbor style sneak attack by Japan. As one Chinese analysis points out, “Japan always excels in sneak attacks. Looking at its history would reveal that it is a country that does not play by the rules.”72 Indeed, in its war against China in 1884, Russia in 1904, and the USA in 1941, Japan in each case launched sudden attacks without declaring war. After China implemented a forceful response to Japan’s nationalization of the disputed islands, General Luo Yuan emphasized that China must remain vigilant. As he argues, “Although we have gradually gained the initiative with this round of struggle over the Diaoyu Islands, we must not let ourselves off guard. This is because Japan is good at surprise attacks. China thus must improve its alertness against possible Japanese sneak attacks at an unexpected time and location.”73 Japan’s war tradition has also been noticed by other Chinese strategists. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Teng Jianqun of the China Institute of International Studies suggested that China must be wary of Japan’s peculiar strategic traditions. According to him:

Japan has launched sneak attacks against China, Russia, and the United States, all of them great powers. For example, before World War II Japan’s GDP was only 1/20 of that of the United States. This, however, did not discourage Japan from launching a sneak attack against the United States. Now, Japan is pointing its spear at China. We must be highly vigilant to prevent its sneak attacks.74 China’s changing NFU policy 131 Japan’s pre-emptive war tradition so worries China that the PLA Daily published an article by Wang Shenguang on the eve of the 2012 Chinese New Year stating that China must maintain vigilance as Japan might pick that very moment for a sneak attack. Wang pointed out that Japan attacked Pear Harbor over a weekend.75 This section has outlined Chinese perceptions of a rising threat to its national security in recent years as a result of the changes in the structure of global power distribution. Perceived intensification of US containment motives and Japan’s resurfacing as a strategic actor in regional affairs have deepened China’s sense of insecurity. However, the 2012 China–Japan crisis over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands caused far more imminent threats to China’s national security. In the eyes of Chinese strategists, there are realistic prospects of crisis escalation over the disputed islands. In fact, both necessary and sufficient conditions of war are believed to be present in the current East China Sea crisis. While necessary conditions of war refer to states’ motives to use war to achieve specific objectives, sufficient conditions of war emphasize states’ calculations of the probabilities of victory and cost and benefit analysis of choosing war over peace. Sufficient conditions of war are met if a state believes that victory is possible and the cost of war is acceptable. A combination of both necessary and sufficient conditions for war makes it highly likely.76 From both strategic and operational angles, China perceives significant probabilities of war with Japan. Chinese strategists believe Japan has strong preventive war motives to turn the crisis into a military showdown with China, with the goal of ending its irreversible relative decline. Other Chinese strategists see dangers of war due to operational-level factors. Japan’s threats of use of force, both before the island nationalization and after, make Chinese strategists worry about a dangerous spiral of crisis escalation. Even worse, China perceives Japanese contempt for its military capabilities and worries that Japan’s confidence in achieving military victories at a low cost may motivate it to pursue war to resolve the island dispute. Finally, China believes that Japan’s long tradition of using pre-emptive wars to gain military advantages could lead to a repeat of a Pearl Harbor scenario in the form of a sneak attack against China.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 China’s tacit nuclear deterrence in the East China Sea For China, the prospect of war in the East China Sea constitutes a highly significant and realistic threat to its national security. In the eyes of Chinese strategists, both necessary and sufficient conditions for war are present in the current East China Sea crisis. The prospect of war threatens the current grand strategy of China, which is to prolong its spectacular rise in the international system. At the moment, China does not want wars with other major powers, as its main adversaries such as Japan and the USA still possess conventional military advantages. Instead, China’s current national security priority is to “safeguard the strategic opportunity period” in order to complete its rise to 132 China’s changing NFU policy the top of the international system. This requires effective prevention of war scenarios through deterrence. This core national security objective very much defines The Science of Military Strategy. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 2013 version of The Science of Military Strategy locates the prevention of wars and effective containment of crisis situations at the core of China’s current security strategy. Therefore, in 2012 and afterwards, China has been compelled to rely on deterrence to prevent war scenarios in the East China Sea. But deterrence through conventional military capabilities can only be effective if China possesses clear advantages over Japan. However, China’s own balance of power assessments do not generate optimistic results. For example, Su Zhirong, a strategist at the PLA Academy of Military Science, candidly acknowledged that Japan’s conventional military capabilities only trail behind those of the USA.77 Fan Jin, a PLA strategist at the National Defense University, pointed out the rough equality between the military capabilities of China and Japan. As he suggests, “Looking at the military capabilities of each side, especially their naval capabilities, they each possess some advantages. While Japan’s naval equipments are of higher quality, we have numerical advantages.”78 A Chinese military aviation magazine, in its November 2012 issue, compared the air power of the two countries. It concluded that while Japan has advantages in combat support systems, including air-based early warning capabilities, China has advantages in the size of its capabilities. However, the magazine emphasized that pilots’ quality may be a decisive factor in determining victory or defeat and Japan seems to have advantages in this regard.79 Another Chinese military magazine also revealed the respective advantages of the two militaries in its November 2012 issue. The study claims that in terms of surface warships, Japan’s advantage lies in the higher percentage of newer ships in its fleet. In fact, “These ships have equipments that are at the world’s most advanced levels. They have advantages over Chinese navy’s latest warships, even those still under construction.”80 In terms of undersea capabilities, the author claims that China has an overall advantage over Japan due to the introduction of its latest conventional submarines such as the Type 039A and its numerical superiority.81 In the area of air power, the study recognizes the changing balance of power in favor of China. It points out that China’s latest fighters are seeing rapid increases in number. However, Japan’s Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 pilots have better training in general.82 The most comprehensive comparison of naval and air capabilities of China and Japan came from a Chinese military magazine that has close ties to China’s defense industry. In December 2012 it published a special supplementary issue that was devoted entirely to detailed comparisons of each category of naval and air force capabilities. In general, the magazine saw broad equality in different areas, even though China and Japan may possess specific advantages in a specific weapons system.83 Overall, the Chinese assessments of the conventional military balance of power do not see clear advantages for China in the East China Sea. In fact, as China’s changing NFU policy 133 aforementioned, many Chinese strategists believe that Japan is overly optimistic about its military advantages over China. In this context, Chinese deterrence based on conventional military capabilities is unlikely to be effective against Japan. The only viable option for China to effectively deter Japan’s possible escalation of crisis situations and prevent the outbreak of war in the East China Sea is through the exercise of nuclear deterrence. In fact, this is exactly what China has done since 2012. Two PLA publications, the 2013 Science of Military Strategy (SMS) and the 2010 Strategic Deterrence, outline how effective deterrence should be exercised. China’s deterrence behaviors in 2012 and after are consistent with these guidelines. According to Strategic Deterrence, “Deterrence is always based on public revelation of power and capabilities. Those who exercise deterrence always need to publicly demonstrate the power of their deterrence capabilities. Without this public demonstration of capabilities, one cannot deter the adversary.”84 As argued by the authors, there are multiple ways to publicly demonstrate capabilities, such as “sudden announcements of results of major weapons projects to reveal the awesome power of new weapons systems.”85 Mystery, according to the authors of Strategic Deterrence, also enhances deterrence effects. As they claim, “Depending on the targets of deterrence, sometimes one needs to publicly reveal one’s total capabilities to the adversary. On the other hand, mystery also adds fear to others, such as letting other countries know the existence of a new and powerful weapon system but not revealing its exact capabilities.”86 The Science of Military Strategy specifically outlines guidelines for nuclear signaling to achieve the desired deterrence effects. For example, it suggests some murkiness for China’s nuclear deterrent and doctrines. As it says, “Maintaining a certain degree of nuclear murkiness will complicate the decision- making of the adversary and will enhance the deterrence effect of China’s limited nuclear deterrent.”87 Another suggestion from the SMS concerns the messengers of deterrence signals. As it recommends, “Sometimes, letting different people send out different messages can achieve good deterrence results.”88 Utilizing multiple mechanisms for signaling purposes is also considered vital for achieving the desired deterrence effects. According to the SMS, “different actions, measures, and tactics must be coordinated” to Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 deliver signals of nuclear deterrence.89 Chinese military texts on deterrence thus suggest an array of coordinated actions and measures to deliver nuclear signals. At a Sino–US strategic dialog in 2013, some Chinese participants also mentioned various types of nuclear signaling, which include tests of strategic weapons, nuclear related statements in authoritative documents in peace time, and the Second Artillery Corps using the media to convey messages.90 According to one study, “Nuclear signals may be a variety of actions intended to convey the credibility of a state’s nuclear weapons capability and its willingness to utilize it, but signaling does not inherently involve weapon 134 China’s changing NFU policy use.”91 For the East China Sea dispute, China has used a range of nuclear signaling to deter possible crisis escalation. They include high profile announcements of the latest developments of China’s nuclear forces, tests of new strategic weapon systems, public comments by leading Chinese security experts on nuclear deterrence issues in the context of the East China Sea crisis, and tacit modification of the no-first-use principle through its omission from the 2013 Defense White Paper. One of the earliest and perhaps the most important Chinese nuclear signaling came from a high-profile announcement in June 2012 that China’s conventional missile brigades are now also armed with nuclear warheads. In the summer of 2012 the tension between China and Japan began to escalate and by June the Japanese nationalization of the disputed islands looked irreversible. In that context, on June 10 China’s Xinhua News Agency published a high-profile report with the following headline, “Walking Into China’s Conventional Missile Forces: the Beginning of A New Era of Nuclear- Conventional Dual Deterrence.”92 The report is about the Second Artillery’s first conventional missile brigade that was founded in 1993. Now, according to the report, the brigade is also armed with tactical nuclear warheads. The report could have been just a regular story on the Chinese military. However, it was actually China’s nuclear signaling before the forthcoming crisis in the East China Sea. There are several reasons to interpret the report from this perspective. First, as the brigade was established for conventional military warfare, the announcement meant it is now also ready for tactical nuclear operations. China could therefore be signaling that it has a lowered nuclear threshold. As discussed previously, China’s nuclear deterrent is supposed to deter a strategic nuclear first strike by other countries and it adopts a purely retaliatory posture. The Xinhua News report suggests, however, that one of China’s missile brigades geared for warfighting with conventional tactical missiles is now ready for nuclear operations at this level. In fact, this is China’s implementation of the “limited deterrence” posture examined by Alastair Ian Johnston. According to Johnston, limited deterrence sees important roles of tactical nuclear weapons in warfighting and seeks to deter both conventional and nuclear wars. The June 2012 Xinhua News reported that one of the PLA Second Artillery Corps’ brigades, which was originally assigned for combat operations with its conventional Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 missiles, is now also geared for nuclear operations. This message aimed to increase the credibility that China could use its tactical nuclear weapons, which have a much lower threshold of actual use than strategic nuclear weapons. Second, the peculiar feature of this report indicates that it is designed for nuclear signaling purposes. While it has a catchy headline, an actual reading of the report itself finds no content in the text that matches that headline. While the report is rather long, amounting to the equivalent of several printed pages on standard-sized paper, it nowhere mentions the brigade’s transition to a nuclear posture. The essence of this report lies in its catchy headline, which China’s changing NFU policy 135 aims to signal China’s nuclear deterrence in the context of a forthcoming crisis in the East China Sea. The report’s signaling intention is also revealed by its extensive dissemina- tion by the Chinese propaganda machinery. In fact, within hours, through a clearly coordinated manner the report was placed in the most prominent positions of the websites of all the important Chinese media outlets. A regular Xinhua News story could not have had such impact. This pattern, in fact, was repeated more than a year later when there was a high-profile media coverage of China’s sea-based strategic nuclear forces. Starting in July 2012, China began to use other forms of nuclear signaling to prepare for the forthcoming crisis in the East China Sea. China began an unusually intensive test schedule for its latest strategic weapons system. On July 24, China tested the new and road-mobile DF-41 strategic missile, which is reportedly capable of carrying 10 independently guided warheads. On August 16, China launched another new strategic missile, the sea-based JL-2 SLBM. Then on August 20, China tested an older silo- based DF-5A strategic missile. Finally, on August 30, China launched the road-mobile DF-31A strategic missile that is capable of carrying up to five warheads.93 This extraordinary series of strategic missile tests conducted within a very short period of time was unseen in the past. Given the broader context, the frequency, and the timing of the tests, which just preceded Japan’s island nationalization decision, they could not have been designed for pure testing purposes. They represented China’s nuclear signaling. In fact, it was the first time that China had tested its new DF-41 ICBM, which is supposed to be the most powerful Chinese strategic missile due to its reported ability of carrying up to 10 independently guided warheads. This test was fully compatible with the guideline set by Strategic Deterrence, which suggests sudden revelations of new weapon systems of “extraordinary capabilities” to signal deterrence intent. In fact, Taikungpao, a Hong Kong-based newspaper that is used by China as its overseas mouthpiece, specifically suggested that these frequent missile tests in the summer of 2012 were to deter the USA and Japan.94 As its editorial read, after the first three of the four missile tests, “No doubt, Beijing intends to use these three long-range missile tests to show power to the United States and Japan.”95 The US strategic rebalancing and Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 rising Sino–Japanese tension in the East China Sea were quoted as causes of the missile tests. A third type of Chinese nuclear signaling concerns the various public comments made by the PLA and civilian security experts of China. This type of deterrence activity is consistent with the guideline suggested by the 2013 Science of Military Strategy. In fact, during the 1995 Taiwan Strait crisis General Xiong Guangkai used this particular tactic to deliver deterrence messages. After the USA announced deployment of two aircraft carriers near the Taiwan Strait, Xiong stated that China could use nuclear weapons to turn Los Angeles into “a sea of fire.”96 136 China’s changing NFU policy In 2012, when China faced a much more credible scenario of war in the East China Sea, various Chinese security experts issued public comments and viewpoints that suggested roles of nuclear weapons in containing the crisis situation between China and Japan. The most notable comment came from General Luo Yuan in October 2012. After it was reported by the Chinese media that Japan’s military had conducted a war simulation that predicted a major victory over China, the Chinese military felt compelled to dampen potential Japanese incentives to escalate the crisis into war. General Luo, on October 20, publicly rebuked Japan’s optimism. As he said, Japan’s prediction of victory in the East China Sea was pure lunacy. According to Luo:

This outcome is due to a computer game they designed. It simply will not occur. In addition to our naval capabilities that have made rapid progresses, we also have a combined combat system that includes our airforce, navy, and the Second Artillery Corps. Therefore we have conﬁdence in victory. Moreover, we have nuclear forces that are feared by Japan. Although we have repeatedly stated that we will not use nuclear weapons ﬁrst and will not use them against non-nuclear countries, nuclear weapons nonetheless provide a guarantee that we will not lose this war.97

Luo’s unambiguous comment on the role of nuclear weapons in a China–Japan war scenario was clearly meant for deterrence purposes. Luo has been a highly visible PLA mouthpiece in recent years and the timing of his comment was designed to neutralize possible Japanese impulses to escalate the crisis after its military reportedly produced a favorable outcome in war simulations. As a Chinese media analysis points out, Luo’s comments clearly meant China would use nuclear weapons if two of its naval fleets were wiped out in a Japanese surprise attack.98 After China released its 2013 Defense White Paper, which did not mention the no-first-use nuclear principle, in an interview with Xinhua News Agency General Luo Yuan immediately highlighted the conditional nature of the policy. He claimed that while China preaches no-first-use, “If our country’s security and core interests face fundamental harms, we will nonetheless risk Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 everything to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nuclear weapons are one of our options.”99 Admiral Yin Zhuo, who has been another high visibility mouthpiece for the Chinese military in recent years, also made public comments that implied the possibility of China using weapons against Japan. Although his comments were made in the context of Japan’s possible decision to allow the US to base nuclear weapons on its territory, they nonetheless sounded like deterrence. As he warned, “Japan has only 300,000 square kilometers of land. If attacked by nuclear weapons, this nation will no longer exist.”100 China’s changing NFU policy 137 In addition to comments on the use of nuclear weapons by Chinese military figures, Shen Dingli, who is considered a pre-eminent Chinese civilian expert on nuclear security, publicly called for China to modify its nuclear doctrines. He argues that due to increasing strategic pressures from the USA and Japan, China needs to reconsider its nuclear posture. Given the inability of China to rapidly narrow the gap in conventional capabilities, it cannot effectively deter its adversaries by conventional deterrence. He thus proposed to “multiply our strategic nuclear capabilities in order to force our adversaries to give up their vicious impulses to violate our sovereignty and territorial integrity.”101 Given the prominence of Shen as an important Chinese nuclear strategist, the publication of his opinions in a highly prominent place could be due to China’sefforts at deterrence. Public statements by people with authority, according to the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, could deliver important nuclear signals to countries that are targets of China’s deterrence. The Chinese media also published comments by other civilian security experts on nuclear deterrence in the contexts of the China–Japan East China Sea crisis and US strategic rebalancing. For example, Wu Junfei published an analysis in the Global Times that called for an increased nuclear deterrent to safeguard China’s national security.102 As he pointed out, a major source of instability is Japan’s misperception that China would not use nuclear weapons. Moreover, the USA has been instigating Japan to pick a fight with China. Therefore, given the inadequacy of Chinese conventional deterrence, Wu asked China to re-evaluate its nuclear doctrines. According to him:

China urgently needs to re-state the roles of nuclear weapons, revamp its nuclear capabilities, declare credible nuclear doctrines, and announce its determination to use nuclear weapons. Only through these measures can we seize the strategic initiatives, win more time for peace, and determine the future direction of East Asian security.103

Long Xingchun, another Chinese civilian security expert, emphasized the necessity of clarifying China’s bottom line for the use of nuclear weapons. He argued that General Zhu Chenghu’s controversial 2005 comment on nuclear war intended to clarify China’s bottom line in crisis situations. Lung said that while China should not use nuclear weapons to attack other countries, it is Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 entitled to use them for self-defense. According to him, clarifying its conditions for both no-first-use and first-use of nuclear weapons is the best way to deter other countries from initiating military actions against China.104 While these civilian discussions, such as the ones by Wu and Luo, on the role of nuclear weapons may not be authorized by the Chinese government, their publications in prominent places nonetheless create the impression that China’s established nuclear doctrines, such as the no-first-use principle, are under pressure. They reveal the domestic forces in China that push for a modification of its nuclear principles. The very discussions of these issues in public generate deterrence effects. 138 China’s changing NFU policy The fourth and last type of Chinese nuclear signaling efforts involves murky or tacit changes of its nuclear doctrines. Indeed, the SMS points out that maintaining “some degrees of murkiness” with China’s nuclear posture will enhance its deterrence effects. In this regard, one Chinese measure consistent with this guideline concerns the omission of the no-first-use principle in China’s 2013 Defense White Paper, which was released in April of that year. For the first time, the section of China’s nuclear forces did not mention the sacred no-first-use principle which has been the defining feature of Chinese nuclear deterrence.105 Foreign analysts quickly took notice of this omission. James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argued that it represents an important policy change. According to him, “The change this year is almost certainly not the result of bureaucratic error. No-first-use has been such an intrinsic part of the Chinese nuclear liturgy that the authors of the white paper would have been extremely unlikely to have forgotten.”106 This suspicion by Acton is highly reasonable. This book reveals two important recent developments in China’s security strategy and behaviors. First, as indicated by the SMS, effective deterrence of crisis escalation is now the central goal of China’s national security strategy. The SMS assigns the key role of deterrence to China’s nuclear forces. Second, during the 2012 crisis over the disputed island China was under tremendous pressure to prevent the escalation of the crisis into war. In that context, China has exercised implicit nuclear deterrence to deter Japan’s possible motives for war. Therefore, the 2013 Defense White Paper may have reflected the above developments in China’s security strategy and behaviors. Yao Junzhu of the PLA Academy of Military Science wrote a reply to Acton’s comments and denied any changes to China’s no-first-use policy.107 According to her, the omission of the policy was simply due to the new format adopted by the 2013 Defense White Paper. Unlike previous versions that had comprehensive examinations of different aspects of China’s armed forces, including specific services such as the Second Artillery Corps, the 2013 white paper focuses instead on the theme of “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.” According to Yao, the 2013 white paper thus does not have specific sections on China’s nuclear policies. However, this explanation by Yao is unconvincing. First, as Acton points out correctly, the no-first-use policy is the cornerstone of China’s nuclear Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 doctrines. It had always been given prominent treatment by previous Defense White Papers. For example, the 2008 Defense White Paper mentioned China’s no-first-use principle in the very second sentence of Section 7, which covers the Second Artillery Corps.108 This prominence of the no-first-use principle in the 2008 Defense White Paper reveals its centrality for China’s nuclear deterrence doctrines. Second, a mere sentence is sufficient to outline China’s no-first-use principle, which is the case with the 2008 Defense White Paper. So the 2013 Defense White Paper could have easily accommodated this fundamental nuclear principle in the long paragraph on the Second Artillery Corps in Section 2 of the document. China’s changing NFU policy 139 Based on its holistic analysis of the role of nuclear deterrence in China’s current security strategies, this book concurs with James Acton that the omission of the no-first-use principle in the 2013 Defense White Paper is no fluke. In fact, it closely reflects recent developments in China’s deterrence doctrines and behaviors, as respectively revealed by the 2013 Science of Military Strategy and China’s actual behaviors in the East China Sea crisis of 2012 and thereafter. In fact, the omission of the no-first-use policy is totally consistent with these developments. However, there is a degree of “murkiness” regarding the issue. As Yao also correctly points out, a later section of the 2013 Defense White Paper does mention that China’s nuclear forces seek to deter enemies from using nuclear weapons against China and will retaliate against such attacks. The roles of nuclear weapons in conventional scenarios are not mentioned at all. This allows Yao to claim that the 2013 Defense White Paper is no different from earlier ones.109 But the issue is not so simple. The “murkiness” surrounding the no-first-use principle could well be the intended outcome. As the SMS contends, the “murkiness” of China’s nuclear deterrent will complicate other countries’ decision-making and enhance the effectiveness of China’s deterrence measures. So the complicated messages from the 2013 Defense White Paper may reflect the above Chinese calculation. In fact, the very fact that foreign analysts took notice of the omission of the no-first-use principle means that China’s “murkiness” of the no-first-use issue has already achieved its intended effects. In fact, the murkiness surrounding the 2013 Defense White Paper was immediately magnified by General Luo Yuan through his media comment on the document. He claimed that while the Defense White Paper maintains China’s traditional position on no-first-use, in dire scenarios that involve its core interests, “Nuclear weapons are one of our options.”110 China has continued to pursue implicit nuclear deterrence after the first round of such exercises from the middle of 2012 to early 2013. In October 2013 the Japanese government discussed the possibility of shooting down foreign unmanned drones flying in its air space. This decision caused alarm in China, fearing Japan’s intention to escalate the crisis in the East China Sea. In addition to an immediate Chinese warning on October 26 that such action Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 by Japan would amount to an act of war, two days later China released high profile propaganda about its sea-based nuclear deterrent.111 On October 28, four leading national newspapers simultaneously published front-page stories about China’s strategic nuclear submarine forces.112 This report was also highly publicized by all the leading media websites of China. While the headline of People’s Daily report was “Forging the Undersea Shield of the Republic,” that of the PLA Daily was “Forging a Sharp Sword in Deep Sea.” According to Chinese media analyses, this high-profile propaganda about China’s strategic nuclear submarine forces was meant to tell the world that its sea-based strategic deterrent is finally operational. More specifically, China 140 China’s changing NFU policy intended to tell the world that its second-generation strategic nuclear submarine, the Type 094, and its matching JL-2 missile are capable of providing China with a truly secure second-strike capability.113 However, the Chinese media also pointed out that the timing of this highly publicized fanfare was meant to deter Japan’s possible escalation of the East China Sea crisis after its government discussed shooting down Chinese unmanned drones flying in its airspace. Rear Admiral Li Jie squarely told Chinese media that in addition to projecting a message about China’s improving nuclear capabilities, the “debut of China’s nuclear submarines is also designed to send a warning to countries that are now provoking China: If you dare to shoot first, you will have to consider the consequences.”114 Other Chinese analyses also specifically suggest that China’s propaganda about its strategic nuclear submarines was designed to deter crisis escalation in the East China Sea. As a People’s Daily analysis points out, “Why did China use high profile propaganda to show off its strategic nuclear submarine forces? There is only one answer: China is currently facing high risks of the outbreak of war. China is compelled to use nuclear weapons to prevent war.”115 An analysis by Wenweipo, a Hong Kong-based newspaper that is directly controlled by the Chinese government, made explicit linkages to Japan’splan to shoot down China’s unmanned drones. As it points out:

