Report on the Population Affected by Armed Conflict in

NGO Forum - Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit December 2015 Report

This report is intended for organizations working on the humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis. This report should not be distributed outside of your organization or posted on the Internet.

For more information on this report contact: NGO Forum HTAU Coordinator Email: [email protected] Cover photo: Alo Jareki/Reuters

Table of Contents Executive Summary ...... 3 Methodology ...... 3 Security ...... 3 IDP movement ...... 4 Shelter ...... 5 Education...... 5 Fuel and heating ...... 6 WASH ...... 7 Livelihood ...... 8 Health ...... 8 Appendix A: Acronyms and Secondary Sources on Syria...... 9 Appendix B: Areas of control and GOS/GOR air strikes in Syria ...... 10

HTAU December 2015 Report Page 2 Executive Summary This brief report on the Syrian affected population covers the period of late November and early December 2015 and area of Aleppo, Idleb and Hama governorates. It is based on interviews with 13 NGO staff and key informants. The informants were asked about the main problems for the affected community, such as the winter weather, and the affected population’s coping mechanisms for those problems. The main findings include:  Safety and security problems continued to increase for the affected population due to increased GOS/GOR air and ground attacks, and offensives by ISIS and OAGs. Areas previously considered safe, such as near the Turkish border, are now often unsafe.  With the increased attacks and fighting, population movements continue to areas that are safer. However, some IDPs are returning to their original homes in ceasefire areas, such as Idleb City.  Access to adequate shelter continues to be problematic for the affected population, due to many IDP camps being at full capacity, few rental options, high rental prices, and little savings or income.  Many children are not attending school due to security reasons, poverty, and lack of adequate, winterized space.  Fuel supplies and heating materials are difficult to find or more expensive.  The lack of electricity and shortage of fuel have made water supplies more difficult and expensive.  While employment is one pull factor for IDPs to safer areas near the Turkish border, jobs are very limited and pay is low.  The health sector has been hard hit by recent GOS/GOR attacks and there is a shortage of staff and supplies, while trauma and preventive care demand continues.

Methodology This report is based on brief interviews with 13 NGO staff and key informants in northern Syria in November and December, 2015. Key informants were from Aleppo, Idleb and Hama governorates. The informants were asked about the main problems for the affected community, such as the winter weather, and the affected population’s coping mechanisms for those problems.

Security Since the GOS increased its coordination with its various allies in late September, 2015, including Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, it has launched multiple offensives in Aleppo, Idleb, Hama, Homs and Daraa governorates. The GOS and its allies have gained some ground in these offensives, while OAGs and ISIS have gained ground in other areas, although the frontlines have not changed much since September (see Appendix B). However, the GOS and allied offensives have been much more intense and destructive with more air and artillery attacks, often in areas that had been safe previously, such as the Turkmen Mountains and other areas along the Turkish border. GOR air attacks have been increasing

HTAU December 2015 Report Page 3 devastating for civilians and humanitarian workers after the destruction of the GOR bomber by on November 24. GOS/GOR has been targeting OAG headquarters, service facilities, fuel and commodity conveys. For example, between Nov. 15 and 30, GOS or GOR attacks hit three hospitals in Daraa, one hospital in Homs, two hospitals and three schools in Eastern Ghouta, and a major bakery in Idleb. The intensity of the bombing and fighting has been almost continually increasing, and double that of the same period one year ago. These GOS/GOR air attacks have had a direct impact on civilian casualties, IDP movements, fuel and food prices and availability, among other things. There is a growing fear among civilians that there is no place safe to go. Specific reports on security came from various localities. Civilian kidnapping by unknown actors was a problem in Dana, Idleb and Aleppo City. In Dana, the local OAG took measures to prevent kidnapping, such as increased road blocks, which supposedly increased the time before kidnappers could contact family members. Media and civil society activists were especially at risk. In Idleb City small arms use has created an atmosphere of insecurity, which has reduced the number of business owners opening their shops. Also, there is concern that the local ceasefire in the Idleb City and Maaret Tamsrin area between GOS and OAGs may break down. Civilians were hit by GOR air strikes while harvesting olives in Kili, Idleb and while getting assistance from a local NGO in Aleppo City. In Sarmada, Idleb the security situation within the urban center was reported to be safe since airstrikes had targeted the outskirts of Sarmada urban center and a truck station near Bab Al-Hawa, destroying humanitarian aid and other shipments. Truck drivers were avoiding the station. In Latmana in southern Idleb there has been daily shelling, even though 40% of its original population is still there. These people preferred to stay in their homes rather than staying in camps, regardless of the destruction. The informal tented settlement in Kafr Zeita was hit by a GOS/GOR airstrike, with women and children causalities. GOS/GOR air strikes in Atareb, Aleppo were a problem, although local NGOs and the local council responded in rapidly. One airstrike hit the Internet and the radio (walkie-talkie) tower, but it was fixed the next day. Some communities have set up observation systems with walkie-talkie radios to provide advance warning of GOS/GOR air attacks, which is communicated to key places, such as schools or hospitals.

