DOCSLIB.ORG

Report on the Population Affected by Armed Conflict in Syria

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Report on the Population Affected by Armed Conflict in Syria Report on the Population Affected by Armed Conflict in Syria NGO Forum - Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit December 2015 Report This report is intended for organizations working on the humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis. This report should not be distributed outside of your organization or posted on the Internet. For more information on this report contact: NGO Forum HTAU Coordinator Email: [email protected] Cover photo: Alo Jareki/Reuters Table of Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... 3 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 3 Security .................................................................................................................................. 3 IDP movement ....................................................................................................................... 4 Shelter .................................................................................................................................... 5 Education................................................................................................................................ 5 Fuel and heating ..................................................................................................................... 6 WASH .................................................................................................................................... 7 Livelihood .............................................................................................................................. 8 Health ..................................................................................................................................... 8 Appendix A: Acronyms and Secondary Sources on Syria..................................................... 9 Appendix B: Areas of control and GOS/GOR air strikes in Syria ....................................... 10 HTAU December 2015 Report Page 2 Executive Summary This brief report on the Syrian affected population covers the period of late November and early December 2015 and area of Aleppo, Idleb and Hama governorates. It is based on interviews with 13 NGO staff and key informants. The informants were asked about the main problems for the affected community, such as the winter weather, and the affected population’s coping mechanisms for those problems. The main findings include: Safety and security problems continued to increase for the affected population due to increased GOS/GOR air and ground attacks, and offensives by ISIS and OAGs. Areas previously considered safe, such as near the Turkish border, are now often unsafe. With the increased attacks and fighting, population movements continue to areas that are safer. However, some IDPs are returning to their original homes in ceasefire areas, such as Idleb City. Access to adequate shelter continues to be problematic for the affected population, due to many IDP camps being at full capacity, few rental options, high rental prices, and little savings or income. Many children are not attending school due to security reasons, poverty, and lack of adequate, winterized space. Fuel supplies and heating materials are difficult to find or more expensive. The lack of electricity and shortage of fuel have made water supplies more difficult and expensive. While employment is one pull factor for IDPs to safer areas near the Turkish border, jobs are very limited and pay is low. The health sector has been hard hit by recent GOS/GOR attacks and there is a shortage of staff and supplies, while trauma and preventive care demand continues. Methodology This report is based on brief interviews with 13 NGO staff and key informants in northern Syria in November and December, 2015. Key informants were from Aleppo, Idleb and Hama governorates. The informants were asked about the main problems for the affected community, such as the winter weather, and the affected population’s coping mechanisms for those problems. Security Since the GOS increased its coordination with its various allies in late September, 2015, including Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, it has launched multiple offensives in Aleppo, Idleb, Hama, Homs and Daraa governorates. The GOS and its allies have gained some ground in these offensives, while OAGs and ISIS have gained ground in other areas, although the frontlines have not changed much since September (see Appendix B). However, the GOS and allied offensives have been much more intense and destructive with more air and artillery attacks, often in areas that had been safe previously, such as the Turkmen Mountains and other areas along the Turkish border. GOR air