Strategic nuclear submarines are important means of the great powers to exercise nuclear deterrence. Yesterday was neither the founding day of the military nor the naval day. It was also not related to any other important anniversaries. But why did China choose this particular moment? Where is its sword pointing to? In the past few days, Japan’s Defense Ministry brazenly talked about shooting down China’s unmanned drones. Japan has also been busily expanding its military and repeatedly violating China’s redlines for Diaoyu Islands. The probabilities of accidental wars are thus rapidly increasing between China and Japan. China’s revelation of its nuclear submarines at this particular moment is certainly meant for something.116

This instance of China’s exercise of nuclear deterrence in October 2013 was thus designed for crisis control in the East China Sea. The timing shows its Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 direct linkage to China’s threat perception at the time. Japan’stalkofshooting down Chinese unmanned drones, in the eyes of China, could escalate the East China Sea crisis into war. The immediate Chinese nuclear signaling, in the form of high profile propaganda about its sea-based strategic nuclear forces, was thus an act of implicit nuclear deterrence. In fact, this instance of Chinese nuclear signaling was similar to another instance exactly one year earlier, when General Luo Yuan stated publicly that nuclear weapons could play a role in war scenarios between the two countries. He made that comment after reports saying that Japan had conducted war simulations that predicted a Japanese victory over China. China’s changing NFU policy 141 The no-first-use policy modified? Judged in their totality, various Chinese deterrence-related measures and activities since 2012 have amounted to implicit exercises of nuclear deterrence. In fact, some of the measures, such as General Luo Yuan’s comments, were quite explicit in their references to the role of nuclear weapons in the current spat between China and Japan. This also includes the October 2013 high- profile debut of China’s strategic nuclear submarine forces that was an explicit response to the perceived Japanese intention to escalate the East China Sea crisis. The omission of the no-first-use principle in the 2013 Defense White Paper, on the other hand, is a “murky” measure situated between implicit and explicit nuclear deterrence. Failing to mention the no-first-use principle was not a subtle change and it was therefore immediately noticed by foreign observers. However, China has never stated officially that it intends to modify its nuclear policies. In February 2013, Major General Sun Kejia of the PLA National Defense University published an important analysis in Xuexi shibao (Study Times), which is published by the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party.117 In this article Sun outlined the changing focus of China’s military strategy from winning wars to crisis containment and the consequent importance of prevention of crisis escalation. As he argued:

While China no longer faces scenarios of full-scale foreign invasions, prospects of limited wars still exist. Most likely, they will be triggered by the escalation of certain crises. Thus, China’s current military strategy must elevate the importance of crises containment to a new height … We must watch closely the trends and factors that may trigger crises and take drastic and forward looking measures to contain crisis situations to their initial levels.118

China’s exercise of tacit nuclear deterrence since 2012 is obviously consistent with Sun’s advice. Its various nuclear signaling eﬀorts are in fact “drastic and forward looking measures” to deter crisis escalation. China’s tacit nuclear deterrence also corroborates the “conditional no-ﬁrst- use” approach that is promoted by some in the Chinese strategic community. As analyzed in Chapter 2, in recent years some Chinese strategists have asked

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 for the replacement of the no-first-use policy with a “conditional no-first-use” policy. Proponents include Wu Tianfu, a pre-eminent strategist of the PLA Second Artillery Corps. They point out the Chinese conventional disadvantages vis-à-vis other major powers and thus China’s inability to deter fundamental threats to its national security. As these people argue, China should exercise nuclear deterrence if its core national interests are under threat. The East China Sea crisis has generated such a scenario that its vital national interests could be harmed by another country. Given its perception of the significant probability of war in the East China Sea and its recognition 142 China’s changing NFU policy of lack of effective conventional deterrence, China has been compelled to exercise implicit nuclear deterrence. By doing so, China has effectively made its no-first-use principle conditional. Evan Medeiros once argued that the best way to test China’s nuclear policies is through its behaviors in a real crisis situation.119 That moment arrived in the form of the East China Sea crisis between China and Japan, which brought them dangerously close to the brink of war. In fact, as this chapter indicates, China perceives a significant prospect of war with Japan. To deter crisis escalation, China has been compelled to exercise implicit nuclear deterrence to prevent scenarios of war. China’s exercise of implicit nuclear deterrence fundamentally represents its balance of threat motives. The changing structure of global power distribution, in the form of the waning of unipolarity and the emergence of a new multipolar system, has intensified China’s threat perceptions. In particular, the perceived rising containment motives of the USA and Japan’s revisionism in recent years have dramatically increased China’s sense of insecurity. Then, the East China Seacrisisof2012magnified China’s threat perception. The Chinese strategic community sees a variety of Japanese motives to escalate the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The most worrisome scenario, in the eyes of Chinese strategists, concerns Japan’s preventive war motives in the context of a rapid balance of power shift between the two countries. The Chinese strategists believe that under US encouragement, Japan could be motivated to escalate the crisis into war in order to avert a power transition in East Asia. On top of this, China also worries about various war scenarios due to the inherent escalatory dynamics of a crisis situation. Therefore China sees both rising long-term threats to its security and highly realistic threats of war in the East China Sea. Its tacit nuclear deterrence has been designed to balance these threats. China’s goal is to prevent the rise of militarized conflicts that will inevitably undermine China’s current grand strategy of completing its rise in the international system. China’s tacit nuclear deterrence in the East China Sea and its balance of threat behaviors are the logical outcomes dictated by the anarchic international system. The strategic imperatives of anarchy force states to use all means available to ensure their own security. China’s tacit nuclear deterrence in the East China Sea might have contributed to the current stability of the dispute situation. Japan has shown great restraint Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 after Chinese coast guard ships started routine patrols inside the Japanese claimed territorial water around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Moreover, contrary to its threats, Japan did not fire warning shots against Chinese military aircrafts and unmanned drones in the area. Therefore, the actual prospect of war in the East China Sea is limited. This could imply that China’s nuclear signaling may have achieved the intended purpose of restraining the escalation of a crisis situation. While further empirical research is required to establish the actual effects of China’s nuclear signaling since 2012, evidence so far suggests that it could be the key factor in explaining the current stability of the dispute situation in the East China Sea. China’s changing NFU policy 143 Notes 1 Liang Yunxiang, Jiben faijiao yu zhongri guanxi (Japan’s Foreign Policy and Sino–Japanese Relations) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2012), pp. 150–157. 2 Ibid., p. 160. 3 Ibid., pp. 171–172. 4 Huang Dahui, Riben daguo hua qushi yu zhongri guanxi (Japan’s Great Power Tendency and Sino–Japanese Relations) (Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe, 2008), p. 248. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., p. 250. 7 For a major study on China’s anti-Japanese demonstrations during this period, see Jessica Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 8 For a major study on the issue, see Yu Zhirong, Tonghai weiquan zhongri donghai diaoyudao zhizheng (Defending Rights in the East China Sea: China–Japan Rivalry over the East China Sea and Diaoyu Islands) (Shanghai: Wenhui chubanshe, 2012). 9 Liang Yunxiang, Jiben faijiao yu zhongri guanxi, p. 173. 10 Ibid., p. 249. 11 Huang Dahui, 2008, p. 260. 12 Ibid. 13 Xinhua News Agency, “Zhongri gongtong lishi yanjiu weiyuanhui di yi ci huiyi zai jing juxing” (The First Meeting of the Sino–Japanese Joint History Commis- sion Is Held in Beijing), December 27, 2006, at http://news.xinhua.com/politics/ 2006-12/27/content_5539317.htm. 14 For Yu’s analysis of the effect of this agreement, see his Defending Rights in the East China Sea, p. 104. For the Chinese government’s announcement of the agreement, see “Zhongri jiou donghai wenti dacheng yuanze gongshi” (China and Japan Reaching a Consensus over the East China Sea Issues), June 19, 2008, at http://news.sohu.com/20080619/n257597205.shtml. 15 See “Hatoyama Proposes East Asian Community to China,” The Taipei Times, September 23, 2009, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/09/23/ 2003454274. 16 For this concern, see Brad Glosserman, “Breaking Point for the Alliance,” Pacnet #19, April 12, 2010, at http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-19-breaking-point-alliance. 17 Gao Lan, “Riben waijiao xin gouxiang zhongdao waijiao” (Japan’s New Foreign Policy Thinking: the Middle Road Diplomacy), Xiandai guoji guanxi, November 2009, pp. 50–56. Also, Liu Jiangyong, “Tongwang dongya gongtongti zhilu hezuo yu chuangxin” (The Road to an East Asia Community: Cooperation and Creativity), Waijiao pinglun, No. 2 (2010), pp. 57–66. 18 Zhan gave his personal account of the incident in a long interview with Mingpao, Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 a Hong Kong-based newspaper, in May 2011. See “Huo shi wei ziyou zhan qixiong bei geli” (Released But Not Free: Zhan Qixiong Cordoned Off), Mingpao, May 24, 2011. 19 For China’s angry reaction, see Mure Dickie, “Japan’s Arrest of Captain Angers Beijing,” The Financial Times, September 8, 2010. 20 See Ian Johnson, “China Arrests Four Japanese Amid Tension,” The New York Times, September 23, 2010. 21 Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan,” The New York Times, September 22, 2010. 22 Xinhua News Agency, “Wen jiabao qianglie duncu riben liji wutiaojian fangren” (Wen Jiabao Strongly Urges Japan to Release the Person Without Conditions), September 22, 2010, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010–9/22c_12596265.htm. 144 China’s changing NFU policy 23 See Justin McCurry, “China-Japan Row over Disputed Islands Threatens to Escalate: Anti-Japan Protests Spread amid Reports that Chinese Boats Are Heading for Senkaku Islands,” The Guardian, September 18, 2010. 24 The National Institute for Defense Studies, China Security Report 2012 (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2012). 25 Ibid., pp. 126–129. 26 See Mure Dickie, “Japan to Shift Military towards China Threat,” The New York Times, December 13, 2010. 27 Ibid. 28 The Japan News, “Ishihara Seeking to Buy Senkaku Islands,” April 18, 2012. 29 For this explanation of the motive of the Japanese government, see Japan Insti- tute of International Affairs, “The Senkakus: Actions to Keep the Situation under Control,” September 24, 2012, at http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/policy_rep ort/20120924e-recommendations.pdf. 30 For this meeting between Hu and Noda, see “China, Japan Discuss Island Disputes at APEC Meeting,” The Voice of America News, September 9, 2012, at www.voanews/com/content/china-japan-discuss-island-dispute-at-apec-meeting/ 1504613.html. 31 See Jane Perlez, “China Accuses Japan of Stealing after Purchase of Group of Disputed Islands,” The New York Times, September 11, 2012. 32 Xinhua News Agency, “Zhongguo haijian chuanbo biandui dida diaoyudao haiyu kaizhan wuiquan xunhang zhifa” (China’s Maritime Surveillance Ships Arriving in the Waters of Diaoyu Islands to Defend Rights), September 14, 2012, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-09/14/c_113073244.htm. 33 See Duowei News, “Jiemi xi jinping lingdao di diaoyudao yingbian xiaozu” (Uncovering the Secrets Behind the Diaoyu Islands Response Group Led by Xi Jinping), January 20, 2013, at http://china.dwnews.com/news/2013-01-20/ 59089000-all.html. 34 Xi’s instructions were reported by an overseas Chinese website. See “Gaoceng huiyi xi jinping dui diaodao weiji shuo le zhe 16 ge zi” (At a High-Level Meeting Xi Said the Following 16 Words for the Diaoyu Islands Crisis), Boxun News, January 29, 2013, at http://boxun.com/news/gb/china/2013/0120130129656/shtml. 35 For further discussions on Chinese perceptions of the US strategic rebalancing, see Zhang Baohui, “Guoji guanxi xianshi zhuyi lilun yu meiguo yatai zai pingheng zhanlue” (Realist International Relations Theory and the US Strategic Rebalancing), Guoji guanxi yanjiu, No. 2 (2014), pp. 11–26. 36 Zhang Yunling, “Meiguo jiyu weidu zhongguo yao wenzhu zhenjiao da taiji yirou kegang” (The US Is Eager for Containment, China Must Keep Its Own Balance and Use a Soft Strategy to Overcome the Harsh Blow), Huanqiu shibao, December 5, 2012, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2011-12/223 6630.html. 37 Luo Yuan, “Dui mei fangwu tiaozheng jixui jingti youyao danding” (Facing US Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Strategic Adjustment, China Needs To be Both Vigilant and Calm), Jiefangjun bao, January 10, 2012. 38 For Peng’s comments, see “Jiafangjun zhuanjia xuezhe miji fasheng guanzhu diaoyudao wenti” (PLA’s Experts Express Intense Concerns about the Diaoyu Islands Issue), August 24, 2012, at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2012-08-24/1713 698924.html. 39 Yu Zhirong, “Zhongri dao zheng meiguo shi yuanxiong” (Sino–Japanese Islands Dispute: The US Is the Culprit), Huanqiu shibao, October 15, 2012, at http://mil. huanqiu.com/Observation/2012-10/3187074.html. 40 Yang Yunzhong, “Riben dui dongya heping di weixie rishen” (Japan’s Rising Threats to Peace of East Asia), Huanqiu shibao, February 18, 2014, at http:// opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2014-02/4838224.html. China’s changing NFU policy 145 41 Yuan Yang and Zhang Renlong, “Biandiao di riben fangwei baipi shu” (The Changing Tones of Japan’s Defense White Paper), Huanqiu junshi, August 2013, p. 7. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., p. 9. 44 Zhang Wei and Hu Wenjia, “An bao san jian yongxin xian e” (The Evil Inten- tions of the Three Darts of Defense and Security), Huangqiu junshi, January 2014, p. 17. 45 Liu Qiang, “Riben zhanche ruo chongxin fadong keneng gei shijie dai zainan” (A Restarted Japanese War Machine Could Bring Disaster to the World), Jiefangjun bao, May 29, 2014, available at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2014-05- 29/092278194.html. 46 Ma Yong, “Riben hui di san ci daiduan zhongguo xiandaihua ma” (Will Japan Stop China’s Modernization for the Third Time?), Huanqiu shibao, January 23, 2013. 47 Ibid. 48 See Huanqiu shibao, “Riben youyi zai diaodao huo cedong dashi yuyu zhongguo haijun tanpai” (Japan’s Right Wing May Be Plotting Major Incidents at Diaoyu Islands to Have a Showdown with the Chinese Navy), January 16, 2014, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2014-01/4760087.html. 49 See Renmin luntan, “Daoyudao beihou di zhanlue jiaoli” (The Strategic Contest behind the Diaoyu Islands), No. 29 (October 1, 2012), p. 23. 50 Yang, “Riben dui dongya heping di weixie rishen” (Japan’s Rising Threat to Peace of East Asia). 51 This decision by Noda’s government was reported by the Chinese media. See “Riben shouxiang kaolui chudong zhiweidui huwei diaodao” (Japan’s Prime Minister Considering the Deployment of the Self-Defense Forces to Safeguard the Diaoyu Islands), July 27, 2012, at http://news.sohu.com/20130727/n349 135203.shtml. 52 Xinhua News Agency, “Japanese PM Orders Self-Defense Forces fully Prepared for Emergency,” September 11, 2012, at http://english.people.com.cn/90777/794 5150.html. 53 See “Riben ruo chudong junjian jiang daozhi diaoyudao xingshi zhibian” (The Diaoyu Islands Situation Will See a Qualitative Change if Japan Deploys War- ships), China News Net, September 21, 2012, at www.chinanews.com/mil/2012/ 09-21/4201237.shtml. 54 Ibid. 55 Li Li, “Ri ruo zai diaoyudao tingerzouxian bu paichu chongtu keneng” (Conflicts Cannot Be Ruled out If Japan Makes Reckless Moves over the Diaoyu Islands), Huanqiu shibao, April 24, 2013, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2013-04/ 3866497.html. 56 For Yin Zhuo interview, see “Riben zhunbei zai diaoyudao yu zhongguo kaizhan Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 jiefangjun yao zuohao zhunbei” (Japan Is Preparing for War over the Diaoyu Islands, China Must Be Prepared Too), June 14, 2013, at http://mil.sohu.com/ 20130614/n378785478.shtml. 57 Ibid. 58 Hua Yiwen, “Riben jiu diaoyudao wenti lian fa henhua shi zai wenhuo” (Japan’s Recent Tough Words over the Diaoyu Islands Are Playing With Fire), Renmin ribao, August 27, 2012. 59 Eric Talmadge, “Japan’s Talk of Warning Shots Heats up China Dispute,” January 20, 2013, at http://news.yahoo.com/japan-talk-warming-shots-heats-china- dispute-051924041.html. 60 For the comments by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, see Huanqiu shibao, “Fa shiguandan ba zhongri tuixiang zhanzheng bianyuan” (Firing Tracer Rounds 146 China’s changing NFU policy Pushes China and Japan toward the Edge of War), January 10, 2013, at http:// mil.huanqiu.com/paper/2013-10/3468128.html. 61 See Daniel Schearf, “Japan, China Territorial Tensions Rising over Unmanned Drones,” The VOA News, October 31, 2013, at www.voanews.com/content/ japan-china-territorial-tension-rising-over-unmanned-drones/1780574.html. 62 For Gao Hong’s comments, see “Riben jiluo zhongguo wurenji jingbei shiwei riben tiaoqi zhongri chongtu” (Japan’s Shooting down of China’s Unmanned Drones Will Be Seen As Provoking Sino–Japanese Conflicts), Huanqiu shibao, September 19, 2013, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2013-09/4373835.html. 63 Xinhua News Agency, “Guofangbu ri fang ruo jiluo zhongguo wuren ji zhong fang jiang guoduan fanji” (The Defense Ministry: If Japan Shoots down Chinese Unmanned Drones, China Will Hit Back Right Away), October 27, 2013, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2013-10/27/c_125604984.htm. 64 For Zheng Ming’s comment, see Huanqiu shibao, “Shiwei jiangjun shoushi riben yaoyou junshi di chongfen zhunbei” (Ten Generals: To Confront Japan Requires Ample Military Preparations), September 13, 2012, at http://opinion.huanqiu. com/1152/2012-09/3113889.html. 65 For Chinese reports on this alleged Japanese war simulation, see Huanqiu shibao, “Guofangbu guanyuan tan zhongri haizhan” (Defense Ministry Officials Discussing Naval Conflicts between China and Japan), October 25, 2012, at http://world.huanqiu.com/regions/2012-10/32132821.html. 66 Meng Yan and Zhou Yong, “Jingti riben bingqi tuiyan shi kuangzao” (Be Alert to Japan’s Wishful Thinking after the War Simulation Game), People’s Daily, October 25, 2012. 67 Ibid. 68 For this interview of Toshio Tamogami by a Hong Kong-based magazine called Yazhou Zhoukan, see Xinhua News Agency, “Riben hongkong ziweidui xunlian chaoguo zhongguo kongjun 30 nian?” (Is Japan’s Self Defense Force Ahead of the Chinese Air Force by 30 Years in Terms of Training?), August 28, 2013, at http://news/xinhuanet.com/mil/2013-08/28/c_125263316.htm. 69 Ibid. 70 For a report on this assessment by a Japanese aviation magazine, see Renmin ribao, “Zhuanjia cheng ri mei zhongri kongzhan zhongfang bibai is zhi er shuo meng” (Expert: the Japanese Media Speaks Fantasy by Claiming Inevitable Chinese Defeat in China-Japan Air War), February 21, 2014. 71 Ibid. 72 For a Chinese analysis of Japan’s pre-emptive war tradition, see “Riben yige xihuan touxi di guojia” (Japan: A Country That Likes Sneak Attacks), July 22, 2013, at http://junshi.xilu.com/20130722/news_340_376553.html. 73 Luo Yuan, “Fanfan riben touxi zuo zhongxing zhanzhen zhunbei” (Taking Pre- cautions against Japan’s Sneak Attack and Preparing for a Medium-Sized War), Wenweipo, January 22, 2013. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 74 See “Teng Jianqun riben xihuan touxi daguo zhongguo bixui jingti” (Teng Jianqun: Japan Likes Sneak Attacks against Big Countries and China Must Be Vigilant), December 7, 2012, at http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/diaoyu daozhengduan/content-2/detail_2012_12/07/19944980_0.shtml. 75 Wang Shengguang, “Junren buke yi ri wubei” (Soldiers Cannot Let Their Guard Down on Any Day), Jiefanjun bao, February 11, 2013. 76 For studies on the necessary and sufficient conditions of war, see Gary Goertz and Jack S. Levy, “Causal Explanation, Necessary Conditions, and Case Studies,” in Gary Goertz and Jack S. Levy, eds, Explaining War and Peace: Case Studies and Necessary Condition Counterfactuals (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 9–45. Also, Jack S. Levy and William S. Thompson, Causes of War (New York: Willey-Blackwell, 2010). China’s changing NFU policy 147 77 Su Zhirong, “Yulun maotou ying zhizhi riben junguo zhuyi” (The Dart of Public Opinion Campaigns Should Point to Japan’s Militarism), Huangqiu shibao, October 25, 2012, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2012-10/3214476.html. 78 For Fan Jin’s assessment, see “Jiafangjun zhuanjia xuezhe miji fasheng guanzhu diaoyudao wenti” (PLA’s Experts Express Intense Concerns over the Diaoyu Islands Issue), August 24, 2012, at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2012-08-24/1713 698924.html. 79 Yan Ming, “2012 zhongri donghai kongquan duiyan” (Assessing China–Japan Air Dominance in 2012), Hangkong zhishi, November 2012, pp. 28–31. 80 Guan Dai, “Diaoyudao haiqu junshi xingdong yaosu” (Key Elements of Military Operations around the Diaoyu Islands), Hailukong guanxing shijie, November 2012, p. 3. 81 Ibid., p. 5. 82 Ibid. 83 This is a special supplementary issue of Binggong keji, which is published by the Chinese defense industry. The title of the supplementary issue is Jiaru zhongri kaizhan? Zhongri hai kong jun shili bijiao (If China and Japan Are at War: Comparing China and Japan’s Naval and Air Capabilities). This special supplementary issue was published in December 2012 and has 160 pages. 84 Ning Ling, Zhang Huaibi, and Yu Fei, Zhanlue weishe (Strategic Deterrence) (Beijing: junshi yiwen chubanshe, 2010), p. 4. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid., p. 5. 87 The PLA Academy of Military Science, Zhanluexue (The Science of Military Strategy) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2013), p. 173. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid., pp. 173–174. 90 Michael Glosny, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs, “US–China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VII Report,” May 2013, US Naval Postgraduate School, pp. 26–27. 91 Ibid., p. 26. 92 Xinhua News Agency, “Zoujin zhongguo changgui daodan budui: kaiqi hechang jianbei shuangchung weishe xinjiyuan” (Walking into China’s Conventional Missile Forces: the Beginning of a New Era of Conventional-Nuclear Dual Deterrence), June 10, 2012, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-06/10/c_ 123260296.htm. 93 For an original report on these Chinese missile tests, Bill Gertz, “Chinese Missile Tests Continue: China Conducts Fourth Flight Test of Mobile ICBM,” The Washington Free Beacon, September 4, 2012, at http://freebeacon.com/national- security/chinese-missile-tests-continue-2. 94 See “Jiefangjun shi jian yizai mei fandaowang xiang mei ri shiwei” (The PLA Testing Its Swords to Show Power to the United States and Japan), Taikungpao, Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 September 3, 2012. 95 Ibid. 96 For Xiong’s comment, see Joseph Kahn, “Chinese General Threatens Use of A- Bomb If U.S. Intrudes,” The New York Times, July 15, 2005. While this report was about PLA Major General Zhu Zhenghu’s comments on China using nuclear weapons in a Taiwan Strait war scenario, it also discussed similar comments by General Xiong during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis. For an academic study of Xiong’s comments, see Wallace J. Thies and Patrick C. Bratton, “When Governments Collide in the Taiwan Strait,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4 (December 2004), pp. 556–58. 97 For video images of Luo’s comments on TV, see “Luo Yuan zhongguo haijun shuiye bupa ri tuiyan chiren shuomeng” (Luo Yuan: Chinese Navy Is Afraid of 148 China’s changing NFU policy No One, Japan’s War Simulation Like Crazy Fantasy), at http://baidu.v.ifeng. com/kan/spGm/spU4. For the full text of Luo’s comments, see “Beihai donghai jiandui ruo zao zhongchuang zhongguo jiang ji chu hedan” (If the North Sea Fleet and East China Sea Fleet Are Destroyed, China Will Use Nuclear Weapons), Duowei News, October 30, 2012, at http://military.dwnews.com/news/2012-10-30/ 58932751-all.html. 98 Duowei News, ibid. 99 Xinhua News Agency, “Luo yuan zhongguo zai hexin liyi shou genben weihai shi huo huiyong hewu” (Luo Yuan: China May Use Nuclear Weapons If Its Core Interests Face Fundamental Harms), April 17, 2013, at http://news/xinhuanet. com/world/2013-04/17/c_124593680.htm. 100 See Huanqiu shibao, “Yin Zhuo riben ruo zao he daji keneng zhege minzu jiou bu cunzaile” (Yin Zhuo: If Japan Is Attacked by Nuclear Weapons, This Nation Will No Longer Exist), February 19, 2014, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/ 2014-02/4842993.html. 101 Shen Dingli, “Gaishan heweishe xiazu dui wuo zhuquan tiaoxun” (Modifying Nuclear Deterrence to Deter Provocations to Our Sovereignty), Huanqiu shibao, August 2, 2013, at http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2013-08/4199966.html. 102 Wu Junfei, “Dongya bianju zhong di zhongguo hewu” (China’s Nuclear Deter- rence and East Asia’s Fast Changing Situation), Huanqiu shibao, August 28, 2013, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2013-08/4286685.html. 103 Ibid. 104 Long Xingchun, “Zhongguo he zhengce bufang jiang qingchu” (China’s Nuclear Policies: It’s Better to Clarify Them), Huanqiu shibao, January 15, 2013, at http:// mil.huanqiu.com/paper/2013-01/3494869.html. 105 The Government of People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo wuzhong liliang di duoyanghua yunyong baipishu (The White Paper on the Multiple Applications of China’s Military Forces), April 16, 2013, at http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov. cn/jrzg/2013-04/16/content_2379013.htm. 106 James M. Acton, “Is China Changing Its Position on Nuclear Weapons?” The New York Times, April 18, 2013. 107 Yao Yunzhu, “China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy,” April 23, 2013, at http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-28-china-will-not-change-its-nuclear-policy. 108 See The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2008 nian zhongguo di guofang (China’s National Defense in 2008), January 2009, at www.mode.gov.cn/ affair/2011-01/06/content_4249949.htm. 109 Yao, “China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy”. 110 Xinhua News Agency, “Luo yuan zhongguo zai hexin liyi shou genben weihai shi huo huiyong hewu” (Luo Yuan: China May Use Nuclear Weapons If Its Core Interests Face Fundamental Harms), April 17, 2013, at http://news/xinhuanet. com/world/2013-04/17/c_124593680.htm. 111 Xinhua News Agency, “Guofangbu ri fang ruo jiluo zhongguo wuren ji zhong Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 fang jiang guoduan fanji” (The Defense Ministry: If Japan Shoots down Chinese Unmanned Drones, China Will Hit Back Right Away), October 27, 2013, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2013-10/27/c_125604984.htm. 112 See “Yangshi jiemi zhongguo shouzhi heqianting budui bao zhenkui huamian” (The CCTV Reveals China’s First Nuclear Submarine Forces with Precious Images), October 28, 2013, at http://mil.sohu.com/20131028/n389027813.shtml. 113 See Huanqiu shibao, “Zhongguo shouci jubei dui meiguo youxiao di shuixia zhanlue he weishe” (For the First Time China Possesses Credible Under-Sea Nuclear Deterrent against the United States), October 28, 2013, at http://mil. huanqiu.com/militaryvision/2013-10/2714866.html. 114 For Li Jie’s comments, see Huanqiu shibao, “Zhongguo heqianting liangxiang yin caiyi wai mei haoqi zhendui na guo” (The Debut of Chinese Nuclear China’s changing NFU policy 149 Submarines Invites Guessing from Foreign Media Regarding Its Targeted Country), October 29, 2013, at http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2013-10/ 4500689.html. 115 See Renmin ribao, “Zhongguo gaodiao xuanchuan shouzhi qianting budui jinfang caqiang zouhuo” (China’s High Profile Propaganda about Its Nuclear Submarine Forces Is Designed to Prevent Accidental War), August 28, 2013. 116 Ge Chong, “Jiemi shashou cang xuanji” (Ploys Hidden in the Revelation of Assassins), Wenweipo, October 28, 2013. 117 Sun Kejia, “Yushi gongjin jiaqiang junshi zhanlue zhidao” (Military Strategies Need to Evolve with Time), Xuexi shibao, February 25, 2013. 118 Ibid. 119 Evan S. Medeiros, “Evolving Nuclear Doctrine,” in Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner, eds, China’s Nuclear Future (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), p. 73. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 6 China’s nuclear assertiveness and East Asian security

