The United States and Japan in Global Context: 2013
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THE EDWIN O. REISCHAUER CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN GLOBAL CONTEXT: 2013 THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY Washington, D.C. THE EDWIN O. REISCHAUER CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN GLOBAL CONTEXT: 2013 THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY Washington, D.C. Edwin O. Reischauer (Oct. 15, 1910 – Sept. 1, 1990) Yearbook Class of 2013 Sean Cate, Yuki Onogi, Curtis Yibing Che, David Wells, James Bisbee, Tina Zhe Liu, Professor William Brooks, Yaowaluk Suthimanus, Haitham Jendoubi, and Yun Han 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 2 William L. Brooks Brash Idealism and the Futenma Issue: Democratic Participation and New Security Perspectives in Japan .................................................................................................................................................................... 26 James Bisbee The Impact of Japan's Territorial Dispute with China on the U.S.’ Rebalancing toward Asia ................... 55 Yun Han Japan’s Economic Partner of Choice: The United States or China? ........................................................... 74 Sean Cate Implications of Abenomics for the U.S.-Japan Relationship ...................................................................... 98 Haitham Jendoubi Abe’s Risky Decision to Join U.S.-led TPP Negotiations ........................................................................ 116 Yaowaluk Suthimanus U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation in the Wake of the Fukushima Accident .............................................. 132 David Wells Japan’s Post-Fukushima Quest for Stable LNG Supply: America or Russia? .......................................... 153 Yuki Onogi Crisis in U.S.-Japan Educational Exchanges ............................................................................................ 173 Zhe Liu Waning Cultural Influence of Japan on the U.S.: Case Study of Video Games ....................................... 193 Curtis Yibing Che Class Research Trip to Tokyo, March 2013: Photo Album ...................................................................... 213 The Reischauer Center in 2012-2013: Expanding Global Horizons ......................................................... 216 Kent E. Calder Reischauer Center 2012-2013 Events ....................................................................................................... 220 2 Introduction By William L. Brooks If 2011 was a national crisis for Japan due the devastating triple disaster of an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident in northern Honshu, 2012 was a major political game-changer, with the crushing defeat of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) after only three years in power by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the former ruling party that once had been seen as permanently relegated to the Diet sidelines. What happened during that fateful year? And what has happened so far in 2013 since the LDP returned under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe? This issue of the yearbook, U.S.-Japan Relations in Global Context, in answering those questions, probes into some of the basic issues that have shaped Japan’s domestic and international policy agenda during 2012 and 2013, as displayed in the nine expertly-researched and professionally-written papers by the SAIS students in the course with the same name. For over a quarter of a century, SAIS has published a yearbook on U.S.-Japan relations as they play out in an international setting or, conversely, how domestic issues in Japan impact on its relationship with the United States, as well as other countries and regions. This year’s themes have a strong bilateral flavor and cover such fascinating subjects as how the seemingly insolvable Okinawa basing issue is affecting Japanese perceptions of the Alliance and the presence of foreign troops on Japanese soil, and how Japan’s escalating territorial row with China may be complicating America’s rebalancing of its foreign and security policy toward Asia. Other papers evaluate Japan’s economic relationships with China and the U.S., Prime Minister Abe’s economic policies and his decision to join the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), as they affect U.S. interests. Energy is twice on the agenda: first, in a paper on Japan’s nuclear energy cooperation with the U.S. after the nuclear accident in 2011; and second, in another paper on energy-pinched Japan’s scramble to line up long-term LNG supplies from Russia and the U.S. The last two papers in the yearbook delve deeply into a perplexing trend of dwindling interest in each other’s culture by young Japanese and Americans, as seen in the alarming decline in educational exchanges between Japan and the U.S., and the waning of Japanese pop-cultural influence in the U.S. Decline and Fall of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, who replaced Naoto Kan in September 2011, inherited a party that was already starting to collapse internally from two years of squabbling and ineffective leadership. By January 2012, due to defectors, the number of DPJ Lower House members had dropped to 291, twenty less than when the party took over in September 2009. Even with coalition partners, it was no longer possible to assemble a two-third majority vote in the Lower House to override bills turned back in the opposition-controlled Upper House. Passing legislation required cooperation from the opposition parties. But the former ruling party, the LDP, had become more interested in toppling the DPJ from power by forcing a snap election than in 3 agreeing to compromises on key bills. In the end, Noda made a deal with the LDP but in it was a poison pill that ultimately destroyed his administration and his party. In March 2012, only six months after Prime Minister Noda took office, his administration was in serious trouble. Although Noda was able to make progress with some issues left over from his two predecessors, Yukio Hatoyama and Naoto Kan, his cabinet’s support rate began to plummet. The chief reason was his unbending commitment to raise the consumption tax rate, for which the government was readying a package of relevant legislative measures for presentation to the Diet that month. Noda, after taking over from Kan in September 2011, found himself on the defensive in steering his government. He inherited a negative legacy from his two DPJ predecessors: Hatoyama, who resigned under a cloud after reneging on a commitment to Okinawa to relocate a U.S. Marine base, Futenma, to another part of Japan, and Kan, who was blamed for inadequate crisis- management responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake disaster and the accompanying Fukushima nuclear accident. Prime Minister Noda was so obsessed with passing the consumption tax hike that he neglected some important policy areas and stumbled badly in others. His impetuousness frustrated his party, ultimately splitting it, delighted the opposition camp in the Diet, and decimated his popularity with the electorate. The anti-consumption tax hike force in DPJ also tended to be against Japan joining the TPP -- making the internal divide virtually irresolvable. Noda’s prioritization of domestic issues over his external policy agenda hurt Japan’s interests. For example, he bypassed a golden diplomatic opportunity in March 2012 by missing the main discussions at the Nuclear Security Summit. Noda arrived in Seoul on the night of March 26 to attend the Summit. Although Noda planned to urge all participating countries to cooperate for blocking the launching of a long-range missile by North Korea, he was not scheduled to hold talks with the leaders of any major countries, such as the United States, China, and South Korea. In contrast, President Barack Obama actively conducted “summit diplomacy” to promote nuclear nonproliferation after arriving in Seoul on March 26. Noda only released a statement mainly on the North Korean nuclear issue at a March 27 plenary meeting. But even though he should have planned consultations on the North Korean issue, he never set up talks with the leaders of the U.S., Russia, China, and South Korea. This was but one example of Noda’s approach of prioritizing domestic affairs over foreign affairs. In order to make his presence felt, the prime minister should have arrived in Seoul by noon of March 26, but he even cancelled the dinner party planned for that evening because of intensive deliberations in the House of Councillors Budget Committee. He should have coordinated the Diet schedule to allow him to attend the full Summit. Instead, he let the opposition parties take the lead in order to get their early support for the fiscal 2012 budget and consumption tax hike- related bills. He even moved up by three hours his return to Japan in order persuade the DPJ in person and obtain its approval in the run-up to the cabinet approval of the consumption tax-hike legislation. 4 Japan experienced a similar situation when the first Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington in April 2010. President Obama declined talks with the Japanese leader because of Tokyo’s flip-flopping over the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama explained the situation for 10 minutes at the dinner table, but his explanation was largely ignored. Japan was described by