attacks have been increasing HTAU December 2015 Report Page 3 devastating for civilians and humanitarian workers after the destruction of the GOR bomber by Turkey on November 24. GOS/GOR has been targeting OAG headquarters, service facilities, fuel and commodity conveys. For example, between Nov. 15 and 30, GOS or GOR attacks hit three hospitals in Daraa, one hospital in Homs, two hospitals and three schools in Eastern Ghouta, and a major bakery in Idleb. The intensity of the bombing and fighting has been almost continually increasing, and double that of the same period one year ago. These GOS/GOR air attacks have had a direct impact on civilian casualties, IDP movements, fuel and food prices and availability, among other things. There is a growing fear among civilians that there is no place safe to go. Specific reports on security came from various localities. Civilian kidnapping by unknown actors was a problem in Dana, Idleb and Aleppo City. In Dana, the local OAG took measures to prevent kidnapping, such as increased road blocks, which supposedly increased the time before kidnappers could contact family members. Media and civil society activists were especially at risk. In Idleb City small arms use has created an atmosphere of insecurity, which has reduced the number of business owners opening their shops. Also, there is concern that the local ceasefire in the Idleb City and Maaret Tamsrin area between GOS and OAGs may break down. Civilians were hit by GOR air strikes while harvesting olives in Kili, Idleb and while getting assistance from a local NGO in Aleppo City. In Sarmada, Idleb the security situation within the urban center was reported to be safe since airstrikes had targeted the outskirts of Sarmada urban center and a truck station near Bab Al-Hawa, destroying humanitarian aid and other shipments. Truck drivers were avoiding the station. In Latmana in southern Idleb there has been daily shelling, even though 40% of its original population is still there. These people preferred to stay in their homes rather than staying in camps, regardless of the destruction. The informal tented settlement in Kafr Zeita was hit by a GOS/GOR airstrike, with women and children causalities. GOS/GOR air strikes in Atareb, Aleppo were a problem, although local NGOs and the local council responded in rapidly. One airstrike hit the Internet and the radio (walkie-talkie) tower, but it was fixed the next day. Some communities have set up observation systems with walkie-talkie radios to provide advance warning of GOS/GOR air attacks, which is communicated to key places, such as schools or hospitals. IDP movement During November and December the conflict patterns were such that airstrikes alone did not often trigger long term displacement, unless they were accompanied by intensive ground hostilities. Most displacement triggered by airstrikes was temporary, with the affected population moving to local farms or nearby communities for a few days, and then returning home. The main push factor for long term displacement was safety, and pull factors were job opportunities and humanitarian services. At first most of the poorest IDPs went to the Atma and Qah camps, and Dana and Sarmada communities, however these areas were quickly became full, so recent IDPs have resorted to erecting makeshift shelters and using unfinished buildings. Due to the escalated fighting and GOS/GOR air strikes, the Dana, Idleb area witnessed a HTAU December 2015 Report Page 4 huge influx of IDPs in November and December, with an unofficial tally of about 250,000 IDPs in the area.1 Since Dana, Idleb was reported to be one of the safest communities in Idleb governorate, many IDPs were going there. These included IDPs from Tadmor, Homs, Sahel Al Ghab, Hama, and many IDPs from communities that were relatively safe in the past, such as southern, rural Aleppo towns like Saan Elghazal, Buz Kij and Iss, and Hama communities like Latmana and Kafr Zeita. Some of these IDPs were the last to leave their villages, since they stayed until the fighting got simply too intense. In Aleppo City, GOS/GOR airstrikes and military hostilities resulted in a huge wave of displacement from Al Kalasseh neighborhood towards the north to Daret Azza and Atareb, which were already overcrowded with IDPs. Other Aleppo City IDPs fled to relatively safer outskirts of the city. Shelter This influx of IDPs to Dana, Idleb caused significant shortage of shelter, since the local IDP camps were overcapacity and few rental apartments were available. As a result, IDPs were finding it very difficult to find adequate shelter. Also, apartment rental prices were increasing. In some cases old tenants were asked to evacuate so landlords could rent to newly arrived IDPs who offered
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Eurazjatycki Dryf Turcji