This book has revealed the important changes in China’s nuclear capabilities and doctrines. Chapter 6 explores the impacts of China’s nuclear assertiveness on regional security. It first examines the stability of the Sino–US strategic relationship. Major realist international relations theories all predict pessimistic scenarios for the future relationship between the two countries. Recent developments in regional security also indicate rising prospects of military conflicts between them. This chapter suggests that the perceived imbalance of power between China and the USA could further destabilize their strategic relationship. The chapter then examines whether China’s rising nuclear capabilities and murkier commitment to the no-first-use principle may contribute to greater strategic stability with the USA. While the Cold War experience suggests that mutual vulnerability tends to be conducive to strategic stability, some Amer- ican analysts fear that this scenario may actually embolden China to pursue more aggressive regional strategies, thereby destabilizing strategic stability. They therefore advise the US to seek superiority, primarily through expanded missile defense. This book argues, however, that the emerging Chinese nuclear posture will make mutual deterrence an inevitable reality. The chapter next analyzes the impact of China’s nuclear capabilities on the US regional alliance system. In theory, China’s more robust nuclear deterrence will make it increasingly difficult for the USA to fulfill its security obligations to its allies and friends in future conflict scenarios. While US nuclear dominance has allowed it to achieve escalatory dominance over its adversaries, China’semerging Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 nuclear capabilities and evolving nuclear doctrines pose direct challenges to the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence in the region. In that context, Chapter 6 examines Japan’s future trajectory. If China’s rising nuclear capabilities imply questionable US security commitment to the defense of Japan, Tokyo might be motivated to pursue the nuclear option. In fact, structural realism’s insights into states’ balancing behaviors suggest that this scenario is realistic in the long term. Recent evidence indicates that Japan may have embraced a hedging strategy that prepares for a future nuclear option. Chapter 6 in particular analyzes China’s perceptions of the prospect of a nuclear Japan. Nuclear deterrence and regional security 151 The troubled Sino–US strategic stability Ever since China started its spectacular rise in the 1990s, international analysts have been discussing the possibility of a hegemonic war that has characterized past power transitions. While the two countries are now intertwined in many aspects of their diplomatic, economic, and societal relations, whether they will be able to maintain strategic stability remains questionable. Both international relations theory and current trends in their bilateral relations generate pessimism. In fact, all major strands of realist international relations theory suggest scenarios of rising conflicts between China and the USA. This begins with structural realism and its defensive realist variant, which emphasize the anarchic order of international relations and its impacts on state behaviors. Waltz argues that this anarchic order forces states to pay the utmost attention to their security.1 In fact, they have to treat their survival as the foremost national goal. Therefore, states carefully watch the power trajectories of other countries to ensure that the balance of power shift will not harm their national security. According to defensive realism, states’ efforts to improve their security, such as military buildup, inevitably cause concerns in other countries. The ensuing security dilemma generates rising mistrust between states.2 The end result can be arms races and security rivalries between countries that only care about their survival. According to structural realism, China and the USA should face intensifying strategic rivalry in the years to come. While defensive realism argues that pure security seeking states could signal benign intentions to each other and take appropriate measures to moderate the security dilemma, the reality is that digesting other countries’ long-term intentions is always difficult and states thus prefer to use an assume-the-worst approach that inevitably causes mutual mistrust.3 Indeed, China’s rise and its relentless efforts to modernize its military have caused mounting concerns in the USA. In return, many Chinese strategists believe that the USA is determined to stop the further rise of China and this explains its recent shift toward a containment posture toward China. Thus, the security dilemma between the two countries has been intensifying and should imply greater security rivalry in the future.4 While structural realism and its defensive realist variant see security mistrust

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 as a source of Sino–US security rivalry, offensive realism, which is another variant of structural realism, offers even more compelling and pessimistic predictions. According to John Mearsheimer, the founder of offensive realism, the structure of the international system offers powerful incentives for every major state to expand its power. Due to the insecurity generated by an anarchic international system, states are obsessed with their relative power: “The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states.”5 As Mearsheimer puts it, “states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival.”6 152 Nuclear deterrence and regional security As a consequence, Mearsheimer claims that the ultimate aim of a state is to be more powerful than all other states. As he argues, “Indeed, the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon, because no other states can seriously threaten such a mighty power.”7 Due to the same quest for hegemony, “There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominant position over potential rivals.”8 Since all great powers are “primed for offense,” meaning that great powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of power in their favor, they are trapped in relentless strategic rivalries with each other. This “tragedy” applies to US–China relations too. As Mearsheimer argues, a US policy of engagement toward China “is doomed to fail. If China becomes an economic powerhouse it will almost certainly translate its economic might into military might and make a run at dominating Northeast Asia.”9 Due to this expected Chinese behavior, Mearsheimer predicts sustained strategic rivalry between China and the USA. According to him:

Neither its neighbors nor the USA would stand idly by while China gained increasing increments of power. Instead, they would seek to contain China, probably by trying to form a balancing coalition. The result would be an intense security competition between China and its rivals, with the ever-present danger of great-power war hanging over them. In short, China and the United States are destined to be adversaries as China’s power grows.10

Power transition theory is equally pessimistic concerning the future. The theory emphasizes uneven development that changes the relative positions of great powers in the hierarchy of the international system.11 Indeed, hierarchy is the defining feature of the international system and it rests on an inverted power structure, which includes a dominant power at the top, great powers at the next level, and middle/small powers at the bottom. In particular, one of the great powers could experience an accelerated growth of its power, which allows it to catch up with or even overtake the dominant power in the international system. Such a phenomenon of power transition generates instability and even prospects of conflicts between the rising state and the declining one. The reason is that an ascending state, such as China, poses threats to the Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 dominant state by changing the relative power between them. One of the most important assumptions of realism is state’s concern for relative power, i.e. the ratio of power between two states. Given that a rising state by definition is closing the gap in relative power with the dominant state, power transition generates a zero-sum relationship between them and triggers a strategic rivalry. Moreover, while the dominant power is status quo oriented, a rising great power is normally revisionist oriented. According to power transition theory, rising states are typically dissatisfied powers. Given that the dominant power sets the rules for international relations, rising states desire greater influence in the international system by sharing some of the rule-making power. However, Nuclear deterrence and regional security 153 rule-making power constitutes an important part of the relative power of the dominant state over the mere great powers. As argued by Organski and Kugler, challengers or revisionist states “want a new place for themselves in the international society” in order to “redraft the rules by which relations among nations work.”12 In this context, conflicts between the dominant power and a dissatisfied rising great power become a structural outcome of power transition. In fact, power transition theory predicts that when the power ratio between the challenger and the dominant power approaches equilibrium, the probability of war increases. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke believe that a power transition increases the chance of war between China and the USA. The probability of war will be especially high when China achieves roughly 80% of the power of the USA.13 Dale Copeland’s dynamic differential theory also examines how the changing relative capabilities (i.e. dynamic differentials) in military, economic, and potential power between states affect the probabilities of war. However, unlike power transition theory that typically sees rising states as challengers to the status quo and therefore the source of major wars, Copeland argues that declining states are more likely to initiate wars.14 He points out that historical evidence suggests that declining powers have strong incentives to use preventive wars to avert a power transition. This is especially the case if a state declines in a bipolar system and when it sees its own decline as steep and inevitable. This scenario in many ways resembles the current power relationship between China and the USA. Although the USA still enjoys overall power advantages over China, the latter is expected to surpass the US in economic power in the coming decade. China’s economic advantage could then help its military power to achieve parity at a later time. In this sense, the US is expected to see a steep and inevitable decline in latent power first and then in military power. This scenario will contribute to the rise of a new bipolar system at some point. According to Copeland, a bipolar system, due to the lack of possibility of finding allies to balance the rising state, may motivate the dominant state to choose preventive war. Therefore, all four realist international relations theories predict rivalries, conflicts, and even wars between a rising China and a USA in relative decline. While defensive realism emphasizes the security dilemma as a source of rivalry between the two countries, offensive realism, power transition theory, and Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 dynamic differential theory offer even more compelling analyses of the rising instabilities in US–China relations. Offensive realism believes that the structure of international relations turns every great power into a revisionist state, determined to acquire as much power as possible. The inevitable outcome of such offensive behaviors is the “tragedy of great power politics.” In contrast, power transition theory sees a struggle between a rising dissatisfied state bent on revisionist goals and declining dominant state bent on defending the status quo. Dynamic differential theory, instead, emphasizes the strong preventive war motives of a state in steep and inevitable decline in latent power, especially in a bipolar system. 154 Nuclear deterrence and regional security Recent trends in the security of the Asia Pacific region seem to confirm the above pessimistic predictions by realist international relations theory. In recent years, China is believed to have become increasingly assertive in its regional policy. China is seen to be pursuing a variety of revisionist policies in the region and they concern the South China Sea disputes, East China Sea disputes, and a regional strategy that seeks to establish a Chinese sphere of influence.15 The aftermath of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, in which the USA responded feebly to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, has further amplified other countries’ concerns for an expansionist China. Recent heightened confrontations between China and other countries in the South China Sea and Beijing’s decision to establish an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea seem to point toward rising Chinese revisionism. The above changes in Beijing’s regional policies have led to an increasingly hard-line posture of the USA.16 Indeed, recent rhetoric of American leaders seems to imply greater US determination to defend its allies and friends in regions that are facing potential threats from China. For example, during US President Barack Obama’s April 2014 trip to Japan and the Philippines, he sent out strong messages regarding US security commitments to these countries, both of which are embroiled in territorial disputes with China.17 In fact, some even argue that the USA has decided to draw a “red line” for an assertive China. For example, US Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel bluntly warned China in April 2013 not to try a “Crimea-style act” in Asia.18 Due to the seeming creeping up of US resolve to confront China in the region, the risk of war between China and the USA has clearly increased. In this context, there have been increasing prospects of crises and even wars between China and the USA in East Asia. According to a report by the Wall Street Journal in April 2014, “The US military has prepared options for a muscular response to any future Chinese provocations in the South and East China Seas, ranging from displays of B-2 bomber flights near China to aircraft-carrier exercises near its coastal waters.”19 This recent US shift toward a harder posture toward China will inevitably generate strategic instability. As the Wall Street Journal report states:

Under the US options, any new moves in the region by China to assert its claims unilaterally would be met by an American military challenge to Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 get Beijing to back down. US oﬃcials said the White House would be prepared to step up military deployments in disputed waters in the South and East China Seas, in a more direct challenge to Chinese claims there than the US has taken in the past. … The steps can be taken without risking a shooting war, oﬃcials say, citing intelligence that suggests there are divisions within the Chinese military establishment about how to respond.20

The planned increase in US military responses to Chinese assertiveness in the region could be highly destabilizing. The US actions could trigger an Nuclear deterrence and regional security 155 escalation of crises and generate momentum for wars. Even worse, the perceived Chinese willingness to back down in the face of US military challenges could be based on dangerous misperceptions of China’s resolve to hold its ground in a crisis scenario. Unfortunately, the current strategic momentum is pushing the two countries toward greater strategic instability. In fact, James Clad and Robert A. Manning argue that the bilateral relationship might have reached a “dangerous tipping point.”21 They suggest that China’s rising power has made it increasingly aggressive. As a consequence, “Along the western Pacific, and in Asian land borders elsewhere, the basic assessment of China’s long-term intent is changing. In particular, the notion of a cooperative US–Chinese economic relationship, balanced nicely by security hedging, has run aground.”22 Indeed, as warned by Clad and Manning, “If China continues to move towards open challenge of our bedrock interests, it cannot complain if we come to play the resulting contest in ‘full spectrum’ mode.”23 Chinese strategists also see increasing prospects of strategic instability. As pointed out by Zhang Zhengwen, a PLA expert, strengthening US commitment to the defense of its allies and partners will sharply increase the prospects of war due to the third-party factors. According to his analysis, the USA seeks to use Japan and the Philippines to stir up territorial conflicts with China as part of its containment strategy. However, as Zhang argues, this game plan of the USA will lead to a dangerous over-commitment to Japan and the Philippines and raise the prospect of direct military conflicts with China.24

Nuclear deterrence and Sino–US strategic stability The above indicates prospects of increasing strategic instability between China and the USA. Recent changes in the foreign and security policies of the two countries are pushing them toward intensifying strategic rivalry and heightened probabilities of military conflict. This section explores whether China’s rising nuclear capabilities and murkier commitment to the no-first-use principle will positively or negatively affect the strategic stability between the two countries. According to David Yost, an expert on nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, strategic stability is “widely used to signify the objective of avoiding major- Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 power war.”25 Indeed, “strategic stability in US–Soviet relations amounted to the avoidance of direct war and successful management of crises that might have led to nuclear war.”26 However, Yost points out that the two sides had different conceptions of strategic stability. While the USA believed that nuclear deterrence and the right kind of nuclear force structure shaped stability, the Soviet Union adopted a political perspective of the concept. It “saw instability as deriving fundamentally from political factors rather than force structure.”27 In this regard, the current Chinese perspective on Sino–US strategic stability has a similar approach. As PLA scholar Lu Yin points out in her analysis 156 Nuclear deterrence and regional security of Sino–US strategic stability, in contrast to the central importance of nuclear deterrence to the US–Soviet strategic stability, “the nuclear relationship between China and the United States is only a minor aspect of the overall relationship.”28 Instead, Lu argues that the current China–US relationship “is a cooperative partnership.” According to this conception of the nature of the relationship between the two countries, China argues that Sino–US strategic stability should be based on cooperation in multiple areas, including economic interdependence and shared regional as well as global interests.29 Due to this Chinese approach to strategic stability, China has proposed the “new type of major power relationship” concept to promote strategic stability with the USA. According to the Chinese conception, China and the USA should base their strategic relationship on mutual respect of core interests and bilateral cooperation in regional and global affairs. Indeed, China’s claimed intent is to transcend the classic trap of wars between rising states and declining dominant states.30 While it is right for China to suggest political cooperation as the foundation of strategic stability with the USA, crisis stability is still vital for the two countries to minimize the prospect of war. In fact, even Lu Yin recognizes that predictability and avoiding mistakes are the two key elements of strategic stability.31 However, for the Chinese, how to achieve predictability and avoid vital mistakes is not well specified. The Cold War experience, on the other hand, suggests the centrality of nuclear deterrence in achieving the above goals. As Yost points out, “The behaviors and declarations of US and Soviet leaders suggest strongly that the risks of highly destructive nuclear operations contributed to the prevention of major-power wars and hence underpinned a form of strategic stability.”32 According to Yost, “Both sides became cautious about risk-taking that could lead to direct hostilities, particularly after they came to the brink of nuclear war in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.”33 Yost suggests that mutual nuclear deterrence, especially the development of secure second-strike capabilities, has generated both crisis stability and arms race stability. Nuclear deterrence has diminished possible incentives to strike first in a crisis and removed incentives to invest in strategic defense or additional offensive strike forces.34 The above strategic stability models, according to Yost, are based on mutual vulnerability.35 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Yost points out that while the Soviet leadership did not fully accept these US strategic stability concepts, the prospect of nuclear wars nonetheless stabilized the relationship between the two countries. As he emphasizes, “Each side’s maintenance of secure second-strike forces may have contributed to stability from the late 1960s to the end of the Cold War.”36 This book argues that the Cold War experience sheds lights on the rising strategic instability between China and the USA. While mutual nuclear deterrence and mutual vulnerability contributed to cautious behaviors by both the USA and the Soviet Union in the latter part of the Cold War, they are supposed to be absent in the current Sino–US strategic relationship. In Nuclear deterrence and regional security 157 fact, the rising tendency toward greater strategic instability is due to the perceived imbalance of capabilities. While China has made vast progress in its military modernization, the USA remains the dominant military power in both conventional and nuclear aspects. This perceived power imbalance may push the bilateral relationship toward greater instability. As the Wall Street Journal report suggests, the US intends to use its superior military capabilities to force China to “back down in” certain scenarios that involve aggression by the latter against US allies and friends.37 This perception of imbalance, however, is due to misperceptions. While the US conventional military capabilities vastly exceed China’s, the latter could use its nuclear weapons to offset the American advantages. In fact, China has already signaled nuclear deterrence in the East China Sea to deter Japan’s possible escalation of the territorial dispute. In scenarios that involve Amer- ican military intervention in a crisis between China and US allies and friends, Chinese nuclear deterrence could significantly balance American conventional military advantages. Although China’s nuclear capabilities are vastly weaker than those of the USA, it is nonetheless acquiring a secure second-strike capability in the form of a new generation of strategic nuclear submarines and sea-based strategic missiles. Moreover, as Robert Jervis famously argued during the Cold War, due to the peculiarly destructive ability of nuclear weapons, “nuclear superiority doesn’t matter.”38 As long as both parties possess secure second-strike capabilities, a larger force capability of one side does not give it superiority in a crisis scenario. Instead, as emphasized by Jervis, what actually determines the outcome of a nuclear crisis scenario is the “balance of resolve.”39 According to Jervis, “resolve is not so much an overall characteristic of an actor as it is a factor that varies with the situation because it reflects the strength of the state’s motivation to prevail on a given issue.”40 In the above Sino–US nuclear scenarios, China may have the upper hand due to the balance of resolve issue. As Yost argues, in a likely crisis situation China’s nuclear deterrence should be more credible than the USA as the stakes involved are vastly different for the two sides. According to him:

US quantitative superiority in strategic forces would not, in other words, necessarily mean that extended US deterrence would prevail. It might take less to deter the United States than to deter China in speciﬁc contingency. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Depending on the circumstances, the stakes might be higher in a Taiwan crisis for China than for the United States, and China’s willingness to run risks might be correspondingly greater than that of the United States.41

While the perceived power imbalance is partly due to a misperception of capabilities, it is also the outcome of a misperception of China’s nuclear resolve. According to the 2014 Pentagon report on China’s military power, its commitment to the no-first-use principle is judged to be relatively robust. If China is believed unlikely to employ nuclear deterrence in a conventional war scenario, then its nuclear capabilities simply do not figure. 158 Nuclear deterrence and regional security However, this view of China’s most important nuclear doctrine is a serious misperception. China’s deterrence behaviors in the East China Sea since 2012 actually indicate that it has made tacit modifications to the no-first-use principle. In fact, China has used a variety of nuclear signaling to deter Japan, which possesses potent conventional capabilities. Facing an even more powerful USA in a crisis situation, China will inevitably rely on nuclear deterrence to prevent war and inevitable defeat. China’s actual behaviors since 2012 have proven that its commitment to the no-first-use principle is fragile and conditional. Finally, the omission of the nuclear factors in the US perceptions of balance of power is also a result of fundamental misreading of China’s national security imperatives, which would motivate Beijing to use all means available to deter wars it cannot win. In fact, the vast US conventional advantages generate precisely the conditions that should compel China to resort to nuclear deterrence to avoid an inevitable defeat. The ruling Communist Party, due to both domestic and strategic imperatives, simply cannot suffer a humi- liating defeat by the USA or the US–Japan alliance. In fact, such a defeat outcome would generate regime collapse scenarios for the ruling party, which has already lost much of its legitimacy due to widespread corruption, abuse of power by officials on many levels, and vast socioeconomic inequalities in today’s China. Unfortunately, the US misperception of the Chinese nuclear resolve is rampant and could contribute to rising strategic instability between the two countries. Indeed, the Pentagon’s misperception of the issue is further illustrated by its Air-Sea Battle doctrine, which is designed to strike deep into China to destroy its offensive conventional military capabilities, such as anti- ship ballistic missiles that pose serious threats to US aircraft carriers.42 However, this doctrine (including its critics) does not imagine any scenarios of China either exercising nuclear deterrence before the outbreak of war or actually employing nuclear weapons during war. The Air-Sea Battle doctrine just assumes that the USA could use its conventionally superior forces to defeat China in a future war. This failure to mention the nuclear scenario is a fatal and extremely dangerous misperception on the part of the US military. The reality is that China will inevitably exercise nuclear deterrence in scenarios that involve conventionally superior adversaries that threaten its core Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 national interests. The East China Sea crisis since 2012 is the best evidence. In fact, the June 2012 high profile announcement by China that its conventional missile brigades are now armed with tactical nuclear warheads represents an unmistakable signal that it will use either nuclear deterrence or nuclear war to prevent harm to its core national interests. This book argues that China’s changing nuclear posture could remove the above US misperceptions of its capabilities and resolve. The current misperceptions are in part due to China’s small nuclear deterrent of the past and its seemingly steadfast commitment to the no-first-use doctrine. Now, the expansion of China’soffensive strike capabilities will inevitably redefine US Nuclear deterrence and regional security 159 perceptions of the balance of power. In fact, as the book has argued, China’s emerging offensive capabilities will no longer be equated with minimum deterrence. Instead, China will acquire the capabilities of a medium nuclear power. By doing so, China’s nuclear posture will also shift from one that merely seeks assured retaliation to one that possesses the ability of assured destruction of its adversaries. Moreover, China’s increasingly murky commitment to the no-first-use principle should also redefine the US perception of its nuclear resolve in a crisis situation. In fact, China should become more candid about its no-first- use policy. It should acknowledge that the policy is conditional, as demonstrated by the East China Sea crisis since 2012. A less ambiguous Chinese deterrence doctrine should facilitate Sino–US strategic stability by removing American misperceptions of China’s nuclear resolve in a crisis that concerns its core national interests. Therefore, the changing nuclear posture of China, defined by a secure second-strike capability and a more conditional approach to the no-first-use principle, could improve Sino–US strategic stability. This scenario implies that Sino–US strategic stability may eventually become more stable, just like the evolvement of strategic stability between the two superpowers during the Cold War. Increased mutual vulnerability could generate the same stabilizing effects on the behaviors of China and the USA in crisis situations, thereby improving strategic stability. However, some analysts question this scenario of rising strategic stability due to the expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities. They argue that mutual deterrence could be de-stabilizing as it may encourage China to pursue more aggressive policies toward its neighbors. For example, according to Benjamin Schreer, an Australian nuclear deterrence expert, “A positive interpretation is that China’s nuclear modernization will increase Sino–US stability by enhanc- ing mutual vulnerability.”43 However, as he warned, “simply assuming that a growing Chinese nuclear arsenal equals greater Sino–US crisis stability is questionable.”44 In particular, he points out that American allies in the region may worry that Sino–US mutual deterrence may give China a freer hand in regional affairs. Therefore, Schreer argues that “the US should intensify efforts to ‘assure’ allies such as Australia about the credibility of its defense commitments.”45 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 The above logic that mutual vulnerability between China and the USA may invite greater strategic instability is best illustrated by Robert Pfaltzgraff.As he argues, “the conscious perpetuation of US vulnerability in the mistaken belief that the result will be strategic stability makes no sense. It may even encourage China to attempt to exploit US vulnerability at a time of crisis and lead to undesired escalation based on miscalculation.”46 David Yost also has a critical view on mutual vulnerability as the foundation of Sino–US strategic stability. According to him, China could use the process of establishing mutual deterrence with the USA to seek other political goals. As he points out: 160 Nuclear deterrence and regional security One of the problems with the phrase ‘strategic stability’ is that it can be employed to convey the misleading impression that there is an agreed and enduring consensus on its requirements. It is important to be aware of the risk that the phrase may therefore be used as an instrument of political struggle, as it was during the Cold War.47