IDP movement During November and December the conflict patterns were such that airstrikes alone did not often trigger long term displacement, unless they were accompanied by intensive ground hostilities. Most displacement triggered by airstrikes was temporary, with the affected population moving to local farms or nearby communities for a few days, and then returning home. The main push factor for long term displacement was safety, and pull factors were job opportunities and humanitarian services. At first most of the poorest IDPs went to the Atma and Qah camps, and Dana and Sarmada communities, however these areas were quickly became full, so recent IDPs have resorted to erecting makeshift shelters and using unfinished buildings. Due to the escalated fighting and GOS/GOR air strikes, the Dana, Idleb area witnessed a

HTAU December 2015 Report Page 4 huge influx of IDPs in November and December, with an unofficial tally of about 250,000 IDPs in the area.1 Since Dana, Idleb was reported to be one of the safest communities in Idleb governorate, many IDPs were going there. These included IDPs from Tadmor, Homs, Sahel Al Ghab, Hama, and many IDPs from communities that were relatively safe in the past, such as southern, rural Aleppo towns like Saan Elghazal, Buz Kij and Iss, and Hama communities like Latmana and Kafr Zeita. Some of these IDPs were the last to leave their villages, since they stayed until the fighting got simply too intense. In Aleppo City, GOS/GOR airstrikes and military hostilities resulted in a huge wave of displacement from Al Kalasseh neighborhood towards the north to Daret Azza and Atareb, which were already overcrowded with IDPs. Other Aleppo City IDPs fled to relatively safer outskirts of the city.

Shelter This influx of IDPs to Dana, Idleb caused significant shortage of shelter, since the local IDP camps were overcapacity and few rental apartments were available. As a result, IDPs were finding it very difficult to find adequate shelter. Also, apartment rental prices were increasing. In some cases old tenants were asked to evacuate so landlords could rent to newly arrived IDPs who offered to pay a higher rent. Many informal tented settlements were erected in areas like Hazano and Kili. These settlements were reportedly lacking basic services like water and health services. These IDPs were buying water from water trucks. Specific locations had unique shelter problems. In Idleb City after the ceasefire treaty between the GoS and OAGs, many IDPs returned to their homes leaving few vacant apartments and houses for rent. The rent prices in Idleb city were reported to be very high, and unaffordable for most IDP families. In addition to local residents who had returned, some IDPs from other areas, like Hama, were looking for shelter in Idleb City. Since some IDPs had been staying in local schools, some schools evicted the IDPs to allow classes to continue. There was reportedly an informal tented settlement in nearby Kafr Zeita, with 2,500 IDPs from Sahel Al Ghab, which was not receiving any humanitarian assistance. In Aleppo City, due to insecurity and extensive population movements over the last four years, there were many vacant houses in the city, which have been given to displaced families, either free through the local council or for rent from the home owner. In Lattakia governorate, due to the intense GOR air attacks on Turkmen Mountain, many communities had been affected and fled towards Yamadia camp. The new IDPs had been living in informal tented camps near the border near Yamadia community, which was reportedly lacking WASH infrastructure and other basic services. Since these camps were located in rainy mountainous areas, there was an urgent need for tarps, mattresses, and other winterization items.

Education Education has also been affected by the military hostilities as schools have been systematically targeted by GOS/GOR or used by OAGs at times. A number of schools

1 This number may differ from CCCM, NPM and other estimates, since it is based on perceptions of local key informants.

HTAU December 2015 Report Page 5 have been destroyed, and students and teachers killed and injured in November and December. Due to the insecurity local councils in many communities have cancelled classes. Other communities, like Dana and Sarmada, have continued educational activities with extra caution: students might get one to two hours of classes, because children are sent home if there is an alarm of an impending air attack. In Aleppo City some schools relocated to basements and bomb shelters for safety. Children are not attending school for other reasons as well. According to sources, many parents have stopped sending their children to schools as a precautionary measurement, across many communities affected by the GOR/GOS aerial campaign. Newly arrived IDPs were not sending their children to schools because they could not afford the costs. Also, reportedly students are not attending schools that need winterization maintenance. In Yamadia camp in Lattakia, school buildings needed repair, and there was a shortage of teachers, school materials and curricula. Even thought it was reported that schools receive support from different sources, like GOS, NGOs and the Syrian coalition, such support was often limited to free text books for students. However, this support doesn’t reach all communities. In Ma'arrat An Nu'man for example, education was reported to be one of the biggest problems since there was a shortage of the full range of resources needed for the huge number of IDPs.