    EURAZJATYCKI DRYF TURCJI Geneza turecko-rosyjskiego partnerstwa, kryzysy w relacjach Turcji z UE i USA, zagrożenia dla spójności NATO Centrum Badań nad Bezpieczeństwem Ośrodek Studiów Przestrzeni Postsowieckiej RAPORT | MARZEC 2018 Eurazjatycki dryf Turcji Geneza turecko-rosyjskiego partnerstwa, kryzysy w relacjach Turcji z UE i USA, zagrożenia dla spójności NATO Centrum Badań nad Bezpieczeństwem Akademii Sztuki Wojennej Raport OSPP | Marzec 2018 Redakcja raportu: Zespół OSPP Zdjęcie na okładce: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 [www.kremlin.ru] Ośrodek Studiów Przestrzeni Postsowieckiej Centrum Badań nad Bezpieczeństwem Akademia Sztuki Wojennej al. gen. A. Chruściela „Montera” 103 00-910 Warszawa Tel.: 26-181-33-25 E-mail: [email protected] Opinie zawarte w niniejszym opracowaniu nie są oficjalnym stanowiskiem Akademii Sztuki Wojennej Spis treści Tezy .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Wstęp ................................................................................................................................................................................... 10 Część 1. Historyczne tło stosunków turecko-rosyjskich ................................................................................. 12 Dziedzictwo rywalizacji Imperiów Osmańskiego i Rosyjskiego ............................................................. 12 Stosunki turecko-sowieckie ..................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of Russian, Syrian, and Iranian Actions Against the Jihadist Movements and Turkish-U.S
    ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue The Evolution of Russian, Syrian, and Iranian Actions Against the No. 394 Jihadist Movements and Turkish-U.S. Responses Jan 2016 Yossef Bodansky The Evolution of Russian, Syrian, and Iranian Actions Against the Jihadist Movements and Turkish-U.S. Responses Yossef Bodansky January 2016 Abstract Almost three months into the Russian military intervention in Syria and Iraq - a clear strategy has emerged. Russia is spearheading a regional allied effort to consolidate tangible gains - to stabilize the lines before Winter freezes the fighting. When fighting resume in early Spring 2016, the Jihadist forces will no longer be able to threaten the Fertile Crescent of Minorities and the buffer areas surrounding Shiite Iraq. Emboldened, better equipped and retrained - the forces allied with Russia will then be able to go on the strategic offensive under a unified master-plan. In mid-October, the Kremlin clarified that the Russian strategic-political objectives in Syria are to stabilize and consolidate the Assad administration as the key to defeating the Jihadist forces, as well as to compel the US-led West to accept and acknowledge this reality. For the Kremlin, all anti-Assad forces are terrorists. In mid-November, Putin returned to Moscow from the G-20 summit convinced that any attempt to deal with Obama was an exercise in futility and that a major face-off, even crisis, over Syria was only a question of time. Hence, the Kremlin resolved to seize the strategic initiative. Thus, the Russian military intervention has already had a profound impact on the region’s strategic-political posture.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamists, Religion, and the Revolution in Syria
    Islamists, Religion, and the Revolution in Syria Mohammad Abu Rumman ΔϴϤηΎϬϟ΍ΔϴϧΩέϷ΍ΔϜϠϤϤϟ΍ ΔϴϨρϮϟ΍ΔΒΘϜϤϟ΍Γή΋΍ΩϯΪϟω΍ΪϳϹ΍Ϣϗέ (2013/9/3259) ή˷ΒόϳϻϭϪϔϨμϣϯϮΘΤϣϦϋΔϴϧϮϧΎϘϟ΍ΔϴϟϭΆδϤϟ΍ϞϣΎϛϒϟΆϤϟ΍ϞϤΤΘϳ ϯήΧ΃ΔϴϣϮϜΣΔϬΟϱ΃ϭ΃ϪϴϨρϮϟ΍ΔΒΘϜϤϟ΍Γή΋΍Ωϱ΃έ ϦϋϒϨμϤϟ΍΍άϫ Imprint Published in 2013 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, FES Jordan & Iraq / FES Syria FES Jordan & Iraq P.O. Box 941876 Amman 11194, Jordan Email: [email protected] Website: www.fes-jordan.org FES Syria P.O. Box 116107 Riad El Solh Beirut 1107 2210, Lebanon Not for sale. © FES Jordan & Iraq / FES Syria All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publishers. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the original authors. They do not necessarily represent those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or the editor. Translation: Dr. Hassan Barari Editing: Anja Wehler-Schoeck Cover: Ramzi al-Arabi Printing: Economic Printing Press ISBN: 978-9957-484-26-2 2 Foreword In the current fall of 2013, not a single day passes by without the crisis in Syria making new headlines. The international community has demonstrated indecision regarding concerted strategic action in the face of Bashar al-Assad’s brutal acts against the Syrian population. Meanwhile, the subsequent refugee crisis is heavily impacting Syria’s neighboring countries Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and to a lesser extent Iraq. In the two latter, the political implications of what is turning more and more into a proxy war are felt the strongest and contribute to the increasing instability of both countries.