According to Yost, accepting Sino–US mutual deterrence may therefore lead to a perception that China could have a free hand in the region, thereby weakening US allies’ confidence in American security commitments in the region. As he argues, “Japanese observers in particular have expressed concerns that the concept of US–Chinese strategic stability might encourage China ‘to be more assertive and confident’ and build up its nuclear arsenal to rough parity with the Untied States.”48 Due to the above apprehensions among some analysts, they prescribe policies that seek US superiority. According to Pfaltzgraff, “For the USA strategic stability can best be enhanced by reducing vulnerabilities, including a strategic nuclear posture that includes deterrence by denial … Therefore, deterrence of China has both offensive and defensive elements.”49 As he emphasizes, “Specifically, this would mean placing greater emphasis on missile defense.” David Yost also suggests measures that could limit the damages caused by China’s nuclear capabilities. As he argues, “The USA and its allies and coalition partners may find it advantageous to invest in superior damage-limiting capabilities, including missile defenses, for multiple reasons: to improve the prospects for successful deterrence and crisis management, to sustain public support and alliance cohesion, and to defend their interests in confrontations with regional powers.”50 The above suggestions of seeking unilateral US superiority through missile defense could in fact destabilize the strategic relations between the two countries. By rejecting mutual vulnerability through missile defense, the USA will further motivate China to expand its offensive nuclear capabilities as well as anti-space capabilities in order to balance future advancement in American defensive capabilities. This outcome will generate “arms race instability” as opposed to the “arms race stability” that formed part of the broader strategic stability during the Cold War. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Moreover, proponents of the USA seeking superiority or deterrence by denial should realize that past US missile defense initiatives have already led to the rise of a more potent nuclear threat from China. To balance the US defensive capabilities, China has transformed its offensive nuclear forces and pursued space warfare capabilities. China’s expanding offensive capabilities and space warfare capabilities have rendered the USA more vulnerable than before. China’s nuclear posture is in fact shifting from one based on minimum deterrence and assured retaliation to one that possesses the ability of assured destruction. In fact, this outcome was predicted by the early critics of US missile defense, who emphasized the self-defeating nature of unilateral quest for Nuclear deterrence and regional security 161 superiority. As argued by Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter in 2001, the US quest for a new deterrence posture that combines offensive and defensive elements would trigger counter-balancing measures by China to restore the broken strategic balance.51 Their predicted outcome, as this book has illustrated, has materialized. Therefore, a more sensible US policy should be the acceptance of the inevitable mutual deterrence that is taking shape. Recent US policies imply that this could be the direction. For example, the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report of the Obama administration mentioned the importance of maintaining Sino–US strategic stability and indicated willingness to provide strategic assurance to China that its nuclear deterrent will not be compromised by US missile defense.52 In addition, the USA has pursued various official and track-2 nuclear dialogs with China in recent years.53 This is a positive development for the establishment of Sino–US strategic stability. However, while Chinese strategists have taken notice of this development, they nonetheless emphasize the vagueness in US position on mutual nuclear deterrence. As pointed out by Lu Yin, a PLA scholar, “However, US policy makers, scholars, and policy analysts have not yet come to any consensus regarding how China–US strategic stability can be defined and how it could be maintained. So far, there has been no official announcement on how it will tackle policies related to US–China strategic stability.”54 The future will thus remain uncertain. It concerns whether the USA will fully accept mutual deterrence and mutual vulnerability as the foundation of its strategic relationship with China. Given the rising competitive dynamics of their relationship, some in the USA may be inclined to seek strategic superiority. However, the rise of Chinese offensive capabilities and anti-space capabilities will inevitably lead to an outcome of mutual deterrence. The USA just needs to recognize this emerging and inevitable reality. However, a relationship based on mutual deterrence will not necessarily increase Sino–US strategic stability. As some have pointed out, such an outcome may encourage China to pursue more assertive policies in the Asia Pacific, thereby destabilizing the overall stability of the region. This issue will be determined by China’s long-term strategic intentions. Mutual nuclear deterrence will not be sufficient to tame great powers’ foreign policies. The posture of the Soviet Union became more aggressive after it had established Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 strategic parity and mutual deterrence with the USA. As a consequence, starting in the mid-1970s the strategic stability between the super powers began to unravel.

China’s nuclear assertiveness and US alliances In addition to its impact on Sino–US strategic stability, China’s changing nuclear posture will also influence the US alliance system in the Asia Pacific region. Given the likely increases in China’s ability to deter the US from fulfilling its security commitments to allies in crisis or war scenarios, how 162 Nuclear deterrence and regional security Washington will be able to maintain its regional influence through the alliance system becomes an important issue. In essence, China’s rising nuclear capabilities and a possible shift in nuclear doctrines will pose a direct challenge to the US extended nuclear deterrence in the region. Due to changes in China’s overall strategic posture in recent years, its disputes with neighboring countries have been on the rise. This includes territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. In fact, conflicts between China on the one hand and US allies such as Japan and the Philippines on the other have sharpened the prospect of wars in the region. Indeed, the Sino–Japanese East China Sea dispute since 2012 has brought them close to the brink of war. In this context, whether the USA will be willing and able to defend its allies has become a central foreign policy challenge. The US post-WWII regional strategy has been based on its bilateral alliance system in East Asia, which forms the basis of its leadership in the region.55 Indeed, the US alliance system has both contributed to regional stability and facilitated its geo-strategic dominance in Asia Pacific. While the USA does not have a military alliance with Taiwan, the Taiwan Relations Act nonetheless stipulates American responsibility for the security of Taiwan. However, as a consequence of power transition, the relative decline of the USA has created increasing strategic dilemmas for Washington. Facing a rising China with rapidly improving military capabilities, US allies and friends in the region have begun to question its commitments to their security. To respond to this confidence problem in the capitals of its allies, the USA has initiated strategic rebalancing to assure these countries that Washington is determined to maintain peace in the region.56 The recent rhetoric of US leaders reaffirming Washington’s commitment to its allies, especially after the 2014 Ukraine crisis, was also designed to address the weakening confidence of its allies and friends. Nonetheless, whether the US will actually use its own military to defend its allies in actual scenarios of war remains a question. During his April 2014 visit to Japan, although President Barack Obama affirmed US commitment to the defense of Japan, he sidestepped a question at the press conference in Tokyo that specifically asked if the US would deploy its military if China attacks the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.57 Therefore, according to one Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 analysis of Obama’s Asian trip, the key issue for US allies is what Washington may actually do in actual crisis scenarios. As the analysis quotes one US security expert, “If the US starts dragging its feet the skeptical whispers could begin again.”58 This book suggests that China’s expanding nuclear capabilities, coupled with murkier commitment to the no-first-use principle, pose rising challenges to the US commitments to its allies. In scenarios that involve conflicts between China and US allies, China may choose to exercise nuclear deterrence to deter the US from fulfilling its alliance obligations, as American conventional superiority would certainly guarantee a Chinese defeat. These Nuclear deterrence and regional security 163 scenarios, which cover the East and South China Seas as well as Taiwan, therefore pose serious challenges to the credibility of US extended deterrence. As suggested by David Yost, “The credibility of extended deterrence commitments depends, among other factors, on the gravity of the interests at stake for the security guarantor, and not only on capability ratios and force posture characteristics.”59 Compared to a potential adversary like China, the strategic stakes for the two parties can be very different. Although the stakes of defending its allies and maintaining its credibility are significant for the USA, for China the stakes involve its core national interests. As Yost concludes, “In the absence of superior US damage-limiting capabilities, however, the risks are higher for Washington, and therefore the credibility challenge is greater.”60 Therefore, because of the asymmetry in stakes and credibility, “China need not attain parity with the USA in nuclear capabilities in order to threaten US allies and hold significant US assets at risk. China’s expanding regional and long- range strike capabilities could complicate US efforts to sustain the credibility of extended deterrence and assure US allies and security partners.”61 David Ochmanek and Lowell H. Schwartz, two experts of the Rand Corporation, also studied the challenges to the USA from nuclear-armed regional adversaries and reached similar conclusions. According to them, these nuclear-armed regional adversaries may be motivated to deter the USA from intervening or projecting military power into the region. In pursuit of this objective:

adversaries could make explicit or implicit threats to escalate. They might also choose this time to remove ambiguities about their own capabilities by openly testing a weapon if this had not already been done or by demonstrating the ability of their forces to strike US forces in the region. Second, if threats to escalate fail to deter the United States from engaging in conﬂict, the adversary will consider using nuclear weapons to blunt or defeat US military operations.62

As Ochmanek and Schwartz then ask:

Can US leaders not be conﬁdent of deterring regional adversaries from Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 using their limited arsenals if the United States maintains its nuclear superiority? We judge that the answer, in certain circumstances, is “no”. The reason lies in an examination of the asymmetries that exist in the stakes, commitments, and capabilities that each side is likely to bring to a prospective conﬂict.63

Because military defeat will mean the end of the adversary regime and because the adversary’s conventional forces cannot prevent military defeat, Ochmanek and Schwartz thus conclude that “it could be very diﬃcult to deter the adversary from rolling the nuclear dice.”64 164 Nuclear deterrence and regional security As they see it, while the nuclear-armed adversaries such as North Korea have vital stakes in preventing defeat:

Decision-makers in Washington (and, perhaps, Seoul) by contrast, probably do not perceive that their truly vital interests are at stake. Accordingly, they will want to avoid a course of action that might result in heavy losses. Under these circumstances, the weaker side has, in a sense, achieved escalation dominance. Profound asymmetries in each side’s perception of its position and of the potential costs and stakes associated with the conﬂict make Pyongyang’s escalation threats highly credible.65

While Ochmanek and Schwartz focus on regional adversaries with limited, even primitive, nuclear capabilities, the USA would certainly face a much more potent nuclear adversary in scenarios that involve China, which possesses the full spectrum of strategic capabilities. If so, the challenge facing US extended nuclear deterrence will be even greater. These likely conflict scenarios, especially those involving Taiwan and China’s conflict with Japan in the East China Sea, genuinely concern Beijing’s core national interests. In fact, the outcomes of these conflicts determine the regime’s survival. This asymmetry between the stakes of China and the USA should imply much greater credibility of Chinese nuclear deterrence than US extended deterrence in the region. These scenarios thus led Rod Lyon, an Australian deterrence expert, to ask the following question: “How long can US extended nuclear assurance last in Asia?”66 He argues that the trend is for the US allies to be increasingly uncertain about Washington’s willingness to “run nuclear risks on their behalf.”67 Therefore, China’s emerging nuclear posture will inevitably affect US alliances in the region. US allies and partners will have rising doubts about Washington’s commitment to their security. The increasing decline in the credibility of US extended deterrence, which is a consequence of China’s rising nuclear capabilities, would imply greater Chinese abilities to deter US intervention in regional conflicts that involve its allies and friends. The power transition between China and the USA is making this prospect not only realistic but inevitable. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Japan’s nuclear prospects In the above context, it is important to examine Japan’s prospects of pursuing the nuclear option. The declining credibility of US extended deterrence as a consequence of the rise of China’s nuclear capabilities should indicate mounting pressure on Japan to shift toward a self-help posture. If so, pursuing nuclear capabilities represents an important strategic option for Japan. In a study of global nuclear proliferation, including scenarios that involve US allies and partners, Kurt Campell and Robert Einhorn made the following observation: “The case studies suggest that the perceived reliability of US Nuclear deterrence and regional security 165 security assurance will be a critical factor, if not the critical factor, in whether such countries as Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey reconsider their nuclear options.”68 Unfortunately for Japan, the rise of Chinese nuclear capabilities is rendering US extended deterrence increasingly less reliable. This prospect inevitably causes concerns in Tokyo. As observed by Michael Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa:

National security oﬃcials in Tokyo have expressed particular concern that China may decide to step beyond its current nuclear posture of minimum deterrence and decide to develop a robust second-strike capability, perhaps with Japan as a primary target. Simultaneously, some Japanese experts worry that US absolute supremacy in nuclear forces may erode in the future… The worst case scenario for these strategic thinkers is that increase in Chinese capabilities and decreases in US capabilities may lead the USA to conclude a bilateral arms control agreement with Beijing that endorses the protection of a Chinese limited nuclear strike capability against the USA, with a decoupling eﬀect that would be devastating for Japan.69

The recent and rapid expansion of Chinese nuclear capabilities, which has made the above scenarios increasingly realistic, may push Japan toward the nuclear direction. According to a 2013 study by Richard Samuels and James Scholl, the world “cannot dismiss a nuclear-armed Japan as a purely academic exercise.”70 For example they note that in 2013 Japan declined to join 74 other nations and sign a statement in advance of the next Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review stating that nuclear weapons are inhumane and should not be used under any circumstance. According to Samuels and Scholl, the Japanese government “does indeed believe that some circumstance might warrant the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons.”71 Given the advancement of China’s nuclear capabilities and increasing threats from a nuclear North Korea, Samuels and Scholl suggest that although they do not expect a Japanese nuclear breakout in the near term, the absence of adequate assurances by the USA about its extended deterrence could eventually push Japan toward the nuclear direction. This recent assessment by Samuels and Schoff stands in contrast to an earlier Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 study by Schoff on the same issue. In the context of North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009, he asked the question whether Japan could re-examine the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of non-possession, non-manufacture, and non-introduction. According to Schoff:

The short answer to the nuclear question in Japan is “no.” There is little evidence to suggest that Japan has notably more interest in developing an indigenous nuclear deterrence as a result of North Korea’s tests, and Japan has not taken steps to shorten its theoretical lead time for launching a domestic nuclear weapons program.72 166 Nuclear deterrence and regional security This earlier assessment by Schoff is clearly at odds with his 2013 assessment with Richard Samuels. The contrast indeed reflects both the new reality of China’s accelerated nuclear expansion and the sharp rise in the possibilities of military conflicts between Japan and China in the East China Sea. Indeed, until recently, Japanese strategists had confidence in the vast conventional superiority of the Japan–US alliance over China. As Schoff quotes a former Japanese Foreign Ministry diplomat, “the conventional superiority advantage is critical, because it obviates the whole debate about whether or not Washington would ‘sacrifice Los Angeles to save Tokyo’ in a nuclear exchange.”73 However, recent Chinese military modernization has seen rapid improvement of its conventional capabilities. More important perhaps, China’semerging nuclear capabilities, which could also be used to offset the conventional superiority of the Japan–US alliance, bring the extended nuclear deterrence issue to the forefront. As analyzed in the previous section, due to the perceived difference in the stakes involved in possible scenarios that involve China on the one hand and Japan on the other, the credibility of US nuclear deterrence would not be as robust as China’s. While recent developments in the nuclear balance of power between China and the USA should lead to more Japanese doubt about Washington’s extended nuclear deterrence and motivate it to consider the nuclear option, other studies do not think that such a course would be politically easy. As Toshi Yoshhara and James R. Holmes argue, contrary to conventional wisdom:

Going nuclear would not be easy for Japan. Tokyo would need to divert substantial funding, scarce human capital, and limited stocks of fissile materials (assuming they can be enriched to weapons grade) into a nuclear weapons program. A clandestine effort would be nearly impossible given the exposure of Japan’s civilian nuclear infrastructure to very intrusive non-proliferation inspection and monitoring programs. A fait accompli strategy thus lies out of reach. It would not be an overnight affair to field affordable, effective, and reliable delivery systems. It would require time-consuming processes of training, testing (something banned by an international treaty of which Tokyo has been a devout supporter), Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 and doctrinal development.74

While Yoshihara and Holmes see material and financial constraints on Japan’s nuclear option, Chinese strategists have very different assessments of the issues. According to Wei Guoan, a nuclear expert of the PLA Second Artillery Corps, each year Japan is capable of processing nine tons of weapon- grade plutonium from the six fissile material processing facilities of the country. According to Wei, this quantity could allow Japan to produce 2,000 nuclear weapons. He even surmises that Japan may have secretly processed enough nuclear materials for two to five nuclear explosive devices.75 Nuclear deterrence and regional security 167 A Chinese defense magazine also interviewed Zhou Wei, a missile expert, to analyze Japan’s capabilities to develop and manufacture nuclear weapons. According to Zhou, “Japan needs just several years to possess several hundred nuclear weapons.”76 The key for developing nuclear weapons, as Zhou argues, concerns the availability of weapon-grade nuclear materials. In this regard, he claims that as Japan runs more than 50 nuclear power stations, it can produce 10 tons of plutonium per year and is in possession of roughly 100 tons of plutonium, more than any other country. According to Zhou, this would allow Japan to produce at least 4,000 nuclear weapons.77 In addition, Zhou stresses that Japan possesses advanced research and development capabilities, which would allow it to easily design and test nuclear weapons. He suggests that Japan has the ability to bypass traditional tests of nuclear weapons through computer simulations. In addition, Chinese security experts also see significant Japanese capabilities in developing delivery systems for its nuclear weapons. After Japan successfully launched its Epsilon space rocket in September 2013, a Chinese defense magazine assessed its military implications. According to Long Lemong, chief designer of China’s Long March 3 space rocket, “As for strategic missile capabilities, it won’t take Japan long to have them if it tries. Although Japan may trail us in terms of experiences, it will have greater industrial capacities than us once achieving the necessary technology breakthrough.”78 This Chinese assessment suggests that the Epsilon rocket has a similar throw weight as China’s liquid-propellant DF-5 intercontinental strategic missile and is thus capable of projecting a two-ton warhead over a distance of 10,000 kilometers. According to this assessment, Japan thus does not face technological hurdles in relation to the development of solid-propellant intercontinental missiles. The Epsilon rocket reveals Japan’s capabilities in this regard and should cause concerns for China.79 China has shown not only concerns for Japan’s potential nuclear capabilities but also its nuclear intentions. This is illustrated by the recent incident that involved Japan failing to report 640 kilograms of plutonium to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).80 An official of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission explained that the omission was due to the belief that they were exempt from IAEA reporting requirements. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 However, China did not believe this explanation. The Foreign Ministry spokesperson stressed that Japan’s stockpiling of nuclear materials should be “a matter of grave concerns for the international community.”81 According to a Chinese analysis, the quantity of the plutonium involved could make roughly 80 nuclear weapons.82 An anonymous Chinese expert on nuclear strategy told the media that “Japan has both the intention and capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. Thus, it is possible that Japan deliberately did not report the involved amount of plutonium.”83 IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano, a former Japanese diplomat, said in an interview there is no sign that nuclear material in Japan “has the risk of 168 Nuclear deterrence and regional security being diverted” for military applications. According to him, “All the plutonium in Japan is under IAEA safeguards.”84 While there is no solid evidence that Japan intentionally tried to hide the involved quantity of plutonium, the Chinese suspicion is also reasonable. After all, Japan is a country known for its meticulous following of rules of all kinds. Japan has also been working with the IAEA for many decades and should be familiar with its rules and regulations. Moreover, the incident came after China began to exercise implicit and not so implicit nuclear signaling in the East China Sea. It is not impossible that Japan is taking measures to hedge against the future, when China’s nuclear capabilities will pose even greater threats. Indeed, as emphasized by Samuels and Schoff, in 2013 Japan also refused to join a global non-proliferation statement against the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, a nuclear hedging strategy may be already underway in Japan. This strategy would require Japan to take some necessary steps to prepare for an eventual nuclear scenario if its national security requires it. Such an assumption is highly reasonable. According to the balancing logic of structural realism, states would do anything to safeguard their security. When the US extended deterrence faces increasing credibility problems, Japan needs to shift toward a self-help posture in the nuclear regard. As Samuels and Schoff argue, while there is no immediate prospect of a nuclear breakout for Japan, it is nonetheless possible for Tokyo to embrace the nuclear option in the future. This outcome is dictated by the anarchic order of the international system. China’s rise and its emerging nuclear posture generate mounting security pressure on Japan to consider the nuclear option. Thus, while Japan’s domestic constraints could be significant, the strategic imperatives of anarchy may in the end prevail. This is indeed the insight of structural realism. Japan’s recent political developments, including the planned revision of the 1947 Peace Constitution, indeed illustrate the above logic and make the nuclear scenario likely.