Fuel and heating Fuel prices and heating materials were major problems with the coming of winter in Syria. Fuel prices were heavily impacted in all areas under OAG control. Most fuel in OAG areas came from ISIS-controlled areas. Thus, with the increased conflict between ISIS and GOS and OAGs, the trade in fuel has been reduced significantly and prices have doubled. The targeting of airstrikes on ISIS oil refineries, fuel trucks and fuel stations along the fuel trade routes in southern rural Aleppo has made the situation worse. Since the private commercial trucks and drivers transporting fuel from IS areas to OAG areas have been targeted by GOR, the trip was reported to be too dangerous, and many drivers have stopped moving fuel. While some vendors had stored fuel reserves after the previous shortage, those stocks have been reportedly used up. Consequently, in Dana, Idleb fuel prices had jumped from SP120 to SP220 within the span of two days, and in Ma'arrat An Nu'man, from SP135 to SP210. Fuel price increases have been continuous. These increased costs have affected most Syrians that rely on diesel fuel for heating and electricity. Many Syrians in OAG areas cannot afford to purchase much fuel. Another fuel issue that was reported was its quality. Since the ISIS fuel is poorly refined, it often has additives like benzene which burn easily and can cause house fires and suffocation. Also, diesel fuel can freeze in the cold weather and create harmful fumes. Suffocation and smoke poisoning were also problems due to the large number of people (sometimes three families) huddled around one wood stove in relatively small, unventilated spaces. Higher fuel costs have increased the price of generator-supplied electricity. The monthly subscription for eight hours of a limited wattage was increased from SP2000 to SP3500 SYP in Dana, Idleb. This wattage just runs a few basic appliances. In Aleppo City and nearby areas the public electrical supply has been stopped for the last 45 days as power

HTAU December 2015 Report Page 6 lines were damaged and local fighting prevents repair. There are four kinds of stoves used in OAG areas; wood, diesel, and kerosene burning stoves, and open cans or barrels in which any flammable material can be burnt. The last type was being used especially by poorer people who scavenge garbage looking for anything flammable, like plastic bags and cardboard boxes. Children were reported to be mainly doing this scavenging. The can or barrel stove increases the risk of suffocation and asthma problems. People preferred wood stoves more than diesel because wood stoves burn any material. Kerosene stoves were reported to be the most efficient because one liter of kerosene would last for 6 to 7 hours, and the most preferred after wood stoves. In Latmana and Kafr Zeita communities more than 70% of the population were reported to be using wood for heating. Wood was being bought or cut from any available trees, even fruit trees. One ton of wood was reported to cost about SP30,000. In some areas local authorities are not regulating tree cutting, while in other areas, like Atareb and Ma'arrat An Nu'man, the local court issued a decree prohibiting tree cutting, as part of an environmental awareness campaign. In Yamadia, the community and camps are located in a mountainous area covered with pine trees, so the local population has been relying on wood for heating. Some Syrians were using any flammable material like old clothes, furniture, and plastic. The use of hazardous materials for heating fires was reported to be problematic, due to the noxious fumes and chimney pipes that were designed for diesel stoves which give off less smoke. During sunny and warmer winter days the affected population don’t use the stoves, and simply cover themselves with blankets and heavy clothes instead. Warm winter clothes were reportedly hard to find, since local clothing factories have been closed or relocated.

WASH Water and sanitation were also affected by the fuel crisis, with varying problems across different locations. In Dana, Idleb the local council was supporting water pumping buy purchasing diesel, however they didn’t always have money to buy fuel. When the public pumps were working, every neighborhood would get water once a week. When public water supplies weren’t available, the local population had to purchase water tanks at SP2000 or more per tank. In Dana, Idleb one source noted that the well water had not been tested for drinkability. Even though the water looked and tasted ok, there were some cases of illness caused by the water. These wells were secure and away from polluting sources, but the water had not been treated or tested. In Idleb City, access to safe drinking water was one of the main issues, in part due to the electrical outage after the shutdown of the Zayzon thermal power station. Local water trucks were unable to supply the increased population with sufficient water. An NGO tried to support to the local water department with diesel fuel to pump water, however the poor quality of the fuel damaged the pump. Since this pump was reported to be an older, but good-quality pump made in Romania and hard to fix, the local counsel had to stop using the pump before it got damaged beyond repair, and returned to using water trucks. In Dart Ezzeh, one key informant reported that it was difficult to pump water to some communities located on higher ground. Efforts by the local council and NGOs to dig wells in the higher elevations were suspended because of rocky ground that repeatedly damaged the drills. In Yamadia camp the affected population was located in mountainous areas, far