    [Show full text]
  • Partner Operations in Syria Lessons Learned and the Way Forward
    Atlantic Council RAFIK HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST Partner Operations in Syria Lessons Learned and the Way Forward Aaron Stein A Report of the Atlantic Council’s Sudan Task Force by Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates with Kelsey Lilley Partner Operations in Syria Lessons Learned and the Way Forward Aaron Stein ISBN: 978-1-61977-405-6. Cover photo: Reuters/Goran Tomasevic. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters stand in line during a funeral of SDF fighters killed by Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham militants in Raqqa, at Tal Abiad, Syria June 23, 2017. This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. July 2017 Partner Operations in Syria CONTENTS Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................................1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................2 Syria: Special Operations Forces and the Task at Hand ..............................................................4 How We Got Here: Tensions with Turkey about Strategy ..........................................................6 Train and Equip: Seeking to Close the Pocket with Arab Forces ............................................9
    [Show full text]
  • Calculated Escalation اﺳم اﻟﻣوﺿوع : Limitations to the Turbulent Relationship ﻋﻧوان اﻟﻣوﺿوع
    Calculated Escalation : ωϭοϭϣϟ΍ϡγ΍ Limitations to the turbulent relationship : ωϭοϭϣϟ΍ϥ΍ϭϧϋ between Ankara and Moscow 07/02/2016 : έηϧϟ΍ΦϳέΎΗ ϱίΎΟΣϑϳρϠϟ΍ΩΑϋ : ΏΗΎϛϟ΍ϡγ΍ : ωϭοϭϣϟ΍ Russian-Turkish relations are undergoing constant escalation since November 24 in the aftermath of Turkish Air Force F-16 fighters' shooting down of a Russian Su-24 attack aircraft on the border with Syria after the aircraft reportedly violated Turkey's airspace and did not heed warnings from the Turkish Armed Forces to leave Turkish airspace.The Russian military aircraft went down in Syria's northwestern Turkmen town of Bayirbucak, also known as the Turkmen Mountain, in the coastal governorate of Latakia, an area targeted with intense bombing by Russian warplanes and the Syrian regime's armed forces.Escalation between the two states has had political, economic and military dimensions, especially after failed attempts to ease their tensions. This requires looking into Turkey¶s motives for downing the Russian military warplane, the nature of Russian escalation, Turkey's attempts to overcome the sanctions imposed by Russia, as well as the future of relations between the two states.Turkey's Intentions behind Downing the Russian warplaneAlthough Turkey insists that it downed the Russian warplane because it violated Turkish airspace, there are a number of objectives that Turkey sought to achieve by the shoot-down. The following stand out as the most important:The crash site of the downed Russian warplane is Bayirbucak, a Turkmen majority town northwest of Syria that Turkey continues to defend. Turkey considers the area as an extension of its territory after Turkey lost it to the French occupation in Syria in 1921 when Turkey and the French occupied Syria signed a border demarcation agreement.
    [Show full text]
  • Organised Crime in Trafficking of Cultural Goods in Turkey Samuel Andrew Hardy University of Oslo - Norwegian Institute in Rome, Norway
    Stolen Heritage Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Heritage in the EU and the MENA Region edited by Arianna Traviglia, Lucio Milano, Cristina Tonghini, Riccardo Giovanelli Organised Crime in Trafficking of Cultural Goods in Turkey Samuel Andrew Hardy University of Oslo - Norwegian Institute in Rome, Norway Abstract This research assesses who is involved in the trafficking of archaeological objects and fake antiquities from Turkey; how they are involved; and how they operate, both online and offline. It highlights the volume and visibility of indicators of illicit activ- ity by suspects in online forums and social networks like Facebook and Instagram. With automatically-generated data, netnographic data and other open data, this research documents online social organisation of mass disorganised crime. It also documents corruption; transnational crime, organised crime and transnational organised crime; and financing of political violence from repression to terrorism and conflict. Keywords Antiquities trafficking. Cyprus. Germany. Narcotics trafficking. Organised crime. Organised cultural property crime. Political violence. Turkey. United Kingdom. Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 Method. – 3 Protected Criminals and Connected Crim- inals. – 4 The Family Business of Organised Cultural Property Crime. – 5 The Boss of the President’s Right-hand Man. – 5.1 Aydın Dikmen. – 5.2 “Tremeşeli” Mehmet Ali İlkman. – 5.3 The Gang and Its Associates. – 6 The Father-in-law of the Godfather of God- fathers. – 6.1 Trafficking of Heroin in Alignment with the State. – 6.2 Trafficking of Heroin in Opposition to the State. – 6.3 Trafficking of Cultural Goods by a Gang in and Around the State. – 7 Crime War in Mexico, Dirty War in Turkey and Proxy War in Syria.