Notes 1 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). 2 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 20, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167–214. 3 For further discussions on defensive realism, see Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128–161. 4 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing the US–China Strategic Distrust (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2012). 5 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 2. 6 Ibid., p. 3. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., p. 2. 9 Ibid., p. 4. Nuclear deterrence and regional security 169 10 Ibid. 11 See A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred. A. Knopf, 1958); A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Ronald Tammen, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan Stam, Carole Alsharahati, Mark Abdollahian, and A.F.K. Organski, Power Transitions (New York: Chatham House, 2000). 12 Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger, pp. 20 and 23. 13 Tammen et al., Power Transitions,p.21. 14 Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), p.15. 15 Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 7–48. 16 Mark Landler, “Obama’s Journey to Tougher Tack on a Rising China,” The New York Times, September 20, 2012. 17 Justin McCurry, “Obama Says US Will Defend Japan in Island Dispute with China,” The Guardian, April 24, 2014; Mark Felsenthal, “Obama Says US Commitment to Defend Philippines Ironclad,” Reuters, April 29, 2014, at www. reuters.com/article/2014/04/29/us-phlippines-usa-obama-IdUSBREA3S02T20140429. 18 David Brunnstrom, “US Warns China Not to Try Crimea-style Action in Asia,” Reuters, April 4, 2014, at www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/04/us-usa-china-crimea- asia-idUSBREA322DA2014-4-4. 19 Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “US Beefs Up Military Options for China as Obama Reassures Allies in Asia,” The Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2014. 20 Ibid. 21 James Clad and Robert A. Manning, “China and America: At a Dangerous Tip- ping Point,” The National Interest, June 10, 2014, at http://nationalinterest.org/ feature/china-america-dangerous-tipping-point-10632. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Zhang Zhengwen, “Zhongmei yao xiaoxin bimian di san fang chongtu” (China and America Must Avoid Conflicts Caused by the Third Parties), Huanqiu shibao, June 18, 2014. 25 David S. Yost, “Strategic Stability in the Cold War: Lessons for Continuing Challenges,” p. 8, Proliferation Paper, No. 36, 2011, The French Institute of International Relations, at www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail@id=6434. 26 Ibid., p. 32. 27 Ibid., p. 18. 28 Lu Yin, “Building a New China–US Strategic Stability,” p. 83, 2012, at www. eastviewpress.com/Files/CIR_6_2012_China%20US%20Stability.pdf. 29 For further analyses of the Chinese perspectives on Sino–US strategic stability, see Thomas Fingar and Fan Jishe, “Ties that Bind: Strategic Stability in the US–China Relationship,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Fall 2013), Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 pp. 125–138. 30 For an elaboration of the concept, see Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s speech at the Brookings Institution on September 20, 2013, “Toward a New Model of Major-Country Relations Between China and the United States,” at www.china. org.cn/world/2013-09/21/content_30086631.htm. 31 Lu Yin, “Building a New China–US Strategic Stability,” pp. 81–82. 32 David S. Yost, “Strategic Stability in the Cold War: Lessons for Continuing Challenges,” p. 11. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., p. 15. 35 Ibid., p. 18. 36 Ibid., pp. 28–29. 170 Nuclear deterrence and regional security 37 Entous and Barnes, “US Beefs Up Military Options for China as Obama Reassures Allies in Asia.” 38 Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Winter 1979–1980), pp. 617–633. 39 Ibid., p. 632. 40 Ibid. 41 Yost, “Strategic Stability in the Cold War: Lessons for Continuing Challenges,” p. 43. 42 For an analysis of the Air-Sea Battle doctrine, see T.X. Hammes and R. D. Hooker Jr., “America’s Ultimate Strategy in a Clash with China,” The National Interest, June 10, 2014, at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/amerias-ultimate-strategy-clash-china- 10633. 43 Benjamin Schreer, “The Future of Sino–US Strategic Stability,” The Strategist, January 16, 2014, at www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-future-of-sino-us-strategic- stability. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Robert L. Pfaltzgraff,Jr.,“China–US Strategic Stability,” pp. 6–7, paper for the Nuclear Order-Build or Break conference, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, April 6–7, 2009, at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ npc_us_china3.pdf. 47 Yost, “Strategic Stability in the Cold War: Lessons for Continuing Challenges,” p. 36. 48 Ibid., p. 47. 49 Pfaltzgraff, “China–US Strategic Stability,” p. 7. 50 Yost, “Strategic Stability in the Cold War: Lessons for Continuing Challenges,” p. 44. 51 Charles L. Glasner and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 40–92. 52 The Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: The Department of Defense, April 2010). 53 For more discussions on the increasing nuclear dialogues between China and the USA, see Michael Glosny, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs, “US–China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VII Report,” May 2013, US Naval Postgraduate School. 54 Lu Yin, “Building a New China–US Strategic Stability,” p. 81. 55 Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009/10), pp. 158–196. 56 Jeff Kingston, “Obama’s Pivot to Asia: Rebalance and Reassure,” The Japan Times, May 3, 2014, at www.japantimes.co.jp/opinon/2014/05/03commentary/ obamas-pivot-asia-rebalance-reassure. 57 See the White House, “Joint Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan,” April 24, 2014, at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2014/04/24/joint-press-conference-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe- japan. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 58 Matt Spetalinick, “Obama Reassures Allies, But Doubt over ‘Pivot’ to Asia Persist,” Reuters, April 29, 2014, at www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/09/us-obama- asia-idUSBReA3S03920140429. 59 David S. Yost, “Strategic Stability in the Cold War: Lessons for Continuing Challenges,” p. 43. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 David Ochmanek and Lowell H. Schwartz, The Challenge of Nuclear-Armed Regional Adversaries (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), p. 37. 63 Ibid., p. 40. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid., p. 65. Nuclear deterrence and regional security 171 66 Rod L. Lyon, “The Challenges Confronting US Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Asia,” International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 4 (2013), p. 931. 67 Ibid., p. 940. 68 Kurt M. Campbell and Robert Einhorn, “Avoiding the Tipping Point: Concluding Observations,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Michell B. Reiss, eds, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004), p. 321. 69 Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan: New Nuclear Realism,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21stCentury Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 354–355. 70 Richard J. Samuels and James L. Schoff, “Japan’s Nuclear Hedge: Beyond ‘Allergy’ and Breakout,” October 2013, The National Bureau of Asian Research, at www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=705. 71 Ibid. 72 James L. Schoff, “Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds, Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), p. 99. 73 Ibid., p. 108. 74 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Introduction,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds, Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), p. 12. 75 Wei Guoan, “Xifang he youshi weiyin caijun er dongyao” (Western Nuclear Advantages Have Not Been Eroded by Arms Control), Huangiu shibao, December 20, 2013. 76 See Jiang Hao, “Riben neng yanzhi chu he wuqi ma? daodan zhuanjia toushi riben zhanlue gongfang nengli” (Is Japan Capable of Developing Nuclear Weapons? A Missile Expert Analyzing Japan’s Strategic Offensive and Defensive Capabilities), Binggong keji, No. 20 (2012), p. 7. 77 Ibid. 78 Zhang Xuesong, “Riben xinyidai guti yunzai huojian Epsilon” (Japan’sNew Generation Solid-Propellant Space Rocket Epsilon), Jianchuan zhishi, November 2013, p. 84. 79 Ibid., p. 85. 80 For a report on the incident, see Austin Ramzy, “China Complains About Plutonium in Japan,” The New York Times, June 10, 2014. 81 Ibid. 82 See Huanqiu shibao, “Ri zhengfu xiang IAeA loubao 640 qianke pu xiangdang yu 80 mei hedan liang” (Japan’s Government Failed to Report 640 Kilograms of Plutonium to the IAEA, Sufficient for Making 80 Nuclear Weapons), June 8, 2014, at http://world.huanqiu.com/article/2014-06/5014143.html. 83 See Huangqiu shibao, “Riben loubao daliang he cailiao beipi qipian shijie zhuanjia Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 cheng bu paichu manbao” (Japan Fails to Report Large Quantity of Nuclear Materials, an Attempt to Deceive the World), June 9, 2014, at http://world.huan qiu.com/exclusive/2014-06/5014411.html. 84 Francois Lenoir, “Japan’s Plutonium Stocks No Reason for Concern-IAEA Chief,” Reuters, March 3, 2014, at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/03/uk- japan-iaea-plotunium-idUKBREA221EE20140303. 7 Conclusion

The conclusion makes broader observations on the role of the anarchic international order in shaping states’ behaviors. It argues that security-related concerns remain central for states in the contemporary world. Economic interdependence and international institutions, which form the core elements of liberal international relations theory, have not been able to change, let alone harness, the anarchic forces in inter-state relations. The conclusion also evaluates the structural approach of this study against alternative perspectives on China’s nuclear posture. It argues that the imperatives generated by an anarchic structure provide better interpretations of China’s emerging nuclear posture than state-level factors, which tend to be emphasized by existing studies. While the technological perspective and the doctrinal perspective seem to be able to explain some of the changes in China’s nuclear posture, this book reveals that ultimately technological progresses and doctrinal developments are themselves driven by the balancing imperatives of an anarchic structure. Finally, this book concludes with predictions of future scenarios for China’s nuclear posture. While structural realism and defensive realism explain the balance of power and balance of threat motives behind China’s nuclear posture, offensive realism may predict China’s quest for strategic parity with the USA. This scenario is likely due to China’s expected rise to the top of the international system in the coming decade. In that context, China may be motivated to seek strategic parity with the USA to solidify its status as a co-super power. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Anarchy, security, and structural primacy This book indicates that anarchy still shapes states’ behaviors. As a result, security remains a key objective of states. Both the US quest for missile defense and China’s responses in the form of offensive expansion and the pursuit of new types of strategic capabilities reflect the insecurity of states in an anarchic international system. As structural realism argues, states seek power to provide their own security. However, the imperatives of self-help also generate states’ balancing motives to hedge against changes in the balance of power between states. The consequences have been security rivalries and arms races. Conclusion 173 Defensive realism complements structural realism in predicting security rivalries. The security dilemma, which is a consequence of anarchy, tends to motivate states to exaggerate the malign intentions of other countries. The result of the security dilemma is an action–reaction spiral that pushes states toward greater mistrust and mutual insecurity. This study on China’s nuclear posture confirms the above insights of structural realism and defensive realism. Anarchy renders security competition between states inevitable and perpetual. Indeed, China’s quest for nuclear capabilities started with its balancing motives. The perceived nuclear threat from the USA during the 1950s was a key driver of China’s nuclear quest. While China later became a nuclear power and has preferred to maintain a small nuclear deterrent in the name of minimum deterrence, the changing balance of power in the international system has forced it to constantly modernize and expand its nuclear capabilities. This balancing imperative has become more astute since the US deployment of a multi-tiered missile defense system. In fact, Chinese strategists recognize the overall defensive motives behind US missile defense. However, in an anarchic international system China has to restore the strategic balance broken by the US efforts to shift to a new superiority posture that combines offensive capabilities with defensive ones. The consequence of Washington’s quest for superiority has been the offensive–defensive strategic arms race between China and the USA. The rise of US missile defense has triggered the expansion of China’soffensive capabilities. Moreover, missile defense has forced China to seek space warfare capabilities and an indigenous missile defense system. In essence, China’s responses to US missile defense are structurally induced behaviors in an anarchic international system. The strategic imperatives of an anarchic order are thus the independent variables that shape the evolution of China’s nuclear posture. As structural realism sees it, the anarchic international system is “an active and autonomous causal force” that affects state behaviors. While many existing studies do recognize the impacts of US missile defense on China’s nuclear forces, they do not explicitly treat the structural imperatives of an anarchic order as the independent variables that shape China’s nuclear evolvement. Instead, they see US missile defense as an intervening variable that could affect China’s nuclear trajectories. In contrast, this book treats balancing and the security dilemma as the central drivers of China’s Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 nuclear posture. The above outcome also vindicates the insights of defensive realism, which predicts security rivalry and arms races even between states that pursue defensive posture. The security dilemma seems to be an intractable challenge to inter-state relations. While the USA has lately attempted to provide strategic assurances to China that its small nuclear deterrent is not the target of missile defense and that the USA values the strategic stability between the two countries, these efforts cannot alleviate China’s profound concerns for its own security. It has to take counter-measures to balance against US efforts to change the strategic balance of power. 174 Conclusion The impact of anarchy on states’ security is also demonstrated in the context of China–Japan relations. The rise of China has triggered increasing security concerns in Japan regarding Beijing’s long-term strategic intentions. In return, China has shown rising worries about Japan’s revisionism to re-emerge as a great power of the world. The result has been an intensifying security dilemma between the two countries in recent years. The 2012 East China dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands brought them to the brink of war. In this crisis, China perceived various kinds of war motives on the part of Japan. To balance against both long-term and imminent threats from Japan to its national security, China has tacitly modified its no-first-use nuclear doctrine to deter the perceived war motives of Japan. In essence, globalization and international institutions have not changed the world. The liberal school of international relations theory paints an overly rosy picture of the “new” world politics, suggesting that economic interdependence and international regimes have significantly harnessed the forces of anarchy.1 However, as realist international relations scholars argue, neither interdependence nor international institutions have really changed the world. As emphasized by both Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, the two greatest structural realists, as long as the anarchic order remains, inter-state relations will continue to be defined by security rivalry.2 In addition to its findings on the roles of balancing and the security dilemma in the shaping of states’ security behaviors, this study also corroborates other insights of structural realism and defensive realism. For example, defensive realists caution against the quest for hegemony as it will lead to counter-balancing by other states. This is why Kenneth Waltz consistently criticized the US pursuit of hegemony in the post-Cold War era.3 Defensive realists, such as Charles Glaser, specifically criticized US efforts to use missile defense to seek unilateral dominance, predicting forceful counter efforts by other states to maintain the strategic balance.4 The development of China’s nuclear capabilities and other types of strategic capabilities has confirmed the insights of defensive realists. China’s emerging nuclear capabilities and space warfare capabilities have made the USA more vulnerable, not less. In essence, the US quest for dominance has backfired, as China is changing its nuclear capabilities from assured retaliation to assured Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 destruction. In the end, the US has not been able to shift the strategic balance of power in its favor.

Evaluating the structural approach The structural approach of this study has shed light on the greater than expected changes in China’s nuclear capabilities and doctrines. Structural realism and its insights on states’ motives and behaviors allow the book to provide a coherent and theoretically informed account of China’s emerging nuclear capabilities as well as the latest changes to its nuclear doctrines. Conclusion 175 A major strength of the structural approach of this book is its ability to focus on change rather than stability regarding China’s nuclear posture. In contrast, existing studies tend to focus on stability over change. The status quo bias of these studies is largely due to their lack of adequate attention to the roles of structural forces of the international system in the shaping of China’s nuclear-related policies and decisions. For example, Taylor Fravel and Evan Medeiros specifically suggest that structural realism has little to offer for the study of China’s nuclear posture.5 Instead, existing studies tend to emphasize state-level factors that supposedly impose various constraints on the evolvement of Chinese nuclear forces and doctrines. This book reveals, however, that structural realism is highly relevant for analyzing and explaining the evolution of China’s nuclear posture. Structural imperatives associated with the anarchic order have powerfully shaped China’s nuclear decisions, forces, and strategies. The balancing motive explains both China’sefforts to expand its offensive nuclear forces and its tacit modifications of the no-first-use principle. Indeed, this book suggests that China’s evolving nuclear posture has revealed both balance of power and balance of threat behaviors. This book also proves that structural imperatives trump state or unit-level variables in shaping the evolution of China’s nuclear posture. While China’s nuclear forces and doctrines do show the influences of its strategic culture and the teachings of Mao and Deng, in the end the balancing imperatives and the security dilemma of an anarchic order prove to be more powerful in determining the direction and scope of changes in China’s nuclear posture. While China prefers to abide by its minimum deterrence and the no-first-use principles, the anarchic international system forces it to pursue various balancing measures that have led to the weakening of both principles. While China’s emerging nuclear posture is moving away from minimum deterrence, its commitment to the no-first-use principle has also become murkier and conditional. Due to its ability to dynamically explain the larger than expected changes in China’s nuclear posture, the structural perspective of this study is superior to existing studies that tend to emphasize stability over change. Nonetheless, it is necessary to evaluate it against alternative approaches of existing studies, which tend to focus on state or unit-level factors. Although this tendency Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 leads to a status quo bias, the technological perspective and the doctrinal approach embodied by some existing studies may offer plausible alternative explanations of the recent changes in the Chinese nuclear posture. The technology perspective suggests technological constraints on China’s nuclear forces and doctrines. However, the logic of this approach also argues that China has been consistently using technological advancements to upgrade its nuclear forces in order to make them more reliable and survivable.6 Indeed, some of the changes of the Chinese nuclear deterrent can be attributed to the technological progresses made by China. For example, China has been making steady efforts to acquire a secure sea-based nuclear strike 176 Conclusion force, which is deemed essential for the credibility of its minimum deterrence and no-first-use doctrines. China’s first-generation SSBN, the Type 094, was noisy and its JL-1 missile also lacked the range to strike the USA. Thus, China has been actively developing the second-generation SSBN, the Type 094, and its matching JL-2 missile. Due to advancement in technologies, China is finally acquiring a genuinely secure second-strike capability. While the technological approach can explain some of the changes in China’s nuclear posture, this study’s structural approach is nonetheless superior. Most importantly, it shows that technological progresses are driven by the structural imperatives of balancing. The rising US defensive capabilities have forced China to pursue MIRV technologies to arm its strategic missiles with multiple and independently guided warheads. In the absence of US missile defense, China chose to arm its strategic missiles with a single warhead. Also, US missile defense has been pushing China to pursue space warfare technologies and indigenous missile defense technologies. The results of these structurally induced technological changes have been China’s new three-dimensional nuclear posture. A pure technological perspective cannot make sense of these more fundamental changes in China’s nuclear posture. The above suggests that while the technological perspective is able to explain some of the changes to China’s nuclear posture, the structural approach of this study can explain more. Also, structural imperatives are themselves drivers of technological changes. This once again reveals the primacy of structural factors in explaining China’s security behaviors and strategies. The doctrinal approach is an ideational model that may also explain China’s recent changes with its nuclear doctrines. For example, according to Alastair Ian Johnston, the concept of limited deterrence once caused internal debates inside China regarding its minimum deterrence doctrine.7 Limited deterrence, compared to minimum deterrence, seeks to deter both conventional and nuclear wars. Moreover, unlike the pure deterrence posture of minimum deterrence, limited deterrence is also geared for warfighting with tactical nuclear weapons, which puts it at odds with China’s no-first-use principle. Johnston’s ideational model implies that new doctrinal ideas may motivate changes in actual nuclear doctrines. However, Johnston failed to see the origins of new military doctrines. For example, he implied that Chinese strategists became aware of NATO’s flexible Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 response doctrine that threatened the first use of tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet armored formations. The fact was that NATO’s flexible response doctrine was a solution to the strategic imperatives of Soviet conventional advantages in Central Europe during the Cold War. In effect, the doctrine was a solution to a strategic problem. In China’s case, until the mid-1980s Chinese strategists faced the same scenario of an invasion by large Soviet armored formations. NATO’s flexible response caught their eyes in that context. Limited deterrence thus became a viable Chinese solution to the military imperative then facing China. Thus, nuclear doctrines are not independent variables that shape nuclear postures. Conclusion 177 Instead, new military doctrines are themselves driven by structural imperatives, such as power imbalance in the real world. China’s recent tacit modification of the no-first-use doctrine and its 2012 high-profile announcement that its conventional missile brigades are now armed with tactical weapons are in fact evidence that China has been shifting toward a limited deterrence posture that seeks to deter both conventional and nuclear wars and is geared for warfighting, not just deterrence. However, this shift is not the result of any new doctrinal developments. Instead, China’s shift toward a limited deterrence posture has been dictated by strategic imperatives. Specifically, China’s continuing conventional disadvantages vis-à-vis the USA and the US–Japan alliance have forced it to rely on nuclear deterrence to deter wars that it cannot hope to win. The East China Sea crisis since 2012 has created realistic prospects of war with Japan and the US–Japan alliance. In that context, China has been compelled to use implicit nuclear deterrence to prevent war in the East China Sea. By doing so, China has shifted its nuclear posture toward one similar to limited deterrence. In essence, changes in China’s nuclear posture are not driven by new doctrinal ideas. They are outcomes of China’s balance of power and balance of threat measures to ensure its own security.

Offensive realism and China’s nuclear future This book uses structural realism and its defensive realist variant to analyze the evolvement of China’s nuclear posture. Their insights on balancing and power provide useful tools to understand China’s nuclear forces and doctrines. In fact, these insights have a good empirical fit with China’s nuclear deterrence. From the very beginning, China’s nuclear deterrent has been defined by the minimum deterrence principle, which just seeks a small retaliatory capability. Recent changes in China’s nuclear capabilities and doctrines reflect its motives to maintain the existing strategic balance of power so that its national security will not be harmed. Therefore, the expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities is not driven by the goal of dominance. Instead, they reflect China’s intention to preserve the existing balance, which has been undermined by the rise of US defensive capabilities. The above shows the relevance of defensive realism, which suggests that states merely crave sufficient Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 power to ensure their security. However, offensive realism may offer alternative insights into the future trajectory of China’s nuclear posture. This is due to the spectacular rise of China, which is pushing it to the very top tier of the international power hierarchy. Recent assessments all suggest a broad convergence of power between China and the USA in the coming decade.8 In this context of China achieving roughly strategic parity with the USA, it may also be motivated to seek nuclear parity. In essence, China may seek nuclear parity to solidify its strategic parity with the USA. Such an outcome will enable China to become a credible co-super power in the international system. 178 Conclusion Recent evidence suggests that becoming a pre-eminent state of the international system constitutes a core national objective of China. President Xi Jinping’s China Dream idea seeks “a great rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation.”9 This vision intends to reclaim China’s past glory as a pre-eminent state of the international system. Although China does not seek to displace the USA from its current position in the world, the China Dream vision nonetheless aims for nothing less than strategic parity with America. This national goal may motivate China to pursue co-super power status in a new world. The recent Chinese strategy to cultivate a “new type of major power relations” with the USA may indicate this ultimate goal for the rise of China. Although China’sofficial rhetoric suggests its intentions to pursue cooperation with the USA, its emphasis on mutual respect for core interests and partnership in regional and global affairs raises the suspicion that China may be aiming for strategic parity with the USA.10 Indeed, China confines its “new type of major power relations” to the Sino–US context, implying a possible motive to define the order of a future bipolar system. In this context, offensive realism may provide important insights into China’s future motives and nuclear trajectories. According to offensive realism, great powers seek to maximize their power and influence in an anarchic world.11 Offensive realists have criticized structural realism and defensive realism for their conservative understanding of states’ motives and preferences. According to offensive realists, states are not satisfied with a mere balance of power. In essence, they are not defensive positionalists. Rather, states seek to maximize their power as they can never be sure how much power is sufficient to ensure their security. Moreover, power shift between states is dynamic and constant and states have to hedge against future power shifts. As offensive realists thus argue, due to the uncertainties of anarchy, states are motivated to maximize power in order to maximize security. China’s grand strategy has been consistent with this offensive realist interpretation of states’ motives. Due to its humiliations at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism, since the late nineteenth century Chinese leaders of all kinds have sought to restore China’s power. Recently, Chinese great leader Deng Xiaoping’s grand strategy focused on the accumulation of China’s latent power through economic reforms and modernization. While this grand strategy has relied on strategic restraint and strategic assurances to avoid Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 counter-balancing by other countries, its fundamental goal is nonetheless the expansion of China’s power and influence in the world.12 So while “peaceful rise” is the means, China ultimately covets the goal of its “great national revival.” Now, as Xi Jinping suggests, “China is closer than ever to achieve this goal of a great national revival.” This strategic reality and rosy future prospect of China returning to the top of the international power hierarchy may motivate it to pursue a full offensive realist posture in world affairs. This includes the pursuit of a broad strategic parity with the USA. To become a co-super power of the world, China may aim for nuclear parity to become the credible equal of the USA. Conclusion 179 The prospect that changes in China’s grand strategy may motivate it to seek strategic parity in general and nuclear parity specifically is also likely for two other reasons. First, the Soviet Union indeed followed this path. Soviet nuclear disadvantages vis-à-vis the USA made it insecure in the earlier parts of the Cold War. As a result, the Soviet Union vigorously expanded its strategic nuclear capabilities in the 1960s to balance US power in this regard. Structural realism and defensive realism may well explain Soviet behaviors during this period. However, after the Soviet Union began to achieve broader strategic parity by the late 1960s, it started to seek formal equality with the USA in world affairs. As some have argued, the strategic nuclear arms talks of the 1970s were the Soviet way of solidifying and formalizing its co-super power status.13 Second, the expected future size of US nuclear capabilities may make parity a realistic scenario for China. In 2010, Russia and the USA signed the New START, which stands for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which calls for each country to limit its nuclear arsenal to 1,550 warheads by the year 2018.14 Fur- ther the Barack Obama administration of the USA has asked for a further reduction of deployed nuclear warheads to just 1,000.15 If this goal eventually materializes, then the prospect for China to achieve nuclear parity with the USA will be realistic and feasible. The emerging Chinese nuclear posture indicates that China may soon possess 400 to 500 strategic warheads once it completes the deployment of at least five Type 094 SSBNs and several dozen DF-41 and DF-31A ICBMs. This prospect is particularly likely if the DF-41, as rumored, is capable of carrying up to 10 warheads. As Chinese official media have reported that even the new DF-25 medium-range missile is capable of carrying three nuclear warheads, the much larger intercontinental missiles such as the DF-31A and the JL-2 should also be armed with multiple warheads. Indeed, Chapter 3 of this book reveals that China sees MIRV capability as essential for penetrating US missile defense. Below are two scenarios of China’s future nuclear capabilities, which assume that each of the 12 JL-2 SLBM of the Type 094 SSBN is armed with five warheads and that the DF-41 ICBM and the DF-31A ICBM are respectively armed with six to ten and three to five warheads. These scenarios, which are based on reasonable assumptions, make “leaping to parity” with the USA realistic and feasible. Basically, by lowering its own Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 strategic nuclear stockpiles to 1,000, the US could make itself a more attrac- tive target of parity. If so, China may choose to go beyond the above scenario

Table 7.1 Scenario 1 of China’s future strategic nuclear capability Number Warhead number Total Type 094 SSBN 5 5x12x5 300 DF-41 ICBM 20 20x6–10 120–200 DF-31A ICBM 30 30x3–590–150 Total warheads 510–650 180 Conclusion Table 7.2 Scenario 2 of China’s future strategic nuclear capability