HTAU December 2015 Report Page 7 from water sources. One NGO was distributing water for Yamadia and other nearby camps, but the affected population occasionally had to buy water, especially after the large influx of IDPs put a strain on WASH services. The destruction of road, electrical, water and sewer infrastructure in OAG-controlled areas has caused many problems. While before the conflict GOS was in charge of maintaining the infrastructure, local councils have taken on this responsibility, often with limited resources. The local councils in Dana were repairing sewer lines in Sarmada as part of their winterization preparation. However, due to a lack of resources, the maintenance was halted and the community was left with a big ditch in the middle of the street. The Kafr- Kafrehmul community was also reported to be in need of sewage system maintenance, since the system only covered 60% of the community and the streets flooded from the rain. Another source noted that roads in and around the IDP camps were in need of repair. Since many of these camps were established on agricultural land, gravelling doesn’t last more than one rainy season. Therefore, more graveling and drainage systems were needed. To cope with these difficulties, some of the affected families had elevated their tent above ground level, using soil, stones or concrete, or dug a trench around the tent, to manage the rain.

Livelihood Safety and employment opportunities were the most influential push and pull factors for IDPs in recent months according to sources. Dana and Sarmada were one of the main destinations for IDPs because of the possibility of finding work in shops, trade or loading trucks at Bab Al Hawa truck station. The average monthly pay for a daily worker was reported to be about SP30,000 a month, which is not enough to cover basic necessities like food, water, electricity and rent. Hence, to cope with the high prices and low wages, the affected population has resorted to minimizing their expenditures and buying the cheapest items. The continuously rising prices were reported to be a result of the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and Syrian pound, and shop owners and businessmen insisting on transactions in U.S. dollars.

Health The health sector faced devastating, systematic attacks on infrastructure and staff between October and December. A number of hospitals were destroyed or damaged, and staff and patients killed or injured. During the past 30 days key informants stated that there was a shortage in Idleb City of specialized medical practitioners, equipment and medicine. Consequently, hospital staff were triaging cases to determine which ones could be managed locally and which had to be transported to other sites. In Dana, Latmana and Kafr Zeita, despite the presence of many hospitals and clinics, similar shortages were reported, including vaccine, epilepsy and cancer medications, and specialty practitioners like psychiatry and neurosurgeons. Cases that required special care were referred to Turkey, although patient travel paper work for crossing into Turkey sometimes created problems for crossing the border. The Turkish government was reportedly facilitating movement for elderly, disabled or sick Turkmen through the Yamadia border crossing without having to register, but movement for other Syrian ethnic groups was more difficult.

HTAU December 2015 Report Page 8 Appendix A: Acronyms and Secondary Sources on Syria Acronyms 1. CCCM: Camp Coordination and Camp Management 2. FSA: Free 3. GOS: Government of Syria 4. GOR: Government of Russia 5. HTAU: Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit 6. IDP: Internally Displaced Person 7. ISIS: Islamic State 8. JAN: Jabhat Al Nusra 9. NGO: Non-Governmental Organization 10. NFI: Non-Food Item 11. OAG: Opposition Armed Group 12. PIN; People in Need 13. SP: Syrian Pound 14. SVBIED: Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device 15. USD: United States Dollar 16. VBIED: Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device 17. WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 18. YPG: Kurdish People’s Protection Units Secondary Sources 1. Institute for the Study of War Syria Updates. http://iswsyria.blogspot.com.tr/ 2. Syria Comment. Joshua Landis. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/ 3. BBC. Syria’s War. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17258397 4. Al Jazeera. Syria. http://www.aljazeera.com/topics/country/syria.html 5. CNN. Syria. http://edition.cnn.com/specials/middleeast/syria 6. Brookings Institute. Syria. http://www.brookings.edu/research/topics/syria 7. RAND Corporation. Syria. http://www.rand.org/topics/syria.html 8. Assistance Coordination Unit. http://www.acu-sy.org/en/information-management/ 9. The Carter Center. Southern Syria Conflict Update. July 10, 2015. http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict-mapping.html 10. The Islamic State in Southern Syria. May 15, 2015. The Carter Center. http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict-mapping.html 11. The Carter Center. The Syria Countrywide Conflict Report #5. Feb. 28, 2015. 12. http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict-mapping.html 13. Syria Needs Analysis Project. SNAP: summary of work Dec. 2012 – June 2015. 14. http://acaps.org/img/documents/s-snap-summary-of-work-dec-2012-june-2015.pdf 15. SNAP: Conflict Dashboard May 2015. http://acaps.org/img/documents/i-snap- conflict-dashboard-may-2015.pdf

HTAU December 2015 Report Page 9 Appendix B: Areas of control and GOS/GOR air strikes in Syria

Source: http://www.iswresearch.blogspot.com.tr/

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Source: http://www.iswresearch.blogspot.com.tr/

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