    [Show full text]
  • MANPADS-A Game Changer See Pg
    fmso.leavenworth.army.mil Foreign Military Studies Office Volume 6 Issue #6 OEWATCH June 2016 FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT MANPADS-A Game Changer see pg. 3, 16 TURKEY INDO-PACIFIC ASIA RUSSIA, UKRAINE 3 The PKK and MANPADs: A Game Changer 22 India’s NAVIC Constellation Is Underway 38 Fleshing Out the Details of Reintroducing Divisions 4 ISIS Targeting Turkey with Katyusha Rockets 24 Space Age Clothing for Indian Soldiers at High 40 Innovation, Cost, and Compromise Regarding the 5 Turkey Opens Military Base in Qatar Altitudes “God of War” 25 Fighting Piracy in the Sulu Sea Through a Subregional 42 Russia Successfully Tests Hypersonic Glide Vehicle for MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA Agreement ICBMs 6 Iran: Chinese Eye Port of Chabahar 26 Terrorism Expert: Jemaah Islamiya Poses a Greater Threat 44 Russia’s Near-Term Asymmetric Response to the 7 Iran: Kurdish Insurgents on the Upsurge than ISIS to Southeast Asia BMD- the Iskander 8 Iran: IRGC Debuts New Explosives Plant 27 President-Elect Duterte’s Approach to Peace in 46 Russian Electronic Warfare Equipment and Personnel 9 Water Scarcity and Conflict: Yemen, Egypt, and Saudi Mindanao Developments Arabia 28 Can Indonesia Spread its Version of Moderate Islam 48 Tank Combat Support Vehicle “Terminator-3” on an 10 Turkistan Islamic Party Makes its Mark on the Syrian Internationally? Armata Chassis? Rebellion 29 Indonesian Official: Southeast Asia is Becoming the New 49 Georgian Perspectives on Armenia-Azerbaijan 11 Tunnels and Refugees: Can ISIS Breach Jordan’s Somalia for Piracy Conflict and Russia’s Position Borders? 30 Southern Thailand Peace Talk Hit Another Bump in the 50 Armenian Officials Reassure the Public about Military Road Effectiveness AFRICA 52 Armenian Views on Russia’s Peacemaking Efforts in 12 New Insurgent Group Emerges in Niger Delta CHINA, KOREA, JAPAN Karabakh 13 New Nigerian Insecurity: Nomads v.
    [Show full text]
  • Vector4peace
    Vector4Peace № 26 2/12/2015 The Chinese threat on Northern Black Sea Coast The Chinese policy in Georgia and in Ukraine creates more threats. And while emissaries from the European Union and NATO in a humiliating for human dignity form do examinations for the Georgian political elite, China increases the economic influence which will create, in the next years, a basis for demographic entry into space of Northern Black Sea Coast. Surprising is the fact that China which in words, is for maintaining territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine, supports the Russian economic projects in the occupied regions of these two countries. Especially it concerns the Crimea and Abkhazia. Tactical interests of Moscow and Beijing coincide today. Both powers don't wish expansion of NATO and the EU. An aggravation of the threats which the countries of the region have Turkish-Russian relations have positive not faced yet. Thus, the problem of the outcome first of all for China. Russia Turkish-Chinese relations will be put in the weakened by economic sanctions will be forefront. It is favorable for China not only ready to do any political concessions to China weakening of Turkey in the region of the to hold control in Northern Black Sea Coast, Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, but also possibly also to the Caspian direction. The reduction of internal problems with Uyghurs. Russian-Turkish format of "Erdogan- From the economic point of view, for China it Medvedev" which was created as a result of will be especially favorable to replace Turkey August war of 2008 and assumed joint control in all Russian and the Post-Soviet market.