Number Warhead number Total Type 094 SSBN 8 5x12x5 480 DF-41 ICBM 30 30x6–10 180–300 DF-31A ICBM 40 40x3–5 120–200 Total warheads 780–980

by just modestly expanding the number of deployed SSBNs and land-based strategic missiles, which may lead to the following scenario. The fact is that neither of the above two scenarios are unrealistic, as both are well within China’s financial capabilities. Chapter 3 shows that Chinese strategists are indeed discussing scenarios of an SSBN force of eight to 12 boats. This is not unreasonable. Both Russia and the USA maintain a fleet of 12 SSBNs. As China is expected to become the largest economy of the world, it will certainly be able to afford a similar SSBN force, if it chooses to do so. China may choose to pursue parity if both offensive and defensive realist logics drive its future nuclear posture. While China’s rising power may motivate it to seek co-super power status, future trajectories of US missile defense may also compel it to further expand its nuclear capabilities as well as other strategic capabilities. Indeed, neither side has shown willingness to restrain an offensive–defensive arms race. In June 2014, the PLA Academy of Military Science released its Strategic Assessment 2013, which analyzes security challenges to China. According to the assessment, US missile defense poses a fundamental challenge to China’s national security. The report suggests that US missile defense destabilizes the relations among the major powers and upsets the global balance of power. Specifically, the report warns that US missile defense will “cause other countries to lose their sense of security and trigger responses in the form of expanding their own missile forces and nuclear capabilities.”16 It is therefore highly likely that both offensive realist and defensive realist dynamics will drive China’s future nuclear posture. Its expected quest for super power status and its continuous need to balance against future advancement in American missile defense could together push China to seek nuclear parity with the USA. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016

Notes 1 For a classic statement of liberal international relations theory, see Bruce Russett, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000). 2 For a realist critique of interdependence, see Kenneth N. Waltz, “Globalization and Governance,” PS: Political Science & Politics, December 1999, pp. 693–700. For a critique of the role of international institutions in world politics, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 4–49. Conclusion 181 3 See Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5–41. 4 Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 40–92. 5 M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), p. 49. 6 For a representative study with this perspective, see Brad Roberts, China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2020 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Institute of Defense Analysis, 2003). 7 Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’sNew‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/6), pp. 5–42. 8 For a representative study of the issue, see the US National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: An Alternative World, December 2012, at http://publicintell igence.net/global-trends-2030. 9 For Xi’s China Dream idea, see Renmin ribao, “Xi Jinping zai canguan fuxing zhilu zhanlan shi qiandiao chengqian qihou jiwang kailai jixu zhaozhe zhonghua minzu weida fuxing mubiao fenyong qianjin” (At the ‘Road to Revival’ Exhibi- tion, Xi Jinping Stressed Continuous Eﬀorts to Realize the Grand Goal of a Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation), November 30, 2012. 10 For this interpretation of China’s motive, see James Clad and Robert A. Manning, “China and America: At a Dangerous Tipping Point,” The National Interest, June 10, 2014, at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-america-dangerous-tipping-poi nt-10632. 11 For a classic statement on oﬀensive realism, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). 12 For further analysis of Deng Xiao-ping’s grand strategy for China’s rise, see Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 13 Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War: From Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009). 14 For further details of the 2010 New START agreement, see Tom Z. Collina, “Pentagon Sets Numbers for New START,” Arms Control Association, May 2014, at www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/Pentagon-Sets-Numbers-for-New-START. 15 For this suggestion by the Obama Administration, see Peter Baker, “Obama Has Plans to Cut US Arsenal, if Russia Reciprocates,” The New York Times, June 18, 2013. 16 For a summary of this strategic assessment, see Xinhua News Agency, “Junkeyuan fabu zhanlue pinggu zhongguo mianlin san da taikong weixie” (The Academy of Military Science Releases Strategic Assessment Report, China Facing Three Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Threats), June 20, 2014, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2014-06/20/c_126647404. htm?prolongation=1. Bibliography

Acton, James (2013) “Is China Changing Its Position on Nuclear Weapons?” The New York Times, April 18. Adams, Richard J. and Martin E. France (2005) “The Chinese Threat to US Space Superiority,” High Frontier, 1(3) (Winter): 18–23. Agence France-Presse (2009) “China’s Military Making Strides in Space: US General,” November 3, at www.spacewar.com/reports/chinas_military_making_strides_in_space_ us_general_999.html. Associated Press (2008) “Gates, Chinese Defense Official Spar over Military Growth,” June 1, at www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,361303,00.html. Baker, Peter (2013) “Obama Has Plans to Cut US Arsenal, if Russia Reciprocates,” The New York Times, June 18. Blair, Bruce G. (2005) “General Zhu and Chinese Nuclear Preemption,” China Security, 1(1) (Summer): 15–22. Binggong kej (2010) “640 gongcheng zhongguo fandao shiyan zaoqi tansuo” (Project 640: China’s Early Exploration into Anti-Missile Tests), March. Binggong keji (2013) “Fan weixing wuqi zongheng tan” (Anti-Satellite Weapons), August. Bolt, Paul J. and Albert S. Willner (eds) (2006) China’s Nuclear Future, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Boxun News (2013) “Gaoceng huiyi xi jinping dui diaodao weiji shuo le zhe 16 ge zi” (At a High-Level Meeting Xi Said the Following 16 Words for the Diaoyu Islands Crisis), January 29, at http://boxun.com/news/gb/china/2013/0120130129656/shtml. Bradsher, Keith (2012) “China Is Said to Be Bolstering Missile Capabilities,” The New York Times, August 25. Bradsher, Keith (2010) “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan,” The Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 New York Times, September 22. Brunnstrom, David (2014) “US Warns China Not to Try Crimea-style Action in Asia,” Reuters, April 4, at www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/04/us-usa-china-crimea- asia-idUSBREA322DA2014-4-4. Cai, Fengzhen (2006) Kong tian yiti zuozhan xue (Doctrines for Integrated Air-Space Warfare), Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe. Caijing ribao (2013) “Zhuanjia reyi zhongguo fandao shiyan: xia yibu is yujing weixing” (Experts Discussing China’s Anti-Missile Test; the Next Step Will Be Early Warning Satellites), January 13, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2010-01/686 960.html. Bibliography 183 Campbell, Kurt M. and Robert Einhorn (2004) “Avoiding the Tipping Point: Con- cluding Observations,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Michell B. Reiss, (eds), The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 317–348. Cha, Victor D. (2009/10) “Powerplay Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia”, International Security, 34(3) (Winter): 158–196. Chase, Michael S. and Evan Medeiros (2002) “China’s Evolving Nuclear Calculus: Modernization and Doctrinal Debate,” in James Mulvernon and David Finkelstein, (eds), China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese Liberation Army, Arlington, VA: CAN, pp. 119–154. China News Net (2012) “Riben ruo chudong junjian jiang daozhi diaoyudao xingshi zhibian” (The Diaoyu Islands Situation Will See a Qualitative Change if Japan Deploys Warships), September 21, at www.chinanews.com/mil/2012/09-21/4201237.shtml. Clad, James and Robert A. Manning (2014) “China and America: at a Dangerous Tipping Point,” The National Interest, June 10, at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/ china-america-dangerous-tipping-point-10632. Cleary, Christine A. (2005) “Culture, Strategy, and Security,” in Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner (eds), China’sNuclearFuture, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 13–38. China Times (2013) “Lu hong 6K changjian 10 heti ke hong quan riben” (Mainland’s H-6K and CJ-10 Combination Can Attack the Entire Japan), December 27, at www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/2013122700104-260309. Collina, Tom Z. (2014) “Pentagon Sets Numbers for New START,” Arms Control Association, May, at www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/Pentagon-Sets-Numbers-for- New-START. Copland, Dale C. (2001) The Origins of Major War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Da, Simo (2013) “Zhongguo haiji he liliang di weilai fazhan yu sikao” (Thoughts on the Future Development of China’s Sea-based Nuclear Deterrents), Xiandai jianchuan, November (B edition). Dahl, Fredrik (2012) “Missile Shield May Spark China Nuclear Upgrade: Officer,” Reuters, July 18, at www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/18/us-china-nuclear-idUSBRE8 6H16H20120718. Dai, Yanli (2007) “Wuo zhoubian zousidun jian di yunxing ji weixie” (Aegis-Equipped Warships Pose Threats around Our Periphery), Jianchuan zhishi, September. Dai, Yanli (2013) “Luji he liliang di youshi” (The Advantages of Land-based Nuclear Forces), Bingqi zhishi, March. Department of Defense (2010) 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, April, Washington, DC: The Department of Defense. Department of Defense (2012) Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, Washington, DC: The Department of Defense. Department of Defense (2013) Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, Washington, DC: The Department of Defense. Department of Defense (2013) Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti- Access & Area Denial Challenges, Washington, DC: The Department of Defense, May 12, at www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf. Department of Defense (2014) Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, Washington, DC: The Department of Defense. 184 Bibliography Dicke, Mure (2010) “Japan’s Arrest of Captain Angers Beijing,” The Financial Times, September 8. Dicke, Mure (2010) “Japan to Shift Military towards China Threat,” The New York Times, December 13. Dong, Feng (2011) “Zhongguo yeyou NMD, jiemi zhongguo daodan fangyu xitong” (China Also Has Its NMD: Unveiling China’s Missile Defense System), Binggong keji, June. Dong, Shihong (2010) “Zhuzhao zhongguo tiantun, zhongguo luji zhongduan fandao lanjie shiyan shendu fenxi” (Building China’s Space Shield: an in-depth Analysis of China’s Land-based Mid-Course Anti-Missile Test), Binggong keji, March. Duowei News (2012) “Beihai donghai jiandui ruo zao zhongchuang zhongguo jiang ji chu hedan” (If the North Sea Fleet and East China Sea Fleet Are Destroyed, China Will Use Nuclear Weapons), October 30, at http://military.dwnews.com/news/2012- 10-30/58932751-all.html. Duowei News (2013) “Jiemi xi jinping lingdao di diaoyudao yingbian xiaozu” (Unco- vering the Secrets Behind the Diaoyu Islands Response Group Led by Xi Jinping), January 20, at http://china.dwnews.com/news/2013-01-20/59089000-all.html. Entous, Adam and Julian E. Barnes (2014) “US Beefs Up Military Options for China as Obama Reassures Allies in Asia,” The Wall Street Journal, April 27. Felsenthal, Mark (2014) “Obama Says US Commitment to Defend Philippines Iron- clad,” Reuters, April 29, at www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/29/us-philippines-usa- obama-idUSBREA3S02T20140429. Finel, Bernard I. (2001/02) “Black Box or Pandora’s Box: State Level Variables and Progressivity in Realist Programs,” Security Studies, 11(2) (Winter): 187–227. Fingar, Thomas and Fan Jishe (2013) “Ties that Bind: Strategic Stability in the US–China Relationship,” The Washington Quarterly, 36(4) (Fall): 125–138. Fravel, M. Taylor and Evan S. Medeiros (2010) “China’s Search for Assured Retalia- tion: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security, 25(2) (Fall): 48–87. Gao, Lan (2009) “Riben waijiao xin gouxiang zhongdao waijiao” (Japan’s New Foreign Policy Thinking: the Middle Road Diplomacy), Xiandai guoji guanxi, November. Ge, Chong (2013) “Jiemi shashou cang xuanji” (Ploys Hidden in the Revelation of Assassins), Wenweipo, October 28. Ge, Dongsheng (2006) “Yi fazhan hangtian liliang wei tupokou, tuijin wuo jun xinxihua jianshe, wei weihu guojia fazhan zhongjiao jiyu qi tigong anquan baozhang” (Developing a Space Capability to Promote Military Digitization and to Provide Security Protection for National Development), in Ba Zhongyan, (ed.) Zhanlue jiyu qi di bawuo he liyong (Seizing and Utilizing the Strategic Opportunity Period), Beijing: Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Shishi chubanshe, pp. 18–26. Gertz, Bill (2008) “Space-Based Defense,” Washington Times, October 16, at www. washingtontimes.com/news/2008/oct/16/inside-the-ring. Gertz, Bill (2012) “Manchu Missile Launch: China Test Fires New Long-range Missile,” August 15, at www.freebeacon.com/manchu-missile-launch. Gertz, Bill (2012) “Chinese Missile Tests Continue: China Conducts Third Long-range Missile Test in 4 Weeks,” August 23, at http://freebeacon.com/Chinese-missile-tests- continue. Gertz, Bill (2012) “Chinese Missile Tests Continue: China Conducts Fourth Flight Test of Mobile ICBM,” September 4, at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinese- missile-tests-continue-2. Bibliography 185 Gertz, Bill (2013) “China Testing New Space Weapons,” October 2, at http://free beacon.com/china-testing-new-space-weapons. Gertz, Bill (2014) “China Fields Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missile: DF-26C Deployment Confirmed,” March 3, at http://freebeacon.com/china-fields-new- intermediate-range-nuclear-missile. Gill, Bates, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes (2002) “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, (eds), The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, pp. 510–560 Glaser, Charles L. (1990) Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Glaser, Charles L. (1994/95) “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security, 19(3) (Winter): 50–90. Glaser, Charles L. (2000) “The Causes and Consequences of Arms Race,” Annual Review of Political Science, 3: 251–276. Glaser, Charles L. and Steve Fetter (2001) “National Missile Defense and the Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security, 26(1) (Summer): 40–92. Glosny, Michael, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs (2013) “US–China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VII Report,” May, US Naval Postgraduate School. Glosserman, Brad (2010) “Breaking Point for the Alliance,” Pacnet #19, April 12, at http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-19-breaking-point-alliance. Goldstein, Avery (2000) Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Goldstein, Avery (2005) Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Goldstein, Lyle J. (ed.) (2006) China’s Nuclear Force Modernization, Newport, RI: Naval War College. Goertz, Gary and Jack S. Levy (2007) “Causal Explanation, Necessary Conditions, and Case Studies,” in Gary Goertz and Jack S. Levy (eds), Explaining War and Peace: Case Studies and Necessary Condition Counterfactuals, New York: Routledge, pp. 9–45. Gordon, Michael R. and David. S. Cloud (2007) “US Knew of China’s Missile Test, But Kept Silent,” New York Times, April 23. Government of People’s Republic of China (2013) Zhongguo wuzhong liliang di duoyanghua yunyong baipishu (The White Paper on the Multiple Applications of China’s Military Forces), April 16, at http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/jrzg/ 2013-04/16/content_2379013.htm. Green, Michael J. and Katsuhisa Furukawa (2008) “Japan: New Nuclear Realism,” in Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Muthiah Alagappa, (ed.), The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 347–372. Grieco, Joseph M. (1997) “Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics,” in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, (eds), New Thinking in International Relations Theory, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 163–201. Griffin, Christopher and Joseph E. Lin (2007) “China’s Space Ambition,” Armed Forces Journal, April 28, at www.afji.com/2008/04/3406827. Guan, Dai (2012) “Diaoyudao haiqu junshi xingdong yaosu” (Key Elements of Military Operations around the Diaoyu Islands), Hailukong guanxing shijie, November. Guangming ribao (2006) “Ke zhanlue lilun zhuanjia wu tianfu di tansuo guiji” (The Path of Nuclear Deterrence Expert Wu Tianfu), August 30. 186 Bibliography Guo, Hua (2009) “DF-31A zhouji dandao daodang” (DF-31A Intercontinental Bal- listic Missile), Binggong keji, Special Supplementary Issue on the National Day Parade, November. Gurtov, Mel and Byong-Moo Hwang (1998) China’s Security: The New Roles of the Military, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Hai, Tian, “Xin yidai ‘julang’ tisheng he wishe liliang” (The New Generation “Giant Wave” Has Strengthened Nuclear Deterrence), Junshi wenzhai, July 2007. Hammes, T.X. and R.D. Hooker Jr. (2014) “America’s Ultimate Strategy in a Clash with China,” The National Interest, June 10, at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/ amerias-ultimate-strategy-clash-china-10633. Hou, Xiaohe and Zhang Hui (2001) Meiguo daodang fangyu jihua toushi (An Analysis of the US Missile Defense), Beijing: Zhongguo minhang chubanshe. Hua, Yiwen (2012) “Riben jiu diaoyudao wenti lian fa henhua shi zai wenhuo” (Japan’s Recent Tough Words over the Diaoyu Islands Are Playing With Fire), Renmin Ribao, August 27. Huang, Dahui (2008) Riben daguo hua qushi yu zhongri guanxi (Japan’s Great Power Tendency and Sino–Japanese Relations), Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe. Huanqiu shibao (2008) “Er pao zhuanjia jinggao mei peshi zhongguo jingxing taikong junbei jingsai” (Expert from the Second Artillery: The United States Is Forcing China to Engage in a Space Arms Race), June 3, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/ 2008-06/130647.html. Huanqiu shibao (2012) “Guofangbu huiying zhongguo jinqi jinxing duozhong xinghao dandao daodan fasha” (The Ministry of Defense Responding to Reports on China Conducting Tests of Multiple Models of Ballistic Missiles), August 30. Huanqiu shibao (2012) “Shiwei jiangjun shoushi riben yaoyou junshi di chongfen zhunbei” (Ten Generals: To Confront Japan Requires Ample Military Preparations), September 13, at http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2012-09/3113889. html. Huanqiu shibao (2012) “Guofangbu guanyuan tan zhongri haizhan” (Defense Ministry Officials Discussing Naval Conflicts between China and Japan), October 25, at http://world.huanqiu.com/regions/2012-10/32132821.html. Huanqiu shibao (2013) “Fa shiguandan ba zhongri tuixiang zhanzheng bianyuan” (Firing Tracer Rounds Pushes China and Japan toward the Edge of War), January 10, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/paper/2013-10/3468128.html. Huanqiu shibao (2013) “Er pao zhuanjia: zhongguo fandao chuju zhanli zhongmei chaju reng henda” (Expert of the Second Artillery: China’s Missile Defense Achieving Initial Combat Capabilities, Still a Big Gap with the USA), January 29, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2013-01/3593756.html. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Huanqiu shibao (2013) “Zhongguo shouci jubei dui meiguo youxiao di shuixia zhanlue he weishe” (For the First Time China Possesses Credible Under-Sea Nuclear Deterrent against the USA), October 28, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/militaryvision/ 2013-10/2714866.html. Huanqiu shibao (2013) “Zhongguo heqianting liangxiang yin caiyi wai mei haoqi zhendui na guo” (The Debut of Chinese Nuclear Submarines Invites Guessing from Foreign Media Regarding Its Targeted Country), October 29, at http://world.huanqiu. com/exclusive/2013-10/4500689.html. Huanqiu shibao (2013) “Dongfeng-41 jiang gaibian mei dui zhongguo liliang di renzhi” (DF-41 Will Change US Perception of China’s Power), December 19, at http://opinions/huanqiu.com/editorial/2013-12/4675859.html. Bibliography 187 Huanqiu shibao (2013) “Zhongguo shi tian nei jinxing liang zhong xinxing zhouji he daodan fashe shiyan” (China Conducted Tests of Two New Models of Inter- continental Ballistic Missiles During the Past Ten Days), December 24, at http:// mil.huanqiu.com/militaryvision/2013-12/2721810.htm. Huanqiu shibao (2014) “Riben youyi zai diaodao huo cedong dashi yuyu zhongguo haijun tanpai” (Japan’s Right Wing May Be Plotting Major Incidents at Diaoyu Islands to Have a Showdown with the Chinese Navy), January 16, at http://mil. huanqiu.com/Observation/2014-01/4760087.html. Huanqiu shibao (2014) “Yin Zhuo riben ruo zao he daji keneng zhege minzu jiou bu cunzaile” (Yin Zhuo: If Japan Is Attacked by Nuclear Weapons, This Nation Will No Longer Exist), February 19, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2014-02/ 4842993.html. Huanqiu shibao (2014) “Ri zhengfu xiang IAeA loubao 640 qianke pu xiangdang yu 80 mei hedan liang” (Japan’s Government Failed to Report 640 Kilograms of Plu- tonium to the IAEA, Sufficient for Making 80 Nuclear Weapons), June 8, at http:// world.huanqiu.com/article/2014-06/5014143.html. Huanqiu shibao (2014) “Riben loubao daliang he cailiao beipi qipian shijie zhuanjia cheng bu paichu manbao” (Japan Fails to Report Large Quantity of Nuclear Materials, an Attempt to Deceive the World), June 9, at http://world.huanqiu.com/ exclu sive/2014-06/5014411.html. Jane’s Naval Forces News (2007) “Photograph Reveals China’s Jin-class SSBN,” October 16, at www.janes.com/news/defense/naval/jdw071026_1_n.shtml. Japan Institute of International Affairs (2012) “The Senkakus: Actions to Keep the Situation under Control,” September 24, Tokyo, at http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/pol cy_report/20120924e-recommendations.pdf. Japan News (2012) “Ishihara Seeking to Buy Senkaku Islands,” April 18. Jervis, Robert (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jervis, Robert (1978) “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, 30(2) (January): 167–214. Jervis, Robert (1979–1980) “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” Political Science Quarterly, 94(4) (Winter): 617–633. Jiang, Hao (2008) “Zhuanjia xitan dandao daodan di dantou” (Expert’s Analysis of Warheads for Ballistic Missiles), Binggong keji, October. Jiang, Hao (2009) “Zhanlue daodan di sheji nandian fang wuo guo zhuming daodan zhuanjia wang wenchao” (The Challenges Facing Strategic Ballistic Missile Design: An Interview with Renowned Ballistic Missile Expert Wang Wenchao), Binggong keji, March. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Jiang, Hao (2012) “Riben neng yanzhi chu he wuqi ma? daodan zhuanjia toushi riben zhanlue gongfang nengli” (Is Japan Capable of Developing Nuclear Weapons? A Missile Expert Analyzing Japan’s Strategic Offensive and Defensive Capabilities), Binggong keji, No. 20. Jing, Zhiyuan and Peng Xiaofeng (2009) “Jianshe zhongguo tece zhanlue daodan budui” (Constructing a Strategic Missile Force with Chinese Characteristics), Qiushi, February. Johnson, Ian (2010) “China Arrests Four Japanese Amid Tension,” The New York Times, September 23. Johnson-Freese, Joan (2007) Space as a Strategic Asset, New York: Columbia University Press. 188 Bibliography Johnson-Freese, Joan (2008) “US Plans for Space Security,” in John M. Logsdon and James Clay Moltz, (eds), Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives, Washington, DC: Space Policy Institute, George Washington University. Johnson-Freese, Joan and Thomas Nichols (2010) “Space, Stability and Nuclear Strategy: Rethinking Missile Defense,” China Security, 6(2): 3–24. Johnston, Alastair Iain (1995/96) “China’sNew‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security, 20(3) (Winter): 5–42. Johnston, Alastair Iain (2013) “How New and Assertive Is China’sNewAssertiveness?” International Security, 27(4) (Spring): 7–48. Kidd, Andrew H. (2007) Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kingston, Jeff (2014) “Obama’s Pivot to Asia: Rebalance and Reassure,” May 3, The Japan Times, at www.japantimes.co.jp/opinon/2014/05/03commentary/obamas-piv ot-asia-rebalance-reassure. Kristensen, Hans M., Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie (2006) Chinese Nuclear Forces and US Nuclear War Planning, Washington DC: The Federation of American Scientists. Kulacki, Gregory (2013) “Kuaizhou Challenges US Perceptions of Chinese Military Space Strategy,” September 27, at http://allthingsnuclear.org/kuaizhou-challenges-u- s-perceptions-of-chinese-military-space-strategy. Landler, Mark (2012) “Obama’s Journey to Tougher Tack on a Rising China,” The New York Times, September 20. Lenoir, Francois (2014) “Japan’s Plutonium Stocks No Reason for Concern-IAEA Chief,” Reuters, March 3, at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/03/uk-japan-iaea- plotunium-idUKBREA221EE20140303. Lewis, Jeffrey (2007) The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Lewis, John Wilson and Hua Di (1992) “China’s Ballistic Missile Program: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” International Security, 17(2) (Fall): 5–40. Lewis, John Wilson and Xue Litai (1991) China Builds the Bomb, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Lewis, John Wilson and Xue Litai (1994) China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Levy, Jack S. (2003) “Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design,” in John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, (eds), Realism and the Balance of Power: A New Debate, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 128–147. Levy, Jack S. and William S. Thompson (2010) Causes of War,NewYork:Wiley-Blackwell. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Li, Bin and Nie Hongyi (2008) “Zhongmei zhanlue wendingxing di kaocha” (An Analysis of Sino–US Strategic Stability), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi,No.2. Li, Daguang (2008) “Meiguo xingqiou dazhan jian zhi zhongguo zhankai yichang xin lengzhan” (The Sword of US Space War Plan Points Toward China and Indicates a New Cold War), Huanqiu shibao, October 21. Li, Daguang (2010) “Zhongguo fandao chushi fengmang” (China’s Missile Defense Makes Its Debut), Huanqiu junshi,No.2. Li, Fang and Yang Zhu (2012) “Meiguo daodan fangyu xitong fazhan xianzhuang ji nengli yuce fenxi” (Analysis and Predictions of the State and Capabilities of US Missile Defense), Xiandai junshi,July. Bibliography 189 Li, Li (2013) “Ri ruo zai diaoyudao tingerzouxian bu paichu chongtu keneng” (Con- flicts Cannot Be Ruled out if Japan Makes Reckless Moves over the Diaoyu Islands), Huanqiu shibao, April 24, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2013-04/ 3866497.html. Liang, Yunxiang (2012) Jiben faijiao yu zhongri guanxi, Japan’s Foreign Policy and Sino–Japanese Relations) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe. Lieberthal, Kenneth and Wang Jisi (2012) Addressing the US–China Strategic Distrust, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Lin, Chong-pin (1988) China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Ling, Yongshun (2006) Wuqi zhongbei di xinxi hua (The Digitization of Weapons), Beijing: Jiefanjun chubanshe. Liu, Jiangyong (2010) “Tongwang dongya gongtongti zhilu hezuo yu chuangxin” (The Road to an East Asia Community: Cooperation and Creativity), Waijiao pinglun,No.2. Liu, Qiang (2014) “Riben zhanche ruo chongxin fadong keneng gei shijie dai zainan” (A Restarted Japanese War Machine Could Bring Disaster to the World), Jiefanjunbao, May 29. Lobell, Steven E. (2010) “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism,” in Robert A. Denemark, (ed.), The International Studies Encyclopedia, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 6651–6669. Long, Xingchun (2013) “Zhongguo he zhengce bufang jiang qingchu” (China’s Nuclear Policies: It’s Better to Clarify Them), Huanqiu shibao, January 15, at http:// mil.huanqiu.com/paper/2013-01/3494869.html. Lowther, William (2014) “China Developing New Nuclear Missiles,” The Taipei Times, March 6, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/03/06/20035 84976. Lyon, Rod L. (2013) “The Challenges Confronting US Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Asia,” International Affairs, 89(4): 929–941. Lyons, James (2009) “A New Challenge at Sea,” Washington Times, March 22. Lu, Yin (2012) “Building a New China–US Strategic Stability,” p. 83, at www.eastview press.com/Files/CIR_6_2012_China%20US%20Stability.pdf. Luo, Yuan (2012) “Dui mei fangwu tiaozheng jixui jingti youyao danding” (Facing US Strategic Adjustment, China Needs To be Both Vigilant and Calm), Jiefangjun bao, January 10. Luo, Yuan (2013) “Fanfan riben touxi zuo zhongxing zhanzhen zhunbei” (Taking Precautions against Japan’s Sneak Attack and Preparing for a Medium-Sized War), Wenweipo, January 22. Ma, Yong (2013) “Riben hui di san ci daiduan zhongguo xiandaihua ma” (Will Japan Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Stop China’s Modernization for the Third Time?), Huanqiu shibao, January 23. Manning, Robert A. (2000) Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts, China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment, New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Mastanduno, Michael and Ethan B. Kapstein (1999) “Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War,” in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, (eds), Uni- polar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 1–21. McCurry, Justin (2010) “China–Japan Row over Disputed Islands Threatens to Esca- late: Anti-Japan Protests Spread amid Reports that Chinese Boats Are Heading for Senkaku Islands,” The Guardian, September 18. 190 Bibliography McCurry, Justin (2014) “Obama Says US Will Defend Japan in Island Dispute with China,” The Guardian, April 24, at www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/obama- in-japan-backs-status-quo-in-island-dispute-with-china. Mearsheimer, John J. (1994/95) “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, 19(3) (Winter): 4–49. Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W. W. Norton. Mearsheimer, John J. (2009) “Reckless States and Realism,” International Relations, 23(2) (June): 241–256. Medeiros, Evan S. (2005) “Evolving Nuclear Doctrine,” in Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner, (eds), China’s Nuclear Future, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 39–77. Meng, Yan and Zhou Yong (2012) “Jingti riben bingqi tuiyan shi kuangzao” (Be Alert to Japan’s Wishful Thinking after the War Simulation Game), People’sDaily, October 25. Nanfang ribao (2013) “Zhongguo ni juxing di san ci fan weixing shiyan” (China Is Thought to Have Conducted Its Third Anti-Satellite Test, Using a DN-2 Missile), May 14, at http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2013-05-14-/110327116342.shtml. National Institute for Defense Studies (2012) China Security Report 2012, Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies. National Intelligence Council (2012) Global Trends 2030: An Alternative World, Washington, DC, December, at http://publicintelligence.net/global-trends-2030. News.163.com (n.d.) “Waijie caice julang 2 zhouji daodan xianshen jiafangjun 10 yue junyan” (The Outside World Surmises that JL-2 Intercontinental Missile Debuted in the October PLA War Game), at http://war.news.163.com/10/1208/10/6NCHNKF T00011MTO.html. Nie, Mo (2014) “Hongqi 19 zhongguo di THAAD?” (HQ-19: China’s THAAD?), Jianchuan zhishi, April. Nanning wanbao (2014) “Zhongguo fazhan kongtian yitizhan shi jueding weilai zhanzheng shengfu shou” (China’s Development of Integrated Air-Space Cap- abilities Will Decide Victory or Defeat in Future Wars), April 22, at http://mil. huanqiu.com/china/2014-04/4977336.html. Ning, Ling, Zhang Huaibi, and Yu Fei (2010) Zhanlue weishe (Strategic Deterrence), Beijing: Junshi yiwen chubanshe. Ochmanek, David and Lowell H. Schwartz (2008) The Challenge of Nuclear-Armed Regional Adversaries, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Organski, A.F.K. (1958) World Politics, New York: Alfred. A. Knopf. Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler (1980) The War Ledger, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Peng, Guanqian (2006) “Zhongguo di he liliang yu he zhence” (China’s Nuclear Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Forces and Nuclear Policies), in Peng Guanqian, Zhongguo junshi wenti yanjiu (Studies on China’s Military Issues), Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, pp. 59–79. Peng, Guangqian and Rong Yu (2009) “Nuclear No-First-Use Revisited,” China Security, 5(1) (Winter): 78–87. People.com.cn (2012) “Hangmu shashou dongfeng 25 tupo lanjie xitong daji fanwei fugai yatai diqu” (Aircraft Carrier Killer DF-25 Can Penetrate Missile Defense and Strike the Entire Asia Pacific Region), October 12, at http://military.people.com.cn/ n/2012/1012/c1011-19245732.html. People.com.cn (1964) “Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo zhengfu shengming” (The Statement of the Government of People’s Republic of China), October 16, at http:// cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66675/4493741.html. Bibliography 191 Perlez, Jane (2012) “China Accuses Japan of Stealing after Purchase of Group of Disputed Islands,” The New York Times, September 11. PLA Academy of Military Science (2013) Zhanluexue (The Science of Military Strategy), Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Robert L. (2009) “China–US Strategic Stability,” paper for the Nuclear Order–Build or Break conference, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, April 6–7, at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/npc_us_ china3.pdf. Qianjiang wanbao (2013) “Zhongguo kuaizhou ganchao meiguo huo nengxiang DF- 31A jidong fashe” (China’s Kuaizhou Catching Up with the US: Could Be Mobile Launched Like the DF-31A), October 1, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observa tion/ 2013-10/4412275.html. Ramzy, Austin (2014) “China Complains About Plutonium in Japan,” The New York Times, June 10. Renmin luntan (2012) “Daoyudao beihou di zhanlue jiaoli” (The Strategic Contest behind the Diaoyu Islands), No. 29 (October 1). Renmin ribao (2012) “Xi Jinping zai canguan fuxing zhilu zhanlan shi qiandiao chengqian qihou jiwang kailai jixu zhaozhe zhonghua minzu weida fuxing mubiao fenyong qianjin” (At the “Road to Revival” Exhibition, Xi Jinping Stressed Con- tinuous Efforts to Realize the Grand Goal of a Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation), November 30. Renmin ribao (2013) “Zhongguo gaodiao xuanchuan shouzhi qianting budui jinfang caqiang zouhuo” (China’s High Profile Propaganda about its Nuclear Submarine Forces Is Designed to Prevent Accidental War), August 28. Renmin ribao (2014) “Zhuanjia cheng ri mei zhongri kongzhan zhongfang bibai is zhi er shuo meng” (Expert: the Japanese Media Speaks Fantasy by Claiming Inevitable Chinese Defeat in China–Japan Air War), February 21. Roberts, Brad (2003) China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond, Washington, DC: Institute of Defense Analysis. Roberts, Brad (2005) “Alternative Futures,” in Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner, (eds), China’s Nuclear Future, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 167–192. Russett, Bruce (2000) Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, New York: W. W. Norton. Samuels, Richard J. and James L. Schoff (2013) “Japan’s Nuclear Hedge: Beyond ‘Allergy’ and Breakout,” October, The National Bureau of Asian Research, at www. nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=705. Sen, Zihui (2013) “Zhongyang tongguo tiaozheng hewu zhanlue fangzhen” (The Party Center Approves Adjustment of Nuclear Strategies), Cheng Ming, February. Shalal-Esa, Andrea (2013) “US Sees China Launch as Test of Anti-Satellite Muscle, Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Source” Reuters, May 15, at www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/15/us-china-launch- idUSBRE94E07D20130515. Shangxi wanbao (2012) “Zhongguo dongfeng 25 duju liu da benling” (China’sDF-25Has Six Unique Abilities), October 12, at http://mil.sohu.com/20121012/n354710262.shtml. Shen, Dingli (2005) “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century,” China Security, 1(1) (Summer): 10–14. Shen, Dingli (2008) “China’s Defensive Military Strategy: The Space Question,” Survival, 50(1) (February–March): 170–179. Shen, Dingli (2013) “Gaishan heweishe xiazu dui wuo zhuquan tiaoxun” (Modifying Nuclear Deterrence to Deter Provocations to Our Sovereignty), Huanqiu shibao, August 2, at http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2013-08/4199966.html. 192 Bibliography Spencer, Richard (2008) “China Modernizing Nuclear Weapons Arsenal,” The Daily Telegraph,May8. Schearf, Daniel (2013) “Japan, China Territorial Tensions Rising over Unmanned Drones,” the VOA News, October 31, at www.voanews.com/content/japan-china- territorial-tension-rising-over-unmanned-drones/1780574.html. Schoff, James L. (2012) “Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, (eds), Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp. 99–113. Schreer, Benjamin (2014) “The Future of Sino–US Strategic Stability,” The Stra- tegist, January 16, at www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-future-of-sino-us-strategic-sta bility. Schweller, Randall (1996) “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” in Benjamin Frankel, (eds), Realism: Restatement and Renewal, London: Frank Cass, pp. 90–121. Sina (2012) “Jiafangjun zhuanjia xuezhe miji fasheng guanzhu diaoyudao wenti” (PLA’s Experts Express Intense Concerns about the Diaoyu Islands Issue), August 24, at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2012-08-24/1713698924.html. Sina (2013) “Dongfeng-41 daodang shi zhongguo hezhanlue di zhongyao zhuangbei zhicheng” (DF-41 Constitutes an Important Element of China’s Nuclear Strategy), December 30, at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2013-12-30/18357556.html. Sina (2013) “Dongfeng-41 fugai weiguo quanjing zengjia mei jun fandao lanjie nandu” (DF-41 Covers the Entire United States and Increases the Difficulty of Interceptions by US Missile Defense), December 18, at http://mil.sina.com.cn/2013- 12-18/17237 55580.html. Sina.com (2013) “Meiti cheng zhongguo DN-2 daodan jiang jubei cuihui mei GPS weixing nengli” (Media Claims that China’s DN-2 Missile Will Be Capable of Destroying US GPS Satellites), May 25, at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2013-05-25/ 0905725830.html. Sina (2014) “Quanmian jiexi hong 6K pei changjian hou cheng zhanlue hongzhaji” (A Comprehensive Analysis of H-6K: A Strategic Bomber with CJ-10 Missiles), April 11, at http://mil.news.sina.cn/2014-04-11/1101773470.html. Sina (2014) “Unveiling the Secrets of Three New Types of Medium Range Missiles of the Second Artillery Corps, Can Wipe out US Forces Based in Guam,” January 23, at http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2014-01-23/1154761435.html. Sohu.com (2008) “Zhongri jiou donghai wenti dacheng yuanze gongshi” (China and Japan Reaching a Consensus over the East China Sea Issues), June 19, at http:// news.sohu.com/20080619/n257597205.shtml. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Sohu.com (2012) “Zhongguo dongfeng 25 duju liu da benling” (China’s DF-25 Has Six Unique Abilities), Shangxi wanbao, October 12, at http://mil.sohu.com/ 20121012/n354710262.shtml. Sohu.com (2013) “Yangshi jiemi zhongguo shouzhi heqianting budui bao zhenkui huamian” (The CCTV Reveals China’s First Nuclear Submarine Forces with Precious Images), October 28, at http://mil.sohu.com/20131028/n389027813.shtml. Spencer, Richard (2008) “China Modernising Nuclear Weapons Arsenal,” The Daily Telegraph,May8. Spetalinick, Matt (2014) “Obama Reassures Allies, But Doubt over ‘Pivot’ to Asia Persist,” Reuters, April 29, at www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/09/us-obama-asia- idUSBReA3S03920140429. Bibliography 193 State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2014) Zhongguo wuzhuang liliang di duoyanghua yunyong baipishu (White Paper: The Diversified Deployment of China’s Armed Forces), April, at http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-04/16/ content_2379013.htm. State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2009) 2008 nian zhongguo di guofang (China’s National Defense in 2008), January, at www.mode.gov.cn/affair/2011-01/06/ content_4249949.htm. Stewart, Phil (2009) “US Missile Defense May Backfire if too Robust: General,” Reuters, November 10, at www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE5A9 4NH20091110. Su, Zhirong (2012) “Yulun maotou ying zhizhi riben junguo zhuyi” (The Dart of Public Opinion Campaigns Should Point to Japan’s Militarism), Huangqiu shibao, October 25, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2012-10/3214476.html. Sun, Kejia (2013) “Yushi gongjin jiaqiang junshi zhanlue zhidao” (Military Strategies Need to Evolve with Time), Xuexi shibao, February 25. Taikungpao (2012) “Jiefangjun shi jian yizai mei fandaowang xiang mei ri shiwei” (The PLA Testing its Swords to Show Power to the USA and Japan), September 3. The Taipei Times (2009) “Hatoyama Proposes East Asian Community to China,” September 23, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/09/23/2003454274. Taliaffero, Jeffrey W. (2000/01) “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security, 25(3) (Winter): 126–161. Talmadge, Eric (2013) “Japan’s Talk of Warning Shots Heats up China Dispute,” January 20, at http://news.yahoo.com/japan-talk-warming-shots-heats-china-dispu te-051924041.html. Tammen, Ronald, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan Stam, Carole Alsharahati, Mark Abdollahian and A.F.K. Organski (2000) Power Transitions, New York: Chatham House. Tang, Zhicheng (2013) “Zhanglue daodan di zuozhan shiyong” (Strategic Missiles in Combat Operations), Bingqi zhishi, March. Tang, Zhicheng (2010) “Huashuo dandao daodan zhengliuzhao” (Nose Cones of Ballistic Missiles), Binggong keji, No. 12 June. Tang, Zhicheng (2012) “Weiguo dong ya fandao dixi zhongguo pojie zhi ce” (China’s Strategies to Defeat US Missile Defense in East Asia), Xiandai bingqi, September. Tellis, Ashley J. (2007) “China’s Military Space Strategy,” Survival, 49(3) (Autumn): 41–72. Tessman, Brock F. (2012) “System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu,” Security Studies, 21(2): 192–231. Theory Talk # 40 (2011) “Kenneth Waltz: the Physiocrat of International Politics,” June 3, at www.theory-talks.org/2011/06/theory-talk-40.html. Thies, Wallace J. and Patrick C. Bratton (2004) “When Governments Collide in the Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Taiwan Strait,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 27(4) (December): 556–558. The Voice of America News (2012) “China, Japan Discuss Island Disputes at APEC Meeting,” September 9, The Voice of America News, at www.voanews/com/content/ china-japan-dis cuss-island-dispute-at-apec-meeting/1504613.html. Walt, Stephen M. (2002) “The Enduring Legacies of the Realist Tradition,” in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, (eds), Political Science: the State of the Discipline, New York: W. W. Norton, pp. 197–230. Walt, Stephen M. (1987) The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Walt, Stephen M. (1985) “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, 9(4) (Spring): 3–43. 194 Bibliography Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1997) “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review, 91(4) (December): 913–917. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1990) “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs, 44(1) (Spring/Summer): 21–37. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1999) “Globalization and Governance,” PS: Political Science & Politics, December, pp. 693–700. Waltz, Kenneth N. (2000) “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, 25(1) (Summer): 5–41. Wang, Baocun (2005) Shijie xin junshi biange (The World’s New Military Transformations), Beijing: Jiefanjun chubanshe. Wang, Jixin (2013) “Haiji he liliang di youshi” (The Advantages of Sea-based Nuclear Forces), Bingqi zhishi, March. Wang, Mingzhi (2010) “Zhongduan fandao shiyan di zhanlue hanyi” (The Strategic Implications of the Mid-Course Anti-Missile Test), Bingqi zhishi, No. 3b. Wang, Shengguang (2013) “Junren buke yi ri wubei” (Soldiers Cannot Let Their Guard Down on Any Day), Jiefanjun bao, February 11. Wang, Yi (2013) “Toward a New Model of Major-Country Relations Between China and the United States,” Speech given at the Brookings Institution on September 20, at www.china.org.cn/world/2013-09/21/content_30086631.htm. Watts, Jonathan (2005) “Chinese General Warns of Nuclear Risk to US,” The Guardian, July 16. Weeden, Brian (2004) “Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian Anti-satellite Testing in Space,” March 17, Secure World Foundation, at www.thes pacereview.com/article/2473/1. Wei, Guoan (2013) “Xifang he youshi weiyin caijun er dongyao” (Western Nuclear Advantages Have Not Been Eroded by Arms Control), Huangiu shibao, December 20. Weiss, Jessica (2014) Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations, New York: Oxford University Press. Wen, Cheng (2013) “Wuoguo he liliang jiegou tansuo” (An Exploration of the Composition of Our Country’s Nuclear Forces), Bingqi zhishi, March. Wenweipo (2009) “Zuguo zhi guang junpei moxing zhan kaimu” (The Pride of the Motherland Military Exhibition Opened), July 5. White House (2014) “Joint Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan,” April 24, at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/24/joint- press-conference-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan. Wohlforth, William C. (2008) “Realism,” in Duncan Snidal and Christian Reus-Smit, Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 131–149. Wohlforth, William (1999) “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, 24(1) (Summer): 5–41. Wong, Zongbo (2012) “Rang he dantou zai fei yihui er MIRV jishu qiantan” (Let the Nuclear Warheads Fly a Bit Longer: an Analysis of MIRV Technologies), Bingqi, November. Wu, Chunsi (2005) “Zhongmei he guanxi di zouxiang” (Trends in Sino–US Nuclear Relationship), in Zhu Mingquan,Wu Chunsi, and Su Changhe, Weishe yu wending: zhongmei he guanxi (Deterrence and Stability: China–US Nuclear Relationship), Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, pp. 221–369. Bibliography 195 Wu, Junfei (2013) “Dongya bianju zhong di zhongguo hewu” (China’s Nuclear Deterrence and East Asia’s Fast Changing Situation), Huanqiu shibao, August 28, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2013-08/4286685.html. Wu, Qin (2009) “Xingqiou dazhan juantu chonglai” (The Return of Star Wars), Xindai junshi, February. Wu, Qin (2008) “Ri mei fan dao hezuo kuaibu qianjin” (Japan–US Missile Defense on a Fast Track), Xiandai junshi, March. Wu, Tianfu (2010) “Zhongguo fandao lanjie jishu shiyan jiedu” (An Explanation of China’s Anti-Missile Test), Liaowang xinwen zhoukan, No. 3 (January 18). Xinhua News Agency (2006) “Zhongri gongtong lishi yanjiu weiyuanhui di yi ci huiyi zai jing juxing” (The First Meeting of the Sino-Japanese Joint History Commission Is Held in Beijing), December 27, at http://news.xinhua.com/politics/2006-12/27/con tent_5539317.htm. Xinhua News Agency, (2009) “He daodang fangzhen zhang guangzhong: gai dan ke gongji suoyou zhongyao zhanlue mubiao” (Zhang Guangzhong of the Nuclear Missile Squadron: It Can Hit All Important Strategic Targets), October 6, at http:// mil.news.sina.com.cn/2009-10-06/1038569252.html. Xinhua News Agency (2012) “Zoujin zhongguo changgui daodan budui: kaiqi hechang jianbei shuangchung weishe xinjiyuan” (China’s Conventional Missile Forces: Beginning the New Era of Conventional/Nuclear Dual Deterrence), June 10, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-06/10/c_123260296.htm. Xinhua News Agency (2010) “Wen jiabao qianglie duncu riben liji wutiaojian fangren” (Wen Jiabao Strongly Urges Japan to Release the Person Without Conditions). September 22, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010–9/22c_12596265.htm. Xinhua News Agency (2012) “Japanese PM Orders Self-Defense Forces fully Pre- pared for Emergency,” September 11, at http://english.people.com.cn/90777/794 5150.html. Xinhua News Agency (2012) “Zhongguo haijian chuanbo biandui dida diaoyudao haiyu kaizhan wuiquan xunhang zhifa” (China’s Maritime Surveillance Ships Arriving in the Waters of Diaoyu Islands to Defend Rights), September 14, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-09/14/c_113073244.htm. Xinhua News Agency (2013) “Luo yuan zhongguo zai hexin liyi shou genben weihai shi huo huiyong hewu” (Luo Yuan: China May Use Nuclear Weapons if its Core Interests Face Fundamental Harms), April 17, at http://news/xinhuanet.com/world/ 2013-04/17/c_124593680.htm. Xinhua News Agency (2013) “Riben hongkong ziweidui xunlian chaoguo zhongguo kongjun 30 nian?” (Is Japan’s Self Defense Force Ahead of the Chinese Air Force by 30 Years in Terms of Training?), August 28, at http://news/xinhuanet.com/mil/2013- Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 08/28/c_125263316.htm. Xinhua News Agency (2013) “Guofangbu ri fang ruo jiluo zhongguo wuren ji zhong fang jiang guoduan fanji” (The Defense Ministry: if Japan Shoots down Chinese Unmanned Drones, China Will Hit Back Right Away), October 27, at http://news. xinhuanet.com/photo/2013-10/27/c_125604984.htm. Xinhua News Agency (2014) “Junkeyuan fabu zhanlue pinggu zhongguo mianlin san da taikong weixie” (The Academy of Military Science Releases Strategic Assess- ment Report, China Facing Three Threats), June 20, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ mil/2014-06/20/c_126647404.htm?prolongation=1. Xinhua News Agency (2013) “Zhongguo yanfa daqiceng wai lanjieqi fandao maixiang quanqiou yujing” (China Developing Extra-atmospheric Interceptors, Missile 196 Bibliography Defense Marching Toward Global Early Warning), October 4, at http://news.xinhu anet.com/mil/2013-10/04/c_125482172.htm. Xinjingbao (2014) “Xi Jinping jian kongtian yiti gongfang jianbei di kongjun” (Xi Jinping: Building an Air Force that Possesses Integrated Air-Space Capabilities as well as Both Offensive and Defensive Capabilities), April 15. Xu, Hezhen (2004) Zuozhan fangshi di geming xing bianhua (Revolutionary Changes in Combat) Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe. Xue, Wenli and Zhang Yanwen (2008) “Yi jian shi xing, jietu indu weixing fashe chenggong” (One Rocket, Ten Satellites: Analyzing India’s Successful Satellite Launch), Binggong keji,July. Yan, Ming (2012) “2012 zhongri donghai kongquan duiyan” (Assessing China–Japan Air Dominance in 2012), Hangkong zhishi, November, pp. 28–31. Yang, Yunzhong (2014) “Riben dui dongya heping di weixie rishen” (Japan’s Rising Threats to Peace of East Asia), Huanqiu shibao, February 18, at http://opinion.huan qiu.com/opinion_world/2014-02/4838224.html. Yao, Yunzhu (2005) “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence,” Strategic Insights, 4(9) (September). Yao, Yunzhu (2007) “Zhongguo di he zhanlue” (China’s Nuclear Policy), in Yan Xuetong, (ed.), Zhongguo xuezhe kanshijie guoji anquan juan (The World in the Eyes of Chinese Scholars: International Security Issues), Beijing: Xin shijie chubanshe, pp. 347–362. Yao, Yunzhu (2013) “China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy,” PacNet #29, April 23, at http://csis.org/files/publication/pac1328.pdf. Yeaw, Christopher T., Andrew S. Erickson, and Michael S. Chase (2012) “The Future of Chinese Nuclear Policy and Strategy,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp. 53–80. Yoshihara, Toshi and James R. Holmes (2012) “Introduction,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, (eds), Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp. 1–16. Yost, David S. (2011) “Strategic Stability in the Cold War: Lessons for Continuing Challenges,” Proliferation Paper, No. 36, p. 8, The French Institute of International Relations, at www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail@id=6434. You, Ji (1999) “Nuclear Power in the Post-Cold War Era: The Development of China’s Nuclear Strategy,” Comparative Strategy, 18: 245–259. Yu, Zhirong (2012) “Zhongri dao zheng meiguo shi yuanxiong” (Sino-Japanese Islands Dispute: The US Is the Culprit), Huanqiu shibao, October 15, at http://mil. huanqiu.com/Observation/2012-10/3187074.html. Yu, Zhirong (2012) Tonghai weiquan zhongri donghai diaoyudao zhizheng (Defending Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Rights in the East China Sea: China–Japan Rivalry over the East China Sea and Diaoyu Islands), Shanghai: Wenhui chubanshe. Yuan, Yang and Zhang Renlong (2013) “Biandiao di riben fangwei baipi shu” (The Changing Tones of Japan’s Defense White Paper), Huanqiu junshi, August. Zakaria, Fareed (1998) From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World’s Role, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zhang, Baohui (2008) “The Taiwan Strait and the Future of China’s No-First-Use Nuclear Policy,” Comparative Strategy, 27(2): 164–182. Zhang, Baohui (2011) “The Space Security Dilemma in the US–China Military Space Relationship: The Prospects for Arms Control,” Asian Survey, 51(3) (March/April): 311–332. Bibliography 197 Zhang, Baohui (2011) “US Missile Defense and China’s Nuclear Posture: Changing Dynamics of An Offence–Defence Arms Race,” International Affairs, 87(3) (May): 555–569. Zhang, Baohui (2014) “Guoji guanxi xianshi zhuyi lilun yu meiguo yatai zai pingheng zhanlue” (Realist International Relations Theory and the US Strategic Rebalancing), Guoji guanxi yanjiu,No.2. Zhang, Xuesong (2013) “Riben xinyidai guti yunzai huojian Epsilon” (Japan’sNew Generation Solid-Propellant Space Rocket Epsilon), Jianchuan zhishi, November. Zhang, Wei and Hu Wenjia (2014) “An bao san jian yongxin xian e” (The Evil Intentions of the Three Darts of Defense and Security), Huangqiu junshi, January. Zhang, Yunling (2012) “Meiguo jiyu weidu zhongguo yao wenzhu zhenjiao da taiji yirou kegang” (The US Is Eager for Containment, China Must Keep Its Own Bal- ance and Use a Soft Strategy to Overcome the Harsh Blow), Huanqiu shibao, December 5, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2011-12/2236630.html. Zhang, Zhengwen (2014) “Zhongmei yao xiaoxin bimian di san fang chongtu” (China and America Must Avoid Conflicts Caused by the Third Parties), Huanqiu shibao, June 18. Zhu, Mingquan (2005) “Zhong mei he waishe zhengce” (Nuclear Policies of China and the USA), in Zhu Mingquan, Wu Cunsi, and Su Changhe, Weishe yu wending zhong mei he guanxi (Deterrence and Stability: China–US Nuclear Relations), Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, pp. 55–146. Zhu, Mingquan (2005) “Zhongmei he guanxi” (Sino–US Nuclear Relations), in Zhu Mingquan, Wu Cunsi, and Su Changhe, Weishe yu wending zhong mei he guanxi (Deterrence and Stability: China–US Nuclear Relations), Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, pp. 147–220. Zhu, Mingquan, Wu Cunsi, and Su Changhe (2005) Weishe yu wending zhong mei he guanxi (Deterrence and Stability: China–US Nuclear Relations), Beijing: Shishi chubanshe. Zubok, Vladislav M. (2009) A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War: From Stalin to Gorbachev, Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press. Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Index