    [Show full text]
  • Refugee Students in the Turkish Higher Education in the Light of the Syrian Conflict
    Szent István University Doctoral School of Management and Business Administration Refugee students in the Turkish higher education in the light of the Syrian conflict Ph.D. dissertation Ahmet BARIŞÇIL Gödöllő, Hungary 2019 1 Szent István University Doctoral School of Management and Business Administration Name of Doctoral School: Doctoral School of Management and Business Administration Discipline: Management and Business Administration Sciences Head of School: Prof. Dr. Zoltán Lakner CSc, HAS Doctor Full Professor Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences Szent István University, Gödöllő, Hungary Supervisor(s): Prof. Dr. József Poór DSc, Full Professor Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences Department of Business Economics and Management Szent István University, Gödöllő, Hungary ……………………………………… ……………………………………….. Approval of Head of Doctoral School Approval of Supervisor 2 Table of Contents DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................ 6 LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... 7 LIST OF GRAPHS.......................................................................................................................... 8 1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 9 1. 1. Study Background ..................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • TURKEY-RUSSIA ASLI AYDINTASBAS.Indd
    EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN BRIEF POLICY RELATIONS ecfr.eu ENGAGINGWITH FRIENDS WITH LIKE IRAN: THESE: ATURKEY, EUROPEAN RUSSIA, AND AGENDA THE END OF AN EllieUNLIKELY Geranmayeh ALLIANCE Asli Aydintasbas Two resurgent powers with regional ambitions, powerful leaders, rising nationalism, and a deep suspicion of the West – there was every reason for Russia and Turkey to form a SUMMARY lasting alliance. Had the friendship between Russia’s Vladi- • Turkey and Russia’s burgeoning friendship mir Putin and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan resulted in a came to an abrupt end when Turkey shot down a more lasting alliance, they could have created a formidable Russian fighter jet over Syria in November 2015. counterbalance to the Western axis in Eastern Europe and • Since the rupture, Ankara has moved back the Middle East. towards the transatlantic security architecture, while Moscow has stepped up its links with the But history rarely unfolds as expected. Turkey’s downing Kurds, fuelling suspicion in Turkey, while the of a Russian jet over Syria in November 2015 led to a sud- two moved towards a proxy war in Syria. den and traumatic rupture in the burgeoning relationship. Economic ties nearly collapsed; Russian animosity towards • The EU cannot afford to watch from afar: Syria, the Ankara spilled over into Syria; harsh rhetoric from leaders refugee crisis, and the Kurdish question are deeply was matched by public outrage. intertwined. Turkey is a NATO member and a key part of planned Russian energy routes to Europe. This paper examines the rise and fall of the Turkey-Russia • The chance of a direct military confrontation friendship during the Putin-Erdoğan era.
    [Show full text]
  • The Blacklist
    THE BLACKLIST Violations committed by the most prominent Syrian regime figures and how to bring them to justice The Blacklist violations committed by the most prominent Syrian Regime figures and how to bring them to justice The Blacklist, violations committed by the most prominent Syrian Re- gime figures and how to bring them to justice First published in the US 2019 by Pro-Justice 8725 Ginger Snap Lane, San Diego, CA 92129 Email. [email protected] Tel. +18588886410 ISBN: 978-605-7896-11-7 Copyright © Pro-justice All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in any retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior permission in writing of Pro-justice Pro-justice is a non-profit that seeks to maintain the principle of accountabil- ity and preclude impunity for major war criminal and human rights violators in societies that suffer from or have just exited civil wars and natural disasters, with special focus on the Middles East and Syria. Visit www.pro-justice.org to read more about pro-justice activities and pub- lications The Blacklist violations committed by the most prominent Syrian Regime figures and how to bring them to justice Foreword More than eight years have passed since Syrians took to the streets as part of a peaceful movement demanding freedom and human dignity. Since then, the Syrian government has continued to resist the laws of inevitable transformation, trying in vain to stop the process of political development and reform through its levers of killing and repression.
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of Russian, Syrian, and Iranian Actions Against the Jihadist Movements and Turkish-U.S
    ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue The Evolution of Russian, Syrian, and Iranian Actions Against the No. 394 Jihadist Movements and Turkish-U.S. Responses Jan 2016 Yossef Bodansky The Evolution of Russian, Syrian, and Iranian Actions Against the Jihadist Movements and Turkish-U.S. Responses Yossef Bodansky January 2016 Abstract Almost three months into the Russian military intervention in Syria and Iraq - a clear strategy has emerged. Russia is spearheading a regional allied effort to consolidate tangible gains - to stabilize the lines before Winter freezes the fighting. When fighting resume in early Spring 2016, the Jihadist forces will no longer be able to threaten the Fertile Crescent of Minorities and the buffer areas surrounding Shiite Iraq. Emboldened, better equipped and retrained - the forces allied with Russia will then be able to go on the strategic offensive under a unified master-plan. In mid-October, the Kremlin clarified that the Russian strategic-political objectives in Syria are to stabilize and consolidate the Assad administration as the key to defeating the Jihadist forces, as well as to compel the US-led West to accept and acknowledge this reality. For the Kremlin, all anti-Assad forces are terrorists. In mid-November, Putin returned to Moscow from the G-20 summit convinced that any attempt to deal with Obama was an exercise in futility and that a major face-off, even crisis, over Syria was only a question of time. Hence, the Kremlin resolved to seize the strategic initiative. Thus, the Russian military intervention has already had a profound impact on the region’s strategic-political posture.
    [Show full text]