Abe, Shinzo 118–19 C4ISR capabilities 24 Academy of Military Science 58 Campell, Kurt 164–65 Acton, James 138–39 Carnegie Endowment for International Adams, Richard J. 99 Peace 138 Aegis missile defense system 84, 89 Carr, E. H. 27 Air Force Command Academy 106 Chase, Michael 18 Air-Sea Battle doctrine 158 Chilton, Kevin 99 anarchic systems: overview 3–4, 6; China Aerospace Science and Industry power, maximization of 35–37; states’ Corporation (CASIC) 102 behaviors 29–32, 34, 151, 172–74; China Dream 178 structural realism 27–28 China–Japan Joint History Commission Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 1972 105 119 anti-satellite (ASAT) tests 99, 101, 103–4, China–Japan Joint Statement 116–17 110 China–Japan war (1884–85) 125 arms races: arms race stability 160; arms China threat thesis 117, 124 race theory 40–41; defensive realism Chong-Pin Lin 21 98; overview 173; prospects for 56, 80, Clad, James 155 109–11, 156; space warfare classical realism 28, 80 capabilities 101 Cleary, Christine 21–22 assured destruction capability 72, 82–83, 92 Cold War 155, 156, 157, 176, 179 assured retaliation capability 72 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 23 atomic bomb test 1964 52 conventional capabilities 26, 60, 61–63, 166 Copeland, Dale 153 balance of power: neorealism 37; over- Council on Foreign Relations 15–16 view 3–4, 7; preservation of 34–35, crisis situations 6, 67–68, 70, 71, 73–74; 40; structural realism 27–28; see also see also East China Sea crisis; Taiwan polarity crisis

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 balance of resolve issue 157 cruise missiles 54 balance of threat 3, 4–5, 7, 8, 38, 43 balancing measures: defensive D30-KP-2 engines 54 realism 34–35, 79, 177–80; Japan 73; Dai, Yanli 89–90 motives for 50–51, 106–7; neorealism Defense White Paper 2008 138 28–33, 40; overview 7–8, 9; Defense White Paper 2013 1, 2, 38, 73, propositions 42–44; structural realism 136, 141 3–4, 37–39 defensive positionalists 34 bandwagoning behavior 31–32 defensive realism: balance of power 40; Britain, comparisons with 81, 91, 92 offensive realism and 34–37; overview Bush, George W. 100 4, 7–8; security dilemma 98–99, 151, Byong-Moo Hwang 24 173; Sino–US relations 79 Index 199 Deng Xiaoping 22, 23, 118, 121, 178 fishing boat incident 119–20 DF-21 missiles 54, 103 France, comparisons with 81, 91, 92 DF-21D missiles 54 France, Martin E. 99 DF-25 missiles 54, 73, 179 Fravel, Taylor 16, 19, 22, 23, 44 DF-26 missiles 54 DF-26C missiles 55 DF-3 missiles 53 Gao, Hong 128 DF-31 missiles 53 Gates, Robert 78–79 DF-31A missiles 1, 2, 25, 53, 78, 89, 92, Ge, Dongsheng 101–2 135, 179 general deterrence 57, 69–70 DF-3A missiles 53 Gill, Bates 17–18, 20, 24, 78 DF-4 missiles 53 Glaser, Charles 40–41, 43, 82, 100, 161, 174 DF-41 missiles 1, 2, 9, 25, 37, 53, 79, 89, global pre-eminence 41–42 92, 135, 179 Global Times 125–26, 137 DF-5 missiles 53 globalization 66 DF-5A missiles 1, 135 Goldstein, Avery 44, 50–51 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: airspace viola- GPS systems 103 tions 128, 139–40; balancing measures Green, Michael 165 73, 174; crisis escalation 127–28, 131, Grieco, Joseph 27, 34 140, 142; Diaoyu Islands Response Griffin, Christopher 110 Group 122; fishing boat incident 120; Gulf War (1990–91) 62 history of 126; nationalization 10, Gurtov, Mel 24 119–22, 126–27; naval predictions 129; overview 1, 5; shelving strategy H-6 medium-range bombers 54 118; US and 123, 127, 162–63 H-6K model 54 DN-1 interceptors 108 Hashimoto, Ryutaro 117–18 DN-2 interceptors 103, 108 Hatoyama, Yukio 119 doctrine-driven model 22–23 hegemony 33, 34–36, 152, 174 dynamic differential theory 153 high-altitude terminal interceptions 108 history projects 119 early warning systems 20, 105, 107, 109 Holmes, James R. 166 East Asian Community 119 Hou, Xiaohe 84, 101 East Asian Strategic Review 120–21 HQ-19 missiles 108 East China Sea crisis: Air Defense HQ-9 missiles 108 Identification Zone 154; concessions Hu Jintao 121 119; implicit nuclear deterrence 9, 11, Hu, Yiwen 127 73, 116, 138–40, 142, 177; military Hua Di 23–24 assessments 129–30, 132; modification Huang, Dahui 117 of policy 61; nuclear signalling 133–38, 141, 142; oil and gas exploration 118; implicit nuclear deterrence 9, 11, 73, overview 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 11, 177; tacit 116, 138–40, 142, 177 nuclear deterrence 131–39; threat

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 indigenous missile defense capabilities perception 73, 122–31; see also 105–9 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Indochina War (1950–54) 50 economic rise 117, 152, 153 integrated nuclear-space warfare cap- Einhorn, Robert 164–65 abilities 26, 37–38, 72, 99–104 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 50 intercontinental missiles 1, 55, 83, 107 Epsilon space rocket 167 intermediate-range nuclear missiles 55 International Atomic Energy Agency Fan, Jin 132 (IAEA) 167–68 Fanji-1 105 international relations theory 5–6, 151–54, Federation of American Scientists 15, 81 174 Fetter, Steve 43, 82, 100, 161 Ishihara, Shintaro 121 Fisher, Richard 104 200 Index J-10 130 Li, Li 127 J-11B 130 Liang, Yunxiang 117 Japan: air force assessment 129–30, 132; limited deterrence doctrine: elements of 70, airspace violations 128, 139–40; bal- 81, 134; limited and minimum deter- ancing measures against 73; history rence 17–18, 60–61; overview 176–77 projects 119; invasion by (1937) 125; Lin, Joseph 110 National Defense Policy Guideline Ling,Yongshun 100 121; navy assessment 129–30, 132; Liu, Qiang 124 normal state 117, 124–25; nuclear Lobell, Steven 34, 35–36 capability 12; nuclear prospects 164–68; Long, Lemong 167 Peace Constitution 124; preventive Long, Xingchun 137 war motives 11, 125–26, 130–31, 142; low-altitude terminal interceptions 108–9 Sino–Japan relations 116–19, 174; Lu, Yin 155–56, 161 strategic traditions 130–31; threat Luo, Yuan 130, 136, 139, 140, 141 perception 4–5, 10–11, 38, 42, 122–31; Lyon, Rod 164 US and 40, 42–43, 117, 123–24, 162; war simulations 129, 136; Yasukuni Ma, Xiaotian 79 shrine visits 117–18; see also Diaoyu/ Ma, Yong 125 Senkaku Islands; East China Sea Manning, Robert 15–16, 155 crisis; Taiwan crisis Mao Zedong 22, 23, 50, 52, 105 Jervis, Robert 35, 98, 157 maximum deterrence 17, 57 Jiang Zemin 22 McKinzie, Matthew 15, 19 Jing, Zhiyuan 78 Mearsheimer, John 36, 41, 151–52, 174 JL-1 missiles 53 Medeiros, Evan 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 26, JL-2 SLBM 1, 2, 9, 25, 53, 79, 89, 92, 44, 142 135, 140, 179 medium nuclear powers 44, 72, 159 Johnson-Freese, Joan 79, 102, 110 medium-range missiles 52, 54, 73, 85, Johnston, Alastair Iain 17, 19–20, 22–23, 104, 108 60–61, 134, 176 mid-course interceptions 108, 109 Jun, Azumi 121 minimalism 21–22 Kanwa Defense Review 54, 109 minimum deterrence doctrine: analysis 15–18, 56, 57–59; changing posture Katsuhisa, Furukawa 165 72; defensive realism 80; limited and Kidds, Andrew 98 minimum deterrence 17–18, 60–61; kinetic kill vehicles (KKVs) 103 modification 107; moving beyond Koizumi, Junichiro 118 91–93; overview 2, 7; pressures on Korean War 50 60–61, 63–65; strategic culture 21; Kristensen, Hans 15, 19 tactical nuclear weapons 26 KT-1 interceptors 103 MIRV technologies 20, 25, 37, 43, 81, Kuaizhou-1 104 89, 176 Kugler, Jacek 153 missile defense capabilities: effectiveness Kunihiko, Miyake 121 109; expansion of 72; future 179, 180; Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Kyl, Jon 110 indigenous missile defense capabilities 105–9; integrated nuclear-space warfare land-based capabilities 81, 87; costs 89–90; capabilities 26, 37–38, 99–104; missile see also DF missiles force 55; missile trajectories 107–8; Lemke, Douglas 153 overview 3; reliability 106; see also Levy, Jack 33 land-based capabilities; sea-based Lewis, Jeffrey 14–15 capabilities; space warfare capabilities Lewis, John 23–24 missile tests 1960 52 Lewis, John Wilson 49, 53, 54, 61 missile tests 1964 51 Li, Daguang 100, 106–7 missile tests 1966 52 Li, Fang 84 missile tests 1971 52 Li, Jie 140 missile tests 1980 52 Index 201 missile tests 2010 106 nuclear signalling 26, 38, 133–38, 141, missile tests 2012 1, 38, 79, 135 142 missile tests 2013 1, 107, 108 nuclear submarines 25, 139–40, 180 missile trajectories 107–8 nuclear tests (1960s) 52 modernization 14–16, 24, 53, 78, 82 Montaperto, Ronald 15–16 Obama, Barack 122–23, 154, 161, 162 Morgenthau, Hans 28–29 Ochmanek, David 163–64 MRVs (multiple re-entry vehicles) 81 offensive nuclear capabilities: expansion multipolarity 35, 38–40, 42, 66, 123–24, of 25, 42, 72–73, 89–90, 105, 158–59; 142 overview 2–3, 4, 9; pessimism about Mulvernon, James 17–18, 20, 24 83 mutual deterrence 12, 84, 150, 159–60, 161 offensive realism 7–8, 13, 34–37, 41, mutual vulnerability 150, 156, 159–60, 151, 177–80 161 Ohio-class submarine 90, 91 mutually assured destruction (MAD) oil disputes 118, 119 principle 100 organizational constraints 23 Organski, A.F.K. 153 Nansei chain 121 National Defense University 15–16 peace, safeguarding 68 National Institute for Defense Studies Peng, Guangqian 51, 52, 53, 55–56, 62–63, 120 123 NATO 176 Pentagon annual report 2, 6, 53, 55, 157 navy assessment 129–30, 132 People’s Daily 126, 129, 139–40 neorealism 3–4, 7, 28–33, 34, 42 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 2, 22, Nie Rongzhen 51 23 no-first-use nuclear policy: challenges to People’s War 61 69–70; by choice 14–16, 56; Defense peripheral challenges 66 White Paper 2008 138; Defense White Pfaltzgraff, Robert 159, 160 Paper 2013 1, 2, 38, 73, 136, 141; PLA Daily 131, 139–40 influence of 19; military handicap 61; polarity 38–40, 66, 142, 153; conceptions modification 26–27, 38, 42, 73, 141–42, of 4–5, 38–40, 42, 66, 123–24, 142; 177; murkiness 138–39, 141, 159; US unipolar moment 35 overview 7, 8, 10, 115; pressures on Politics among Nations (Morgenthau) 62–65, 136–38; SMS and 65; US first 28–29 strike capability 83–84 power, maximization of 34, 35–37, 151–52 Noda, Yoshihiko 121, 126 power transition theory 152–53 non-nuclear scenarios 64, 65, 68, 69, Project 640 105 70–71 Norris, Robert 15, 19 Qian Qisen 105 nuclear assertiveness 161–64 Qu, Xing 127 nuclear capability future 179, 180 nuclear deterrence, quest for 49–55 retaliatory oriented deterrence 57 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 nuclear doctrines 55–59; challenges tra- revisionist states 152–53, 154 ditions 69–70; changing 72–74; doc- Roberts, Brad 15–16, 24, 82 trine-driven model 22–23; tensions Rong, Yu 62–63 within 59–65; US missile defense and Russel, Daniel 154 80–83; see also limited deterrence Russia 13, 90, 179 doctrine; minimum deterrence doctrine; no-first-use nuclear policy Samuels, Richard 165–66, 168 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review Schoff, James 165–66, 168 165 Schreer, Benjamin 159 nuclear posture: arms race prospects Schwartz, Lowell H. 163–64 109–11; changing posture 72; structural Science of Military Strategy: deterrence realism 37–42 58–59, 65–71, 132; no-first-use 202 Index nuclear policy 73; nuclear signalling Strategic Assessment 2013 180 133, 137, 138; overview 8–9; threat strategic culture 20–23 perception 7 Strategic Deterrence 133, 135 sea-based capabilities: advantages 108; strategic deterrence doctrine: challenges expansion of 2, 25, 52–53, 90–91; traditions 65–71; changing posture land-based favored 81; navy assessment 72; core principles 58–59, 67–69; 129–30, 132 rather than operational and tactical Second Artillery Corps: assertive atti- 57 tude 78; central role 71; Kuaizhou strategic opportunity period 4, 40, 66, system 104; limited deterrence doc- 67, 131–32 trine 26; missile test motivations 106; strategic stability 151–55; nuclear deter- missions 57; space warfare cap- rence 155–61 abilities 101–2; as strategic deterrent structural realism 3–5, 6, 7–8; evaluation force 52; technology lack 24 174–77; nuclear posture 37–42, 109–11; second-strike capability: commitment to self-help 50; Sino–US strategic stability 17; media analyses 140–41; no-first- 151; state security and 27–28; structural use nuclear policy 90–91; offensive primacy 172–74; see also defensive rea- capabilities and 16; progress in 2, 9, lism; offensive realism 53, 79; stability and 156–57 Su, Zhirong 132 security 172–74; defensive realism 34–35; Sun, Kejia 141 offensive realism 35–36; structural realism 27–28 security dilemma 35, 37, 40–41, 98–99, 151 tacit nuclear deterrence 131–39, 141, 142 self-help 27–28, 50–51 tactical nuclear capability 26, 60–61, Shen, Dingli 62, 101, 137 72–73 Shiyan-7 103–4 Taiwan: defense of 62, 67, 69; no-first- short-range missiles 52, 108 use nuclear policy 116–17 Sino–Japan relations 116–19; see also Taiwan crisis (1954–55) 50 East China Sea crisis Taiwan crisis (1958) 50 Sino–Japan war (1884–85) 125 Taiwan crisis (1995–96) 117, 135 Sino–Russian border conflict 6 Taiwan Relations Act 162 Sino–US relations 78–80 Taliaferro, Jeffrey 35 Sino–US strategic stability 151–55; Tamogami, Toshio 129 nuclear deterrence 155–61 Tanaka, Kakuei 116 Song, Xiaojun 109 Tang, Zhicheng 89, 102 Song, Xinzhi 130 Tellis, Ashley J. 99 Soviet Union: Anti-Ballistic Missile Teng, Jianqun 127, 130 Treaty 1972 105; collapse of 21–22; Terminal High Altitude Area Defense nuclear capability 179; security help System 108 50–52; strategic stability 155; threat theater nuclear weapons 17–18, 24, perception 60 54–55, 60, 72–73, 84 space warfare capabilities: arms race

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Theory of International Politics (Waltz) prospects 110; arms races 101; inte- 28 grated nuclear-space warfare cap- threat perception: global power 122–23; abilities 26, 72, 99–104; progress in Japan 4–5, 10–11, 38; neighboring 25–26; US and 3, 9–10 countries 66–67; polarity 38–40, 142; Star Wars 100–104 US 49–50; US–Japan alliance 42–43 state-level factors 20–27 Three Non-Nuclear Principles 165 status quo bias: criticisms of 36, 79–80; Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1979) existing studies 14–20; as minimum 117 goal 98; offensive capabilities 25; Type 092 SSBN 53 overview 2, 3, 5, 7 Type 094 Jin-class SSBN 53, 78, 89, 92, Stokes, Mark 17–18, 20, 24 140, 176, 179 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 179 Index 203 Ukraine crisis 154 Weeden, Brian 103 unipolarity 4, 35, 38–40 Wei, Guoan 166 USA: absolute security 98; Air-Sea Wen, Jiabao 118–19, 120 Battle doctrine 158; Anti-Ballistic Wenweipo 140 Missile Treaty 1972 105; Asia Pacific Wohlforth, William 28 alliances 161–64; containment posture Wu, Chunsi 83 10–11, 66; controversy 62; defense Wu, Junfei 137 capabilities 4, 9–10, 37–38, 42, 44, Wu, Qin 100 80–83, 106–7, 173; Diaoyu/Senkaku Wu, Tianfu 63, 64, 101, 106, 141 Islands 127; hegemony 174; Japan and 40, 123–24; NMD 110–11; Xi, Jinping 122, 178 Nuclear Posture Review Report 161; Xichang Satellite Launch Center 103 offensive responses to 84–89, 92–93; Xinhua News Agency 133–35, 136 Russia and 179; satellite defense Xiong, Guangkai 135 system 99–101; sea-based capability Xu, Hezhen 100 84, 91; Sino–US relations 11–12, Xue, Litai 49, 53, 54, 61 63–64, 78–80; Sino–US strategic Xuexi shibao 141 stability 151–55,178;Sino–US strategic stability, nuclear deterrence 155–61; Yang, Yunzhong 123, 126 space warfare concerns 99; Taiwan Yang, Zhou 84 and 50, 67; Terminal High Altitude Yao, Yunzhu 19, 56–57, 83, 91, 138 Area Defense System 108; threat per- Yasukuni shrine 117–18 ception 49–50, 83–84, 122–23; TMD Yin, Zhuo 127, 136 110–11; unipolarity 35, 39; US–Japan Yoshihara, Toshi 166 alliance 42–43 Yost, David 155, 156, 157, 159–60, 163 You, Ji 61 Wall Street Journal 154, 157 Yu, Zhirong 119, 123 Walt, Stephen 3–4, 7, 27, 28, 30, 32–33, Yukiya, Amano 167–68 36, 38 Waltz, Kenneth 3, 7, 28–32, 34–35, 174; Zakaria, Fareed 36 anarchic systems 151; balance of Zhang, Hui 84, 101 power 79; polarity 38–39; status quo Zhang, Yunling 123 bias 98; US capabilities 92–93 Zhang, Zhengwen 155 Wang, Jixin 90 Zheng, Ming 129 Wang, Mingzhi 106, 107–8 Zhou Enlai 116 Wang, Wenchao 83, 100–101, 102, 107 Zhou, Wei 167 Wang, Xianghui 109 Zhu, Chenghu 62, 82, 115, 137 war management 68 Zhu, Mingquan 50, 63–64 war scenarios 61–62, 69–71 Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 eBooks '. •. from Taylor &: Francis l• : •• Helping you to choose the right eBooks for your Library Add to your library's digital Choose from a range of subject collection today with packages or create your own! Taylor & Francis eBooks. Benefits for you We have over 50,000 eBooks • Free MARC records in the Humanities, Social • COUNTER-compliant usage statistics Sciences, Behavioural Sciences, • Flexible purchase and pricing options Built Environment and Law, • 70% approx of our eBooks are now from leading imprints, including DRM-free. Routledge, Focal Press and Benefits for your user Psychology Press. • Off-site, anytime access via Athens or referring URL • Print or copy pages or chapters Free Trials • Full content search Available • Bookmark, highlight and annotate text We offer free trials to qualifying academic, • Access to thousands of pages of corporate and government customers. quality research at the click of a button.

eCollections eFocus Choose from 20 different subject We have 16 cutting-edge interdisciplinary eCollections, including: collections, including:

MiddleadffMiddleadff DevelopmentDevelopmentStudiesStudies J~~

EconomiCSMiddleadff ~J ~ MiddleadffMiddleadff

Health Studies IslamIslam ~~

Downloaded by [New York University] at 22:38 06 August 2016 Mid Korea

Middle East Studtes Urban Studies

For more information, pricing enquiries or to order a free trial, please contact your local sales team: UK/Rest of World: [email protected] USA/Canada/Latin America: [email protected] East/Southeast Asia: [email protected] India: [email protected]